AT - DOD Tradeoff DA - Mean Green 2022
AT - DOD Tradeoff DA - Mean Green 2022.docx
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Aff Ukraine Thumps Biden not focused on Asia – Ukraine proves Madhani and Megerian 3-17-2022 [Aamer and Chris, AP News reporters, “Biden’s China ‘pivot’ complicated by Russia’s war in Ukraine”, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-biden-business-china-d47d4b2215de708b55a12bc4b648818d] President Joe Biden set out to finally complete the “pivot to Asia,” a long-sought adjustment of U.S. foreign policy to better reflect the rise of America’s most significant military and economic competitor: China. But Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has made that vexing move even more complicated. China’s government has vacillated between full embrace and more measured responses as Russian President Vladimir Putin prosecutes his war, making the decisions for Biden far more layered. Biden and China’s Xi Jinping are scheduled to speak by phone on Friday, a conversation that the White House says will center on “managing the competition between our two countries as well as Russia’s war against Ukraine and other issues of mutual concern.” The Biden administration is left needing to focus east and west at the same time, balancing not simply economic imperatives but military ones as well. “It’s difficult. It’s expensive,” Kurt Campbell, the coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs on the White House National Security Council, said during a recent forum of maintaining a high-level U.S. focus in two regions. “But it’s also essential, and I believe we’re entering a period where that’s what will be required of the United States and of this generation of Americans.” Biden has been deeply invested in rallying NATO and Western allies to respond to Russia with crippling sanctions, supplying an overmatched Ukraine military with $2 billion in military assistance — including $800 million in new aid announced Wednesday — and addressing a growing humanitarian crisis. Eastern flank NATO allies, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, have made clear to the Biden administration that they want the U.S. to increase its military presence in the region and do more to address the worst humanitarian crisis in Europe since World War II. More than 3 million Ukrainian refugees have fled their country in recent weeks. Though the war in Ukraine has dominated Biden’s focus of late, White House officials insist they haven’t lost sight of China — and are watching intently to see how Xi decides to play his hand. No Link – Appropriations Congress will just fund the plan – they love funding the DOD Reuters 6/22/2022 [“U.S. Congress moves to boost Biden's record defense budget”, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-congress-moves-boost-bidens-record-defense-budget-2022-06-22/] WASHINGTON, June 22 (Reuters) - The U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee on Wednesday backed a proposal to increase spending for the Department of Defense by $37 billion on top of the record $773 billion proposed by President Joe Biden. The vote paved the way for a Pentagon budget of at least $810 billion next year after the Senate Armed Services Committee already backed a $45 billion increase in its version of the bill. The two chambers will decide the ultimate level when they meet in conference on the bill at an undecided date. The vote in favor of the $37 billion amendment to the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) was 42-17, as more than a dozen Democrats joined Republicans in favor of higher spending. The amendment included $2.5 billion to help pay higher fuel costs, $550 million for Ukraine, funding for five ships, eight Boeing Co-made (BA.N)F-18 Super Hornet fighter jets, five Lockheed Martin Co-made (LMT.N) C-130 Hercules planes, and about $1 billion for four Patriot missile units. Biden requested a record peacetime national defense budget of $813 billion which earmarked $773 billion for the Pentagon. About $40 billion of Biden's national defense budget is set aside for other national security-related programs at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Energy and other agencies. read more Biden's budget requested a 4.6% pay raise for troops and the largest research and development budget in history, as Russian aggression in Ukraine spurs demands for more military spending. Last year, the NDAA authorized $778 billion in defense spending, which was $25 billion more than requested by Biden. Link Turn/Not Zero Sum Commitment to Europe deters China Liptak 5/19/2022 [Kevin, CNN, “Biden turns his attention back to Asia after months focused on Russia's war in Ukraine”, https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/19/politics/joe-biden-asia-trip-preview/index.html] After months of all-consuming attention on Russia's war in Ukraine -- a conflict that has summoned Cold War comparisons and revitalized alliances built last century -- Biden's debut visit to Asia is an opportunity to renew what he views as this century's challenge: Confronting a rising China through a system of renewed economic and military partnerships. "We think this trip is going to put on full display President Biden's Indo-Pacific strategy and that it will show in living color that the United States can at once lead the world in responding to Russia's war in Ukraine, and at the same time chart a course for effective, principled American leadership and engagement in a region that will define much of the future of the 21st century," national security adviser Jake Sullivan told reporters a day ahead of Biden's departure for Asia. Sullivan discounted the suggestion that the President and his team were distracted from their Asia initiatives by the crisis in Ukraine. "We actually don't regard this as a tension between investing time, energy and attention in Europe and time, energy and attention in the Indo-Pacific. We regard this as mutually reinforcing," he said, adding: "For us, there is a certain level of integration and a symbiosis in the strategy we are pursuing in Europe and the strategy we're pursuing in the Indo-Pacific and President Biden's unique capacity to actually stitch those two together, is, I think, going to be a hallmark of his foreign policy presidency." Even as Biden turns his attention to Asia, the crisis in Ukraine remains his administration's dominant foreign policy focus. Before he departs Thursday, Biden will meet at the White House with the leaders of Finland and Sweden, who filed emergency applications this week to join NATO following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. No tradeoff, and the plan solves Lowry 5/19/2022 [Rich, editor of National Review and a contributing editor with Politico Magazine, “Opinion | Why Even America-First Conservatives Should Back Aid to Ukraine”, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/05/19/america-first-conservatives-back-ukraine-aid-00033762] Hawley further contends that the $40 billion distracts from the need to focus on China. It is not a zero-sum game between Europe and East Asia, though. We will need a robust trans-Atlantic alliance to help contain China. If we leave Europe to deal with the Ukraine crisis on its own, it’s less likely to be there for us on China. On top of this, Beijing is obviously watching how we deal with the Russian invasion as part of its calculations with regard to Taiwan. If Russia gets it way, or if we pull up short in our support of Ukraine, it will send the wrong message. No Impact No China war or rise. Norrlof 2021 [Carla; March 23; Visiting Professor at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in Helsinki, Senior Fellow at The Atlantic Council and at Massey College, Associate Professor at the University of Toronto, and Research Associate at The Graduate Institute of Geneva; The Washington Quarterly, “The Ibn Khaldûn Trap and Great Power Competition with China,” vol. 44] The return of great power rivalry has been the defining feature of the 21st century. Since the beginning of the new millennium, China and Russia have openly defied the United States and upset the stability of the liberal international order. Both China and Russia share physical and material attributes possessed by the United States that are traditionally required for great power status: land mass, a sea portal, a large population, and technology to field and develop a competitive military capability. Most scholars and policymakers agree that China presents the largest challenge to US interests and the US-led liberal international order. Economic and military growth in China has been astounding, surpassing Russian expansion. China’s outward extension is not primarily resource-based as is Russia’s but multidimensional, posing a structural challenge to US military and economic dominance. Much ink has been spilled over the nature of US-China rivalry and whether the two great powers are destined for war. Structural factors figure prominently when predicting US-China relations. A famous deadly Greek trap describes how the fear of a hegemonic power sparks catastrophic war with a rising power. In the History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides writes, “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.” 1 Thucydides’ statement has been widely adopted as a metaphor for the dangers associated with great-power transition. Both A.F.K. Organski’s power transition theory and Robert Gilpin’s realism see great-power wars as most likely to occur when a rising challenger is about to surpass a declining hegemonic power. 2 Today, the Thucydides Trap is highly relevant insofar as we have a clear incumbent power, the United States, and according to many measures of great powerhood, a clear rising power—China—with military, manufacturing, and commercial, and corporate power. However, the analogy mismatches international hierarchy and regime type. In classical times, the incumbent land power, Sparta, was the authoritarian power who feared the rise of the democratic maritime power, Athens.3 This incongruity is not even the biggest problem with the analogy. In order for the Thucydides Trap to apply, China would have to significantly narrow the power gap with the United States. While China has caught up with the United States in important respects, it has not caught up with the United States in terms of the logic and networks that inform dominance in the key economic and security areas required for power transition.4 Apart from the obvious inhibiting factors of nuclear weapons and economic interdependence, the United States and China are nowhere close to the power parity likely to spark a major power war between them. The Thucydides Trap is a powerful analogy for bellicose dynamics between a hegemonic power and a rising power, but in the near term, war between the United States and China for the reasons proposed in the Thucydidean analogy is highly unlikely. No US-China war Krulak and Friedman 2021 [Charles C., former President of Birmingham-Southern College, former Commandant of the US Marine Corps, M.S. from George Washington University, Alex, former Chief Financial Officer of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, J.D. from Columbia University, “The US and China Are Not Destined for War,” Project Syndicate, 08-17-2021, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-china-not-destined-for-war-by-charles-c-krulak-and-alex-friedman-1-2021-08] First and foremost, any military conflict between the two would quickly turn nuclear. The US thus finds itself in the same situation that it was in vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Taiwan could easily become this century’s tripwire, just as the “Fulda Gap” in Germany was during the Cold War. But the same dynamic of “mutual assured destruction” that limited US-Soviet conflict applies to the US and China. And the international community would do everything in its power to ensure that a potential nuclear conflict did not materialize, given that the consequences would be fundamentally transnational and – unlike climate change – immediate. A US-China conflict would almost certainly take the form of a proxy war, rather than a major-power confrontation. Each superpower might take a different side in a domestic conflict in a country such as Pakistan, Venezuela, Iran, or North Korea, and deploy some combination of economic, cyber, and diplomatic instruments. We have seen this type of conflict many times before: from Vietnam to Bosnia, the US faced surrogates rather than its principal foe. Second, it is important to remember that, historically, China plays a long game. Although Chinese military power has grown dramatically, it still lags behind the US on almost every measure that matters. And while China is investing heavily in asymmetric equalizers (long-range anti-ship and hypersonic missiles, military applications of cyber, and more), it will not match the US in conventional means such as aircraft and large ships for decades, if ever. A head-to-head conflict with the US would thus be too dangerous for China to countenance at its current stage of development. If such a conflict did occur, China would have few options but to let the nuclear genie out of the bottle. In thinking about baseline scenarios, therefore, we should give less weight to any scenario in which the Chinese consciously precipitate a military confrontation with America. The US military, however, tends to plan for worst-case scenarios and is currently focused on a potential direct conflict with China – a fixation with overtones of the US-Soviet dynamic. This raises the risk of being blindsided by other threats. Time and again since the Korean War, asymmetric threats have proven the most problematic to national security. Building a force that can handle the worst-case scenario does not guarantee success across the spectrum of warfare. The third reason to think that a Sino-American conflict can be avoided is that China is already chalking up victories in the global soft-power war. Notwithstanding accusations that COVID-19 escaped from a virology lab in Wuhan, China has emerged from the pandemic looking much better than the US. And with its Belt and Road Initiative to finance infrastructure development around the world, it has aggressively stepped into the void left by US retrenchment during Donald Trump’s four-year presidency. China’s leaders may very well look at the current status quo and conclude that they are on the right strategic path. Finally, China and the US are deeply intertwined economically. Despite Trump’s trade war, Sino-American bilateral trade in 2020 was around $650 billion, and China was America’s largest trade partner. The two countries’ supply-chain linkages are vast, and China holds more than $1 trillion in US Treasuries, most of which it cannot easily unload, lest it reduce their value and incur massive losses. China Not Revisionist Multiple years of empirical research disprove Chinese revisionism Jalil 19 (Ghazala; 4-3-2019; Research fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies at Islamabad; “China’s Rise: Offensive or Defensive Realism”; http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/3-SS_Ghazala_Yasmin_Jalil_No-1_2019.pdf; SML) The test of the offensive realism theory would be to determine whether China displays the revisionist tendencies, acts aggressively towards its neighbours and shows power maximising behaviour. In sum, it would entail determining whether China displays revisionist tendencies or acts like a status quo power. Under Mao (1949-1976), China had the policy of overturning all the imperialist regimes in Asia and the world. During this period, China actively supported revolutions in many developing countries that it considered imperialist or saw them as imperialist proxies. This threatened China’s neighbouring states especially the US allies.28 China essentially wanted to export its socialist ideology to other states. During this time, China’s policy can be described as operating under the principles of offensive realism. At the same time, during this era, China was operating with limited capabilities in an international environment characterised by bipolarity. It was operating within an environment where global politics was driven by the intense Cold War rivalry of the two great powers ─ the US and the former Soviet Union.29 However, since the 1970s China’s policies have shown less revisionist tendencies. The country has increasingly become a state that is embracing defensive realism. One thread of this evidence is that China has toned-down its revolutionary rhetoric. It is also not supporting insurgencies in other countries. The second thread of evidence is that since the late 1970s China has increasingly pursued a cooperative security approach in its relations with regional neighbours and in the international arena. By and large, China has tried to forge friendly relations with its neighbours. It includes ameliorating relations with states like India which is traditionally a rival. Their relations did become strained in 2017 when there was a standoff between the Indian and the Chinese forces on the Doklam plateau. Dhoklam is a territory claimed both by Bhutan (aligned with India) and China. However, Indo-China relations improved as the two countries held an informal summit in China in April 2018.30 The two countries even held a joint military exercise in December 2018, called Hand-in-Hand.31 Over the years, China has also managed to resolve border issues with so many neighbouring states. It has settled border disputes with countries like Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan initially and recently with Russia, bordering the Central Asian States and Vietnam.32 Moreover, China has territorial disputes with India and Japan but it has never made these disputes a hurdle in forging friendly ties with these two countries. Avery Goldstein dubs it a neo-Bismarckian grand strategy of China whereby it is pursuing its interests by reassuring those who may feel threatened and may form anti-China alliances.33 This, in his opinion, has resulted in a security environment that is conducive for China as well as for the region as a whole. Another indication that China does not show aggressive behaviour in its policies is that China has increasingly engaged and integrated with the international community. Over the past 30 years, China has amply demonstrated this by its increasing membership of international organisations and institutions as well as membership of treaties since the 1980s. China has increasingly participated in the regional multilateral institutions over the years. In the last few decades, East Asia has seen a number of regional institutions being formed. Foremost among those are the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); ASEAN plus 3 and the East Asia Summit. China is part of most of these multilateral institutions as well as an active member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). China was also a key player in the sixparty-talks in getting North Korea to halt and roll back its nuclear and missile programmes. On the global front, China sought participation in global institutions like the World Trade Organisation (WTO). China is also playing a very active role in the UN. According to one figure, China’s membership of international governmental organisations doubled (from 21 to 52) during the years 1977-1997. In the same time period, its membership of International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) increased from mere 71 to an impressive 1,163.34 Similarly, according to another account, China signed less than 30 per cent of the arms control accords it was eligible to join in the 1970s compared to 80 per cent by mid-1990s. 35 China has actively taken part in the treaties of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as those of aimed at non-proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. It has also become a part of the voluntary non-proliferation groups like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2004 and exercises strict export control policies. Since 2004, China has also shown interest in joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
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