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2022 Michigan Kritik

K - AT Analytic Eclecticism - Michigan Classic 2022 MMP

K - AT Analytic Eclecticism - Michigan Classic 2022 MMP.docx

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Neg – AT Analytic Eclecticism
Perm Fails – Reinforces Dominant Theories of IR
The perm fails – it is not an authentic attempt at analytic eclecticism. The attempt to tack our alternative onto the plan reinforces dominant discourses in IR
Eric Blanchard, 2020, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, “Combing the same beach: analytic eclecticism and the challenge of theoretical multilingualism ,” 75(3): 404-419, mm
If analytic eclecticism is to successfully engage post-positivist research, it must continue to engage in debates over “reflexivity,” debates which have been mostly confined to the field’s dissident periphery. But to do so, it will have to more fully engage the “double hermeneutic,” which denotes the “slippage”—between the meaningful frames of lay actors on the one hand and the metalanguages of social scientists on the other—that a researcher will encounter while practising social science.47 Meaning is imposed doubly, by the objects of research upon the relevant events situated in their own context and by the researchers. This is challenging to forms of triad scholarship modelled on natural sciences, which, being concerned with unreflective physical objects and a world that “does not answer back,” need neither take into account the self-interpretations of the people being studied nor weigh the researchers’ self-interpretations, as do the social sciences. Eclecticism will also have to navigate myriad conceptions of “reflexivity” and, as Michael Lynch suggests, there is “a confusing array of reflexivities” but “no single way to be, or not to be, reflexive.”48 In IR, reflexivity has been deployed to signal the self-conscious situating of a researcher in their research, attending to the premises of one’s process of theorizing and researching (including one’s cultural-political prejudices), the submission of favoured theories to contextualization and historical reflection, and recognition of how analytic and data-gathering choices condition the data produced, among other definitions.49 Though variously conceived, reflexivity is a key value commitment of non-triad research traditions in IR. Constructivists Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch urge that scholars recognize the inevitability of “bias,” yet “strive to be self-aware, in order to understand the moral and methodological implications of our choices.”50 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson argues that the recognition that methodology is “complicit in the production and reproduction of the world” commits the scholar who wants to research this world to reflexivity, “an awareness of how the habits and experiences that one is bringing to bear on a situation shape and construct that situation.”51 Feminist IR theory offers perhaps the most sustained reflection on reflexivity and IR research. For example, Ackerly, Stern, and True place reflexivity, which they define as the continual re-interrogation of one’s own scholarship, at the core of the feminist approach to methodology.52 Following the work of Sandra Harding and others, Ann Tickner describes feminist reflexivity as a posture that recasts the relationship between researcher and subject, attends to related power disparities, and resists the assumption of scholarly detachment.53 Thus, eclecticists must be willing not only to countenance a broad rejection of the belief in any transcendent, universally valid knowledge,54 but also to open their own scholarly practices up to scrutiny and consider their own normative influences. As Cai Wilkinson observes, since reflexivity cannot “be retrospectively bolted on to our research” analytic eclectics can start from an “explicit articulation of how the research was actually done, why and with what effects for the resulting interpretation that is presented.”55 Reflexivity may prompt a variety of reappraisals regarding the ways scholars are bound up in the production of knowledge about climate change. Directed at institutions, reflexive attitudes may inspire us to inquire into the funding sources of the modern university system, colonized as it is by corporate sponsorship of academic institutions and foundations funded by energy extractive industries with a pronounced “interest in staving off any government action on climate change and weakening environmental safeguards.”56 Individual-level approaches to scholarly reflexivity are diverse and defy summary, but Heather A. Smith’s work is illustrative. Writing in a post-positivist feminist vein, Smith presents Indigenous voices and ways of knowing, which, she argues, disrupt the “global” discourse of climate change in a way so as not to colonize or exoticize their discourse while at the same time flagging the contested and political nature of the term “Indigenous.” Smith further emphasizes how un-reflexive scholarly practices can reinforce dominant discourses, seen for example in discussions of climate inequality that ignore Indigenous peoples from the global North.57
Perm Fails – Pragmatism Bad
The pragmatic nature of the permutation renders power relations invisible which reinforces the dominant norms of IR
Jessica Peet, 2020, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, “Eclecticism or exclusivity? The (critical) pragmatist ethos of (intersectional) analytic eclecticism,” 75(3): 420-432, mm
Analytic eclecticism holds significant promise for IR. However, as it is currently conceptualized, analytic eclecticism falls short of resulting in eclectic research. Instead, it has the opposite effect, reinforcing the hold of mainstream paradigms on the field. Why does analytic eclecticism fall short of its emancipatory promise? In this article, I trace this contradictory effect to the pragmatist ethos underlying analytic eclecticism. The internal contradiction begins with the pragmatist tenets Sil and Katzenstein lay out. These tenets rely on a popular—but uncritical—understanding of pragmatism, one that fails to account for power.15 This foundation is especially problematic as it makes invisible the disciplinary power dynamics which reify and are reified in the privileging of the dominant theoretical triad in IR.16 Given this contradictory outcome, can analytic eclecticism’s promise of liberating scholarship from paradigmatic boundaries still be achieved? Perhaps, but not without a critical ethos.
Perm Fails - Ethics DA / Policing DA
Their permutation can’t capture the ethical orientation of the alternative – their method’s insistence on “policy relevance” is an act of disciplinary policing
Eric Blanchard, 2020, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, “Combing the same beach: analytic eclecticism and the challenge of theoretical multilingualism ,” 75(3): 404-419, mm
Christian Reus-Smit has argued that Sil and Katzenstein’s epistemologically “empirical-theoretic project” is not equipped to deal with normative reflection and thus unable to produce the kind of practical knowledge that can “animate social and political action.”71 This lack of “systematic reflection on values,”72 according to Reus-Smit, hobbles analytic eclecticism’s efforts to produce policy-relevant knowledge as it intends, in the spirit of Aristotelian phronesis. Relatedly, an avowed concern with ethics is never far from the top of the intellectual priority list of many non-triad scholars. For instance, feminist IR approaches to research methods place ethics among epistemology, ontology, and choice of method as primary elements of a definition of methodology.73 Constructivists Klotz and Lynch recognize what they see as the unavoidable ethical dimension of constructivist scholarship, though they warn “against translating ethical assumptions into particular tools of analysis” and against granting any particular method the “moral high ground.”74 Ethical motivations are certainly not the monopoly of critical scholars, but this community tends to foreground ethical concerns in its publications more prominently than realist, liberal, and causal-oriented constructivists. Sil and Katzenstein’s discussion of ethics (in their review of the work of Hoffmann and Finnemore) is scattered, lacks focus, and could be enriched through dialogue with non-triad approaches.75 This is not to say it will be easy to surface ethics in the eclectic analytic heuristic. The urgency of climate change clearly raises enormous ethical issues: intergenerational responsibilities, the morality of population growth, the commitment to exuberant consumption and carbon-intensive transportation practices, and obligations to (distant) humans and non-human life, to name a few. Generally, the commitments of the dominant paradigms of IR, with their group-centric power politics and free-trade-centred pursuit of progress, sit uneasily with the range of anthropocentric and ecocentric approaches to environmental ethics. Burke et al. suggest we develop an ethics of climate change, one worthy of the unprecedented challenge, one that goes beyond “visions of the good life” to address “the goodness of life itself.”76 At a more modest scale, ethical approaches to climate change scholarship align with reflexive postures that acknowledge and foreground researcher positionality and entail giving respectful voice to marginalized peoples and impacted positions. Given the demand for ethics in a chaotic present and uncertain future, non-triad approaches are arguably better placed to cultivate the necessary ethical imagination or identify the constitution of nascent planetary identities, but they certainly complicate the picture we have of climate change beyond states and markets, geopolitics, and public goods, making the boundaries of policy relevancy particularly salient. Critical and post-positivist scholars might naturally be suspicious of the eclectic project, directed at climate change or as a general program, if it seems to reify existing power-laden disciplinary structures by policing the borders of legitimate scholarship. This particular emphasis on power relates to a possible post-positivist concern with the eclectic impulse toward policy relevance. Recall Sil and Katzenstein’s argument that the value-added of eclecticism involves relating research to ordinary actors and policy-makers. Sil and Katzenstein suspect the “compartmentalization of knowledge” prohibits the beneficial sharing of insights that address real-world dilemmas. Yet a move toward policy relevance as a criterion for research may strike many who self-identify outside of the mainstream as political and even disciplining. Steve Smith argues that when “one party announces that approaches have to be policy relevant, [it is] usually defined as relevant for activities of the state. Dismissing work as being irrelevant to policy choices is a powerful disciplining device.”77 This issue evokes further discussion of the ethics of useful knowledge, of its “relevance” (to the state? to ordinary or marginal people? to whom?) and intelligibility. From Sil and Katzenstein’s text, it seems eclecticism emphasizes an appeal to policy-makers more than “ordinary actors,” but this need not be the case. Feminist IR scholars, for example, can argue that their theories and scholarship, developed in close consultation and interaction with real-world activists, policy-makers, and ordinary women, does not “sit on the sidelines” and suffers no such relevance deficit (witness titanic efforts to theorize “gender mainstreaming” in global governance, attention to rape in warfare and other forms of sexual violence, and projects to enable women by making them “productive” in the global economy).
Perm Fails – Exclusion DA
Exclusion DA – Consensus is not always possible - forcing the alternative to coexist with the plan fosters inclusionary violence and inevitably excludes the voices of the oppressed
Jessica Peet, 2020, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, “Eclecticism or exclusivity? The (critical) pragmatist ethos of (intersectional) analytic eclecticism,” 75(3): 420-432, mm
At first glance, pragmatism seems to provide an appropriate foundation for analytic eclecticism. Pragmatism’s investment in consensus combined with its recognition that knowledge is discursive and social—and thus open to reformulation—provides an alternative perspective to IR’s tendencies to understand knowledge as either the product of objective rationalism or subjective interpretivism. Where specific theoretical paradigms choose one approach or the other, pragmatism advocates the utility of both derivations. Thus, in theory, a pragmatist ethos allows eclectic research to sidestep metatheoretical debates and the challenges inherent in combining opposing perspectives.18 In practice, by not acknowledging the power dynamics which shape these controversies in disciplinary IR,19 a pragmatist ethos can have the effect of (re)producing the status quo, privileging rationalism, positivism, and the dominant theoretical triad. This inattention to power, generally, and the disciplinary power dynamics of epistemological difference, specifically, can be linked to pragmatism’s investment in universalism. Universalism, or the belief in a common category or position salient across theoretical traditions, enables multiple perspectives to be combined without fear of incommensurability, an issue that Fred Chernoff addresses in more detail in his contribution to this forum.20 Yet, by assuming that a universal category exists, pragmatism actually simplifies complex issues. Moreover, this focus on a universal category privileges that category as most important, marginalizing the relevance of other categories along with their potential explanatory power. This marginalization directly counters analytic eclecticism’s goal of attending to complexity and bringing diverse approaches to the forefront. This investment in universalism also brings about a static view of categories. Universal categories are identified by their similarities, which are fixed and unchanging across time and theoretical tradition. Sil and Katzenstein identify the substantive referent (i.e., the research problem) to be the universal category, arguing that the research problem is not dependent on the theoretical approach(es) being employed. However, to identify a common category among different approaches, it must be determined a priori what similarities are to be contained within that category. Thus, for any determination to be made, artificial boundaries must be imposed upon the referent so that it can be identified. But imposing constructed boundaries upon the referent works to simplify the problem, which again contravenes the goals of analytic eclecticism. Pragmatism also provides a questionable foundation for analytic eclecticism because it tends to privilege consensus over difference.21 Achieving consensus renders dynamic and complex interactions among and within categories invisible. This both undermines the spirit of eclecticism and ignores the wider power dynamics that shape the field. Consensus is not always possible. Sometimes commonality cannot be found because no universal category or position exists, and forcing commonality can breed violences of inclusion.22 Gayatri Spivak famously argues that the subaltern is rendered mute (and therefore can neither speak nor be heard) because of the complexities of finding consensus between the position of the subaltern and that of the oppressor.23 Achille Mbembe argues that the illusion of consensus across wide power differentials is only possible in conditions of extreme violence perpetrated on those at the lower end of those differentials.24 Taken together, these problems show how eclectic theorizing functions to exclude. Investment in consensus and universality inhibits the visibility of (disciplinary) power dynamics, even though they are central to shaping what is considered universal and who is considered part of any consensus produced by analytic eclecticism. When conceptualized with this kind of ethos, analytic eclecticism will always have exclusive effects because it lacks the tools to recognize or correct its own exclusivity. To achieve inclusivity, these foundations must be challenged.
Perm Fails – Footnoting DA
Footnoting DA – the perm fails since it only emphasizes dominant IR, rendering the alt ineffective
Eric Blanchard, 2020, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, “Combing the same beach: analytic eclecticism and the challenge of theoretical multilingualism ,” 75(3): 404-419, mm
The promise of eclecticism as a facilitator of scholarly communication, however, is limited by Sil and Katzenstein’s decision to limit its scope to realism, liberalism, and constructivism without giving sustained consideration to the wide range of potentially eclectic approaches to world politics. The authors justify limiting the purview of their pluralist project to the triad by arguing these represent the “most prevalent approaches in the United States and worldwide.”35 However, as Cornut has noted, this choice opens Sil and Katzenstein to charges “of using problem-driven pragmatism to appear more pluralist while creating strict disciplinarian boundaries that render challenges to the mainstream illegitimate.”36 Since a partial pluralism is ultimately self-defeating, it makes sense to promote Sil and Katzenstein’s stated efforts to produce a “greater scope for deliberation among a more inclusive community of inquirers”37 by involving as many outsiders as possible who roughly fit the three main commitments (noted above). Limiting the relevant paradigms to those currently dominant also misses an opportunity to interact with a set of interlocutors ignored in the original formulation of eclecticism. Ten years after the publication of Beyond Paradigms, eclecticism has the opportunity to live up to its communicative promise by engaging the products of a maturing methodological turn in critical approaches to IR and Political Science. There are a number of excellent works addressing research design, argument, and metatheory in IR and Political Science that include consideration of non-triad approaches within the framework of philosophy of social science.38 In addition, there exists a first generation of high-quality methodological primers on what it means to engage in the practice of critical research produced by authors working under the banners of interpretivism, constructivism, feminism, post-structuralism, and political theory.39 This literature is remarkable in that it emanates from traditions that had long resisted the imperatives of systematization, methodologism, and scientism, recognizing the negative effects that adherence to standardized cannons or procedures can have on scholarship.40