Aff - AI Clarity - Michigan Classic 2022 CGNO
Aff - AI Clarity - Michigan Classic 2022 CGNO.docx
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AI Clarity Notes Special Thanks to Ezra Gearheart, Evelyn Alsop, Isa Harrison, Ella Flores, Edward Mu, Alper Guvenen, Anna Yang, Annabelle Durbin, Rebecca Chan, Charles Harrington, Aaron Kinsley, and Jun Kwon for all their hard work and contributions. The idea behind this aff is that the US would cooperate with NATO on increasing clarity and transparency of AI and AI regulations- that could mean a variety of things. Info sharing between militaries, discussion and decision making around clarity on the legal and ethical frameworks of military AI. The first advantage argues that a creation of a clarity doctrine is what’s needed in order to win the tech race with china and create an alternative to digital authoritarianism. The basic spillover mechanism is trust- once transparency is created and set as a social norm, it would get through some of the roadblocks in AI development and innovation which accesses the second advantage. 1AC 1AC—Clarity China is quickly catching up to U.S. in AI development- technological cooperation key to developing a strong government led strategy NSCAI 21 “final report” National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence: Eric Schmidt (Chair) Safra Catz, Steve Chien, Mignon Clyburn, Chris Darby, Kenneth Ford, José-Marie Griffiths, Robert Work (Vice Chair), Eric Horvitz, Andrew Jassy, Gilman Louie, William Mark, Jason Matheny, Katharina McFarland, Andrew Moore https://www.nscai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf acd The impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on the world will extend far beyond narrow national security applications. The development of AI constitutes a new pillar of strategic competition, and it heightens the competition in existing pillars. The nation with the most resilient and productive economic base will be best positioned to seize the mantle of world leadership. That base increasingly depends on the strength of the innovation economy, which in turn will depend on AI. AI technologies will drive waves of advancement in critical infrastructure, commerce, transportation, health, education, financial markets, food production, and environmental sustainability. The race to research, develop, and deploy AI and associated technologies is already intensifying strategic competition. The U.S. government must embrace the AI competition and organize to win it. The American approach to innovation, which has served the country well for decades, must be recalibrated to account for the centrality of the competition involving AI and associated technologies to the emerging U.S.-China rivalry. To retain its innovation leadership and position in the world, the United States needs a stronger government-led technology strategy that integrates promotion and protection policies and links investments in AI to a larger constellation of related emerging technologies. This chapter articulates the nature of the AI competition and the two prerequisites for winning it: organizing for technology competition under White House leadership and establishing the principles for continued cooperation with competitors. The following chapters (10–16) enumerate the core elements of an integrated strategy and prescribe actions to ensure the United States wins the AI competition and sets the foundation to win the broader technology competition. It is foremost an affirmative agenda for growing and recruiting talent, promoting a diverse AI innovation ecosystem, and investing in the R&D to harness AI and associated technologies to build a healthier, more prosperous, and secure society. Protection of research, intellectual property (IP), and investments will be necessary to complement the effort to invigorate AI competitiveness at home and build a coalition of like-minded partners in the world. The U.S.-China AI Competition Is Serious and Complex. The leading indexes that measure progress in AI development generally place the United States ahead of China.2 However, the gap is closing quickly. China stands a reasonable chance of overtaking the United States as the leading center of AI innovation in the coming decade.3 In recent years, technology firms in China have produced pathfinding advances in natural language processing,4 facial recognition technology,5 and other AI-enabled domains. China’s businesses, investors, technologists, and academics are integral to global AI development. China’s social media and e-commerce companies compete for users around the world. Its telecoms build global 5G infrastructure. Its venture capitalists and large technology firms invest huge sums in new startups.6 Its leading AI companies have research labs in the United States7 and elsewhere.8 Its researchers produce a trove of respected AI papers that advance the field.9 None of this would concern us from a national security perspective, except for the fact that China is led by a single-party authoritarian regime that threatens American interests. China has moved more quickly and with more determination than the United States, guided by a constellation of AI plans for government ministries, universities, and companies.10 These strategic documents reflect Beijing’s view that advances in AI will fundamentally reshape military and economic competition in the coming decades.11 China has backed up its strategic plans with significant state subsidies to technology firms and academic institutions that engage in cutting-edge AI research.12 China preserves its capital by taking advantage of basic research done by the West so that it can focus more on applications. It pours significant sums of money into research and talent in relevant fields,13 and it promotes “national champion” companies to win markets abroad.14 Through its military-civil fusion programs, China has sought to integrate advances in AI from the commercial and academic worlds into military power.15 Using espionage, technology transfer programs, and targeted investment, Beijing seeks to acquire sensitive IP and data from the United States and other countries. The U.S.-China competition is complicated by the complex web of supply chains, research partnerships, and business relationships that link the world’s two AI leaders. Dramatic steps to sever these ties could be costly for Americans and reverberate across the world. The relationships between American and Chinese academics, innovators, and markets are deep, often mutually beneficial, and help advance the field of AI.17 Moreover, it remains in the U.S. national interest to leverage formal diplomatic dialogue about AI and other emerging technologies and to explore areas for cooperative AI projects that will benefit humanity. The United States can compete against China without ending collaborative AI research and severing all technology commerce. Broad-based technological decoupling with China could deprive U.S. universities and companies of scarce AI and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) talent,18 sever American companies’ efficient supply chains,19 and cut off access to markets and capital for innovative firms.20 Instead, the United States should conceive of targeted disentanglement as just one element of its overall approach, which, if applied judiciously to key sectors, can help build U.S. technological resilience, reduce threats from illicit technology transfer, and protect national security–critical sectors. (Tech race scenario) AI is a crucial component of the US-China tech race—without a clear and transparent model of digital governance to oppose digital authoritarianism the US will lose the tech race and the world will fall to digital authoritarianism Justin Sherman, 2019 (WIRED, Washington Post, The Atlantic, New America geopolitics contributor; New America; Chapter 3 “Why U.S.-China AI Competition Matters”,“Essay: Reframing the U.S.-China AI “Arms Race”; https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/reports/essay-reframing-the-us-china-ai-arms-race/why-us-china-ai-competition-matters//EF) Competing AI development in the United States ande China needs to be reframed from the AI arms race rhetoric, but that doesn’t mean AI development itself doesn’t matter. In fact, the opposite is true. We are in an era of great power competition, and U.S. policymakers must pay greater attention to artificial intelligence development domestically and in China, primarily for two reasons. First, artificial intelligence will have a profound impact on state power, mainly through economic growth and enhanced military capability. Second, global leaders in AI will set norms around its use—and around the use of technology in society writ large—which will have important influence on other “undecided” states and the future international order. This is why American policymakers should focus on engaging with China on AI projects without giving up critical expertise or technologies that could potentially enhance harmful applications of artificial intelligence, whether they are in governance, business, or the military. An Era of Great Power Competition We are entering an era of great power competition, characterized by “struggle, change, competition, the use of force, and the organization of national resources to enhance state power.” Industrial productivity, science, and technology are critical in this struggle as well, notes international relations scholar Paul Kennedy.41 Indeed, that seems to be the case. Amidst a heap of articles on the death of the liberal world order,42 there is also much concern in the American national security arena around China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—what political scientist Amy Zegart refers to as the “big four” due to their various elements of state power and the threat vectors they present (nuclear risks, cyber risks, territorial aggression against U.S. allies, and disruption of the international order).43 The great power competition that Paul Kennedy identified from the twentieth century is back in full force.44 Artificial Intelligence and State Power Artificial intelligence is poised to contribute greatly to bolstering a developed nation’s economy. Accenture Research and Frontier Economics predict, based on research in 12 developed countries, that AI could “double annual economic growth rates” in 2035 while also increasing labor productivity by up to 40 percent.49 McKinsey Global Institute predicts AI may deliver $13 trillion in global economic activity by 2030.50 PricewaterhouseCoopers puts that figure even higher at up to $15.7 trillion in global GDP growth by 2030, much of which will be due to productivity increases.51 These estimates are varied, but they all rightfully predict enormous economic growth due to an explosion in AI uses worldwide.52 However, these gains will not be evenly spread. As research from McKinsey Global Institute articulates, “leaders of AI adoption (mostly in developed countries) could increase their lead over developing countries,” and “leading AI countries could capture an additional 20 to 25 percent in net economic benefits, compared with today, while developing countries might capture only about 5 to 15 percent.”53 With the United States and China already representing the largest economies in the world, maximizing uses of AI within either nation could lead to massive gains in state power and influence on the global stage. “After all,” writes political scientist Michael Horowitz, “countries cannot maintain military superiority over the medium to long term without an underlying economic basis for that power.”54 Further, there is in part a question of pure economic power: If Chinese companies don’t just develop better but also use that AI more profitably than American firms, China benefits economically and by extension has more resources to build state power generally. That the United States currently has significant AI talent does not mean an American edge in AI development is decisive and everlasting. Militarily speaking, artificial intelligence is also revolutionary for state military power. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in China views AI as a revolutionary factor in military power and civil-military fusion,55 just as the U.S. Department of Defense has similarly recognized how advances in artificial intelligence “will change society and, ultimately, the character of war.”56 China is investing in this future. The PLA has already funded a number of AI military projects as part of its 13th Five-Year Plan, spanning command decision-making, equipment systems, robotics, autonomous operating guidance and control systems, advanced computing, and intelligent unmanned weapon systems.57 In 2017, President Xi Jinping called for the military to accelerate AI research in preparation for the future of war.58 There has even been a report of the Beijing Institute of Technology recruiting high-talent teenagers for a new AI weapons development program.59 The Chinese government is undoubtedly preparing to maximize its AI development in the service of maximizing its military power. That the United States currently has significant AI talent does not mean an American edge in AI development is decisive and everlasting. The United States has started to do the same, in some respects: It has established a Defense Innovation Board for ethics of AI in war,60 as well as a Joint Artificial Intelligence Center to develop “standards….tools, shared data, reusable technology, processes, and expertise” in coordination with industry, academia, and American allies.61 DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, currently has 25 programs in place focused on artificial intelligence research, and in September 2018, its director announced a plan to spend up to $2 billion over the next five years on more AI work.62 But there is still much to be done, as I’ll address in the last section. Even within the U.S. military’s approaches to artificial intelligence, as one West Point scholar notes, “the military is facing some hard questions about how it will adapt its culture and institutions to exploit new technologies—and civilians face a tough job ensuring they answer them effectively.”63 There are certainly military leaders aware of this fact—in announcing the $2 billion in AI funding, DARPA’s director depicted it “as a new effort to make such systems more trusted and accepted by military commanders”64—yet the road ahead will have its challenges. In general, the U.S. defense apparatus’ willingness to engage in cultural and operational shifts will greatly influence how successfully AI is integrated into the United States military. It’s also important to note that China’s government and its private companies will likely be less constrained by ethical and legal norms when developing AI than will their American counterparts.65 Faster deployment of and greater experimentation with AI may result, even though this may lead to perhaps chaotic or more unpredictable deployments of artificial intelligence—or, perhaps, plainly unethical uses of AI. This leads into the second main reason why U.S.-China AI competition still matters. Artificial Intelligence and Global Technology Norms Artificial intelligence is increasingly enabling authoritarian governance around the world. Many commentators have referred to this as “digital authoritarianism,”66 by which technologies like AI—deployed at scale to, say, bolster citywide facial recognition—enable or enhance authoritarian principles of state governance. Chinese companies have been complicit—and at times instrumental—in the diffusion of the technology and practices that enable this authoritarian governance. While Western companies sometimes export surveillance technology to dictators as well, most democratic governments take steps to prevent it through export controls, such as those established in the Wassenaar Arrangement.67 Artificial intelligence is increasingly enabling authoritarian governance around the world. Chinese firms have exported facial recognition systems to governments in Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, Zimbabwe, and Malaysia. Broader categories of surveillance technology—from national identity cards to biometric sensors, internet monitoring software, and more—are also exported by Chinese companies to governments in Ethiopia, Ecuador, South Africa, Bolivia, Egypt, Rwanda, and Saudi Arabia.68 In addition to enabling insidious social control and large-scale human rights abuses, such spread of surveillance technology—which includes AI—consolidates power in the hands of governments that are hostile, or typically align with powers hostile, to American interests.69 Democracy is under attack around the world,70 and authoritarian uses of AI further harm democratic norms and the state of democracy globally. This is especially true for the many countries who remain undecided in their use and regulation of technologies like artificial intelligence. This is an obvious strategic problem for U.S. policymakers, especially as Beijing has already sought to become a global leader in technology norms through an assortment of proposals at the likes of the United Nations71 and through channels such as IEEE.72 Unsurprisingly, this interest has already been reflected with respect to artificial intelligence. The China Electronics Standardization Institute, involved in standard-setting under China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, released a white paper in January 2018 on a framework for AI standardization.73 In April 2018, Chinese organizations hosted a major international AI standards meeting in Beijing.74 Similar to how China is proactive in trying to set global norms around the internet, it is also intent on setting global standards and norms around artificial intelligence and its use in society.75 As Jeffrey Ding, Paul Triolo, and Samm Sacks explain, “realizing that China’s many large companies are increasingly global players, and Chinese-developed AI algorithms will have effects on users outside of China, China’s government aims to advance global efforts to set standards around ethical and social issues related to AI algorithm deployment. Should Chinese officials and experts succeed in influencing such standards and related AI governance discussions, the policy landscape may skew toward the interests of government-driven technical organizations, attenuating the voices of independent civil society actors that inform the debate in North America and Europe.”76 This may very well become a greater trend—as China’s government and private industry develop increasingly sophisticated AI applications—that lends even further global influence to China alongside bigger economic advantage. It’s not just through diplomats, trade negotiators, and military officers that the Chinese or American government will exercise influence in areas of competition between the two countries (most obviously Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America). Without a clear, viable model of digital governance to oppose digital authoritarianism, the United States stands to lose political influence over a number of countries in these areas. This, too, will significantly impact great power competition, potentially in ways that diminish the relative importance of military power. The Chinese government, in this larger process of global norm-setting on uses of contemporary technologies, is attempting to remake the world in its image. This is why U.S. policymakers desperately need to reframe their thinking on AI competition. Authoritarian governments like China don’t have the capacity for complete totalitarianism right now but current development of Authoritarian AI will change that—The US is key to a democratic pushback to avoid global mind control and widespread explosive success of authoritarian empires- Wright 18 -- (Nicholas Wright is a cybersecurity fellow in New America’s International Security Program. Wright’s work combines neuroscientific, behavioural, and technological insights to understand decision-making in politics and international confrontations
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