DA - DOD Tradeoff - Mean Green 2022
DA - DOD Tradeoff - Mean Green 2022.docx
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1NC Tradeoff US security cooperation is focused on Taiwan now Menendez and Graham 6/17/2022 [U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) and Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), “MENENDEZ, GRAHAM INTRODUCE COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATION TO OVERHAUL U.S.-TAIWAN POLICY”, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/menendez-graham-introduce-comprehensive_legislation-to-overhaul-us-taiwan-policy] WASHINGTON – U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) and Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) announced they have introduced the bipartisan Taiwan Policy Act of 2022. The new legislation, which comes in the wake of last week’s threats by Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe’s that China will “not hesitate to start a war” and “smash to smithereens” Taiwan, represents the most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. policy towards Taiwan since the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. The bipartisan proposal expands U.S. efforts to promote the security of Taiwan, ensures regional stability, and deters further People’s Republic of China (PRC) aggression against Taiwan. The legislation also imposes steep costs on the PRC for hostile action against Taiwan by setting up a broad economic sanctions regime. Specifically, the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 creates a new initiative to bolster Taiwan’s defense capabilities, providing almost $4.5 billion in security assistance over the next four years. The bill also bolsters support for Taiwan’s democratic government; provides additional support for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations and in multilateral trade architecture; takes concrete steps to counter PRC’s aggressive coercion and influence campaigns; creates a Taiwan Fellowship Program; and designates Taiwan as a Major Non-NATO Ally. Under U.S. law, a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status designation is a powerful symbol that provides our closest global partners with additional benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation. “As Beijing continues to seek to coerce and isolate Taiwan there should be no doubt or ambiguity about the depth and strength of our determination to stand with the people of Taiwan and their democracy,” said Chairman Menendez. “The Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 represents a seminal statement of the United States’ absolute commitment to stand with Taiwan and all those who share our interests and our values in the Indo-Pacific in the face of Beijing’s military, economic, and diplomatic threats and bullying. The United States and our partners have a critical window of opportunity to reinvigorate our diplomatic strategy to assure cross-Strait stability and security and to work with Taipei to modernize their military; embed them in the region’s economic architecture; combat Beijing’s political influence and misinformation campaigns; and develop deeper ties between our two peoples. I thank Senator Graham for working with me on this landmark legislation to send a clear message to Beijing not to make the same mistakes with Taiwan that Vladimir Putin has made in Ukraine.” “I’m very pleased to be working with Senator Menendez to strengthen the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Our bill is the largest expansion of the military and economic relationship between our two countries in decades,” said Senator Graham. “When it comes to Taiwan, our response should be that we are for democracy and against communist aggression. We live in dangerous times. China is sizing up America and our commitment to Taiwan. The danger will only grow worse if we show weakness in the face of Chinese threats and aggression toward Taiwan. I’m hopeful we will receive large bipartisan support for our legislation and that the Biden Administration will sign on in support.” The plan’s spending trades off – R&D in Europe takes focus and resources away from East Asia – the impact is war over Taiwan *Answers “we solve because we’re good for heg” Colby 3/28/2022 [Elbridge A., principal at The Marathon Initiative. He is the author of The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict from Yale University Press, “More Spending Alone Won’t Fix the Pentagon’s Biggest Problem”, https://time.com/6161573/us-defense-budget-strategy/] Fourth, we need to spend a higher fraction of our defense budget on dealing with China in Asia, limiting our ability to pursue dominance in other theaters. This is because we should spend more than merely a bare plausible minimum on China, particularly ensuring our forces are able to prevail in the Pentagon’s “pacing scenario”—Taiwan. The stakes of a war in the world’s most important region between the globe’s two superpowers are too great and the uncertainty of how such a great power war would unfold too profound. Accordingly, we should spend enough on dealing with China to be very confident we could successfully deny Beijing the ability to subordinate a U.S. ally or Taiwan. In practical terms, this means we should hedge by constructing both long-range strike capabilities less vulnerable to Chinese preemption and resilient forward-deployed forces, not only to build redundancy into our plans but also to impose dilemmas on Beijing’s planning and galvanize allied efforts. The upshot of this is that a greater portion of any defense spending increases should go to Asia than many realize, constraining our ability to pursue multi-theater dominance. Fifth, we also need to acknowledge that there are no easy routes to restoring global military dominance. The reality is that military investments in today’s environment are less multipurpose or fungible than some contend. Fundamentally, we are not preparing for, say, simultaneous wars against 1990s Iraq and North Korea, over whom our armed forces would dominate, swinging forces such as bombers, tankers, and carriers as needed between the conflicts to address whatever deficiencies might arise. Rather, we are dealing with great powers. In this context, our military investments are much more often zero-sum—they do trade off against each other. This is partially because of probable attrition. If we are to be prudent in planning for a war with China or Russia, we must assume that our forces would take significant losses, including in the key war-winning capabilities needed to prevail and where our scarcity is most acute. Vital systems like B-2 stealth bombers, attack submarines, satellites, and possibly even aircraft carriers would be lost and critical munitions like long-range anti-ship missiles and land-attack air-launched missiles expended in considerable numbers. Such losses would, if we did not have adequate stocks of replacements, make us highly vulnerable in a second—let alone third—theater, possibly for years given the timelines required for replenishing these forces. It is also because even those forces that do survive are more likely to be fixed in a given region or for a particular conflict, limiting their flexibility. This is at root because a war with a China or Russia would be a much different affair than, say, defeating the Iraqi military in 2003. Fighting a great power would almost certainly be much tougher and take a considerably longer time in its critical phases—much more a matter of a hard slog simply to prevail in the conventional military contest than a quick shock and awe campaign. In such a context, we would not want to have to remove critical forces from one unfinished fight to go to deal with another conflict. This is a very real dynamic: Germany decided to pull forces from the Western Front in summer 1914 to deal with Russia, and this may have made the difference between victory and stalemate—indeed, ultimately Germany’s defeat. Furthermore, forces like attack submarines and surface vessels may not be physically able to transition between theaters in the relevant timeframes. If critical fights happen in concurrent timeframes, as was the case in 1914 and again in the Second World War, key systems may not be able to move fast enough between theaters. And the transit of any forces might well be inhibited by the actions of our opponents, further limiting our ability to swing them between theaters. The upshot of this is that, in order to be able to fight two concurrent major power wars, we would need to buy much more than just one set of major war-winning capabilities. This means a much greater expense is required to deal with the potential for concurrent conflicts with both China and Russia, let alone other threats like Iran and North Korea. US weakness in Asia causes nuclear war Kapila 2019 [Dr Subhash Kapila is a graduate of the Royal British Army Staff College, with a Masters in Defence Science (Madras University) and a PhD in Strategic Studies (Allahabad University) Combines a rich experience of Army (Brigadier) and diplomatic assignments in major countries."United States’ Potent Existential Crisis: The China Threat – Analysis." https://www.eurasiareview.com/18012019-united-states-potent-existential-crisis-the-china-threat-analysis/] The ‘China Threat ‘emerging in 2018 in comprehensive and diverse manifestations poses an existential crisis challenging not only the continuance of United States as the global unipolar Superpower but also targeted with intended consequences of prompting the United States to retreat into isolation within its continental confines. The United States has long ignored the China Threat to the detriment of United States own national security but also to the security of US Allies and strategic partners. The acid test of a nations’ strategic greatness lies not only in checkmating a threat in existence to its national security but also being vigilant to a ‘Threat in the Making’, as I would put it. The United States is guilty of the latter in relation to China. China has reached this stage of posing a potent existential challenge to the United States mainly due to United States own acts of strategic omission and commission. United States misreading of China’s long range intentions has not only facilitated the emergence of a China Threat to United States but also United States permissive attitudes on China facilitated to create two ‘rogue nuclear weapons state’ of Pakistan and North Korea as its proxy cats-paws against US Allies and strategic partners. China is unlikely to succeed in achieving ‘strategic equivalence’ that it seeks with the United States in the foreseeable future nor are the Major Powers of the world, including Japan and India, likely to accede ‘American Exceptionalism’ to China despite its burgeoning military power. This for the simple reason that I have been stressing in my writings for two decades and that is China has no Natural Allies like the United States. For detailed analysis on the subject, kindly read my Book, “China-India Military Confrontation: 21st Century Perspectives” (2015) Chapter 13 ‘China’s Giant Leap for Superpower Status in 21st Century: Geopolitical Implications’. However, China will in the 21st Century with great persistence, and unmindful of the prevailing reality, that China is besieged today from both within and without, China will continue to challenge United States global predominance and specifically Indo Pacific predominance with greater potency. The United States has belatedly woken upto the reality that what they attempted to market globally for decades that China can be co-opted as a responsible stakeholder in global security and stability was a mirage. Long years of United States ‘China Hedging Strategy’ and ‘Risk Aversion Strategy’ made China only more recalcitrant and fed Chinese misperceptions that United States global power is on the decline. United States policy formulations of this decade of a ‘Strategic Pivot to Asia Pacific’ and the recent emphasis on Indo Pacific Security Blueprint are seemingly belated but welcome steps to checkmate China’s unrestrained flexing of its military muscle as evident in the South China Sea. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s call on Chinese Armed Forces to prepare for an all- out war are not defensive calls by a besieged nation but like Hitlerian Germany, these are offensive calls of a revisionist power. Annexation of Taiwan by use of military force seems to be China’s aim today. This has a larger aim of challenging United States resolve and determination to maintain its Superpower status. China has placed the United States on the horns of a strategic dilemma where the United States will be damned if it does not militarily intervene to defend Taiwan and if it does so it risks a full-fledged war with China. China is gambling on the United States shying away from the latter option. Right from the turnover of the 19th Century till today no major power, not even Nazi Germany, has dared to challenge the United States predominance, geopolitically and strategically, as China is now engaged in doing so. Even at the height of the Cold War 1945-91 when the United States and the Former Soviet Union were involved in a bitter ideological struggle one did not witness the unfolding of the type of China’s ‘Grand Strategy Blueprint’ decades in the making and operationalising, to initially unravel United States security architecture in Asia Pacific, and graduated now to a more vividly clear reality in 2019 that China is on the avowed path of emerging as the ‘sole challenger ‘of United States predominance and exceptionalism. That China could geopolitically and strategically engage in the execution of such a blueprint unchallenged arose fundamentally from United States flawed policy decisions spread over many US Administrations. Such flawed US policy decisions sprung from misconceived American readings of China’s long range strategic intentions and short-term American geopolitical expediency subjugating and distorting United States strategic vision of the ‘China Threat’ to United States national security. The United States ‘original sin’ in relation to the latent China Threat to US national security can be placed on shoulders of US President Truman who ignored General MacArthur’s dire warnings on China and petulantly dismissed General MacArthur from the command of UN Forces in Korea. If Japan today after decades since 1945 continues as the United States most enduring and steadfast Ally, it has a lot to do with General MacArthur’s visionary zeal. The second most serious sin in relation to flawed US policy decisions was inflicted by US President Richard Nixon in 1972 egged by his Sinophiles Secretary of States Henry Kissinger. To spite the Former USSR the United States in 1972 endowed an unwarranted international legitimacy on China despite its disruptive credentials and thereafter followed as to what could be termed as a China Appeasement policy. The third sin was committed at the turn of the Millennium when US President Bush in his messianic zeal to tame President Saddam’s Iraq left untended both Afghanistan and more significantly Asia Pacific security. China made full use of the decade ending 2010 for its exponential military power expansion and with emphasis on a well-calibrated buildup of Chinese naval power for ‘naval operations in distant seas’. China’s latest strategic-economic enterprises of One Belt One Road and Maritime Silk Route are nothing but an attempt to control maritime chokepoints along the global commons to United States disadvantage and as strategic pressure points against regional peer competitors. Uniqueness UQ – Material US military spending in Taiwan is increasing Wong and Schmitt 5/24/2022 [Edward, diplomatic correspondent for The New York Times who reports on foreign policy from Washington, D.C, and Eric, senior correspondent covering national security for The New York Times, “U.S. Speeds Up Reshaping of Taiwan’s Defenses to Deter China”, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/24/us/politics/china-taiwan-military.html] WASHINGTON — The Biden administration has accelerated its efforts to reshape Taiwan’s defense systems as it projects a more robust American military presence in the region to try to deter a potential attack by the Chinese military, current and former U.S. officials say. Russia’s war in Ukraine has made American and Taiwanese officials acutely aware that an autocrat can order an invasion of a neighboring territory at any moment. But it has also shown how a small military can hold out against a seemingly powerful foe. U.S. officials are taking lessons learned from arming Ukraine to work with Taiwan in molding a stronger force that could repel a seaborne invasion by China, which has one of the world’s largest militaries. The aim is to turn Taiwan into what some officials call a “porcupine”— a territory bristling with armaments and other forms of U.S.-led support that appears too painful to attack. Taiwan has long had missiles that can hit China. But the American-made weapons that it has recently bought — mobile rocket platforms, F-16 fighter jets and antiship projectiles — are better suited for repelling an invading force. Some military analysts say Taiwan might buy sea mines and armed drones later. And as it has in Ukraine, the U.S. government could also supply intelligence to enhance the lethality of the weapons, even if it refrains from sending troops. American officials have been quietly pressing their Taiwanese counterparts to buy weapons suitable for asymmetric warfare, a conflict in which a smaller military uses mobile systems to conduct lethal strikes on a much bigger force, U.S. and Taiwanese officials say. Washington increasingly uses the presence of its military and those of allies as deterrence. The Pentagon has begun divulging more details about the sailings of American warships through the Taiwan Strait — 30 since the start of 2020. And U.S. officials praise partner nations like Australia, Britain, Canada and France when their warships transit through the strait. UQ – Focus Biden is shifting focus back to Asia Solís 5/24/2022 [Mireya, Director - Center for East Asia Policy Studies Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, “Will Biden’s Asia trip help the US meet its strategic objectives?”, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/05/24/will-bidens-asia-trip-help-the-u-s-meet-its-strategic-objectives/] U.S. President Joe Biden’s inaugural trip to Asia provides an important milestone to assess the direction and effectiveness of American policy in the Indo-Pacific — a region identified by Republican and Democratic administrations alike as holding a key to American prosperity and security. The Asia tour came on the heels of the president hosting Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) leaders in Washington and comprised stops in Seoul and Tokyo for bilateral meetings and participation in the second Quad leaders’ meeting. This full-court diplomatic engagement was crucial, given the importance of the objectives at stake: buttressing the rules-based order across Eurasia; deepening strategic relations with and between the United States’ Asian allies; and launching the economic track of the administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Mission critical for the presidential visit was to reassure the region that the United States will remain committed to its Indo-Pacific tilt, even as it weathers the worst crisis Europe has suffered in seven decades in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In visiting two Asian democratic allies — Japan and South Korea — that have proactively partaken in the economic sanctions campaign to deter and punish Russian aggression, the Biden administration has sent an eloquent message about the indivisibility of the rules-based order. In other words, unchecked military aggression and economic coercion weaken peace and stability everywhere, and the United States is uniquely placed to mobilize allies across Europe and Asia to meet the challenge. BILATERALS AND MINILATERALS Biden’s trip was timely as both South Korea and Japan are each expanding their strategic horizons in ways that complement U.S. interests in the regio
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