Aff - Disease - UTNIF 2022
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NATO Disease Aff – UTNIF 2022 AFF 1AC 1AC – Disease Advantage NATO’s response to COVID-19 was helpful but insufficient – modernization now is key to preventing the next superbug Giovanna De Maio 2020. Was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. “NATO’S RESPONSE TO COVID-19: LESSONS FOR RESILIENCE AND READINESS.” Brookings. October 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/research/natos-response-to-covid-19-lessons-for-resilience-and-readiness/#:~:text=In%20spite%20of%20this%2C%20NATO,health%20crisis%20from%20impacting%20readiness. IZP) COVID-19 took the world by surprise: for the first time in living memory, the entire globe was under attack. Although the pandemic was quickly understood to be a global challenge, international cooperation was initially put under severe stress, with uncoordinated travel bans, competition over acquisition of medical equipment, and authoritarian powers trying to take advantage of the crisis to push forward their geopolitical agendas. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was also impacted by COVID-19: exercises and operations were scaled down and some countries repatriated their militaries to redeploy them at home.1 There were initially few reasons to be optimistic about either the role of the political-military alliance in supporting the fight against COVID-19 or the future of the organization. Less than a year ago, French President Emmanuel Macron had referred to NATO as “brain-dead,” lamenting the lack of shared strategy between its members vis-à-vis the most pressing challenges facing the alliance.2 Furthermore, for the past four years, U.S. President Donald J. Trump has consistently undermined the importance of NATO, treating security as transactional and casting doubts on U.S. commitment to the Article 5 mutual defense clause at the heart of the North Atlantic Treaty.3 Despite this backdrop and amidst negative propaganda from China and Russia, NATO established a dedicated COVID-19 Task Force. Leveraging its experience in crisis management and disaster relief along with its massive logistical apparatus, the alliance was able to offer a decisive response through transporting medical aid and equipment across the globe, fighting against disinformation, and ultimately preventing the public health crisis from leading to a traditional security crisis. The goal of this essay is to provide a critical assessment of NATO’s preparedness and response to COVID-19. By exploring the mechanisms in place, the support offered, and the measures taken by NATO to avert a security crisis, it provides reflections on how lessons learned from this pandemic could help to manage and prevent similar future crises. In conclusion, this report argues that the alliance has proved capable of overcoming political tensions and has given an important sign of resilience and solidarity at a crucial moment for its member states. However, more could have been done with better preparedness in managing health risks and most importantly with better political coordination between member states. Despite the disruptive effect COVID-19 had on global economy and international relations, the virus’s impact on the future of the alliance will be marginal. NATO’s survival and success in responding to global challenges will ultimately be contingent on a relaunch of trans-Atlantic relations. Existential disease is imminent – current frameworks fail, but international mitigation efforts are the only hope Nicholas Studzinski 2020. MA, Visiting International Research Fellow at the Policy Institute of King’s College London. “Managing existential risks of pandemics: a systems approach.” 2-14-20. The world is generally not prepared for a severe pandemic, whether natural or bio-engineered to evade known variants of vaccines and medical countermeasures. According to the Global Challenges Foundation, pandemics are among the key likely causes of the collapse of human civilisation, defined as a “drastic decrease in human population size and political, economic/social complexity, globally and for an extended time.” A recent estimate by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation suggests that an outbreak of a magnitude similar to the Great Influenza of 1918, could result in 360 million deaths, despite modern vaccines, antivirals and antibiotics. According to a report by the RAND Corporation, “the spread of infectious disease can be worse than world wars.” The complete costs of a severe pandemic are difficult to estimate, given the potential array of social, political, agricultural, and economic impacts. A World Bank analysis put the minimum cost of the recent Ebola crisis in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone at $2.8 billion in GDP. But a subsequent analysis of the total economic and social costs of the same outbreak was estimated at $53.19 billion. In a new paper, I explore the nature of pandemic risk as a threat to human and civilisational security and discuss the shortcomings of the currently accepted international strategy for pandemic preparedness. In its place, I propose a comprehensive pandemic risk management system (CPRMS), including a practical roadmap for its institutional implementation. The current system Academic and public assessments confirm a lack of global preparedness. In May 2018, the Johns Hopkins Centre for Health Security conducted a pandemic simulation called “Clade X”, in which a bioengineered microbe ended up killing 150 million people within 20 months and producing devastating impacts across the US. The exercise found that many vulnerabilities, including leadership challenges, were “hardwired into the American system.” Established in the wake of the early 21st century crises with avian influenza, SARS and Ebola, the current international pandemic strategy aims to improve preparedness by strengthening the capacity of national public health systems. This is pursued via appeals to compliance with the standards of the International Health Regulations, as part of an emergency framework designed to prevent outbreaks with infectious disease from becoming international health crises. While such efforts are appropriate and necessary, they are centred primarily on the health sector, with less focus on the global multisectoral, multidimensional risks and impacts of pandemics. The current strategy also remains primarily country-focused and reactive, and as such is not cost-effective, allocatively efficient, or sustainable for preventing and managing the large-scale impacts of severe pandemics. A comprehensive pandemic risk management system (CPRMS) A new cost-effective system is needed to manage the spectrum of multisectoral pandemic risk to both national and global security. Such a comprehensive pandemic risk management system (CPRMS) would constitute a genuine global public good. As a complex-systems-based paradigm, the strategy would help prevent and manage both the direct human security risks to health and ensure a critical continuity in the flow of essential services and infrastructure, sustaining interconnected global socio-economy, on which human security depends. Characteristics of an effective CPRMS Human security: The conceptual grounding of the approach includes but transcends the currently dominant, state-oriented framework of global health security, in favour of a multidimensional concept of human security. Full-spectrum risk management: The CPRMS assumes an integrated system of prevention, preparedness, response and mitigation, with universal, pre-emptive vaccine protection against prioritised microbes that threaten the human genome. It must also mitigate the drivers of cross-species contagion within human society and secure the functional continuity of essential services and infrastructure critical to global human security. Principal characteristics: As a strategically coherent system, the CPRMS must be risk-based and grounded in evidence derived through the emerging discipline of complexity science. The approach must be long-term and multisectoral, integrating prevention, preparedness and response in health, essential public services and enabling critical infrastructure. It needs to be financially and politically sustainable to meet 21st century challenges at national and global levels. Organisational framework: Institutionally, a CPRMS would also be structured as an organised operational system whose structure and functions embody the six critical elements of all institutional systems: harmonised leadership and governance; sustainable financing; information systems management; requisite human resources; essential commodities and related logistics; and a capacity for operational interventions and service delivery. Crucially, governance of the CPRMS must be envisioned in the broader, increasingly urgent context of managing a growing complex of existential risks. Without mitigation, disease causes extinction Dennis Pamlin & Stuart Armstrong 15. *Executive Project Manager Global Risks, Global Challenges Foundation. **James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford. February 2015, “Global Challenges: 12 Risks that threaten human civilization: The case for a new risk category,” Global Challenges Foundation, p.30-93. https://api.globalchallenges.org/static/wp-content/uploads/12-Risks-with-infinite-impact.pdf A pandemic (from Greek πᾶν, pan, “all”, and δῆμος demos, “people”) is an epidemic of infectious disease that has spread through human populations across a large region; for instance several continents, or even worldwide. Here only worldwide events are included. A widespread endemic disease that is stable in terms of how many people become sick from it is not a pandemic. 260 84 Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 3.1 Current risks 3.1.4.1 Expected impact disaggregation 3.1.4.2 Probability Influenza subtypes266 Infectious diseases have been one of the greatest causes of mortality in history. Unlike many other global challenges pandemics have happened recently, as we can see where reasonably good data exist. Plotting historic epidemic fatalities on a log scale reveals that these tend to follow a power law with a small exponent: many plagues have been found to follow a power law with exponent 0.26.261 These kinds of power laws are heavy-tailed262 to a significant degree.263 In consequence most of the fatalities are accounted for by the top few events.264 If this law holds for future pandemics as well,265 then the majority of people who will die from epidemics will likely die from the single largest pandemic. Most epidemic fatalities follow a power law, with some extreme events – such as the Black Death and Spanish Flu – being even more deadly.267 There are other grounds for suspecting that such a highimpact epidemic will have a greater probability than usually assumed. All the features of an extremely devastating disease already exist in nature: essentially incurable (Ebola268), nearly always fatal (rabies269), extremely infectious (common cold270), and long incubation periods (HIV271). If a pathogen were to emerge that somehow combined these features (and influenza has demonstrated antigenic shift, the ability to combine features from different viruses272), its death toll would be extreme. Many relevant features of the world have changed considerably, making past comparisons problematic. The modern world has better sanitation and medical research, as well as national and supra-national institutions dedicated to combating diseases. Private insurers are also interested in modelling pandemic risks.273 Set against this is the fact that modern transport and dense human population allow infections to spread much more rapidly274, and there is the potential for urban slums to serve as breeding grounds for disease.275 Unlike events such as nuclear wars, pandemics would not damage the world’s infrastructure, and initial survivors would likely be resistant to the infection. And there would probably be survivors, if only in isolated locations. Hence the risk of a civilisation collapse would come from the ripple effect of the fatalities and the policy responses. These would include political and agricultural disruption as well as economic dislocation and damage to the world’s trade network (including the food trade). Extinction risk is only possible if the aftermath of the epidemic fragments and diminishes human society to the extent that recovery becomes impossible277 before humanity succumbs to other risks (such as climate change or further pandemics). Five important factors in estimating the probabilities and impacts of the challenge: 1. What the true probability distribution for pandemics is, especially at the tail. 2. The capacity of modern international health systems to deal with an extreme pandemic. 3. How fast medical research can proceed in an emergency. 4. How mobility of goods and people, as well as population density, will affect pandemic transmission. 5. Whether humans can develop novel and effective anti-pandemic solutions. The aff would strengthen the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme – that boosts science diplomacy and international mitigation effectiveness NATO ESCG 2019. The Emerging Security Challenges Division. “THE NATO SCIENCE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY SPS PROGRAMME.” NATO OTAN. 2019. IZP) Now in its seventh decade of existence, the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme remains a key vehicle for engaging NATO partners in practical cooperation in the areas of civil science, technology, innovation and capacity building. Based on the Overarching Guidance provided by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), it develops and supports key flagship projects in line with NATO’s Strategic Objectives and fosters regional cooperation among partners. As demonstrated over decades, the Programme is very flexible and versatile in its response to changing security environments and to Allied guidance. SPS top-down flagship activities in particular are demand- driven responding to Allies’ and partners’ priorities for practical cooperation, reflecting NATO’s balanced and 360 degree approach. While SPS staff is monitoring the implementation of its activities on a daily basis, Allies in the Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee (PCSC) approve applications following review and recommendation from the Independent Scientific Evaluation Group (ISEG). In addition the PCSC is regularly presented with updates on the progress and results of SPS activities. A 2014 audit by the Independent Board of Auditors of NATO (IBAN) confirmed the strong alignment of SPS with the political priorities of the Alliance, and underlined the effective management of the SPS Programme. It also provided a number of recommendations that have been addressed over the last five years to further streamline the Programme, including efforts to systematically analyze the results of SPS activities. In 2019, this included the organization of a SPS cluster workshop on Advanced Technologies. SPS activities bring together experts and scientists from NATO and partner countries through several grant mechanisms, including Multi-Year Projects (MYP), Advanced Research Workshops (ARW), Advanced Training Courses (ATC), and Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) that lead to tangible outputs with a concrete impact and a high public diplomacy value for NATO. This well-established partnership programme is an integral part of NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD), and, over the years, has helped to forge important international expert networks and build capacity while addressing a wide range of security concerns as identified in the SPS key priorities. These priorities include counter-terrorism, cyber defence, energy security, CBRN defence, the development of advanced technologies with security applications, mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) detection as well as human and social aspects of security. At the same time, the SPS Programme has grown to include projects that encompass capacity-building, hybrid threats and the implementation of UNSCR1325 on Women, Peace and Security. In order to achieve its goals, SPS works in close coordination with other relevant NATO Divisions and Bodies. STRONG ALIGNMENT WITH NATO’S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND POLITICAL GUIDANCE All SPS activities have a clear link to security and help to address NATO’s Strategic Objectives. The Programme closely follows guidance received from Allies, and has repeatedly demonstrated its flexibility and versatility to adapt to the changing political and security context. The PCSC is directly overseeing the implementation of the SPS Programme by approving SPS activities, the annual SPS Work Programme and the nominations received from Allies for the Independent Scientific Evaluation Group (ISEG). At the same time, SPS follows the strategic and political guidance resulting from NATO Meetings and Summits, such as the July 2018 Brussels Summit and the December 2019 Leaders’ Meeting in London. This has been reflected in the development of SPS activities to support NATO-wide priorities such as the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative, NATO efforts to project stability, the fight against terrorism, and the strong cooperation with partners in the South, the Western Balkans and East. SPS has also continued its strong engagement with Ukraine, including through the 16th annual meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group Scientific and Environmental Cooperation (JWGSEC) in March 2019. WORKING WITH KEY STAKEHOLDERS ACROSS NATO AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY The SPS Programme relies heavily on its close and well-established cooperation and coordination with various NATO stakeholders, including Allied and partner Delegations, NATO Agencies, Divisions, and Offices, such as the Office of the Secretary General’s Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security. The Programme has established longtime coordination and cooperation with the Science and Technology Organization (STO) and the Office of the Chief Scientist, with one expert from each being an ISEG member. The Senior SPS and Partnership Cooperation Advisor is an ex-officio member of the Science and Technology Board (STB) for the ESC Division. Where appropriate, SPS draws on the expertise of the network of NATO Centers of Excellence to deliver specialized, modular training activities, tailored to the needs of partner nations. The SPS Programme is also engaging with other International Organizations, including with the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU) and, since 2019, the African Union, to identify synergies, forge networks and avoid duplication. SPS PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION FACTS AND FIGURES Over the last year, the SPS Programme received a total of 130 applications in response to three calls for proposals throughout the year. Of these, 112 passed the eligibility screening and were peer-reviewed by the Independent Scientific Evaluation Group (ISEG) during two meetings. 52 proposals were recommended by the ISEG. The NATO Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee (PCSC) met on eight occasions throughout 2019 to discuss the SPS Programme, and during these meetings approved new SPS activities. Out of these, 25% were top-down activities that had been developed in close cooperation with the NATO and partner countries involved, to respond to their needs and priorities. While SPS activities cover a wide range of security-relevant topics, cyber defence, CBRN defence and the development of advanced technologies were the top three SPS key priority areas addressed by new activities in 2019. 22 partner countries from all NATO partnership frameworks are leading last year’s new
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