Neg - Information Warfare Addendum - Michigan Classic 2022 HJV
Neg - Information Warfare Addendum - Michigan Classic 2022 HJV.docx
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EU CP
EU is key to solving Disinformation and is already Responding
Annina Claesson, April 8, 2019, "Coming Together to Fight Fake News: Lessons from the European Approach to Disinformation," CSIS, https://www.csis.org/coming-together-fight-fake-news-lessons-european-approach-disinformation
For observers across the pond, Europe has been a testing ground for tactics to counter disinformation in democracies. Over the course of many national elections in the past few years, Europe has tried a variety of measures to counter disinformation efforts from multiple sources. Now, the European Union is aiming to complement national efforts by scaling up its own response through EU-level policies.
In an effort to address what some civil society and media organizations have criticized as an overly disaggregated approach by the European Union, current EU efforts focus on proper coordination with and among the many actors involved in countering disinformation. Specifically, the EU response is focused on three lines of effort: improving interagency and international cooperation; stepping up ambitions in addressing the role of the private sector; and instituting a plan to support media literacy. In addition to helping the European Union tackle disinformation campaigns that seek to disrupt the democratic process, these measures can also serve as a template for the United States and other countries as they design their own anti-disinformation strategies.
Strengthening Interagency and International Cooperation
The problem of disinformation is a complex and disaggregated one. While the United States often sees disinformation narrowly as the dissemination of “fake news” by Russian trolls, the “European approach” often takes a wider view.1 its recent communications, the European Union presents disinformation as a problem rooted in complex and rapid socioeconomic changes. Our democracies are now characterized by stark societal divisions that malign actors may seek to exploit. While this is nothing new, technological developments have made disinformation a powerful, inexpensive, and often profitable method of influencing a range of actors from powerful states to small extremist groups. State-sponsored Russian campaigns in particular have become a mounting threat to European democracies and remain a significant challenge ahead of the 2019 European parliament elections, but other groups (such as those on the far-right) have also been active in disinformation campaigns in recent European elections.2,3
Since disinformation is a problem with diverse and complicated roots, the challenge of countering it does not land in any one portfolio. It requires cooperation between different agencies within states and internationally. As an important co-regulatory actor, this is where the European Union has a vital role to play. Over the course of 2018, the European Union has stepped up its ambitions in countering disinformation campaigns through a range of new initiatives.
EU for Nato support to counter disinformation:
Annina Claesson, April 8, 2019, "Coming Together to Fight Fake News: Lessons from the European Approach to Disinformation," CSIS, https://www.csis.org/coming-together-fight-fake-news-lessons-european-approach-disinformation
There are several positive lessons to draw from these. Perhaps most importantly, the European Commission has appropriately identified the need for a unified, multi-stakeholder response to disinformation, including participation from governments, civil society, and the private sector.4 The commission’s most recent action plan, released in December 2018, sets out important improvements in this regard. The EU budget for tackling disinformation is expected to more than double in 2019, going from €1.9 million in 2018 to €5 million.5 This is not to be disregarded—money matters a great deal, especially when Russia invests over €1 billion each year into their disinformation and propaganda efforts.6
The action plan’s most concrete new step is the creation of a rapid alert system, which provides alerts on new disinformation campaigns as they emerge in real time.7 This mechanism is set to involve NATO and could become a promising tool for intelligence and data sharing across borders. This action plan also strength- ens previously under-resourced tools such as the East Strategic Communication Task Force, an issue which was identified by experts as a significant roadblock to improving anti-disinformation efforts in the European Union.8
EU doesn’t even think we should take action against disinformation but is doing it anyaway.
Daniel Funke, 7-20-2022, "A guide to anti-misinformation actions around the world," Poynter, https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/anti-misinformation-actions/
BRUSSELS — In mid-March 2018, a European Commission high-level group published its final report on misinformation, drawing upon the input of experts from around the world who gathered over several weeks to help the European Union figure out what to do about misinformation. The report created by the high-level group — announced in November 2017 to help the EU craft policies to address growing concern about misinformation in Europe — contains an inclusive, collaborative approach to addressing misinformation around the world (Disclosure: Poynter attended the meetings as one of the experts). The report, while imperfect, explicitly recommends not regulating against misinformation — but the EU is only one of many governing bodies that have sought to stem the flow of online misinformation over the past few months. Spanning from Brazil to South Korea, these efforts raise questions about infringing free speech guarantees and are frequently victims of uncertainty. The muddying of the definition of fake news, the relative reach of which is still being studied, hinders governments’ ability to accomplish anything effective. In the spirit of this confusion, explained in detail in a Council of Europe report, Poynter has created a guide for existing attempts to legislate against what can broadly be referred to as online misinformation. While not every law contained here relates to misinformation specifically, they’ve all often been wrapped into that broader discussion. We have attempted to label different interventions as clearly as possible. Since these efforts seem to be announced weekly, this article will be updated on an ongoing basis.
AT: Vaccines
Belief of scientific narratives of covid are high.
Agley, J., Xiao, Y., 1-7-2021, "Misinformation about COVID-19: evidence for differential latent profiles and a strong association with trust in science," BioMed Central, https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-020-10103-x
For the full sample, believability of the narratives varied, from a low of 1.94 (SD=1.72) for the 5G narrative to a high of 5.56 (SD=1.64) for the zoonotic (scientific consensus) narrative. Four distinct belief profiles emerged, with the preponderance (70%) of the sample falling into Profile 1, which believed the scientifically accepted narrative (zoonotic origin) but not the misinformed or conspiratorial narratives. Other profiles did not disbelieve the zoonotic explanation, but rather believed additional misinformation to varying degrees. Controlling for sociodemographics, political orientation and religious commitment were marginally, and typically non-significantly, associated with COVID-19 belief profile membership. However, trust in science was a strong, significant predictor of profile membership, with lower trust being substantively associated with belonging to Profiles 2 through 4.
No link between misinformation and non-preventive disease behaviors.
Chan, HW., Chiu, C.PY., Zuo, S. et al., 5-4-2021, "Not-so-straightforward links between believing in COVID-19-related conspiracy theories and engaging in disease-preventive behaviours," Nature, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-021-00781-2#Sec16
Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, pertinent conspiracy theories have proliferated online, raising the question: How might believing in those conspiracy theories be linked with engagement in disease-preventive behaviours? To answer this, we conducted a repeated cross-sectional survey of around 1500 respondents to examine the link between conspiracy-theory beliefs and disease-preventive behaviours across six time-points in the United States from early February to late March 2020. The findings reveal that believing in risk-acceptance conspiracy theories (RA-CTs; e.g., “COVID-19 is a man-made bioweapon”) was linked to more preventive behaviours. However, believing in risk-rejection conspiracy theories (RR-CTs; e.g., “COVID-19 is like influenza and was purposefully exaggerated”) was associated with fewer preventive behaviours. These differential links were mediated by risk perception and negative emotions and modulated by the stage of the outbreak—RA-CTs predicted higher risk perception in the mild stage, whereas RR-CTs predicted lower risk perception in the severe stage.
People also opposed early disease preventative measures due to contradictions and lack of transparency from health organizations.
Lu He,21, 2021 Apr 24, "Why do people oppose mask wearing? A comprehensive analysis of U.S. tweets during the COVID-19 pandemic," PubMed Central (PMC), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7989302/
Further, some users opposed mask wearing because they believed that it was not an effective measure for preventing the spread of the virus and it was unnecessary for healthy individuals. These stances were indeed supported by authoritative bodies such as the CDC and the U.S. Surgeon General at the early stage of the pandemic. However, many of these tweets were posted in June and July, yet the CDC had reversed its position on public mask wearing in April. This finding indicates that certain segments of the U.S. population might not be aware of, or refuse to believe in, new recommendations from the CDC, and that earlier, contradicting recommendations might have a long-lasting impact. This means that public health experts and officials must clearly communicate about scientific uncertainty, reasons for specific recommendations, and the possibility that recommendations could change as more evidence emerges. In addition, public health experts should continue to engage the public so that new scientific findings, conclusions, and recommendations are immediately delivered to all members of the public.
Masking is high, reliance on misinformation is low, disease spreading was just natural.
Dennis Thompson, 10-22-2020, "Mask Use by Americans Now Tops 90%, Poll Finds," WebMD, https://www.webmd.com/lung/news/20201022/mask-use-by-americans-now-tops-90-poll-finds#1
More than nine in 10 U.S. adults (93%) said they sometimes, often or always wear a mask or face covering when they leave their home and are unable to socially distance, including more than seven in 10 (72%) who said they always do so, the poll revealed. "Compared to when we first asked this question in late August, our latest survey with HealthDay finds that more Americans are now consistently wearing a mask or face covering outside the home," said Kathy Steinberg, vice president of research for public release at The Harris Poll.
AT: European Populism
Populism declined drastically due to leaders’ mishandling of the pandemic and is unpopular in the squo – no democratic backsliding
Bennett Institute of Public Policy Cambridge 22 – The Bennett Institute of Public Policy is an organization at the University of Cambridge that researches public policy and politics. ("Support for populist politics ‘collapsed’ during the pandemic – global report," Bennett Institute for Public Policy, 1-18-2022, https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/blog/great-reset/, Accessed 7-20-2022, LASA-KS)
Support for populist parties and politicians, and agreement with populist sentiment, has diminished during the pandemic, according to a “mega-dataset” taking in attitudes of over half a million people across 109 countries since 2020. A University of Cambridge team say there are clear signs of a turning tide for the “populist wave”, as the mishandling of coronavirus by populist leaders – along with a desire for stability and a decline in “polarising” attitudes resulting from the pandemic – starts to move public opinion. The authors of the new report, from Cambridge’s Centre for the Future of Democracy (CFD), describe the study as the first global overview of how the Covid-19 crisis has affected political beliefs. They say that threats posed by the pandemic saw a “technocratic” shift in political authority worldwide, with increased trust in government, and in experts such as scientists and civil servants. Yet faith in the democratic process has continued to falter. “The story of politics in recent years has been the emergence of anti-establishment politicians who thrive on the growing distrust of experts,” said Dr Roberto Foa, Co-Director of the CFD and the report’s lead author. “From Erdogan and Bolsonaro to the ‘strong men’ of Eastern Europe, the planet has experienced a wave of political populism. Covid-19 may have caused that wave to crest.” “Electoral support for populist parties has collapsed around the world in a way we don’t see for more mainstream politicians. There is strong evidence that the pandemic has severely blunted the rise of populism,” said Foa. The findings are published today by Cambridge’s Bennett Institute for Public Policy. The first months of the pandemic saw many political leaders get a boost in ratings – a classic “rally round the flag” effect in troubled times, say researchers. However, the approval ratings of populist leaders the world over began declining almost as soon as coronavirus hit, and have continued to sink ever since. On average, populist leaders have seen a 10 percentage point drop between the spring of 2020 and the last quarter of 2021, while ratings for non-populists – on average – returned to around pre-pandemic levels. Electoral support also plunged for their parties – seen most clearly in Europe, where the proportion of people intending to vote for a populist party* has fallen by an average of 11 percentage points to 27%. Overall, across Europe, early lockdowns saw voting intention for incumbent parties increase. Yet all the continent’s governing populists – from Italy’s Five Star to Hungary’s Fidezs – bucked the trend with the largest declines in support. Support for Europe’s opposition populist parties also fell over the pandemic – by 5 pp on average to 11% – while it rose for “mainstream” opposition. Researchers suggest several factors for populism’s fading appeal. One is simply the botch job made of the pandemic by populist governments: from Bolsonaro’s mask veto to Trump’s “bleach injection” suggestion. The report’s polling shows the public considered populist leaders to be less trustworthy sources of virus-related information than centrist counterparts. In June 2020, approval of government handling of the crisis was 11 percentage points lower on average in countries with populist leaders than in those with more centrist governance. By the end of 2020, this gap had widened to 16 points. Researchers also found that political “tribalism” – fertile ground for populists – has declined in most countries. The percentage of party supporters expressing a “strong dislike” of those who vote for opposing politicians fell in most nations (although not the US) during the crisis. “The pandemic fostered a sense of shared purpose that may have reduced the political polarisation we’ve seen over the last decade,” said CFD researcher and report co-author Dr Xavier Romero-Vidal. “This could help explain why populist leaders are struggling to mobilise support.” Some of the ideas propagated by populists are losing ground. Levels of agreement with statements such as “corrupt elites” divide our nation or the “will of the people” should be obeyed fell in almost every nation surveyed.
Populism is inevitable and a structural cause – drastic changes in social and economic affairs means misinformation is not key to its buildup in European politics – the aff won’t solve populism with the plan
Sheri Berman 19 – Berman teaches political science at Barnard College at Columbia University and writes scholarly articles of the political landscape of Europe. ("Populism is a Symptom Rather than a Cause: Democratic Disconnect, the Decline of the Center-Left, and the Rise of Populism in Western Europe," Polity, 9-26-2019, https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/705378?journalCode=pol, Accessed 7-21-2022, LASA-KS)
How can we understand the rise of populism in Europe? Perhaps the most common approach is to look at the demand side, or the long-term structural changes that are said to have caused growing dissatisfaction with democracy and growing support for populism. This debate is primarily between those who stress economic factors and those who stress social factors. The former camp emphasizes the disruptive effects of globalization, neoliberalism, and technological change. In this view, increasing trade openness, the rise of non-Western economic powers, diminished government regulation, and growing automation have made life more insecure for the working and middle classes, have privileged highly educated and urban dwellers over less-educated and rural ones, and have made capitalism more of a zero-sum game.' These forces have also aggravated divisions within societies and between them. Over the past few decades, the economic winners have been the rising mid die classes in developing countries such as India and China and the wealthy in the West. The losers, meanwhile, have primarily been the lower and middle classes in the West, which explains their resentment of emerging economic powers as well as of elites in their own countries. The impact of these changes was exacerbated by the financial crisis of the late 2000s, which deepened social divisions and economic fears. A different narrative stresses social change as the root cause of populism. Over the past years, the foreign-born share of the population has reached historic heights in most European countries. The impact of this demographic shift was aggravated by the refugee crisis of 2015 and the fear generated by high-profile terrorist incidents, such as the November 2015 Islamist attacks in Paris, which killed over 400 people, and the December 2016 Islamist attack in Berlin that left a dozen people dead. The growth in the number of foreign-born residents, particularly of non-European backgrounds, occurred against the backdrop of an assault on traditional values that began the 1960s. According to this narrative, the cumulative impact of these change is that many citizens, particularly white males, have come to feel like strangers in their own countries. In this view, social change has led to a nativist or even racist backlash, with citizens growing dissatisfied with liberal democracy for allowing the decline of national cultures, traditions, and sovereignty. More recently, scholars have focused on the interaction between social and economic change. Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris argue that, during the postwar period, prosperity prompted a generational shift towards post-materialist values in the advanced industrial world that in turn prompted a reaction among more materialist voters. But this reaction exploded onto the political scene only when rising economic insecurity activated traditionalist and xenophobic attitudes that were already present. In a different analysis, Noam Gidron and Peter Hall stress the intraction of economic and social grievances, arguing that the decline of wellpaying, secure, respected jobs and the growing prominence and mobilization of women and minorities has combined to threaten the dominant status of white males in Western societies, leading to dissatisfaction with the political establishment and growing support for p
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