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2022 MGC Negative

Neg - AI Interoperability - Mean Green 2022

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Case Neg – Mean Green Debate
Case – Cyber
1NC vs Cyber ADV
New Russian attacks wont reach the threshold of article V
The Hill 6/14/2022
“Finland, Sweden’s NATO moves prompt fears of Russian cyberattacks”, https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/3488518-finland-swedens-nato-moves-prompt-fears-of-russian-cyber-attacks/
Finland and Sweden’s move to join NATO has raised concerns about potential cyber retaliation from Russia, which sees the expansion of the alliance as a direct threat.
While it is too early to judge how Russia might try to use its cyber capabilities against Finland, Sweden or other NATO members, including the U.S., experts said it will likely launch unsophisticated and small-scale cyberattacks as a form of protest against the expansion.
Such attacks would not have the severity of cyber efforts Moscow launched against Ukraine amid the Russian invasion of that country.
No cyber war or retaliation
Rodet 18
Jasmine, Master’s Degree in Cyber Security, Strategy, and Diplomacy from the University of New South Wales, Cyber Security Program Manager at Fortescue Metals Group, “The Threat of Cyber War is Exaggerated”, 11/11/2018, linkedin.com/pulse/threat-cyber-war-exaggerated-jasmine-rodet/
For the regular person on the street, the term ‘cyber war’ is more likely to bring to mind the 1983 movie “WarGames” and the doomsday articles that appear regularly in the media about the ‘cyber battlefield’ and an impending World War III. This essay argues that the threat of cyber war is exaggerated and although it can, by definition, be stated that we are already in a state of cyber war, the impact on states is negligible compared to conventional war domains.
The argument is presented in 3 steps. The first step is to define cyber war and cyber weapons, referencing scholars and experts in the area of conventional war and the cyber domain. The second step is to explore who has been exaggerating the threat of cyber war and what their motivations might be. The third is to explore the evidence and quantify the probability and impact that cyberwar has had on states to date.
‘Cyber war’ is a term often used interchangeably in media with cyber-crime, cyber-attacks, cyber-conflict and cyber-incidents, creating confusion amongst the public and scholars alike. Clausewitz (1989, 75), in his book, On War, defines war as ‘an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will’. Rid (2012, 7) on the other interprets Clausewitz use of ‘force’ as meaning ‘violent’ force. According to Rid, if an act is not potentially violent, it is not an act of war. However, Stone (2013, 107) describes ‘cyber war’ as a politically motivated act of force, not necessarily lethal and not necessarily attributable. The definition by Powers and Jablonski states more simply that cyber war is the utilisation of digital networks for geopolitical purposes (Nocetti 2016, 464). Neither of the latter two definitions requires violence to qualify as cyber war. Under these definitions, the Stuxnet cyber-incident in 2010 and the Estonia incident in 2007 would constitute an act of cyber war, and as such we could say that nations have been at cyber war in the past and are likely to continue to engage in cyber war in years to come.
For this essay, I will use Stones definition to argue that even though states may engage in cyber war, the concept of cyber war is exaggerated. It seems that cyber war is deliberately exaggerated in the media and by politicians for financial and political gains. There are countless examples in the media and in politics of the exaggeration of the threat of cyber war and the language used plays a big factor in creating a sense of fear in the community.
The Four Corners report, Hacked, is a classic example where the reporter, Andrew Fowler describes the current situation in Australia as ‘… a secret war where the body count is climbing every day’ (Fowler 2013). The documentary reveals nothing violent or lethal about cyber incidents. The documentary is actually about hackers working from locations overseas, having targeted key Federal Government departments and major corporations in Australia.
In another example, NATO may be interpreted as exaggerating the threat of Cyber War when they invited Charlie Millar to present at their Conference for Cyber Conflict at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in 2017. Millar is an independent security evaluator, and his presentation was titled ‘Kim Jong-il and me: How to build a cyber army to attack the US’. He later presented similar content at Def Con 2018. His presentation described the steps he would take to mount a cyber war, including the types of people he would engage, how much he would pay them, what his strategy would be and how much it would cost in total.
Who stands to gain from the exaggeration and hype? Logically, one group would be those that gain financially from the sale of cyber protective services and software. According to Valerino, 57% of technical experts surveyed said that we are currently in a cyber arms race and 43% said that the worst-case scenarios are inevitable (Valeriano and Ryan 2015). Translate this into sales and Gartner projects worldwide security spending will reach $96 Billion in 2018, up 8 Percent from 2017 and to top $113 billion by 2020 (Gartner 2017).
Additionally, there may be political motivations to exaggerate the threat of cyber war. Cyberspace is not well understood by the general public and fear is natural. In the US’s cyber security debate, observers have noted there is a tendency for policymakers, military leaders, and media, among others, to use frightening ‘cyber-doom scenarios’ when making a case for action on cyber security (Dunn 2008, 2).
There is some evidence to suggest that more recently in the political arena; we may be maturing in our understanding of the real threat of cyber war. The Tallinn Manual, an academic, non-binding study on how international law applies to cyber conflicts and cyber warfare, was written at the invitation of the Tallinn-based NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. It was first published in 2013 with the title ‘The Tallinn Manual on the International Law of Cyber War’. In 2017, it was re-released with the revised title ‘Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law of Cyber Operations’. The change in title from ‘war’ to ‘operations’ signifies a more moderate use of language from NATO and is an acknowledgement that cyber incidents generally fall below the threshold at which International Law would declare them to be a formal act of war. Experience over the 4 short years from 2013 to 2017 has demonstrated that cyber incidents tend to have a low-level impact on the target state. As the book’s authors put it ‘the focus of the original Manual was on the most severe cyber operations, those that violate the prohibition of the use of force in international relations, entitle states to exercise the right of self-defence, and/or occur during armed conflict’ while the new version ‘adds a legal analysis of the more common cyber incidents that states encounter on a day-to-day basis and that fall below the thresholds of the use of force or armed conflict’ (Leetaru 2017).
To get a better sense if cyber war is exaggerated, we must also consider the probability of cyber war in the future. The probability of cyber war should be weighed up against the probability of conventional war. Where tensions are already high, for example, between North Korea and the US or Russia and Estonia, I would argue that cyber war is more likely than conventional war. This is due to factors including; cyber warfare is less costly than conventional warfare, states are less rational in their decision space in the cyber realm, states find cyber attribution very difficult to achieve so attacks can be undertaken covertly and cyber war is considered ‘a challenge’ and central to the hackers’ ethos (Junio 2013, 128). Further, Sanger describes in his book, The Perfect Weapon, cyber weapons (such as cyber vandalism, Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS), intrusions and advanced persistent threat (APT)) as the ‘perfect weapons’ for the following reasons;
They are cheap: When compared to Nuclear weapons, there are only a handful of nations globally that can afford the technology to create a nuclear weapon.
They are easily accessible: Unlike a Nuclear bomb that requires uranium, a highly protected metal, in the production process, a cyber weapon can be created with minimal investment and highly available IT infrastructure.
They can be dialled-up or dialled-down relatively easily. A ballistic missile, the force of the explosion cannot be adjusted as easily as a DDOS attack. A DDOS attack can be adjusted to last an hour, a few days or a few weeks.
They have a huge range in how they are used: Sabotage as with Stuxnet, Espionage as with the Chinese industrial spying on the US, North Korea’s infiltration of Sony, the Iranians attack on Las Vegas Sands Corp. casino operators.
The significant factor is that cyber weapons can and are being used every day for discrete, low-level cyber conflicts to undermine and disrupt rivals, but historically it has not progressed to open conflict, nor has it warranted a military response (Sanger 2018). Additionally, massive cyber operations would necessarily impact the civilian population and violate the immunity of non-combatants. The conditions of war dictate that this is “taboo” and to date, rival states have shown restraint in their use of cyber weapons for this reason (Valeriano and Ryan 2015). It appears that the threat that cyber weapons represent to national security is overstated and the threat of cyber war is overstated.
The US and likely other highly networked nations appear reticent about using cyber weapons for significant cyber conflict given their vulnerabilities. Ironically, NSA programs such as PRISM have made the US more of a target given the sheer volume of sensitive information stored in one place. Regardless of US defences, there is no way to make this information completely secure from intrusion, and as such, the very act of storing the information makes them more vulnerable.
Rid (2012) is among some academics who argue that cyber war has never and will likely never eventuate. The benefits of being on this side of the debate mean that public funding can be allocated away from offensive cyber security initiatives to other, potentially more important initiatives, such as public health and housing. The government is constantly under pressure to prioritise public spending and it is imperative that they have realistic, accurate projections regarding the risk of cyber war, the probability and the impact, to allow them to focus spending on the most important areas.
Cyber threats are OVERBLOWN – most recent studies prove
Maschmeyer & Kostyuk 2/8/2022
Lennart Maschmeyer is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of Toronto and co-chairs the FIRST Threat Intel Coalition as well as the European Cybersecurity Seminar. Nadiya Kostyuk is an assistant professor at the School of Public Policy and the School of Cybersecurity and Privacy at the Georgia Institute of Technology. She directs the Cybersecurity Summer Institute and co-chairs the Digital Institute Discussion Group. She holds a Ph.D. from the University of Michigan. “THERE IS NO CYBER ‘SHOCK AND AWE’: PLAUSIBLE THREATS IN THE UKRAINIAN CONFLICT”, https://warontherocks.com/2022/02/there-is-no-cyber-shock-and-awe-plausible-threats-in-the-ukrainian-conflict/ -- ECM
The specter of cyber war is back. Not only does Russia’s massive military buildup along Ukraine’s borders bring a growing risk of the largest-scale military clash since World War II, but many analysts stress the potential for destabilizing and devastating cyber-attacks in its wake. Jason Healey predicts that if Russia invades, “the opening salvo is likely to be with offensive cyber capabilities.” William Courtney and Peter A. Wilson from RAND warn of the “massive employment” of cyber warfare tools to create “shock and awe causing Ukraine’s defenses or will to fight to collapse.” Accordingly, the United States and the United Kingdom have deployed cyber warfare teams to help Ukraine defend against an impending strategic cyber strike against critical infrastructure. Some go further, suggesting that Russia may not need to use military force at all, because cyber strikes can “achieve much the same effect from across the border.” This assessment is apparently shared by policymakers working on countering the Russian threat to Ukraine, with an (anonymous) senior Biden administration official recently stating as much.
These predictions suggest that cyber operations will provide significant strategic advantages to Russia either as complements to military force, or as standalone instruments — or at least that policymakers and commentators think that they will. Current warnings of escalating cyber warfare conjure deep-seated fears of cyber doom and the recurring specter of a “cyber Pearl Harbor” strategic surprise attack. In practice, however, cyber warfare has been a failure. Our research shows that cyber operations have remained irrelevant on the battlefield, while standalone operations to weaken Ukraine through election interference, critical infrastructure sabotage, and economic disruption largely failed to contribute to Russia’s strategic goals of making Ukraine abandon its pro-European Union and pro-NATO foreign policy. Consequently, current fears of cyber warfare defy not only Russia’s track record in Ukraine, but also strategic logic. Given that Russia’s cyber operations have failed to produce significant strategic value to date, why would we expect this to suddenly change now? Or, to put it more pointedly: If cyber operations offer such effective and potent instruments, why did Russia go through the trouble (and costs) to mobilize its troops? Current predictions of cyber onslaught do not offer a persuasive answer.
Giving in to these fears risks fighting phantom threats, playing into Russia’s hands by distracting from the need to counter its military threat and sowing fear and confusion — at least among Western audiences. A level-headed analysis of the threat that distinguishes what is theoretically possible from what is practically feasible is urgently needed. Our research suggests that, contrary to hysteria, cyber operations will remain of secondary importance and at best provide marginal gains to Russia.
2NC/1NR – Cyber Attacks wont trigger Article V
New attacks against NATO, Finland, or Sweden are UNLIKELY to trigger article V
The Hill 5/14/2022
“Finland, Sweden’s NATO moves prompt fears of Russian cyberattacks”, https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/3488518-finland-swedens-nato-moves-prompt-fears-of-russian-cyber-attacks/
“I think it’s unlikely that Russia will launch the types of cyberattacks against Finland and Sweden like it did with Ukraine, primarily because the aims are different,” said Jason Blessing, a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
Blessing said that since Russia has no intention, at least for the moment, to invade Finland or Sweden, it may use different cyber tactics than it did with Ukraine to get its message across.
He added that it’s likely that Russia will launch unsophisticated types of attacks including website defacement and distributed denial-of-service attacks to disrupt its enemies’ networks rather than starting a full-scale cyber warfare.
Russian cyberattacks on Finland and Sweden wont trigger follow-up military actions
Orenstein 6/7/2022
Mitchell Orenstein is a Senior Fellow at FPRI’s Eurasia Program and Professor and Chair of Russian and Eastern European Studies at the University of Pennsylvania, “Russia’s Use of Cyberattacks: Lessons from the Second Ukraine War”, https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/06/russias-use-of-cyberattacks-lessons-from-the-second-ukraine-war/ -- ECM
Russia also deploys cyberattacks as a poignant warning or threat, often to put more force behind diplomatic actions.
For instance, on April 8, 2022, while Ukrainian President Zelensky gave an invited address to the Finnish Parliament, the Finnish foreign and defense ministries were hit by a distributed denial of service attack. Finnish government systems were back up in an hour, but given the circumstances, this cyberattack appears to have been designed to signal Russia’s displeasure with Finland’s plans to join NATO and its support of Ukraine. This attack was presaged by Russian diplomatic statements warning Finland of “retaliatory steps” to joining NATO. To date, it remains the only significant cyberattack against Finland or Sweden as they planned their applications to join the alliance. This attack bears similarities to other instances where Russia used cyberattacks to emphasize diplomatic warnings.
Following the 2015 doping scandal that resulted in the Russian Olympic team being banned from the Olympics through 2022, Russian military intelligence launched a significant cyberattack against the Swedish Sports Confederation while Sweden was issuing a bid to host the 2026 Winter Olympics. These cyberattacks were part of a “systematic campaign” targeting FIFA, the World Anti-Doping Agency, and the United States Anti-Doping Agency in furtherance of diplomatic goals rather than military or societal disruption.
Three Distinct Uses of Cyberattacks
Russia uses cyberattacks in three different ways. First, it deploys cyberattacks to prepare and facilitate military conflict by attacking critical infrastructure such as government websites, IT servers, banks, media outlets, and power plants. As the Second Ukraine War shows, Russia seeks to disrupt and disable critical infrastructure to advance its military goals.
Russia also deploys cyberattacks as part of a hybrid war strategy that substitutes for war. These attacks may be persistent over longer periods of time. However, Russia deploys cyberattacks in smaller quantities and often combined with other hybrid or political war techniques, such as disinformation campaigns and civil actions in targeted countries. In these instances, Russia does not appear to intend imminent military action, but may seek to degrade defensive capabilities.
Cyberattacks may also be deployed as a more isolated threat signal and complement to diplomatic warnings, when a country takes actions that Russia interprets as unfriendly. For these purposes, cyberattacks are more frequently combined with traditional diplomacy.
2NC/1NR – XT 2 & 3 No Escalation
Empirics prove – You should subscribe a low risk to their advantage
Orenstein 6/7/2022
Mitchell Orenstein is a Senior Fellow at FPRI’s Eurasia Program and Professor and Chair of Russian and Eastern European Studies at the University of Pennsylvania, “Russia’s Use of Cyberattacks: Lessons from the Second Ukraine War”, https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/06/russias-use-of-cyberattacks-lessons-from-the-second-ukraine-war/ -- ECM
The empirical record of cyber conflict, however, suggests that what is feasible in practice is far more limited. Ukraine has been a “giant test lab” where Russia, one of the world’s foremost cyber powers, has experimented with cyber operations for eight years. Yet these operations have failed to produce significant strategic value either as force complements or standalone tools.
The substitutability argument — that states can or do substitute cyber operations for the use of force — has little empirical support since Russia levied no major cyber operations against Ukraine in the runup to the military escalation of the conflict in 2014. While it is possible that we do not know about such operations given their veil of secrecy, it is clear that any attempted but undetected cyber surprise strike failed to produce any measurable effects.
Evidence supporting the complementarity perspective is similarly sobering. One of us has examined the role of low-level disruptive 

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