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2022 UTNIF Negative

Neg - AI Logistics Supplement - UTNIF 2022

Neg - AI Logistics Supplement - UTNIF 2022.docx

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NEG – AI – UTNIF 2022
NATO Advantage
Conventional Deterrence Turn – 1NC
European security cooperation is stable, but has shifted to the EDI to deter Russia---plan trades off, undermines conventional deterrence
Michael J. Mazarr et al 22, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. "Security Cooperation in a Strategic Competition" Research Report. http://www.rand.org/t/RRA650-1 //pipk
Security Cooperation Efforts in Europe Emphasize Reassuring U.S. Allies European partners have consistently received approximately 26 percent of all U.S. security aid, but there has been a shift since 2014 in the type of aid these partners have received. Specifically, more attention has been devoted to developing conventional capabilities to deter Russian aggression. Eastern European states that border Russia, particularly Ukraine, received $1.1 billion from 2014 to 2019.18 Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia also received some funding through the European Deterrence Initiative. However, of the billions of dollars designated for the initiative, only a small portion supports building partner capacity. The initiative was designed primarily to support U.S. force presence, infrastructure, and exercises; as a result, DoD does not formally categorize European Deterrence Initiative funding as security aid.19
Over our period of study, U.S. military sales have increased for both highly capable allies and newer North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners in Europe. Among the top weapon purchasers, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany are purchasing advanced aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, and missiles through the FMS and DCS programs. Poland and Romania are acquiring Patriot air-defense systems, and Slovakia is purchasing F-16 aircraft through FMS.20
The focus of U.S. education and training efforts in Europe has also been on conventional military capabilities funded by FMS. Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Romania, and Poland are the top recipients of these security cooperation activities.21
Furthermore, U.S.- and NATO-sponsored exercises in Europe are increasing in number and size. These exercises, which focus on improving interoperability for conventional operations, include Saber Guardian (a U.S.-sponsored exercise with 25,000 service members from 22 allied and partner nations) and Trident Juncture (a NATO-sponsored exercise with 50,000 participants from NATO and partner countries).22 NATO arrangements afford the United States a high degree of access in Europe. Of the 51 countries in the EUCOM AOR, 45 have multilateral SOFAs through NATO or the Partnership for Peace program, and there are 126 acquisition and cross-servicing agreements that apply to the region.23 The majority of USAF armament agreements and airmen in personnel exchanges are with European countries, and most personnel exchanges through the USAF’s Military Personnel Exchange Program are with the United Kingdom. Countries in EUCOM’s AOR received $27 million in Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid support, divided across several Eastern European states; Ukraine received $4 million, the highest amount.
Heg Bad – 1NC
Multipolarity is inevitable – Trump provided a strategic opening for retrenchment and soft-landing – the affs cling to hegemony ensures violent transition wars and failure of global cooperation.
Marchetti ‘17 (Raffaele Marchetti, *senior assistant professor in International Relations at the Department of Political Science and the School of Government of LUISS, external expert for the European Commission, “End of the American hegemonic cycle,” Feb 14, https://www.opendemocracy.net/raffaele-marchetti/end-of-american-hegemonic-cycle)//cmr
Trump’s election marks the end of the long phase of American world hegemony. Despite the electoral slogan “Make America Great Again” and the great expectations this may have generated, his presidency will presumably be characterized by an overall retrenchment. Many different interpretations have been provided on the reasons of Trump’s success ranging from populist framing to FBI support. Contrary to the mainstream debate, I see a more fundamental reason underpinning his victory: the changed costs/benefits balance in the US role in the world. The theory of hegemonic stability holds that at some point the hegemon will start to decline due to the increased costs of the management of the system which outbalance the benefits the hegemon gains out of it. The costs of the management of the system have in fact been accumulating in the last 4 presidencies. During the Bush administrations, security costs due to the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have, among other damage, impacted negatively on the US government. Equally, during the Obama presidencies costs due to economic stimuli have increased the overall debt of the country. As predicted by hegemonic theory, we finally come to a point in which the costs became too heavy for the citizens, or rather their perception of this becomes more evident, so that they start to protest and demand a change. This was intercepted by Trump much more than by Clinton, with Trump stepping back to decrease the costs of international projection. So-called “imperial overstretch”, formed much earlier, led Trump’s electorate to seek less international costs (and possibly, but less likely, more domestic benefits). Hence, the promised withdrawal from a number of Free Trade Agreements, the discussion of the terms of NATO participation, cancellation of the environmental deals etc. From this perspective Trump’s election has to do with a much longer trend of international order rather than the specific time-lapse of the electoral campaign, a trend of dis-engagement that had already begun during the Obama administration and will now be more clearly visible with Trump. The system in which we have been living in the last 70 years was created in large part by the US leadership. The UN system, Bretton Woods Institutions, NATO, and WTO are all institutional arrangements that have been strongly promoted by the post WWII hegemon and that have been preserved in life thanks to continuous support by the USA. Now all of this is put into question by the resistance of the newly elected president to engage in and with these multilateral organizations. Trump will most likely have a more unpredictable, possibly turbulent behaviour vis a vis all of these institutions and this will lead to their transformation and perhaps for some, to their marginalization. Other significant elements in this jigsaw puzzle have to do with the phenomenon of globalization. It is because of global transformation in production chains, the relocation of multinational corporation abroad coupled with the possibility of (re-)importing goods, and the subsequent loss of jobs that a component of the middle class has been badly affected by unemployment. But it is also thanks to globalization that China is rising fast and challenging the US leadership in economic, but also increasingly in political and military terms. It is clear by now that the policy choice for globalization taken by the US leadership in the ‘80s (republican) and ‘90s (democratic) was beneficial only at the beginning, but later turned out to be detrimental to the power position of the USA in the world economy. It is widely recognised that India and especially China are the real winners in the game of globalization, hence closing the gap with the west. Russia is an additional element in this calculation. This new would-be multipolar system, deprived of the overall western master plan, is left to pure bargaining, pure transactionalism played with ad hoc games, which is very much in line with Trump’s overall attitude to socio-economic engagement. And yet, this might have a de-polarizing effect, a de-escalating consequence in terms of the current world tensions that have grown in the last few years. Here I am thinking especially of the west-Russia split. Without a hegemonic power pushing for a specific world order, a more balanced system might emerge. We might end up with a Trump presidency that has polarizing effects domestically and depolarizing effects internationally. The line of march is clear: either new competition based on multipolar rivalry which might possibly escalate into conflicts, or the opening of new channels for dialogue, might lead to a foundational phase in which innovative rules of the international games are written by western and non-western powers together. It will be up to Trump and the other leaders to steer the way and to take a decision on which way to go.
Hegemony fuels global prolif – withdrawal solves.
Mearsheimer and Walt ‘16 (John J, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, and Stephen M, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, July/August, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing)//cmr
Proponents of liberal hegemony also claim that the United States must remain committed all over the world to prevent nuclear proliferation. If it reduces its role in key regions or withdraws entirely, the argument runs, countries accustomed to U.S. protection will have no choice but to protect themselves by obtaining nuclear weapons. No grand strategy is likely to prove wholly successful at preventing proliferation, but offshore balancing would do a better job than liberal hegemony. After all, that strategy failed to stop India and Pakistan from ramping up their nuclear capabilities, North Korea from becoming the newest member of the nuclear club, and Iran from making major progress with its nuclear program. Countries usually seek the bomb because they fear being attacked, and U.S. efforts at regime change only heighten such concerns. By eschewing regime change and reducing the United States' military footprint, offshore balancing would give potential proliferators less reason to go nuclear. Moreover, military action cannot prevent a determined country from eventually obtaining nuclear weapons; it can only buy time. The recent deal with Iran serves as a reminder that coordinated multilateral pressure and tough economic sanctions are a better way to discourage proliferation than preventive war or regime change.
Prolif causes extinction.
Kroenig ’16 (Matthew; June 2016; Associate Professor in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council; National Bureau of Asian Research, No. 58 “Approaching Critical Mass: Asia's Multipolar Nuclear Future,”)
The most important reason to be concerned about nuclear weapons in Asia, of course, is the threat that nuclear weapons might be used. To be sure, the use of nuclear weapons remains remote, but the probability is not zero and the consequences could be catastrophic. The subject, therefore, deserves careful scrutiny. Nuclear use would overturn a 70-year tradition of nonuse, could result in large-scale death and destruction, and might set a precedent that shapes how nuclear weapons are viewed, proliferated, and postured decades hence. The dangers of escalation may be magnified in a multipolar nuclear order in which small skirmishes present the potential to quickly draw in multiple powers, each with a finger on the nuclear trigger. The following discussion will explore the logic of crisis escalation and strategic stability in a multipolar nuclear order.14 First and foremost, the existence of multipolar nuclear powers means that crises may pit multiple nuclear-armed states against one another. This may be the result of formal planning if a state’s strategy calls for fighting multiple nuclear-armed adversaries simultaneously. A state may choose such a strategy if it believes that a war with one of these states would inevitably mean war with both. Alternatively, in a war between state A and state B, state A may decide to conduct a preventive strike on state C for fear that it would otherwise seek to exploit the aftermath of the war between states A and B. Given U.S. nuclear strategy in the early Cold War, for example, it is likely that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would have also resulted in U.S. nuclear attacks against China, even if China had not been a direct participant in the precipitating dispute. In addition, conflicts of interest between nuclear powers may inadvertently impinge on the interests of other nuclear-armed states, drawing them into conflict. There is always a danger that one nuclear power could take action against a nuclear rival and that this action would unintentionally cross a red line for a third nuclear power, triggering a tripartite nuclear crisis. Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper have dubbed this category of phenomena the “security trilemma.”15 For example, if the United States were to engage in a show of force in an effort to signal resolve to Russia, such as the flushing of nuclear submarines, this action could inadvertently trigger a crisis for China. There is also the issue of “catalytic” war. This may be the first mechanism by which Cold War strategists feared that multiple nuclear players could increase the motivations for a nuclear exchange. They worried that a third nuclear power, such as China, might conduct a nuclear strike on one of the superpowers, leading the wounded superpower to conclude wrongly that the other superpower was responsible and thereby retaliate against an innocent state presumed to be the aggressor. This outcome was seen as potentially attractive to the third state as a way of destroying the superpowers and promoting itself within the global power hierarchy. Fortunately, this scenario never came to pass during the Cold War. With modern intelligence, reconnaissance, and early warning capabilities among the major powers, it is more difficult to imagine such a scenario today, although this risk is still conceivable among less technologically developed states. In addition to acting directly against one another, nuclear powers could be drawn into smaller conflicts between their allies and brought face to face in peak crises. International relations theorists discuss the concept of “chain ganging” within alliance relationships, the dangers of which are more severe when the possibility of nuclear escalation is present.16 Although this was a potential problem even in a bipolar nuclear order, the more nuclear weapons states present, the greater the likelihood of multiple nuclear powers entering a crisis. A similar logic suggests that the more fingers on the nuclear trigger, the more likely it is that nuclear weapons will be used. Multipolar nuclear crises are not without historical precedent.17 Several Cold War crises featured the Soviet Union against the United States and its European nuclear-armed allies, Britain and later France. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War involved the United States, the Soviet Union, and a nuclear-armed Israel. The United States has been an interested party in regional nuclear disputes, including the Sino-Soviet border war of 1969 and several crises in the past two decades on the Indian subcontinent. Indeed, many of these crises stand out as among the most dangerous of the nuclear era.
Heg causes nuclear miscalc with Russia.
Zuckerman ‘16 (June 7, 2016, at 4:21 p.m., Mortimer Zuckerman is the chairman and editor-in-chief of U.S. News & World Report and the publisher of the New York Daily News, Cites William Perry – former sec of Defense under Clinton, https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-06-07/four-paths-to-nuclear-disaster)//AP
The third current nuclear threat, the danger of nuclear war through miscalculation, most seriously with the Russians, is, Perry warns, complex but quite credible. The story begins at the end of the Cold War when prospects seemed promising for a crucial cooperative atmosphere with the Russians, perhaps eventually a pan-European security system. Indeed, because of the considerable diplomatic effort led by Perry, the Russians had joined their military forces with NATO's operating in Bosnia, a remarkable and hopeful development. But the present situation is marked by Russia's continuing aggressive statements about their ongoing dependence on nuclear weapons, their robust program to modernize those forces (which seems to mirror U.S. modernization programs) and their aggression in Ukraine and elsewhere in their neighborhood. It has been an especially bitter development for Perry, for it started after the Cold War ended. So what happened? After the Cold War ended, and under Perry's leadership, the Partnership for Peace was formed as an interim organization which Eastern European nations, including Russia, could join as a step to eventual NATO membership, the key idea being that the transition would be gradual. Understandably, there was little patience among the outside nations in waiting to join. Perry emphasized that traditional Russian sensibilities and concerns about its regional security mandated a carefully staged, gradual expansion of the security organization. He was opposed by Richard Holbrooke, then an assistant secretary in the State Department, who argued to promptly move to the Eastern European "partnership" members into NATO. After all, what could the Russians do? Perry asked Clinton to hold a decisive National Security Council meeting where he could make the case for delay. There Vice President Al Gore argued for immediate inclusion and Perry lost the day. Clinton agreed to membership at once for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, delaying for a while the membership of the Baltic States. Perry nearly resigned, but decided not to do so in the hopes he could help mitigate the increasing lack of trust by the Russians who claimed NATO had no concern for their priorities. But it was not possible; NATO expansion turned out to be the first slip down a slick slope leading to the hostile relations we have today. Russia today genuinely feels threatened and concerned regarding what it believes is U.S. pursuit of military superiority and political and economic hegemony. It views our actions as inconsistent with traditional notions of strategic stability. Thus Russia presently is an unlikely partner in the process of nuclear disarmament. Perry makes the case that it is in U.S. and Russian interest to change our present momentum toward a new Cold War and he emphasizes that this process requires listening carefully to the concerns of others. Failing that, the germinating threat is evident today: Look, for example, to Russia's action in the Ukraine and the Baltics, where President Vladimir Putin has pursued an aggressive policy based on the stated belief that his country bears a responsibility to protect ethnic Russians in those countries. This policy has already led to warfare in the Ukraine; if it were applied to any of the Baltic nations, all of which have a substantial number of ethnic Russians, it could lead to a military conflict between Russian and NATO troops. Clearly the greatest danger is an escalation to the use of nuclear weapons, either by foolish design or miscalculation. The expressions by the Russian government of its dependence on nuclear weapons make this danger all the more pressing. Neither the Russian nor NATO leadership would want this outcome of course; but the escalation could occur beyond their control, especially with the Russian emphasis on "tactical" nuclear weapons whose management might be in the hands of battlefield military commanders, as it was during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
! D – 2NC
Their ev fearmongers
Valeriano and Maness 15 – co-authors of Cyber War versus Cyber Realities, AND *Senior Lecturer in Social and Political Sciences at the University of Glasgow, AND **Visiting Fellow of Secur

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