CP - Democracy QPQ Updates - Michigan Classic 2022 BBE
CP - Democracy QPQ Updates - Michigan Classic 2022 BBE.docx
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Democracy QPQ Conditions Solve Democracy Conditioning the benefits Hungary and Poland receive from the US and NATO is key to maintaining democratic values within the alliance Cordelia Buchanan, 2-4-2021, "What Can We Do About Poland and Hungary?," (Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek was a Title VIII Fellow in the Transatlantic Leadership program at CEPA. Buchanan Ponczek graduated from the University of Oxford with an MPhil (dist.) in Russian and East European Studies and was awarded the Michael Kaser Prize for the best political economy thesis. Previously, she earned her BA (magna cum laude) in Political Science at Miami University, with a focus on Russian kleptocracy and petroleum transit in the Caspian Sea region. At CEPA, she will research the domestic drivers of Polish and Hungarian foreign policy.) CEPA, https://cepa.org/what-can-we-do-about-poland-and-hungary/, accessed 7-22-2022,[ONHS HC] Governments in Poland and Hungary — U.S. allies and members of NATO and the European Union — continue to pursue policies that are fundamentally at odds with healthy democratic development and that marginalize some of their most vulnerable communities. Outsiders have lumped the phenomena in Poland and Hungary together, but that glosses over some important differences between the two countries and possible approaches to their situations. In Hungary, changes to electoral law and deteriorating economic and political institutions put the country in a precarious place, compounded by the government’s cooperation with other nondemocratic regimes. Poland has maintained its strategic alignment with the United States and economic integrity, but its domestic politics and social policies are worrisome. Both governments were democratically elected and earned a legitimate mandate to rule from their populations. Both governments also assert that external actors should keep out of their domestic affairs. Nevertheless, as an ally and active promoter of democracy in the region, the United States must find a way to head off decline. Through diplomatic pressure, the incoming administration should strongly advocate minority rights and support regional civil society. With other partners, such as the EU and NATO, the United States should establish democratic expectations and make it clear to the Polish and Hungarian governments that accountable governance through rule of law and democratic norms is the key to stability and partnership. INTRODUCTION In 2020, covid-19 swept through the globe, causing a public health and economic crisis. To offset the economic fallout, the European Union set up a recovery fund. There was a hitch: the European Commission would hand out money from the fund only to members that demonstrated respect for the rule of law, a condition that EU leaders had for years been seeking to link to other funding disbursements. This stipulation targeted primarily Poland and Hungary, which then blocked approval of the EU budget and recovery fund. Refusing to back down, the EU threatened to cut Hungary and Poland out of the covid fund if the gridlock was not resolved.1 The commission was not alone: Majorities in all European countries, including Poland and Hungary, support the principle of tying EU funds to respect for the rule of law.2 In the resulting compromise, the EU Parliament passed the rule of law conditionality, but the EU Commission had to make several concessions on language, scope, and enforcement.3 This flurry of political developments is the culmination of years of accusations that governments in Poland and Hungary are pursuing domestic policies at odds with their democratic mandate, resulting in a great deal of head-scratching about how outside parties should respond. Earlier in 2020, Freedom House downgraded the most democracies ever in its 25 years of compiling the Nations in Transit report. Poland and Hungary stood out as the worst examples of democratic decline.4 Critics have accused Hungary’s Fidesz-led government, which came to leadership in 2010 under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, of consolidating power by undermining independent media and the judiciary, changing election laws, and facilitating corruption.5 In Poland, the Law and Justice-led coalition (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, styled “PiS”) has drawn criticism throughout its five years in power, especially for its changes to the judiciary, which the EU and other critics say undermine the rule of law and violate the principles of EU membership.6 The PiS and Fidesz governments defend their policies as necessary.7 Domestically, both parties’ focus on economic development and social spending have won them a mandate to rule, especially from rural voters.8 The charge that democracy in Poland and Hungary is deteriorating is serious and has prompted calls for intervention. As a bilateral ally, NATO member, and promoter of democracy in the region, the United States has an important role to play in addressing challenges to the rule of law and its consequences for democracy. This paper argues that Poland and Hungary are pursuing policies that erode the rule of law and democratic norms. It also argues there are key differences between the two countries, all of which put Hungary on a more worrying trajectory. The United States should maintain its role as an active promoter of democracy in the region and continue to advocate minority rights, support civil society, and stress to the Polish and Hungarian governments that accountable governance through rule of law and democratic norms is the key to stability and partnership. To do this, the United States should lead with diplomacy and set the conditions that will safeguard its relationships in central and eastern Europe, a region that still matters for the United States’ strategic interests. In this report, Section 1 will explain the spectrum of concepts and definitions applied to the domestic situations in Poland and Hungary. Section 2 provides an account of each country’s recent domestic developments. Section 3 gives broader context for attacks on the rule of law and backsliding. Section 4 notes differences between Poland and Hungary. Section 5 offers a discussion on policy options, makes recommendations, and concludes. SECTION 1. TERMS Experts debate what to call the situation in Poland and Hungary, and its causes.9 Some call it backsliding.10 Others call it a “playbook of autocracy” or “autocrat's playbook.”11 Still, others consider it a mere hiccup not indicative of a lasting deviation from the countries’ prior trajectories: All democracies have occasional problems, and Poland and Hungary are not swerving off democratic course.12 Even the concept of democracy is complex and encompasses a spectrum of systems.13 Populism and backsliding are separate phenomena that feed off each other.14 Populism enables a party or political formation’s path to power; backsliding is the way that power is wielded and maintained through twisting proper governing mechanisms.15 Populist rhetoric provides a narrative of why for the ruling party — why the country is in danger; why the party is the only hope for salvation and ought to be voted into power; why governing mechanisms need to be altered. Backsliding is how those ruling parties stay in power. It is the sum of measures taken to ensure that the power structures are still secure in favor of the ruling party even if the electorate has a change of heart or stops believing the narrative. Related to this, one prevailing explanation for populism’s success is a divided and/or weakened opposition.16 The opposition’s weakness could in turn be due to the lack of a compelling platform, infighting, or the power of the majority party’s simplistic narrative (especially if it taps into aspects of the electorate’s identity).17 The rise of populism and concerns over the deterioration of democratic institutions are not unique to Hungary and Poland. Other EU members, and indeed countries around the world, are experiencing these problems to some degree.18 Ironically, growing illiberalism elsewhere helps the Polish and Hungarian governments claim that the “West” and “Western media” are singling them out — a convenient narrative. SECTION 2. COUNTRY SPECIFICS People wearing protective face masks attend a voting during the presidential election at a polling station in Warsaw, Poland June 28, 2020. Slawomir Kaminski/Agencja Gazeta/via REUTERS Although criticism has intensified in recent years, concerns over the domestic politics of Hungary and Poland date back to the early 2000s and 2010s. Then, onlookers cited Poland as the worse offender.19 Now, Hungary has taken the lead, with Poland’s government allegedly mimicking the Hungarian government’s methods to keep a grip on power.20 A summary of developments in the two countries over the past decade shows similarities, but also some striking differences that ought to be noted in assessments and subsequent policy responses.21 Sketching out events in each country also helps avoid the tendency to draw overly simplistic caricatures. While some comparison can yield valuable insights, if we rely too much on this approach, we risk overlooking some of the nuances specific to each country. <Section 2.1-2.3 5.1 and 3.2 excluded for irrelevance and length> POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Considering the above, U.S. should adopt a cautious and considered approach in addressing concerns over perceived backsliding in Hungary and Poland. The PiS and Fidesz governments were elected democratically, and they represent a sizable number of Polish and Hungarian citizens. Some recent developments in both countries are undoubtedly problematic, but to call foul on the legitimacy of their governments is unwarranted: It’s important to not treat them like fully authoritarian regimes. Advocates of softer measures would steer away from material threats in favor of more political finesse, vocal diplomatic pressure, and institutional weight. The actions of Poland and Hungary come nowhere close to those of countries that have economic or targeted personal sanctions leveled against them, such as Russia, Iran, and North Korea. The United States must maintain influence to address key U.S. interests in the region, allowing strategic objectives to drive its diplomatic priorities while keeping its focus on engaging in areas it can influence. U.S. policymakers can do this by adopting a tandem of internal and external measures. 5.2.1. INTERNAL The United States should establish formal tools to measure the impact of its regional stance on rule of law and threats to democracy. So far, U.S. policymakers have reacted to crises or developments in Poland and Hungary on an ad hoc basis. They have relied on external meters to diagnose the problem and have rushed to do damage control (or not). Instead, the United States should establish its own benchmarks or metrics to gauge whether developments in Poland and Hungary (and any ally facing rule-of-law issues) are impeding strategic objectives, alongside a plan to reassess the U.S. response when Poland and Hungary take measures in line with U.S. goals. Such measurements and procedures would offer stability, consistency, and transparency to regional partners and clarify the U.S. role in encouraging democratic practices and safeguarding strategic goals in Poland and Hungary. The United States should take a harder line toward Hungary’s and Poland’s transgressions, imposing consequences for violations of the rule of law. The incoming administration should make it clear that high-level visits, bilateral cooperation, economic support, and other benefits will depend on meaningful changes in Polish and Hungarian behavior and policy. At the same time, the United States must reassure Poland and Hungary that despite domestic woes, it would defend them against an external threat. In official and unofficial meetings, the United States should press Poland and Hungary on actions that threaten the rule of law or democratic norms, especially laws that restrict the rights of minorities or limit freedom of the press. The United States should encourage greater social freedoms where possible, modeling adherence to the rule of law, political decency, and democratic pluralism at home. The United States should not condition its military aid or weapons sales — vital to U.S. interests in the region — on successful domestic political reforms or EU dialogue. But a loosely connected approach could create an incentive potent enough for the governments in Warsaw and Budapest to sit up and take note. For example, the United States could privately insist on serious, good-faith efforts to revisit certain domestic developments, particularly in the judiciary, civil society, and media, as part of returning to the shared values under which Poland and Hungary came to benefit from a U.S. troop presence along NATO’s eastern border. The United States should support a vigorous and well-funded civil society in the region. The United States has made an enormous difference in central and eastern Europe not with military might or arms sales, but through diplomacy and support for the organizations and people who create democracy. It should return to these people-to-people methods with funding, training, and teaching and learning opportunities for Polish and Hungarian NGOs and civil society, including English- and regional-language NGOs, which inform an ever-wider audience. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden addresses to media after meeting Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski in Warsaw March 18, 2014. 5.2.2. EXTERNAL There are compelling reasons to push for a regional approach to democratic development. An aggressive diplomatic push to bring local actors into a regional dialogue could help realize democratic objectives. The United States must work with allies and partners to keep Hungary and Poland from further degrading the rule of law and to encourage the governments in Warsaw and Budapest to cooperate in addressing shared democratic concerns. The United States can use its considerable influence to push for a structured dialogue within NATO — alone or with support from other members — that explores democratic norms and the safeguarding of democracy. Indeed, a U.S. troop presence in the eastern flank offers more leverage to shape security and political outcomes. Even a “failed” discussion could offer a framework for future talks and, later, arrangements. If dialogue proves difficult, the United States could focus the conversations on responding to shared security threats, such as Russian revanchism or the effects of Chinese economic power. In parallel, the United States could use diplomatic power to support a regional EU-based discussion track. Piggybacking off the NATO discussion, the United States could facilitate a regional dialogue on issues of rule of law and democratic norms. Such conversations would not require any new institution or official bi- or multilateral declarations. Like the NATO conversations, these dialogues would be open-minded and flexible, and focused on getting many interests and players at the table. Some conversations would be best held with U.S. support but with no U.S. representation — to ensure that EU countries feel they are properly representing their regional interests. Other conversations could include envoys from Washington. Still others might include players outside the region, such as Russia and China. Currently, the more the elites in Brussels push, the more the Polish and Hungarian administrations decry an external EU “threat” in order to legitimize their power grabs, but adding the United States as a broker alongside the EU to facilitate these conversations might wear down Poland and Hungary’s rhetoric. Dialing back the heat, even a bit, among Poland, Hungary, and the EU would be conducive to creating structures for future progress. In addition to this, the United States and other regional partners should use Poland and Hungary’s desire for power and prestige within international organizations to leverage for reform. Both countries would need to feel they had something to gain by behaving in line with the norms of those institutions and that they have a legitimate opportunity to wield influence within such organizations. More broadly, the United States needs to be more consistent in its policy toward the transatlantic space. This means not fracturing the EU or threatening the integrity of the alliance. Lack of predictable U.S. policy in central and eastern Europe, and indeed the EU, breeds uncertainty among allies and partners, which encourages them to act in ways counter to U.S. policy objectives, including hedging. This is particularly true in Hungary, which has cultivated close relationships with the governments in Beijing and maintained a close relationship with Putin’s Russia. The United States can expect Orbán to continue to deepen ties with China and Russia, which is strategically smart, but it should use diplomatic ties to remind Orbán of Hungary’s enduring and important relationship with the United States. Hungary may seek diplomatic alternatives in Russia or trade and investment in China, but these are not truly credible alternatives to security and intelligence partnerships with the United States. At the same time, the United States should consider not getting too close to the government in Budapest, whose continued threats to the rule of law will likely undermine its long-term stability and which could increasingly turn to Russia and China for aid. This move away from Budapest might give the government in Warsaw pause, as it sees itself as promoting Western values, in tandem with the United States, in its foreign policy. Both Russia and China have incentives to maintain or exacerbate the current divide between central and eastern Europe on the one hand and the European Union and United States on the other. China poses a lesser threat than Russia to the de facto territorial integrity of countries like Poland and Hungary, but China throws its weight and money around in ways that could further erode democratic norms. At the same time, when considering its relationship with Poland and Hungary, the United States should avoid over-emphasizing its geopolitical competition with China and Russia. At this point, Poland is firmly in the “Western” camp. But countries like Poland and Hungary are encouraged by the economic opportunities China provides, and they should not be forced to choose between the United States and “others.” The United States should be mindful of Russian and Chinese activity in the region but should avoid treating it as moves in a zero-sum game. China and Russia still have largely transactional relationships with Hungary: Russian activity continues to focus on projection of power, and China is focused on sowing economic accord through investment, but the government in Beijing has not seemed eager to dive into domestic politics outside of the political pressure necessary to ensure its own ends. Finally, because the United States is facing some of the same domestic issues as Poland and Hungary, it has an opportunity to speak to the two CEE countries peer-to-peer. Common experience could be a starting point for recommitting to values underlying a healthy democracy. President Biden’s remark at an October 2020 town hall lumping Poland and Hungary in with Belarus as “totalitarian” is not conducive to a constructive dialogue. Indeed, Biden’s victory has gotten a frosty greeting in Poland and Hungary (as opposed to other Western countries), as the two countries anticipate the shift in strategy from the incoming U.S. government. But the Biden Administration could echo the dialogue of healing and return to civility — which it has used domestically — in addressing such topics on the transatlantic space and bi-lateral ties. 5.3 CONCLUSION A more constructive approach to Poland and Hungary is essential for sustainable democratic development and U.S. interests in the CEE region. A successful stra
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