AT - Empire K - Michigan Classic 2022 BBE
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AT: Empire Alt Fails - Multitude Alt fails---the multitude doesn’t assume religion in the real world Ian K. McDaniel 2009. department Of Philosophy, Oklahoma State University, Usa 9. . “Multitude against Empire: A sin of omission.” SAGE Journals. 8-18-2009. https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/abs/10.1177/0191453709106241 //NM Given the small population of American atheists as a percentage of the total population, the question that now concerns us is this: where are all these atheists who must constitute the suffering multitude? Assuming the highest estimate for the atheist population of each country, the top 10 atheist countries are Sweden, Vietnam, Denmark, Norway, Japan, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, South Korea and Germany. The atheist population in these nations ranges from a low of 49 per cent in Germany up to a high of 85 per cent in Sweden.14 At this point it is important to note that the majority of these nations, indeed many of the nations with significant atheist communities, reside within the European Union. If Hardt and Negri are correct, then these ‘atheist nations’ should have deplorable economic suffering among their populations and worse income inequality than the United States. Yet this is not the case. In fact, only Vietnam comes close to the USA in terms of income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. All the others have a Gini coefficient below 0.34 and only Japan dips below 0.25, meaning that the income distributions of these nations are in the optimal ranges for growth and prosperity. It would seem that prosperity, not an increase in exploitation and suffering, leads to a decline of religion Let us now consider several nations with Gini coefficients that are more unequal than the United States; perhaps there we can find a preponderance of atheists to support Empire’s dismissal of religion. Mexico,Brazil and Argentina (indeed most of South America), South Africa, Namibia and Botswana all have Gini coefficients in excess of 0.50, yet only Argentina appears among the top 50 nations in terms of atheist populations (in the 45th position, a scant two spots behind the USA) with 8 per cent of the total population as atheists. The rest of these nations have less than 7 per cent of their total population as self-described atheists.15 Greater inequality and suffering on the part of the multitude 797 McDaniel: Multitude against Empire do not seem to result in a lack of faith within the multitude as Hardt and Negri imply. On the contrary, those countries that are experiencing greater inequality have higher proportions of religious persons than those with greater equality and prosperity. While individual religions act to unite portions of the multitude together under the banners of Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, etc., at the same time, however, religion acts as a divisive force, separating Christians from Jews, Muslims from Christians, Hindus from Buddhists and so forth. Religions identify themselves so as to create a sense of unity, but this same labeling also creates a division among the multitude. By labeling themselves ‘Christian’, a third of the world’s population has at the same time labeled two-thirds of the world’s population as ‘Other’ (to use Hardt’s and Negri’s terminology); that is to say, other than us, i.e. non-Christian. So while it has the attractive power of unity and immobility to draw people to it in a time of crisis, change and uncertainty, religion also divides up the multitude along these lines of faith. This division not only makes seeking a unified community outside their religious affiliations difficult for most practitioners, the continuing notion of different faiths as inherently ‘other’ makes the seeking of such a unity undesirable for many religious persons. Herein lies the problem for Hardt and Negri: religion must be destroyed in order for the multitude to exist as a unified force capable of overcoming Empire; so long as the multitude remains divided along religious boundaries, the multitude will not be fully mobile, unified or, most importantly, capable of making the social demands necessary to overcome Empire. Bringing our current argument together at this point, we see that Hardt and Negri’s notion of the multitude as a unified force capable of standing in opposition to Empire requires an end to the various religious belief structures that separate and divide the multitude. At the same time, the economic forces that exist within Empire of exploitation and suffering among the multitude indicate an increase of religious belief and acceptance among the multitude. Simplifying the argument, to create multitude economically means to create more religious belief, but to create more religious belief means to deny the creation of a unified multitude. Within their discourse on the creation of Empire, Hardt and Negri ‘object to social contract theorists who pretend “that the subject can be understood pre-socially and outside the community”’ and yet they also claim that ‘no subjectivity is outside’.20 Religious beliefs, while perhaps not a major aspect of the European community at present, are very much a part of the global community. By omitting from their discourse the influence of religion on the multitude, Hardt and Negri have placed on 799 McDaniel: Multitude against Empire the ‘outside’ an important subjectivity of the multitude. It is this contradiction of their own construction in Empire that results in their contradictory notion of the creation of the multitude as a unified force capable of opposing the capitalist Empire. Alt fails---the multitude doesn’t know what it’s fighting. Carol A. L. Prager 2007. associate professor of political science at the University of Calgary. “Empire and Imperialism: A Critical Reading of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri.” Canadian Journal of political science. March 2007. https://sci-hub.hkvisa.net/ //NM Michael Walzer, reflecting in a 2002 Dissent article ~vol. 49, Spring! upon the compelling issues in world politics, asked “Can there be a decent Left?” After reading Atilio A. Boron’s impassioned and derisive critique of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire ~Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2000!, one wonders whether today there can be an empirically sophisticated, coherent Left. ~Negri, by the way, spent seventeen years in Italian prisons for his involvement with the Red Brigade and the murder of Italian politician Aldo Moro.! Boron, a professor of political theory at the University of Buenos Aires claims, no doubt rightly, that the last three decades, embracing the end of the Cold War, the impact of neo-liberal policies on the “periphery” and sweeping technological changes, have necessitated a reformulation of leftist thinking. The influential Empire, which advances a root-and-branch restructuring of socialist thought, though hugely popular among anti-globalization groups and already translated into over a dozen languages, is to Boron emphatically not it. While paying obeisance to Hardt and Negri’s “noble intentions and intellectual and political honesty” ~4–5!, the author proceeds to shred virtually all their main contentions. At least the general reader surmises as much, for Boron fails to provide an account of Empire adequate for those who are learning about Empire for the first time to judge. At the same time, summarizing the over 500-page and all-butunintelligible Empire is no mean task inasmuch as the book consists of an impenetrable mix of postmodern theory and systems analysis. What does seem clear, however, is that Empire—the forces of globalization, including the unobstructed flow of information, capital and labour—provides a complete contrast to imperialism because it has no centre and is not under anyone or anything’s control. Absent, too, are hierarchy and sovereign nation-states for it is Empire that is now sovereign. Opposing Empire is the “multitude,” which seems to include humanity, notably those who resist, from subsistence farmers to knowledge workers and jihadists, who are characterized simply as “being against.” Precisely against what, however, is unsatisfactorily explained. Dissidence in Empire is metaphorically depicted by the authors as a snake, undulating about Empire looking for opportunities to attack. It is small wonder to Boron that the authors are wrong-headed since their analyses are grounded in “French postmodern philosophy, Italian politics and US economic science” ~8! rather than the socialist canon of Rosa Luxemburg and Vladimir Lenin. Boron considers the most egregious of Hardt and Negri’s mistakes to include the asserted end of imperialism, the disintegration of the state and the notion of independent multinational corporations. Premised on a Chomskyesque critique of US foreign policy, Boron insists that an American empire, together with the multinational corporations incorporated under its laws whose interests are American interests, continues to dominate the world and despoil vulnerable countries looting their natural resources, thereby refuting Hardt and Negri’s notion of the insignificance of states. Although Boron maintains that “the atrocious 9011 attacks,” which were “momentous and spectacular” ~6!, undermine Hardt and Negri’s thrust, he does not return to terrorism, but persists in the assumption that social injustice continues to be the world’s most pressing problem. No doubt Boron comes by his fury honestly. Latin America’s economic and political distress is as intractable as in any other part of the “periphery.” There is widespread economic suffering, civil insecurity and social disintegration. How many of these misfortunes can be laid at the door of neoliberal restructuring is, however, 280 Recensions / Reviews surely debatable. Some neoliberal reforms have misfired, causing hardship and dislocation, but more have been constructive. Much of Latin America’s misery can be laid at other doors, especially the weakness of democracy and other political institutions. Boron concedes that he not only wants to provide a theoretical context within which the world economic and political problematique can be analyzed, he also wants to facilitate political change. This admission does not inspire confidence in the unconverted; nor does the author’s reliance on pragmatic arguments. For example, Boron attacks Hardt and Negri’s conception of a deterritorialized space on the ground that “the classic distinction between centre and periphery...vanishes into thin air” ~11!. What is at issue here, however, is not how much of Boron’s preferred conceptual apparatus Hardt and Negri displace but what approach emerging realities will support, a matter that must be settled empirically. Flawed arguments along with the overwhelmingly polemical tone of this volume will be troublesome for those for whom understanding the world is more than enough. Unless readers already agree with Boron’s political orientation, they will remain unconvinced by his analysis. If the Left is to be revitalized, it will not, unfortunately, be at the hands of Boron, Negri or Hardt. Alt fails--- materialization is impossible Paul Thompson 5. Paul B. Thompson is a philosopher currently teaching at Michigan State University, where he holds the W.K. Kellogg Chair in Agricultural Food and Community Ethics. “Foundation and Empire: A critique of Hardt and Negri.” SAGE Journals. 7-1-2005. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/030981680508600105 //NM Baffled by the ‘logic’ of one of Empire’s central arguments, Wolfe observes: ‘Thus one has to read Hardt and Negri’s question many times over, so flat out wrong are its assertions and assumptions, in order to judge whether they can possibly be serious’ (2001: 2). The task the authors set themselves was serious. But the big picture outlined in Empire, eclectically combining elements of Marxism, managerialism and postmodernism, remains unconvincing and often incomprehensible. The book is neither a robust guide to the realities and challenges of global governance, nor to the potential for Downloaded from cnc.sagepub.com at UCSF LIBRARY & CKM on December 7, 2014 92 Capital & Class #86 social challenge and change. With respect to the latter, Wright argues that the recurrent problem of Negri and operaismo has been a penchant for all-embracing categories, and ‘the unrelenting preoccupation with the technical composition of labour power as a key explanation in the explanation of behaviour’ (2002: 226). This reached its peak with the socialised worker concept, which flattened differences instead of opening out contradictory dynamics and tendencies. There is much truth in this observation, but the problem runs deeper. Hardt and Negri largely ignore the real insights that can be generated from Marxist political economy, but reproduce what is, arguably, its weakest point—the gravedigger thesis. This search for an economic actor inside the hidden abode of production, who is then required to be a transcendent political subject with the responsibility of changing the whole society, creates an impossible practical and theoretical burden. Even within these terms, the multitude—‘all the subjugated and exploited’—is not a meaningful political subject. Instead of the difficult task of actually mobilising labour, we are presented with a picture of a multitude already formed and victorious. When faced with the reality that potential revolutionaries in various struggles did not recognise either themselves or others as part of an expanding chain of revolt, Hardt and Negri can only take refuge in the banal argument that this was a failure of communication (p. 54-5). Which leaves us, finally, with their own conclusion. For all the talk of postmodern republicanism, the underlying logic of Empire is an infantile vanguardism. The labour, whether immaterial or multitudinous, in whose name the book speaks is labour to which the communist militant, lauded in the postscript, imputes motives, labels struggles, allocates roles, and proclaims unity of purpose and outcome. Intellectual militants become the means of communication, except that what they are communicating is a fantasy that exists only in their own heads. This is absolutely consistent with the history of Negri and Italian workerism. For all its earlier insights, from its inception this current was distinctive for its view that what labour actually thought was secondary to its position as a particular category of labour (the mass worker, the social worker, immaterial labour, and so on). As Negri remarked of the social worker, ‘At the political and social level, this subject presents a complete materialization of consciousness within the structure of its own existence. Alt fails---the neg fails to address gender norms that make the multitude impossible Susanne Schultz Translated By Frederick Peters 6. Earth and Environmental Sciences - Academic & Research, Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences,Manchester Environmental Research Institute, FSE Research Institutes, professor of evolutionary ecology and conservation at the university of Manchester. “Dissolved Boundaries and “Affective Labor”: On the Disappearance of Reproductive Labor and Feminist Critique in Empire.” Taylor & Francis. 8-1-2006. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10455750500505473 //NM If one wants to do justice to this claim, one would have to push the organization of the boundary between paid and unpaid labor into the center of a critique of political economy*/and this in order to comprehend the very shifts in this boundary. The thesis of a dissolving boundary between production and reproduction treats this boundary as an historical relic, an object of anachronistic research agendas, and thus no longer a valid subject of study. In Hardt and Negri, the division between productive and reproductive work only appears in the form of the distinction 9 Hardt and Negri, op. cit., p. 364. 10 Frigga Haug, ‘‘Zur Theorie der Geschlechterverha¨ltnisse,’’ Argument, 243, 2001, pp. 761/787. 11Hardt and Negri, op. cit., p. 274. 80 SUSANNE SCHULTZ Downloaded by [Erciyes University] at 05:18 22 December 2014 between direct and indirect forms of capitalist exploitation.12 This may be read as a vague reference to longstanding debates about the role of household work in the generation of surplus value, debates which Hardt and Negri do not engage with explicitly. Certainly, the thesis on the dissolution of boundaries makes it impossible to critique the hierarchies that are produced in the process of dividing paid from unpaid work. This does not mean, however, that the division between productive and reproductive labor is not shifting. This becomes particularly clear when one considers hegemonic models of ‘‘‘female’’ wage labor, notably the attractive model of the ‘‘successful’’ professional woman in the fields of culture, finance or advertising. Empire correctly thematizes how qualifications acquired during so-called free time through cultural or political groups or through private relationships become valorized in the labor process. The division between work and leisure has become more mutable as a result of flexible working time. Certainly, the housewife model*/ the hegemonic model of femininity under Fordism*/no longer applies (and was never a reality for many women, in any case). In light of these displacements, one should not lose sight of the fact that these boundaries shift in significantly uneven ways. Women’s workforce participation faces extremely stable gender divisions of labor in the so-called sphere of reproductive work, notably in child and elderly care. One only has to recall that that a mere 1.5 percent of people who take official parental leave in Germany are men. In this sense, the convergence model of production and reproduction reflects less the reality of labor relations than an increasingly hegemonic image of female subjectivity, where reproductive labor disappears into the holes and gaps of the patchwork that is the neoliberal working day. The delegation of reproductive labor to underprivileged women, particularly migrant women, is certainly to be understood as a displacement of the boundaries between productive and reproductive labor as well. This case expresses everything but the dissolution of (unpaid) reproductive labor, however. One factor accounts for the extreme social and financial devaluation of this work. It is not seen as skilled and qualified labor, but rather as something that women and girls are ‘‘naturally’’ socialized to do. Also, reproductive labor remains structurally close to unpaid labor, with its extreme flexibility of hours and tasks as well as the mechanisms of emotional dependence and familial loyalty. This domestic worker model, which depends on high wage differentials, cannot be universalized. It is logically untenable for a domestic worker to pay yet another domestic to look after her own reproductive work. Finally, the thesis of a shrinking divide between production and reproduction appears absurd when one thinks of the neoliberal cutbacks to public services such as kindergartens and health care, which (re)privatize reproductive labor and force unpaid women to pick up the slack in the system. 12Ibid., p. 53. DISSOLVED BOUNDARIES AND ‘‘AFFECTIVE LABOR’’ 81 Downloaded by [Erciyes University] at 05:18 22 December 2014 How unpaid reproductive labor should be organized is no longer a question when its disappearance is quietly presupposed, as in Empire. Rather than speaking about a dissolution of the boundaries between production and reproduction, it would make more sense to analyze the restructuring of reproductive labor along the categories ‘‘race, class, gender’’ on an international level. This would be the only way to realize a materialist approach to the ‘‘production of life,’’ something Hardt and Negri promise but do not carry out. Because Empire offers no basis for a critique of the political economy of gender regimes, its cla
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