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2022 Michigan Negative

Neg - AI Clarity - Michigan Classic 2022 CGNO

Neg - AI Clarity - Michigan Classic 2022 CGNO.docx

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AI Clarity
NEG
Clarity
1NC – CHINA AHEAD
China’s already won the AI race
Guy Faulconbridge; 2021 (writer for Reuters; Reuters; “China has won AI battle with U.S., Pentagon's ex-software chief says”; https://www.reuters.com/technology/united-states-has-lost-ai-battle-china-pentagons-ex-software-chief-says-2021-10-11///EF)
China has won the artificial intelligence battle with the United States and is heading towards global dominance because of its technological advances, the Pentagon's former software chief told the Financial Times. China, the world’s second largest economy, is likely to dominate many of the key emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence, synthetic biology and genetics within a decade or so, according to Western intelligence assessments. Nicolas Chaillan, the Pentagon's first chief software officer who resigned in protest against the slow pace of technological transformation in the U.S. military, said the failure to respond was putting the United States at risk."We have no competing fighting chance against China in 15 to 20 years. Right now, it’s already a done deal; it is already over in my opinion," he told the newspaper. "Whether it takes a war or not is kind of anecdotal." China was set to dominate the future of the world, controlling everything from media narratives to geopolitics, he said. Chaillan blamed sluggish innovation, the reluctance of U.S. companies such as Google (GOOGL.O) to work with the state on AI and extensive ethical debates over the technology. Google was not immediately available for comment outside business hours. Chinese companies, Chaillan said, were obliged to work with their government and were making "massive investment" in AI without regard to ethics. He said U.S. cyber defences in some government departments were at "kindergarten level". Chaillan announced his resignation at the beginning of September, saying military officials were repeatedly put in charge of cyber initiatives for which they lacked experience. A spokesperson for the Department of the Air Force said Frank Kendall, secretary of the U.S. Air Force, had discussed with Chaillan his recommendations for the department’s future software development following his resignation and thanked him for his contributions, the FT said.
1NC – NO TECH IMPACT
The aff’s characterization of AI as primarily military is wrong AND there’s no arms race
Scharre ’21 (Paul, vice president and director of studies at the Center for a New American Security, “Debunking the AI Arms Race Theory”, Accessed 7/21/2022, https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/87035/TNSRVol4Issue3Scharre.pdf?sequence=2//EA)
Current Military AI Competition Is Not an “Arms Race” As Heather Roff has written, the arms race framing “misrepresents the competition going on among countries.”5 To begin with, AI is not a weapon. AI is a general-purpose enabling technology with myriad applications. It is not like a missile or a tank. It is more like electricity, the internal combustion engine, or computer networks.6 General-purpose technologies like AI have applications across a range of industries. Wired magazine co-founder Kevin Kelly has argued that it “will enliven inert objects, much as electricity did more than a century ago. Everything that we formerly electrified we will now cognitize.”7 Nations may very well be in a technology race to adopt AI across a range of industries. AI will help to improve economic productivity and, by extension, economic and military power. During the industrial revolution, early adopters of industrial technology significantly increased their national power. From 1830 to 1890, Britain and Germany, which were both early industrializers, more than doubled their per capita gross national product while Russia, which lagged in industrialization, increased its per capita gross national product by a mere 7 percent over that 60-year period.8 These technological advantages led to increased economic and military power, most notably for Europe relative to the rest of the world. In 1790, Europe (collectively), China, and India (including what is now Pakistan and Bangladesh) held roughly the same shares of global manufacturing output, with Europe and India each holding about one-quarter of global manufacturing output and China holding roughly one-third. They all had approximately equivalent levels of per capita industrialization at that time. But the industrial revolution skyrocketed European economic productivity. By 1900, Europe collectively controlled 62 percent of global manufacturing output, while China held only six percent and India less than two percent. These economic advantages translated into military power. By 1914, Europeans occupied or controlled over 80 percent of the world’s land surface.9 Being ahead of the curve in adopting AI is likely to lead to significant national advantages. Although AI can increase military capabilities, the more consequential advantages over the long term may come from non-military AI applications across society. Long-term benefits from AI could include increased productivity, improved healthcare outcomes, economic growth, and other indicators of national well-being. Increasing productivity is especially significant because it has a compounding effect on economic growth. Over the long term, technological progress is the main driver of economic growth.10 Of course, AI can also be used for weapons. Militaries around the world are actively working to adopt AI to improve their military capabilities. Yet the militarization of AI does not, at present, meet the traditional definition of an arms race, despite the rhetorical urgency of many national leaders. Michael D. Wallace, in his 1979 article “Arms Races and Escalation,” defined an arms race as “involving simultaneous abnormal rates of growth in the military outlays of two or more nations” resulting from “the competitive pressure of the military itself, and not from domestic forces exogenous to this rivalry.” Wallace further stated that the concept of an arms race only applied “between nations whose foreign and defense policies are heavily interdependent” and who have “roughly comparable” capabilities.11 AI is being adopted by many countries around the globe.12 Arguably at least some of the dyads, such as the United States and China, meet Wallace’s definition in terms of being nations with “roughly comparable” capabilities, locked in competition, “whose foreign and defense policies are heavily interdependent.” However, AI fails the arms race test in the critical area of spending. Wallace distinguished arms races from the normal behavior of states to improve their military forces. A state that adopts a new technology and modernizes its military forces is not automatically in an arms race, under Wallace’s definition, even if the modernization is aimed at competition with another country. The decisive factor in qualifying as an arms race, according to Wallace, is the rate of growth in defense spending. Wallace characterized arms races as resulting in abnormally large growth rates in defense spending, beyond the historical average of 4 to 5 percent annual growth (in real dollars). In an arms race, annual growth rates are above 10 percent or even as high as 20 to 25 percent.13 Other scholars define arms races using different quantitative thresholds — and some definitions lack clear quantitative thresholds at all — but the existence of rapid increases in defense spending or military forces above normal levels is a common criterion in the scholarly literature on arms races.14 Arms races result in situations in which two or more countries are locked in spiraling defense spending, grabbing ever-greater shares of national treasure often with little to no net gain in relative advantage over the other. Classic historical examples include the Anglo-German naval arms race prior to World War I and the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race during the Cold War. Military AI spending today clearly does not meet these criteria of abnormally large growth rates in defense spending. AI defense spending is difficult to calculate due to the general-purpose nature of AI technology. Unlike ships or ballistic missiles, AI systems cannot be easily counted. Nevertheless, even crude estimates of defense spending show that military AI investments are nowhere near large enough to constitute an arms race. An independent estimate by Bloomberg Government of U.S. defense spending on AI identified $5 billion in AI-related research and development in fiscal year 2020, or roughly 0.7 percent of the Department of Defense’s over $700 billion budget.15 The scale of military AI spending, at least at present, is nowhere near large enough to warrant the title of “arms race.” (Adding in private sector spending, which constitutes the bulk of AI investment, would lead to larger figures but would further belie the claim of an “arms” race since most private sector AI investment is not in weapons.)
1NC -- DEMOCRACY IMPACT
Democratic peace theory is wrong — democracy doesn’t eliminate conflicts.
Larison 12 — Daniel Larison, Senior Editor at The American Conservative, holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of Chicago, 2012 (“Democratic Peace Theory Is False,” The American Conservative, April 17th, Available Online at http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/democratic-peace-theory-is-false/, Accessed 08-11-2013)
Rojas’ claim depends entirely on the meaning of “genuine democracy.” Even though there are numerous examples of wars between states with universal male suffrage and elected governments (including that little dust-up known as WWI), the states in question probably don’t qualify as “genuine” democracies and so can’t be used as counter-examples. Regardless, democratic peace theory draws broad conclusions from a short period in modern history with very few cases before the 20th century. The core of democratic peace theory as I understand it is that democratic governments are more accountable to their populations, and because the people will bear the costs of the war they are going to be less willing to support a war policy. This supposedly keeps democratic states from waging wars against one another because of the built-in electoral and institutional checks on government power. One small problem with this is that it is rubbish. Democracies in antiquity fought against one another. Political equality and voting do not abolish conflicts of interest between competing states. Democratic peace theory doesn’t account for the effects of nationalist and imperialist ideologies on the way democratic nations think about war. Democratic nations that have professional armies to do the fighting for them are often enthusiastic about overseas wars. The Conservative-Unionist government that waged the South African War (against two states with elected governments, I might add) enjoyed great popular support and won a huge majority in the “Khaki” election that followed. As long as it goes well and doesn’t have too many costs, war can be quite popular, and even if the war is costly it may still be popular if it is fought for nationalist reasons that appeal to a majority of the public. If the public is whipped into thinking that there is an intolerable foreign threat or if they believe that their country can gain something at relatively low cost by going to war, the type of government they have really is irrelevant. Unless a democratic public believes that a military conflict will go badly for their military, they may be ready to welcome the outbreak of a war that they expect to win. Setting aside the flaws and failures of U.S.-led democracy promotion for a moment, the idea that reducing the number of non-democracies makes war less likely is just fantasy. Clashing interests between states aren’t going away, and the more democratic states there are in the world the more likely it is that two or more of them will eventually fight one another.
Democracy promotion fails -
Fein, 2014- American lawyer and contributor to countless think tanks specializing in constitutional and international law with a JD from Harvard Law (Bruce Fein, 12/24/14, “Stop U.S. democracy promotion abroad,” http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/24/bruce-fein-stop-united-states-democracy-promotion-/?page=all, accessed: 3/28/15)
Leaders just as bad, allows for authoritarians to rise, aggravate threats
The U.S. government should cease its arrogant and ill-informed attempts to promote democracy around the globe — whether in Cuba, Iraq, Afghanistan, Communist China, Ukraine, Burma or otherwise. The attempts are extraneous to the purposes of the United States Constitution. Democratically elected leaders can be every bit as tyrannical and aggressive towards the United States as unelected dictators. Hamas, listed as an international terrorist organization, decisively triumphed in Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006. It has ruled in Gaza since 2007, routinely denies human rights, chronically attacks Israel, and execrates the United States. Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi, proved as much or more contemptuous of the rule of law, human rights and amity towards Israel and the United States than his dictatorial predecessor, Hosni Mubarak. Thus, the United States shed only crocodile tears when he was overthrown in a military coup. Adolf Hitler climbed to power through popular elections. His Nationalist Socialists captured more than 37 percent of the vote in 1932 to become the largest party in the Reichstag. Free and fair elections in Saudi Arabia would yield victory for radical Islamic parties with affinity and sympathy for the murderous perpetrators of 9/11. In sum, promoting democracy in foreign lands may aggravate rather than diminish threats to perceived interests of the United States. Thus, we have supported dictators over democrats in Iran, Guatemala, Chile, Indonesia, Argentina, Bahrain, Kuwait, Cambodia, Brazil, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Spain, the Philippines, ad infinitum. In any event, democracy promotion is overwhelmingly a fool’s errand. The process is vastly too complex for us to master or to jump start. Sending nations copies of the Declaration of Independence and Constitution will not do. Words without a reinforcing political culture are worthless. Iraq’s Constitution prohibits laws that contradict the “principles of democracy.” But Salmon Rushdie would be killed if he attempted to sell The Satanic Verses in Baghdad. We also forget that democracy in the United States evolved over more than seven centuries. We cannot expect more from other people. Anglo-American democracy was born with the Magna Carta to check the absolutism of King John in 1215 on the fields of Runnymede. Through succeeding centuries and periodic civil wars, the powers of Parliament strengthened and the powers of the King diminished. Landmarks included the Grand Remonstrance, the beheading of Charles I by Oliver Cromwell, and the English Bill of Rights of 1688. American colonists claimed the rights of British freemen. They soon took on the trappings of democracy with the Virginia House of Burgesses, the Mayflower Compact, the Connecticut Charter Oak, the Maryland Toleration Act, etc. The United States Constitution was not drafted until 1787, more than five centuries after Magna Carta. Democratic principles did not completely triumph until the Civil War Amendments ending slavery and enfranchising blacks, and the Women’s Suffrage Amendment ending their disenfranchisement in 1919. Blacks did not de facto enjoy the right to vote until the Voting Rights Act of 1965, more seven and one-half centuries since the road to democracy began at Runnymede. It was facilitated in the United States by a literate society, a homogeneity of ethnicity, culture and language, natural boundaries, and an unprecedented array of profound and selfless leaders, for example, George Washington and James Madison. Despite these vast advantages, the United States still needed a bloody Civil War and an obscenely prolonged period of Jim Crow before finally achieving substantial national unity and racial justice. In light of our own seven-century journey to democracy, the idea that we can install democratic dispensations in nations that are at the pre-Magna Carta stage of political maturity and lacking our peculiar cultural advantages is delusional. Our miserable track record speaks for itself, including South Vietnam, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Burma, South Sudan, Somalia, Syria, and Bahrain. Taiwan moved into a democratic orbit in 1988 after the deaths of dictators Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo, and South Korea did the same after military strongman Chun Doo Hwan left office. But these democratic movements were indigenous. The United States was complacent with reliable, friendly, and anti-democratic leadership. At best, democracy promotion is harmless — like shouting at the weather. At worst, it is counterproductive. Many societies are insufficiently mature, literate, and homogeneous to for its practice. Democracy in these places degenerates into majoritarian, sectarian, or tribal tyrannies notwithstanding formal elections. Russia, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and South Sudan are emblematic. Democracy is given a bad name, which may handicap its return at a more propitious tim
2NC – DEMOCRACY IMPACT
Democracy doesn’t prevent war – Larison [phd in history from u of Chicago] – war can be popular among voters. Can’t check Nationalist and imperialist ideologies which change the way democracies think about war.
Clashing interests still exist between states. Their theory relies on a small sample size that is insufficient to make such a broad claim
1. Cherry Picked Data
Antić, Associate professor at University of Zagreb, and Vlahovec, MA, University of Zagreb, 2013
(Miljenko and Jadranka, “’Democratic War’: Democratic Peace Theory and the War in Former Yugoslavia” International Studies, vol. 13, no. 2, 2013, p. 55-71, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d223/9f6efa19ec227df5b083233469507217d213.pdf, accessed 5-16-18, JCP RH)
David Spiro’s “The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace” (1996) argues against the democratic peace theory by stating that the apparent absence of war between democra- cies is statistically insignificant. For most of international history before 1945, there were few democracies and little chance for them to fight each other. Spiro also su- ggests that institutional explanations of democratic peace are weak, because institu- tional constrains on a government’s ability to wage war would make democracies less war-prone. The data, however, reveal that democracies frequently go to war against non-democracies. Spiro also criticizes studies of democratic peace for failing to define democracy clearly. Moreover, he states that shifting definitions of war have also made democratic peace appear more significant than it is. Many supporters of the democratic peace exclude the U.S. Civil War, Spanish-American War of 1898, and Finland’s World War II alliance with the Axis powers against the Western democracies. Therefore, Spiro suggests that the number of wars between democracies is higher than claimed by the proponents of democratic peace proposition.
2. leaders will just change the definition of democracy to justify war – Germany, Russia, and Japan prove
Antić, Associate professor at University of Zagreb, and Vlahovec, MA, University of Zagreb, 2013
(Miljenko and Jadranka, “’Democratic War’: Democratic Peace Theory and the War in Former Yugoslavia” International Studies, vol. 13, no. 2, 2013, p. 55-71, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d223/9f6efa19ec227df5b083233469507217d213.pdf, accessed 5-16-18, JCP RH)
Ido Oren’s “The Subjectivity of the ‘Democratic’ Peace: Changing U.S. Perceptions of Imperial Germany” (1995) analyses how statesmen change their definitions of democracy. Oren holds that pairs of countries do not remain at

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