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2022 Michigan Kritik

K - Militarism - Michigan Classic 2022 CGNO

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Militarization
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Created by CGNO 07/23/2022
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NATO’s rhetoric of a dangerous Russia creates a security feedback loop of military modernization and unintended consequences leading to conflict
Julie Wilhelmsen, 9-30-2020, "Spiraling toward a New Cold War in the North? The Effect of Mutual and Multifaceted Securitization," OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/6/3/ogaa044/5916402//CDMoney
For example, a securitization of NATO as different and dangerous to Russia creates both inner cohesion in the Russian polity and makes possible a policy of “military modernization” and a posture of “defensive deterrence,” but it can have unintended consequences. It can be taken as a rejection of NATO's self-constituted identity as a legitimate, reliable, security-seeking actor and elicit a string of representations of Russia as different and dangerous on the NATO side.8 Failure to be recognized by the other on one's own preferred terms might not necessarily result in feelings of inferiority and shame, triggering efforts to reconstruct one's own identity, as Bially Mattern has suggested (2004, 12–13) or “progressive change” of self to become like the other, as Ringmar (2014) holds. As Lupovici (2012, 818) notes a collective actor that experiences ontological threat can “redefine the situation in order to protect identity.” “Avoidance,” he says, building on Giddens (1991, 188) “allows an actor facing an ontological dissonance to revalidate its identity rather than to change it or to change its behaviour.” Lupovici explores the strategy of avoidance in situations where dissonance is created endogenously, between conflicting self-identifications and the responses undertaken to offset threats to these self-identifications within one political entity. Avoidance may play out differently when the ontological dissonance emerges exogenously in a dyad of political entities. To reduce the dissonance between the understanding of self and the explicit identification of one's own political entity by the other as being something different and dangerous, revalidation of own identity can be achieved through externalization, by simply returning the negative identification. This strategy is manifest as a clear pattern in the texts by Norwegian/Western and Russian leaders studied below. It is hardly surprising that a collective actor would respond to the non-recognition implicit in being securitized with externalization in the form of talking and hitting back instead of undertaking some form of internal revision. Responding by mirroring the securitization of your group by the other party can be rewarding in terms of delineating and maintaining self-identity, particularly in a time of crisis. To restate and return to the case in focus: the non-recognition implicit in Russia's securitization of NATO can elicit highly antagonistic representations of Russia from the NATO side, triggering another round of representations and accusations from the Russian side, and so on. Such a negative spiral of mutual representations and accusations can be driven further when the different non-military issue-areas in which collective political entities engage also become subject to securitization. While relations between such entities usually take place on different international arenas addressing different issue-areas and exhibit a mixed pattern of friendly and hostile interaction (Jervis 2001, 37; Bially Mattern 2004), they may become subject to patterned all-encompassing friendly or hostile interaction. The latter, I propose, can happen when security concerns take center-stage in relations, through a spillover from mutual securitization in the military sphere into other arenas of potentially neutral or friendly interaction, such as trade, culture, or even diplomacy.
The 1AC’s language perpetuates and normalizes militarism as a cultural system
Gusterson and Besteman 19 (Hugh, Professor in the Department of Anthropology and Elliott School of International Affairs of George Washington University, Catherine, Professor in the Department of Anthropology of Colby College, “Cultures of Militarism: An Introduction to Supplement 19”, February 2019, “Current Anthropology Volume 60, Supplement 19”) // Ilake LT
In contrast, anthropologists’ interest in militarism has taken shape in the context of post–cold war transformations in the management of violence. These years have seen the violent reorganization of some cold war client states; the proliferation of militia-led insurgencies; the interpenetration of organized crime and drug trafficking with insurgency and counter in-surgency in parts of the global south; the articulation of coun-ter insurgency abroad with domestic policing at home in many Western countries; the reformulation of the United Nations into an institution of militarized peacekeeping and occupation; the increasing use of military labor to perform civil, humanitarian, policing, and development activities; and a growing awareness of the ways in which militarism as a set of cultural practices and ideologies pervades all domains of social life. The anthropologists in this volume see militarism as a cultural system; it is shaped through ideology and rhetoric, effected through bodies and technologies, made visible and invisible through campaigns of imagery and knowledge production, and it colonizes aspects of social life including reproduction, self-image, and notions of community. We interrogate militarism in its established and emergent forms, probing its genealogies, its facility at colonizing daily life, and its ability to present itself as a response to insecurities it has itself provoked.4This collection of papers draws on the rich discussions at the symposium from which this volume emerged to capture some of the distinctive features of cultures of militarism. The papers emphasize militarization as a contingent process over militarism as a measurable object;5decenter the state as the core locus of such processes; probe the relationship between militarism, experience, and identity, with a special focus on the body; examine connections between militarism and social injustice; and evince a commitment to critique and under-mine militarism while, at the same time, respecting the force of its appeal. The New Anthropology of Militarism: Four Features Threat Constructions These papers understand militarism as a process rather than as a bounded, measurable thing enmeshed in deterministic relationships with other reified variables. Militarism as an in-flective force or bundle of processes acts upon society in pow-erful and expansive but uneven and contingent ways. Although militarism carves its way deep into social structures, it is also shaped and reshaped in the dialectical interaction between in-grained structures on the one hand and human agency and contingency on the other. It is capillary, shape-shifting, always in motion as it constructs threats, enrolls constituencies, colonizes cultural life, and generates new loci of resistance. As Michel Foucault (2007:44) writes, security apparatuses “have the con-stant tendency to expand; they are centrifugal. New elements are constantly being integrated....Security therefore involves or-ganizing, or anyway allowing the development of ever-wider circuits.” And there is no domain of social life it does not touch. Just as contemporary wars seem to have no clearly demarcated end, so militarism has no discernible edge; it increasingly seeps into every corner of the world, every aspect of social life, in someway. Military/intelligence logics and personnel are now being directed to manage arenas of life formerly understood as outside the purview of the military, like development projects in Africa, humanitarian aid, and responses to environmental catastrophes, black markets, and the hacking of political parties’ computers. In the words of Catherine Lutz, one of the foremost anthropological theorists and observers of militarism, the process of militariza-tion“ has reshaped almost every element of global social life over the 20th century.” It involves an intensification of the labor and resources allocated to military purposes, including the shaping of other institu-tions in synchrony with military goals. Militarization is simul-taneously a discursive process, involving a shift in general societal beliefs and values in ways necessary to legitimate the use of force, the organization of large standing armies and their leaders, and the higher taxes or tribute used to pay for them. Militarization is intimately connected not only to the obvious increase in the size of armies and resurgence of mil-itant nationalisms and militant fundamentalisms but also to the less visible deformation of human potentials into the hierarchies of race, class, gender, and sexuality, and to the shaping of national histories in ways that glorify and legiti-mate military action. (Lutz 2002:723)As Lutz’s comment indicates, the material base of militarism is connected with ideologies and discourses through which proliferating militarized infrastructures and rationalities are normalized, naturalized, and legitimized. Such ideologies and discourses valorize the ethos of the warrior (Gibson 1994; Orr2004; Webb 2018) and construct threats in such a way as to validate military spending, military interventions, and the mil-itarization of formerly nonmilitary arenas of life. To say that threats are “constructed” does not mean that they are imaginary or unreal. But threats can be figured through different narratives and addressed in different ways, and the choice of narrative figuration may have enormous material consequences. The So-viet missiles deployed to Cuba in 1962 were quite real and, if used, would have inflicted crushing damage on the United States. But the United States could have chosen to regard them as a reasonable counterweight to its own Jupiter nuclear-tipped mis-siles in Turkey, on the Soviet Union’s doorstep, rather than pro-voking a global crisis by narrating them as an existential threat (Weldes 1999). Likewise, based on the evidence of the last 2 de-cades of US-Vietnamese relations, the United States could plausibly have decided in the 1960s that its vital interests would have suffered little if a small country on the other side of the planet were allowed to “go Communist. “Instead, it fruitlessly expended the lives of over 50,000 Americans and 2–3 million Vietnamese in what American national security elites wrongly perceived, thanks to the consensually accepted domino theory, as a struggle it could not afford to lose. Or, as discussed in this volume, Turkey in the early twentieth century could have constructed Armenians as constituency to be accommodated, not exterminated, and Guatemalan and Colombian elites could have constructed rural challenges against inequality and injustice as a social problem to address through development and land reform, not a military threat that demanded counterinsurgency. In these cases, the preferred threat constructions militarized the problems at hand, mobilizing more resources for military projects and saturating the social field with militarized violence.
The alt is feasible and can be implemented through a three-part plan that involves the defunding of the military, the conversion of the economy and the aiding of veterans in their transition to civilian life.
Burke 22, Matthew, a research associate at the University of Vermont who holds a PhD in Renewable Resources from McGill University; and Nina Smolyar, a Gund Graduate Fellow from the Rubenstein School of Environment and Natural Resources with a BA from the University of Pennsylvania and an MA from Goddard College|Demilitarize for a Just Transition. In: Dunlap, A., Brock, A. (eds) Enforcing Ecocide. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99646-8_11
This set of deeply intertwined issues underscores the need for converting the U.S. military to civilian purposes and control. This section turns to the specific options and opportunities for a just transition of the U.S. military.
This transition requires nothing less than a complete dismantling and restructuring of this institution of war, firmly rooted under civilian control, toward the goal of creating an equitable and ecological society. There are three broad strategies to pursue as part of this just transition: spending reductions and reallocation; economic conversion to a peace economy; and assistance, retraining, and civilian repurposing for workers and veterans (D’Agostino and Rynn, 2019). Spending Reductions and Reallocation Demilitarization and just transition require decreases in military spending and a green fiscal shift toward meeting urgent social and environmental needs. Often it is a budget reduction that catalyzes deeper, more abiding conversions, yet such a curtailment must be combined with targeted reinvestments (Pemberton and Hartung, 2020). Military spending creates many fewer jobs than if those same funds were spent on healthcare, education, and clean energy and infrastructure, and jobs in these other sectors are on average equally well or better compensated (Peltier, 2019; Pollin and Garrett-Peltier, 2011). Shifting military spending to green manufacturing can support a just transition for regions of the U.S. experiencing declines in manufacturing, while scaling up lower-carbon energy infrastructure and public transportation, better preparing communities for impacts of climate change, and improving and expanding jobs in care work (Steichen and Koshgarian, 2020). A growing consensus is emerging around proposals to cut military spending. For example, a Defense Spending Reduction Caucus has been formed in the U.S. Congress, while an amendment was further introduced in 2020 to cut the Pentagon budget by 10% (Lee, 2020). This reduction is especially urgent in view of the need for and popularity of Covid-19 economic relief payments, and changes in rules to allow significant cuts to the DoD independently of non-defense spending. Even at just 10%, this reinvestment could achieve significant benefits across any number of priorities: housing half a million people, dramatically expanding coronavirus testing, bridging the funding deficit for majority non-white school districts, providing renewable energy to nearly every U.S. household, transitioning nearly every worker in conventional coal, oil, and gas sectors, hiring close to a million public school elementary educators, and so on (Steichen and Koshgarian, 2020). At a global level, the opportunities for shifting funding become even greater, given $2 trillion annually in global expenditures (half from the U.S.) on war and war preparations. Small percentages of this amount could end starvation or provide drinking water worldwide, reducing unrest, and improving well-being (World Beyond War, 2020). Economic Conversion In coordination with these shifts in budgetary priorities, a just transition requires converting from a military to a peace economy, including especially industrial planning and restructuring. Economic conversion refers to “political, economic and technical measures for ensuring the orderly transformation of labor, machinery and other economic resources now being used for military purposes to alternative civilian uses” (Melman and Dumas, 1990). Such efforts have been proposed and tested for decades, emphasizing the use of sector- and community-based planning for workers and communities dependent on defense and defense industries (D’Agostino and Rynn, 2019). Beginning with moves toward nuclear disarmament and the end of the Cold War in the 1980s and 90s, advocates and organizers seriously examined the necessary elements of conversion to a peace economy (Melman and Dumas, 1990; Pemberton and Hartung, 2020). In addition to spending reductions and reinvestment, successful economic conversion depends upon several key conditions. These conditions include availability of technical and financial assistance to firms, workers, and communities; supportive civil society measures including research, education, and legislation; and well-designed industrial policies and planning. Many examples of successful conversion can be traced at the level of firms, communities, bases, laboratories, and sectors since the end of the second world war. However, the size and complexity of the network of militarism in the U.S. now require a largescale industrial policy to achieve full disarmament and demilitarization (Pemberton and Hartung, 2020). Much has already been learned about scaling up economic conversions. Especially since the end of the Cold War, the work of Seymour Melman and colleagues, along with efforts of labor and trade unions, has provided a foundation for this comprehensive approach to economic conversion and industrial planning. These lessons reflect the fact that for decades, military priorities have served as the de facto plan for the U.S. economy, and markets are incapable of making the needed shift to peaceful economies (Eisenscher, 2014; Melman and Dumas, 1990). Supportive legislation nearly passed as early as 1963, while legislation such as the Defense Economic Adjustment Act has been introduced in various forms since the early 1990s (Swanson, 2010). More recently, Miriam Pemberton and others have put forward comprehensive strategies for defense transition that operate at all levels and are federally funded and resourced, and state- and locally coordinated and implemented (Pemberton, 2018). The scale and pace of change needed now demand new models for economic conversion. Demilitarization and conversion to a peace economy will require explicit industrial planning in public and private sectors, a challenge in the U.S. context to say the least. Nevertheless, several tools may provide a starting point if applied to the purpose of a just transition. One obvious measure is to implement new rounds of base closures through the Base Realignment and Closure process, especially including closures of overseas bases, and to shift the savings to just transition and civilian priorities. Closed bases and installations could serve as new sites for restored ecosystems and alternative energy generation (Crawford, 2019). Another measure would be to shift the focus of the Defense Production Act, which provides presidential authority to expedite and expand materials and services from U.S. industries, toward emergency preparedness. A specific focus would be to minimize hazards and impacts of climate change and protect and restore critical infrastructure—both built and natural—as needed for a just transition. In the context of climate emergency, a more direct approach to large-scale industrial planning could effectively reverse the function of the War Production Board, which was active during the wartime period. This mode of planning would instead convert factories from manufacture of weapons and military equipment to peacetime industries under public control, while conserving high-priority materials and limiting waste and luxury items. It is important to emphasize in the context of emergency preparedness and climate resilience, the point is not to extend military control but rather to unequivocally transfer resources and responsibility of the existing military apparatus to civilian control (Barber and Bennis, 2020). For example, civilian organizations such as the U.S. Public Health Service or the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention would assume responsibility for medical staff, equipment, and facilities. All these methods and more will need to be integrated over time within a broad strategy of demilitarized industrial planning for conversion to a peace economy. Assistance, Retraining, and Civilian Repurposing The third general strategy for a just transition of the U.S. military centers on the contribution of the workers and their communities toward minimizing ecological catastrophe and providing for basic needs. This stra

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