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2022 Michigan Kritik

AT - Militarism K - Michigan Classic 2022 CGNO

AT - Militarism K - Michigan Classic 2022 CGNO.docx

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AFF Answers
2AC – Militarization Good
Militarization is key to Russia deterrence
Sherr 17 (Sherr, James. “Policy Implications.” The Militarization of Russian Policy, German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2017, pp. 15–17. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19014.9. Accessed 20 Jul. 2022) // OA
Since February 2014, NATO Allies have become increasingly aware of Russia’s determination to disrupt the cohesion of the West as we have come to define it. However, doubts persist about the degree of strategic thinking that motivates its policy. The picture we have presented not only outlines a strategic framework. It delineates, even by Russian standards, an unusual degree of integration between the political objectives of the state and the expansion of its military power. That expansion is not a Brownian motion. It is a coherent and purpose-driven activity designed to challenge Western dominance of an international order that Russia’s state leadership perceives as harmful to its interests and intrinsically vulnerable. For understandable reasons, many in the West are also addressing the critical question of how our own policy tools might be used to change Russian mindsets and perceptions. But the underlying challenge, much as Putin has aggravated it, is not Russian perceptions, but its interests. And, where European security is concerned, Moscow’s interests can be expected to diverge from ours in significant respects even if Putin is replaced by a successor with different priorities. The more immediate challenge is to change Western mindsets rather than Russian ones. Our homo economicus, business school metrics do not explain very much about Putin’s Russia. State mobilization might impose serious diseconomies on an already overburdened resource base. But as long as it continues, it continues and produces consequences that NATO needs to confront and counter. Those who believe that compromise, vigorous dialogue, or neorealist grand bargains will resolve our differences have been neither watching nor listening. Dialogue will never be more effective than the policy underpinning it. Angela Merkel’s exhaustive discussions with Vladimir Putin have provided useful reinforcement to a moderately tough policy. John Kerry’s indefatigable dialogue with Sergey Lavrov over Syria only amplified weakness. The Kremlin is willing to match us in talking as well as fighting. Its curt and pre-emptive rejection of a grand bargain with the United States at the start of the Trump administration is telling in itself. Russia expects material changes to the structure of international relations and is determined to press its perceived advantages until concessions are forced upon us. The only way to diminish the threats Russia poses is to diminish these advantages. Once that imperative is accepted, we will find that the news is not all that bad. Time does not favor Russia. True enough, Russia has defied repeated Western forecasts about the unsustainability of its economic model. Low oil prices and Western sanctions have brought its proverbial coping mechanisms and organizational ingenuity to the fore. Nevertheless, Russia’s economy is in decline, its technological base is stagnant, and the mobilization reflex merely postpones the day when its structural problems are either addressed or wreak vengeance. Thus, the West has good grounds for strategic patience. However, time is not a strategic actor. It has to be used. For strategic patience to bear fruit, there must be a strategy as well as patience. Deterrence is only a strategy if it addresses the threat to be deterred. As serious students of Russian strategy have noted, war with Russia means war with all of Russia. Yet the war Russia is preparing to fight has limited objectives: to shatter the cohesion of NATO, destroy its forces in the operational theater, and force it to concede defeat at the earliest possible moment. Without confidence in these outcomes, Russia will not go to war. The aim of NATO’s deterrence must be to convince Russia that any war against NATO means war with all of NATO, wherever its forces are based. To this end, the priority for Western military establishments is not to outmatch the Russians where they are naturally strong, but to invest in the antidotes to these strengths. The Alliance confronted a similar challenge at the height of the Brezhnev era. Its “dual track” decision of 1979 forced the Soviets to contend with mobile, high-readiness, theaterbased nuclear systems that could have been used to devastating effect at the outset of conflict. Coupled with the exploitation of then revolutionary “smart” non-nuclear U.S. Army weapons and war-fighting concepts (AirLand Battle), the West effectively threatened to annul ten years of Soviet investment in a “strategic offensive operation” against NATO. NATO undertook this task in the teeth of unprecedented internal opposition to its policy (focused on the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) and an intense Soviet active measures campaign in Europe. The result of the new NATO policy was not an apocalyptic confrontation, but a change of course for the USSR and a process of mutual de-escalation of military threats and political tensions in Europe. Today’s conditions are in one respect more promising than those that confronted NATO 35 to 40 years ago. Gerasimov’s anxiety, “the destruction of military forces and key state assets in several hours,” derives from “prompt global strike” and shorter range non-nuclear systems against which Russia might only be able to threaten nuclear retaliation. Strategically, they have the potential to threaten assets critical to war-waging and state management without producing nuclear devastation. Operationally, they might cut several of Russia’s pathways to escalation dominance that presently exist. From a Russian perspective, this new generation of weapons is destabilizing; from a Western perspective, the opposite. Investment in these systems will not absolve NATO of the need to maintain a coherent nuclear posture. But when combined with other means of enhancing the West’s robustness and resilience, it will constrain Russia’s ability to fight war on its terms. If it cannot do so, it is most unlikely to fight at all. The observation of Finland’s leading expert on Russian military policy is worth citing: In the Georgian and Ukrainian crises and Syrian air operations, Russia has demonstrated its high readiness for limited military operations to secure and promote its national interests in situations when, according to its estimation, success is easily gained and risk of unfavourable escalation is low.36 In these respects, Vladimir Putin is a good steward of Russian tradition. Only two conditions have provoked Russia during his tenure: weaknesses (Ukraine in conditions of state collapse and Syria after a geopolitical vacuum had been created by the United States) and bluff (NATO’s ill-judged 2008 promise that Georgia and Ukraine “will become members of NATO”). No example can be found of Russia attacking a stronger opponent that understood its own strength. A strong opponent afraid of its own strength is only asking for trouble. The simple and most basic object of deterrence is to persuade would-be opponents that force is not the solution to their problems. But it is not simple to achieve. In 1987 the Soviet Union concluded that “the application of military means to resolve any dispute is inadmissible under current conditions.”37 It is not beyond our means to bring Russia to the same conclusion
2ac – Small States
NATO and the US have a vested interest in protecting and incorporating smaller states
James Jay, 8-10-2018, "Why Small States Matter to Big Powers," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-small-states-matter-big-powers-28362//CDMoney
Nobody is bigger than the United States of America. No big power more appreciates small powers. No small state will find a better friend than the United States. In an era of great power competition, “small” matters a good deal. Little nations are not sand to be ground between the great wheels of major powers. They are made up of people, not pawns. Citizens in small states have the same hopes, aspirations and natural rights as those in world powers. These people have every reason to expect and demand a life of freedom, peace and prosperity. Further, it is in the interests of bigger states to help small states flourish. Great powers, if wise, will support the best hopes of smaller states. There are three reasons why the United States, in particular, ought to take small states seriously. Sonovia 1. Geography Matters. In geopolitics—as in real estate—a critical consideration is “location, location, location.” To a major power, a country’s greatest asset might be its map coordinates rather than the size of its arsenal or bank account. Geography matters when it comes to economic integration, transportation, energy distribution and physical security. Even in a digitized world, the freedom to move people, goods, and services across physical space is a valuable commodity. Recognizing the importance of connecting dots on the ground is not an argument for hardened spheres of control (such as during the Cold War) or carving up the world (like seventeenth-century mercantilists). On the other hand, there is a case to be made for building bridges between like-minded nations that want to live together with surety in commerce and share peaceful borders. Thus, a small state in the right place can be very important to a big power. Iceland is a case in point. Even though it has no armed forces, the island’s location makes the nation a lynchpin in transatlantic security. That’s the reason Iceland was included as one of twelve founding members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Without question, Iceland’s strategic location is of far greater importance to U.S. security than the state’s size and resources would suggest. Washington should be working hard to make that bilateral relationship even stronger. Part of the reason NATO continues to keep the membership door open is because there are nations still not included whose accession would enhance collective security due to their location. These include Macedonia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kosovo. And there are states in other regions where stronger bilateral relations would greatly serve U.S. interests. Closer ties with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, for example, would further U.S. efforts to sustain a free and open Indo-Pacific. In the Middle East, few states are smaller than Jordan. Yet, a peaceful, prosperous Jordan is a keystone for regional stability, and regional stability is a vital interest of the United States—as important to this administration as it should have been to the last one. Similarly, Tunisia is an important state for extending an umbrella of regional stability in the greater Middle East to North Africa. 2. Freedom Matters. Like-minded nations make better partners. One of the reasons NATO works is because the alliance is a partnership of free nation-states. The foundational rationale of the transatlantic alliance is that free states have the right to associate for the purpose of collective security. To close NATO’s open door would undermine what NATO stands for: the right of free peoples to choose their future.
If not already, aff increases coordination and quality of life for smaller states
James Jay, 8-10-2018, "Why Small States Matter to Big Powers," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-small-states-matter-big-powers-28362//CDMoney
Building Bridges to Small Nations The United States has an inherent advantage over adversarial powers in partnering with small nations. China and Russia don’t have allies. They have underlings. No country wants to be a suburb of Beijing or Moscow. America, however, has to up its game. Here is a ten-step process to get the job done. Step 1. Set the Right Objectives for Friends. In reducing vulnerabilities of friends, allies and strategic partners to adversarial influences, American objectives should be framed less in driving particular political outcomes or agendas (e.g., promoting marriage equality) than in achieving good stable governance, strong institutions and a reduction in corruption. This will make our partners more resilient and self-confident. Step 2. Avoid Us-or-Them-ism. The goal of a small-state strategy is not to exclude adversarial competitors. For example, America can’t ask countries not to do business with China. After all, the United States does business with China. The goal is not to get countries to takes sides but to engage and help them act consistent with their own interests—eschewing, for instance, economic engagement detrimental to national security or that undermines the rule of law and good governance. Step 2. Promote Economic Freedom. China and Russia can buy influence because, in poor nations with weak governance, a little money goes a long far. The best way to make these states more resistant to malicious influence is to help them become wealthier and better governed. This is best accomplished by promoting economic freedom. Step 3. Enter Free Trade Agreements (FTA). Trade agreements fundamentally have to be about liberalizing trade and making markets freer. That said, prioritizing agreements with states where the United States is seeking friendship, and common cause makes sense. America, for example, ought to have an FTA with Tunisia. Step 4. Be There. In many small, like-minded nations, all the United States has to do to win friends is, simply, to be there. Too much American engagement rests on foreign assistance and not enough on building human-to-human relationships and a more robust presence by the U.S. private sector.
Author Indicts
Balko is biased!
McMichael 16 (Christopher, PhD in Politics from Rhodes University, research include organized crime, Libertarian Marxism, and Fascism, “Pacification and Police: A critique of the Police Militarization Thesis,” November 29 2016, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)
Strikingly, and little commented on by liberal or leftist outlets, some of the most vocal proponents of the ‘militarization’ thesis (at least within the context of the United States) have been from the Libertarian Right. An article published by the Foundation for Economic Education (FEE) portrays the disturbing arrival of a ‘new breed of cop’ with a ‘military mentality’ (Greenhunt 2008), while an essay in the journal of the Independent Institute claims that a long standing separation between the domestic police and military functions of the US government has been irrevocably breached (Hall and Coyne 2013: 501). By far the most influential advocate of the militarization doctrine is Radley Balko, a former writer and analyst for libertarian institutions Reason Magazine and the Cato Institute, the latter of which has intimate ties with the powerful Koch Brothers, who have also increasingly become concerned with police reform. Balko, currently of the Huffington Post, is a prolific and outspoken journalist, who has written countless media articles and policy reports and two books on the subject: Overkill: The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in America (Balko 2006) and the more recent Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America’s Police Forces (Balko 2013a). Balko (2006) maintains that domestic law enforcement has become dangerously invasive: ‘Americans have long maintained that a man’s home is his castle and that he has the right to defend it from unlawful intruders. Unfortunately, that right may be disappearing’ (p. iv). His main contention is that such tactics have encouraged a dangerous blurring between the police and military, in which the police work of protecting public safety is confused with the military work of seeking and destroying enemies (Balko 2006: 15). Despite Balko’s work focusing primarily on the United States, it has transcended its North American trappings, with his work referenced in a report prepared by the South African government, which called for the ‘demilitarization’ of the national police force (National Development Plan 2012: 392). Although his work is often cited in progressive or radical publications, Balko’s politics are squarely on the right: getting his start with Fox News, and then working long stints for Republican Party aligned think tanks, calling for the privatization of social welfare and prisons and, of course, defending the public influence of the Koch Brothers (Ames & Levine 2013).
AT 1033 is militarized
1033 is largely not militarized
Mendenhall 21 ( Michael, “Consideratons For Acquiring Excess Military Equipment by Police Leaders”, PhD from Western Michigan Administration on Publican Administration and Philosophy, Published by Western Michigan University, https://www.proquest.com/docview/2599062490?parentSessionId=CYdTyFk9fAuCK3M32D8nUg2Hel7MeXMgGlOk3ZD92vY%3D&pq-origsite=primo&accountid=14667)
It is important to note that according to the Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO, 2020), 5% of the excess property that law enforcement agencies receive are small arms (handguns), and less than 1% are tactical vehicles. Some of the weapons and tactical vehicles that can be acquired include: MRAPs (Mine Resistant Vehicles), other armored vehicles, night vision (sights, binoculars, goggles and lights), aircraft (planes and helicopters), machine guns (5.56mm and 7.62mm rifles) and or magazines with no ammunition. The vast majority of property acquired through the program includes clothing, office supplies, tools, and rescue equipment and is thus not militarized (LESO, 2020).
AT Democracy Impact
Case solves the impact to the K – NATO can promote democratic reform
*NOTE: This card could be cross-applied to the perm – warrants of card do say how gov is key to democracy (2nd paragraph )
Poast and Chincilla 20 (Paul and Alexandra; associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago; Rosenwald Fellow in US Foreign Policy and International Security and Niehaus Postdoctoral Fellow at Dartmouth College & Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of Chicago, Assistance professor at Texas A&M’s Bush School of Government and Public service, “Good for democracy? Evidence from the 2004 NATO Expansion”, April 30 2020, https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6.pdf)
In what way should one expect NATO to enhance democratic development? After all, as highlighted above, democracy is a core principle of the institution. Much of the existing work on NATO and democratic development points to several avenues of possible influence: socialization, guidance from NATO about how to create and implement reforms, NATO pressure to implement reforms, and legitimizing new democracies by helping them provide the public good of security through NATO membership. It is important to note that each of these mechanisms for how NATO could prompt reform should begin operating before full NATO membership is achieved. Once prospective members are given a promise of membership in the form of the MAP, they will be brought into close contact with NATO members and therefore exposed to the socialization mechanism. If domestic reform is a necessary condition for NATO membership, prospective members participating in the MAP should begin reforming so that they can reap the benefits of membership. Finally, if democratic reforms made to gain NATO membership persist, NATO membership should also be associated with higher levels of democracy in new member states. Below we discuss each of these means for NATO influence proposed in the literature.
First, NATO may have a subtle impact on future member states by socializing military and civilian leaders from states seeking membership to respect democratic norms. Democracy is dependent not only on the formal institutions of a country, but also on whether elites are willing to

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