Aff - AI Logistics - UTNIF 2022
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UTNIF – AI Aff 1AC 1AC Advantage - NATO Advantage 1 is NATO China and Russia are pursuing military usage of AI now Parrikar 2022 - Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses By Manohar Parrikar May 30, 2022 “China and Russia are pursuing military usage of AI now” https://www.eurasiareview.com/30052022-natos-ai-push-and-military-implications-analysis/ The technological advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI), machine learning, big data analytics, robotics, quantum computing and virtual reality have led to the rise in use of autonomous systems in military applications. This is changing the face of the battlefield by enabling new forms of military functions, over and above the conventional systems, thus enabling the execution of higher coercive actions. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries are also adopting such emerging technologies to maintain their strategic advantage and to mitigate transnational threats. Russia’s offensive cyber hostilities and China’s military adoption of AI for augmenting its high-tech warfare mechanisms have emerged as the contributing factors for NATO to upscale its technological efforts in Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDTs). NATO is making ambitious investments in EDTs to ensure interoperability and standardisation among member states. This Issue Brief takes stock of the current strategic surge by NATO in AI adoption and its ongoing efforts to exploit EDTs for defence innovation and adoption. It discusses the role of AI in contemporary conflicts, specifically NATO’s response to the Russia–Ukraine conflict, and explores the vulnerabilities in the AI systems as well as the challenges and limitations in AI adoption by NATO. NATO’s Technological Push The US National Security Commission Report of 2021 states that China is leapfrogging to new technologies by investing in intelligentised warfare like swarm drones and using AI for reconnaissance, electromagnetic countermeasures and coordinated firepower strikes.1 The US is jointly working with its allies on the policy implications of such new technology. It is also partnering with countries like Canada, Denmark, Estonia, the UK, France and Norway, to work on military standards on AI.2 In October 2021, NATO formally adopted the first AI strategy on the responsible military use of AI with three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.3 NATO’s strategy aims to accelerate the uptake of AI for military systems.4 The six principles of the NATO’s AI strategy include: Lawfulness, Responsibility and Accountability, Explainability and Traceability, Reliability, Governability and Bias Mitigation.5 This strategy aims to protect, monitor and innovate AI and related disruptive technologies in a phased manner to establish political support for AI military projects. The strategic surge in EDTs is driven by the accelerated investment towards the military adoption and innovation of EDTs and maintaining a sustainable innovation ecosystem that can be achieved through civil–military collaboration. In 2021, NATO endorsed the strategy on EDTs that included AI and machine learning among the seven identified key technologies (Data, AI, Autonomy, Quantum, Space, Biotechnology, and Hypersonic).6 The strategy plans to invest US$ 1 billion in building test centres across Europe and North America, focusing on emerging technologies like AI, Quantum and hypersonics.7 In the NATO Summit held at Brussels in 2021, as a part of the NATO 2030 Agenda, NATO’s new Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) was launched. It aims to maintain NATO’s technological edge compared to nations like China and Russia, which are challenging the West with their accelerated investments to build technological capacity and use offensive subversive measures. DIANA has been assigned to manage the NATO Innovation Fund, receiving a funding of US$ 82.6 million a year for 15 years.8 It will explore the future roadmap of implementation of advanced technologies and competition to foster transatlantic cooperation.9 At present, there are 10 accelerator sites with more than 50 test centres in technological hubs across the states.10 The NATO advisory group on EDTs is an external body that advises NATO on the optimisation of its innovation efforts. This group provides recommendations on improving collaboration and partnerships with the private sector, industry, and academia. In addition, there are other bodies like the NATO Advisory board, Allied Command Transformation (ACT), NATO’s Science and Technology Organisation (STO), and NATO Communication and Information Agency (NCIA) that support the alliance’s adoption of deep technologies and EDTs. NATO’s AI Influence in Russia–Ukraine Confrontations AI has been a contributing agent in weaponising cyberspace and augmenting cyberwarfare to the next level in modern battlefield scenarios. While some of its uses such as in scaling of data analytics, data fusion, deep fakes, cyber defence have matured, its use in autonomous weapon systems and other complex operational applications are at a nascent stage. AI has been aggressively used to spread disinformation in the Russia–Ukraine War. Machine learning algorithms have been used to amplify misleading and fake content on social media platforms, like doctored videos of invading forces and fake live streams. On the other hand, it has also been used for anomaly detection, identification of disinformation and for cybersecurity. AI uses natural language processing algorithms, machine learning and deep learning to identify anomalies in the text data, images and videos. Russia is said to have used AI-enabled systems not only on the battlefield but also in cyberspace, targeting the critical infrastructures of Ukraine.11 Russian troll farms have been alleged to have used AI-enabled systems to generate human faces for fake propagandist personas on social media platforms like Twitter, Instagram and Facebook.12 NATO countries have also used AI to help Ukraine counter such AI-based attacks. Private companies are also playing a role in the unfolding AI battlespace. US-based companies like Snorkel AI, a data science platform, has made its services accessible to federal authorities for the detection of anomalous signals and adversary communications in order to access high-value information for better decision-making.13 Similarly, Ukraine has been given free access to Clearview AI facial recognition software, which has a database of 2 billion photos crawled from Russian social media platforms. This software is being used for the detection of Russian forces and to identify the dead and gauge the spread of disinformation in cyberspace.14 AI’s analytical potential has been tapped by companies even before the Russia–Ukraine war started. In December 2021, a geospatial data firm, SpaceKnow, claimed to have detected a military presence in Yelna, a Russian town. The Russia–Ukraine conflict has become a test case for AI adoption in modern warfare. The US is using the conflict as a test-bed for many of its AI projects with the Pentagon’s ‘Maven’ project having contributed to the detection and classification of objects of interest from various drone footage through AI and Machine Learning (ML) algorithms. It has been reported that the Pentagon has been using AI and ML tools to collect a vast amount of data on the Russia–Ukraine war and analyse it to learn and generate battlefield intelligence about the Russian command and control strategies.15 The advanced AI-enabled systems with the US Department of Defense (DoD) are said to have been used for overseeing the battlefield and collecting and archiving signals intelligence. It was stated at the Defense One’s Genius AI Summit in April 2022 that all this information will be fed into systems for training of machine learning algorithms to support future decision-making processes.16 It is believed that the US and NATO allies have already built such AI-enabled cyber weapons and defences, information about which is said to be highly classified.17 NATO is key to countering this new front of modern warfare – absent adoption multiple theaters of conflict make escalation likely Lucarelli et al 2021 - Professor at the University of Bologna, member of the Board of Directors of the Forum on the Problems of Peace and War and of the Institute of International Affairs Sonia Lucarelli Alessandro Marrone Francesco N. Moro “Technological Changes And A Transformed International Security Environment” Nato Decision-Making In The Age Of Big Data And Artificial Intelligence, Nato Allied Command Transformation Università Di Bologna Istituto Affari Internazionali Digital revolution has substantially transformed the world we live in, providing great opportunities but also making societies more vulnerable and transforming the meaning of state borders. Technology makes external interferences cheaper, faster and all-encompassing: citizens can potentially become direct targets of information warfare, all members of a society can be part of conflicts one way or another. From advanced weaponry to command and control, most security-related domains are undergoing deep transformations as data availability and transmission increase exponentially. This is especially true as the emergence of so-called hybrid tactics contributes to universalize the battlefield. Also, attackers may lose control of their offensive cyber weapons, and ‘collateral damages’ across the private sector and the public worldwide might be more and more difficult to contain. Less visible, yet important challenges connected with Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) also exist. For instance, data overload can create problems for decisionmakers that are unable to detect important signals. Losing sight of how machines make their calculations – a somewhat inherent feature of Artificial Intelligence (AI) – can hinder deeper understanding of phenomena as well as learning, besides having dense ethical implications. A crucial question for Western societies and governments is how to deal with technological changes by exploiting their many benefits while managing to limit their risks. Broadly speaking, observers have long noticed the potentialities of technologies in the security domain: better situational awareness, early warning against threats and risks, the ability to prevent and/or stop attacks to happen, the use of technology against the adversaries’ own technologies, and eventually deterrence of high-end hybrid warfare or, at least, the increase of resilience against it. In particular, in order to harness the potential of new technologies, higher levels of security are needed. While internet is unfortunately not secure by design, it has to be somehow retrofit to guarantee a certain level of protection – for instance by avoiding a single point of failure, developing better firewalls, etc. Ultimately, the digital revolution poses challenges to decision makers both as potential users of new technologies and as leaders of targeted societies. Learning to achieve political aims through the support of technological innovations and at the same time acquiring the ability to prevent and manage interferences, if not attacks, have become paramount. However, achieving such results is not only about engineering. Technologies need ad hoc governance, organizations and skilled users to properly function. Actually, history is full of examples of good technologies that were improperly used and/or unable to provide the expected gains. Therefore, a joint, multi-disciplinary efforts is needed to think and manage technologies in a more comprehensive and secure way across various domains. For instance, the very same design of AI needs exchanges with social scientists in order to limit analytical biases and increase the quality of data that will then be processed through Machine Learning (ML). Moreover, many public policies involve technologies with a strong security dimension. This is one of the main reasons security standards should be harmonized across individual government’s policies as well as among Allies: this is what has been leading NATO’s renewed efforts on standardization beyond the strictly military perimeter, for instance towards the 5G domain. While digital technologies continue to dramatically increase in scope and relevance, they are deeply embedded into the broader geopolitical framework, with the re-emergence of multipolarism and looming great power confrontation. This connection has to be discussed and understood as it affects not only security but also economic and technological domains. The globalized supply chain of technology building block entails vulnerabilities and dependencies on unreliable suppliers. Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) in hightech companies, Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and critical infrastructures are guided not only by an economic rationale but also by a politico-military one, and have to be monitored accordingly. Cyber space and, partly, outer space are de facto unregulated global commons where the ability to set regulations and standards could be a matter of competition and/or cooperation among major countries worldwide. The notions of ‘whole-of-government’ and ‘whole-of-society’ approaches confirm that these problems should be dealt with comprehensive strategies. Great and middle powers increasingly rely on stand-off weapons, both physical and cyber ones, able to create damages rapidly, worldwide and on a large scale. This trend is going to be accelerated by AI. Some countries are adopting principles on responsible use of AI, including in terms of control and accountability. However, a vacuum remains in international law. And such vacuum is more difficult to fill because of the aforementioned interaction between geopolitics and technologies. Different powers conceive technology – and what it can bring them in terms of benefits – in different ways, and they are unwilling to regulate internationally this field of competition and warfare. In such a rapidly changing security environment, NATO and allied activities directly or indirectly defend citizens’ daily life. In the age of Big Data, AI and the pervasive use of internet, the challenge is to defend the ever-expanding information environment while maintaining all its functionalities. Against this backdrop, in the post-Cold War period NATO somehow missed the opportunity to involve Allies and partners in a debate on how defense technologies and norms have been changing with the ICT revolution. The result is that the web is not secure by design, and both private and public actors struggle to mitigate risks and threats in an unregulated environment where attackers are structurally advantaged over defenders. Today, the Alliance should not miss the opportunity twice vis-à-vis Big Data, AI and, broadly speaking, the current and future (r)evolution of ICT. The aim of the 2020 Academic Conference was precisely to explore some fundamental aspects of the challenges and opportunities posed by technological change to the security environment in which NATO works. Below follows a brief introduction to NATO, cyber defense and three sets of issues investigated in closer detail: Big Data and decision-making; hybrid threats to allied decision-making; AI adoption by allied armed forces. NATO, Cyber Defense and Emerging Disruptive Technologies NATO begun to focus on cyber defense already in 2008, and over time it built up institutions and frameworks to deal with it from a well-limited military perspective. Allies recognized a cyber attack could lead to the activation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty on collective defense. In that case, there is a clear procedure where NATO authorities take the military lead. Article 5 does not prescribe a clear procedure factoring in new technologies. On a regular basis, headquarters and the Secretary General cabinet carry on exercises on situational awareness, whereby they receive intelligence and military advice and are immersed in an information space with blue and red teams. Moreover, every two years, there is a large-scale exercise involving national governments. These efforts aim to build familiarity with the technology-related security challenges. However, further evolution of AI-based cyber attacks can constitute an increasing threat for datareliant organizations such as NATO. Beyond cyber defense, the Alliance started to work on the broader issue of Emerging Disruptive Technologies (EDTs) only in 2019, by setting up an innovation board co-chaired by the Deputy Secretary General and the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation. Moreover, a dedicated unit was created in the Emerging Security Challenge Division. Two White Papers were produced, respectively on AI and on autonomous weapons, to provide inputs for Allies’ decisions in this regard. The current NATO approach is based on the motto “adopting and adapting”, entailing five complimentary goals: (1) better understand emerging disruptive technologies; (2) properly look at their implications for defense; (3) decide about their use; (4) mitigate their risks; and (5) exploit their advantages. Noticeably, the traditional defense industrial ecosystem entails long planning, oligopolistic supply and monopsonic demand. Over time, it was characterized by substantial technology transfers from the military to the civilian domain (the so-called ‘spin offs’), including the very same embryonic Internet. In recent years, several new technologies with relevant implications for security and defense have been emerging from a different ecosystem, marked by bottom-up innovation, a rapid development-to-market cycle, and a technology transfer from the civilian to the military domain. As a result, with the relevant exception of certain space assets and hypersonic technologies, the civilian sector is increasingly developing into the innovation driver, and defense one has become quite dependent. Such a shift implies that priority setting for current and future technology development is not substantially driven by states anymore. In the US, the Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) struggles to develop a dialogue with the private sector gravitating around the Silicon Valley to embrace certain research lines. The NATO Industry Partnership on the cyber domain serves as platform for Alliance’s officials and industrial representatives to exchange notes, yet major ICT players do not seem very interested in having such a structured dialogue. Moreover, investments in these technologies require venture capitals and the acceptance of the risks to fail – something which usually states, and particularly Ministries of Defense, cannot afford. The US, the UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands and other Allies made certain steps to adapt their defense innovation models in these domains, but this is only the beginning of a long transformation process. As a matter of fact, adapting to emerging and disruptive technologies is harder for some Allies than others. The related risk is moving towards a multi-layer Alliance, with some member states holding new technologies, and others not having such advantage. Ideally, the solution would be to collectively adopt certain new technologies, but this represents a challenge for the NATO Defence Planning Process, military procurement, common funding, etc. A technology group of experts has been appointed to reflect upon issues including but not limited to these, and the Secretary General will probably present a report to the next summit of Heads of state and governments. Incorporating AI into military logistics and sustainment reinvigorates the defense industrial base – that ensures supply chains capable of rapid response Low 2022 - junior fellow at NDIA By Thomas Low 3/25/2022 “U.S. Must Ready Defense Industrial Base to Aid NATO” https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/3/25/us-must-ready-defense-indus
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