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2022 MGC Kritik

K - Security K - Mean Green 2022

K - Security K - Mean Green 2022.docx

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K: Security—Neg
Core
Core: 1NC Shell
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Securitization causes endo-colonization---that makes ecological collapse, global war, and structural violence inevitable through a fear of difference---question their impacts because they’re founded on a simplified interpretation of the world
^^ Also a tech modernization link
Lacy 15, Mark---Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University, 2015 (“Security, Technology, and Global Politics: Thinking with Virilio, PRIO New Security Studies, pp. 8-10)
For Virilio, attempts to contain the insecurity of geopolitics through improved global governance, 'free markets' and the liberal peace might transform security and war around the world, creating a world of perpetual peace and prosperity. The global economy - coupled with the acceleration of technology - might generate harmonious and creative societies where the unpleasant jobs have been replaced by machines and where there is a growing consensus that we need to accelerate and intensify distributive justice around the planet. Technology will not only improve our health and security - it will foster a cosmopolitan society built on the information technologies that expand the possibilities for dialogue. The war game will become the peace game that aids the improvement of the human condition. Virilio isn't so sure about the optimistic liberal view of history. For Virilio, we are surrounded by the 'propaganda of an endless progress', the promise of a world where technology and capitalism will overcome the problems and suffering that have blighted the human condition; the 'propaganda of progress' is the vision of the future one often finds in corporate depictions of the future that illustrate how new products will transform life, creating an existence where a multitude of technologies are effortlessly integrated into everyday life to create more rewarding and efficient work and relationships.27 Virilio is less certain that technology and capitalism will improve the human condition, asking us to pay attention to what lies underneath this propaganda of progress in the world around us - in the stress, suffering, paranoia, control, exhaustion and inequality that he thinks might intensify in coming decades. Progress (and the peace game), on this view, is a progress in the arts and technologies of control designed to manage the growing numbers of the 'living dead' that are excluded from the 'legitimate' economy, to control those that seek to exploit vulnerabilities in 'network' society. As we see later, for Virilio the peace game is the war game turned inward, toward what he calls the endo-colonization of society, the attempt to control the constantly mutating terrains of security in the post-Cold War world. The other side of the 'propaganda of an endless progress' is the 'administration of fear': Virilio suggests that we need to pay attention to the way fear (usually fear of otherness and difference) is used to distort debate over the problems we confront (so, for example, when fear of immigrants is presented as the cause of our economic woes and societal implosion - and the route to further disorder). For Virilio, we need to negotiate our way through both the propaganda of progress and the administration of fear, to pay attention to the way we can be captured by these 'easy' modes of responding to the world around us, to be constantly aware of these two very different traps. 9 Our world might be heading toward the realization of the liberal dream of progress but Virilio looks around and sees a world of accelerating ecological, economic and social degradation; politics becomes an increasingly narrow attempt to manage the insecurity and messiness in societies intent on realizing the dream of a fast and efficient consumer lifestyle. On this view, the politics of security that promises to control the messiness has a tendency to get out of control, nourishing the 'war-machine' and the 'military scientific complex', producing misguided security projects that generate chaos in the realization of policies that are often driven by fear, technological optimism about what technology and war can achieve, and a sense of cultural and racial superiority. 28 We might believe that we will learn from our mistakes (such as the wars that have dominated the first decade of the twenty-first century after 9111) but that is to become caught up with the 'propaganda of endless progress'. There is an excess to security that results in 'unnecessary wars' that become experimental zones for new technologies - and there is desire to control all aspects of life in increasingly intensive and extensive ways that risks to undermine civil liberties, tipping the balance of liberty and security toward the endo-colonization of society; an excessive focus on the problems of 'otherness' to the exclusion of the insecurity that comes from inside, from our financial systems or modes of consumption. Military and political elites get caught up in the seductive possibilities offered by new technologies, the god-like ability to control the world. Virilio comments that: the nature of absolute speed is also to be absolute power, absolute and instantaneous control, in other words an almost divine power. Today, we have achieved the three attributes of the divine: ubiquity, instantaneity, immediacy; omnivoyance and omnipotence. 29 We can see an example of this excess of security and the desire to obtain these attributes of the divine in the discovery in June 2013 that the National Security Agency obtained direct access to the digital infrastructures of Google, Facebook, Apple and other companies, allowing the PRISM program to access the emails, file transfers, search histories and live chats of all citizens, the metadata of the world. While this desire to become an omnipotent machine of surveillance might confront ethical and limits - or might confront the limits of what is possible, the excess of information - the intention is clearly to know everything. 30 Or we can see this desire to control the world from a distance in the development of drone technology: machines of vision and death that make possible control-at-a distance. In his preface to The Administration of Fear, Betrand Richard notes that 'this son of an Italian communist and a catholic from Brittany traces the rules of the game in which we are caught. And that we must escape' .31 We are trapped in a perverse situation where our societies are obsessed with security - but are governed with a security politics and economic policy that appears to be making the societies we live in more fragile (and thus requiring more 'security' and 'protection sciences'). The question that Virilio leaves us with is - after we negotiate through the propaganda of progress and the administration of fear - how do we escape the dangers of our accelerating reality, the darker possibilities made possible by the modem world? There is a sense in Virilio's work that past attempts to re-design how we live were not up to the task, producing new 'traps', new types of control. 10 So the optimistic 'liberal' student of international politics won't find much to agree with in Virilio's vision of politics and security. For the liberal optimist, the modem age has made it possible for our 'rationality' to overcome the irrational and dangerous aspects of the human condition; while there is much more to 'overcome' we are heading in the right direction and progress in this overcoming will be aided by new 'tools' and technologies; human existence is more civilized and secure than at any point in our history.32 The liberal will reply that information technologies are creating the foundation for a global public sphere that generates a 'transparent society' that makes it harder for states to hide what they do; Virilio replies that information technologies create new types of control and incarceration. Freedom and progress in this world order are illusions that mask the stress, control and inequality created by the system. The liberal will suggest that the continued growth in a interconnected global economy - where crisis is simply a glitch on the way to a world of progress for everybody around the planet - is a sign of the liberal capitalist world's resilience, its superiority to other ways of organizing human life.33 Virilio would reply that we should be careful not to mistake this resilience as proof of the universal or 'timeless' vitality or appeal of a capitalist (and not necessarily liberal) world order. The liberal sees global mobility as a symbol of the emerging cosmopolitan world order that overcomes the limits of locality and nationalism. Virilio sees global mobility in terms of forced migration, of border camps, of climate refugees, of habitats that can no longer support human life. Writing about Michel Foucault's studies of prisons and asylums Virilio comments: 'I think that the real imprisonment is just ahead. '34 For Virilio, the problems on the horizon will expose the fragility of the ways of organizing life that were enjoyed in the West through the second half of the twentieth century: rapid technological, ecological and geopolitical transformation will force us to confront a reality where it becomes difficult to hold on to the values and ideas that shaped political imaginations in the West during much of the previous century.
Vote neg to reject the 1AC in favor of insecurity---that interrogates and disrupts the epistemological failures of the 1AC
Philippe Bourbeau 15, Associate Professor, holder of the Canada Research Chair in Immigration and Security, in the Department of Political Science at the University Laval, Ph.D. from the University of British Columbia, Juha A. Vuori, Professor of World Politics at the University of Helsinki, Adjunct Professor of International Politics at the University of Tampere, 11/16/15, “Security, resilience and desecuritization: multidirectional moves and dynamics,” Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 257-259
Securitization and desecuritization ¶ The ceteris paribus normative push, and political recommendation of the securitization approach has been ‘less security, more politics’, and the development of ‘possible modalities’ for the desecuritization of politics (Wæver 1989a, 52): it is generally (which can only be assessed in practice though) more conducive to treat identities as identities, religion as religion, the environment as the environment, and so on, and to engage their politics through the particular modalities and rationalities of those fields rather than those of security. In the received reading, whilst securitization raises issues into the realm of security policies and practices (arrow 2a in Figure 1), desecuritization lowers issues back into the realm of ‘regular politics’ or removes issues from the political agenda altogether (arrow 1 in Figure 1). ¶ Desecuritization can be achieved through a number of options: by simply not talking about issues in terms of security, by keeping responses to securitized issues in forms that do not create security dilemmas or other vicious spirals, and by moving security issues back into ‘normal politics’ (Wæver 2000, 253). These options can follow objectivist, constructivist or deconstructivist strategies in bringing about desecuritization (Huysmans (1995, 65–67). These strategies differ in regard to how the process relates to the claimed threat: has the threat been dealt with, can the security drama be somehow handled from without, or can identities beyond security threats be produced from within the process. ¶ Beyond conceptualizing desecuritization as an option or a strategy, it has also been viewed from the viewpoint of political actors (de Wilde 2008, 597), and their political moves in games of contestation and resistance (Vuori 2011a, 2015). There can be desecuritizing actors who evade, circumvent or directly oppose securitizing moves by, for example, emphasizing competing threats (de Wilde 2008, 597). Security policies aim at desecuritization (the solution to the threatening situation), but desecuritization can also happen independently from the actions of securitizing or desecuritizing actors: the original security problem may be solved, institutions may adapt through new reproductive structures, discourses may change (e.g., with the loss of interest or audiences), and the original referent object may be lost (de Wilde 2008). ¶ A key issue of debate has been on whether desecuritization can be considered to be an active political process, or whether desecuritization can only happen as a fading away of the issue (Behnke 2006, 65): the question is whether the logic and possibility of securitization is necessarily retained in explicit discussions of whether an issue has retained the status of a security issue. As empirical studies of securitization and desecuritization dynamics (e.g., Salter and Mutlu 2013; Lupovici 2014; Vuori 2015; Donnelly 2015) have shown, it is difficult to point to a definitive end point for either securitization or desecuritization: political and social situations evolve. Whichever the philosophical stance on how and whether desecuritization can be achieved (Vuori 2011a), such empirical studies show that political actors do make active desecuritization moves. ¶ Indeed, systematizing empirical studies of desecuritization, Hansen (2012, 529; 539–545) has identified four ideal type forms for the concept. In regard to its issues of concern, namely the status of enmity and the possibility of a public sphere, when a larger conflict is still within the realm of possibility, but when a particular issue is presented with terms other than security, we have an instance of (1) ‘change through stabilisation’ (arrow 2b in Figure 1); when another issue takes the place of a previously securitized issue, we have (2) ‘replacement’; when the originally phrased threat is resolved, we have (3) rearticulation; and finally, when potentially insecure subjects are marginalized through depoliticization, we have (4) ‘silencing’ (types 2–3 are represented by arrow 1 in Figure 1). ¶ The previous literature on both securitization (arrow 2a in Figure 1) and desecuritization (arrow 1 in Figure 1) has produced ample illustrations of both dynamics. As a brief example of how both dynamics can alter between the same political actors, we can use some of the vicissitudes of Sino-Soviet relations. ¶ China entered the Cold War in the Soviet camp and relied on the Soviet Union as the guarantee of the international security of the new People’s Republic. Chinese views in the late 1940s clearly structured the world into two opposing camps, with China firmly in the Soviet one (Mao 1949). In the 1950s, however, Sino-Soviet relations soured, and the following ‘Sino-Soviet split’ (Lüthi 2008) has been used as an example of the capacity of ‘parochial’ securitizations to become disaffected by or even be withdrawn from dominant ‘macrosecuritizations’ (Buzan and Wæver 2009, 257). ¶ Following the split, Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960s were characterized by intensive ideological conflict, and Mao Zedong securitized Soviet revisionism as a major threat for the Chinese Communist Party (Vuori 2011b). Indeed, newly available documents suggest that it was the Chinese side, in effect Mao Zedong, which was more active in the pursuit of ideological conflict (Lüthi 2008, 2). In his securitization of the Soviet Union, Mao linked the revisionism he identified there to that which he also securitized domestically (Vuori 2011b), and the issue of revisionism was presented as an issue of life and death for the party. ¶ Sino-Soviet relations began to mend in the 1980s with the removal of a number of political obstacles and with the intensification of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union (Wishnick 2001). Yet, it is only with the fall of the Soviet Union that we can see an overall desecuritization in the form of rearticulation (Hansen 2012, 542–544) taking place in Sino-Russian relations. In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, China’s line was not to take the lead in international affairs. China worked towards ‘world multipolarization’, which was exemplified with China and Russia forming a ‘strategic partnership’ in 1996. China and Russia even shared the same ‘threat package’ of ‘terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism’ (the ‘three evils’) within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Jackson 2006, 310). These are strong indicators of how the two states have managed to reform their identities away from the Sino-Soviet antagonism. In the overall state relations then, we can see a rearticulative desecuritization tactic at play on both sides: ever since the early 1980s, China’s policy towards the Soviet Union (and later Russia) shifted from antagonism to one of collaboration and negotiation rather than securitization.¶ Desecuritization can be conceptualized in the above manner as a negative ontological corollary to securitization. Yet, it is also prudent to investigate securitization and desecuritization as political moves in order to potentially understand the logic of when and how they are wielded in practical politics. It is proposed here that in addition to instances where a securitized situation is dismantled (arrow 1 in Figure 1), desecuritization can also be viewed as a political move that can be deployed before ‘securitization plays’ in a game of securitization (arrow 2a in Figure 1). In other words, desecuritization moves – both in terms of discourse and practice – can be used in a pre-emptive manner before the threshold of securitization is reached (arrow 2b in Figure 1). For Wæver (2000, 254), silencing can be a strategy to ‘pre-empt or forestall securitization’. We argue here that beyond silencing, active desecuritization efforts can be made to block the escalation of a contention. Thereby, in addition to change through stabilization (Hansen 2012) and the silencing of an issue (Wæver 2000), there can be explicit rebuttals of security frames and claims before they are solidified into policy. This tactic can be termed ‘pre-emptive desecuritization through rebuttal’.
Core: FW—2NC
1---counter-interpretation---epistemology comes first---if we disprove the justifications of the plan, it means you should be suspect about the aff’s conclusions and the efficacy of the aff
2---clash---our model is best for it---the aff chose their reps, they should be prepared to defend them---ensures in-depth debates about the aff instead of stale and generic debates about implementation
3---implementation is unrealistic---the aff doesn’t actually get implemented if you vote for them, which means you should prioritize subject formation from our epistemological orientations
4---Epistemology comes first---IR constitutes itself through linguistic and discursive practices like the aff---policy cannot be disentangled from its epistemological justifications
Ringmar 14 – Erik Ringmar is professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at İbn Haldun Üniversitesi, Istanbul, Turkey; 2014 (“Performance, Not Performativity: An Embodied Critique of Post-Structural IR Theory”, Performativity and Agency in International Politics, Available online at https://lucris.lub.lu.se/ws/files/6266345/7512005.pdf, Accessed 03-08-2021)
When applied to the study of international politics, this position turns into a critique of the state, or rather, a critique of sovereignty. There is no state, say post-structural international relations scholars such as Cynthia Weber and David Campbell, at least if we take the state to constitute a pre-existing subject to which sovereignty can be attached as an attribute.9 Focusing on “institutions,“ the “people,“ or perhaps on the state as a transcendental idea, mainstream accounts always presuppose that which they intend to prove. Instead sovereignty must be understood as the process through

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