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2022 UTNIF Evidence

AT - Turkey PIC Addendum - UTNIF 2022

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AFF Addendum – Turkey PIC – CP Gripe – UTNIF 22
PDCP – Turkey PIC – 2AC
“The” isn’t the whole.
Random House 6 Unabridged Dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/the)
(used, esp. before a noun, with a specifying or particularizing effect, as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of the indefinite article a or an): the book you gave me; Come into the house.
Offense – Net Benefit – Turkey PIC – 2AC
NATO-Turkey Coop Good – Turkey PIC – 2AC
NATO-Turkey co-operation is both possible and necessary.
Jeffrey 6/15 (James, Former ambassador to Iraq and Turkey, and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition To Defeat ISIS, "The NATO Accession Crisis Risks Final Collapse of the Alliance-Turkey Relationship" June 25, 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/nato-accession-crisis-risks-final-collapse-alliance-turkey-relationship)
A month ago, Washington hosted Turkish Foreign Minister Melvut Cavusoglu and signaled a new bilateral strategic dialogue. This included possible sales of F-16’s to Ankara, symbolically ending the bitter dispute over a Turkish Russian missile purchase, and Washington’s subsequent cutting Turkey from the F-35 program. Turkey was also following analogous rapprochement with Arab states, Israel, Greece, and Armenia, and now plays a central role in the Ukrainian conflict providing weapons, closing the Straits to Russian naval reinforcements and pressing on various diplomatic exchanges. Then almost overnight Ankara lashed out against Finland and Sweden, threatening to block their NATO accession if they did not cut real and alleged ties to the PKK, and followed up with the aforementioned threats in Syria and escalation in the Aegean. Predictably, American commentators reacted vigorously, even suggesting once again for Turkey to be thrown out of NATO.
Shifting attitudes toward Turkey
Such dramatic flips in Turkish policy, gelding any predictable diplomacy, have become a hallmark of both Turkish president Erdogan and the convoluted internal political system with his party, dependent on an extremist nationalist partner. Such flips also make efforts to resolve issues such as those above (let alone the underlying rift between Ankara and NATO allies), a high-risk endeavor which most Western leaders avoid, writing Turkey off as a lost cause. But as Ukraine has demonstrated, Turkey is vital to containing Russia, as it has been to NATO’s nuclear deterrence, missile defense against Iran, operations in the Balkans, and Afghanistan. It is just too big, too important, and at times too problematic to ignore.
While the Ukraine conflict is now generating strife between Turkey and NATO over Scandinavian accession, it also offers a chance to improve relations between them. That conflict resembles nothing seen since the late 1930s and immediate post-war period, with the very survival of the world order at stake. Winning this conflict, by maintaining Ukraine’s survival as an independent state and deterring new Russian aggression, while avoiding escalation into the unknown, is a categorical imperative not experienced since the Cold War. While this is true of the Alliance as a whole, it is especially relevant for Turkey, a front line state with a long history under Russian pressure.
Furthermore, experience shows Turkey can be cooperative. The Bush administration worked well with Turkey on counter-PKK operations, and the Obama administration negotiated a NATO anti- Iranian ballistic missile radar deployment. The 2019 Pence-Erdogan ceasefire in Northeast Syria still holds despite Turkish threats, and the two capitals handled well President Biden’s acknowledgment of Armenian genocide. And, ironically, despite deep geostrategic hostility and recent military clashes, Russia and Turkey maintain productive presidential-level relations, with Putin and especially Erdogan usually following a ‘no-surprises’ principle.
Turkey-NATO military partnerships are necessary and successful. Turkey is KEY to NATO military ops.
Çoban and Akar 20 (Samet, Research Fellow @ Beyond the Horizon ISSG, Furkan, Research Intern @ Beyond the Horizon ISSG, “NATO-Turkey Relations in a Turbulent Environment: The Military Dimension of NATO-Turkey Relations”, NATO-Turkey Relations Policy Brief, Beyond the Horizon ISSG, December 2020, https://behorizon.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/NATO-Turkey-Relations-Policy-Brief_Beyond-the-Horizon-ISSG.pdf)
Unlike political turmoil, military relations between Turkey and NATO are on track. What most analysts agree about is that there is no shrinkage of Turkish military contribution to NATO. Turkey (still) provides substantial contributions to the NATO and EU-led operations. As Flanagan and Wilson point out "engagement slowed somewhat in the immediate months after the coup, almost 95 per cent of planned operations and activities with US Army Europe forces resumed the following year. In fact, the TSK [TAF] participated in ten US Army Europe exercises during 2016, which was a significant increase over previous years."
Along with these operations, Turkey contributes to the NATO Response Force (NRF) substantially, e.g. hosting an NRDC Headquarters in Istanbul and providing naval vessels to SNMG-2 and SNMCMG-2 that are maritime components of the NRF.
More importantly, Turkey will resume the command of NATO's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), the spearhead force of the NRF in 2021 and is expected to assign additional military headquarters regarding NATO Readiness Initiative (NRI).16
The active participation of Turkey is incoherent with harsh rhetoric of both sides. In case, a Turkey, which is pivoting to the East, is expected to diminish its contributions. Why doesn't Turkey decouple from NATO at least to some extent? Conversely, cooperation is still increasing amidst tensions. For example, the Maritime Security Centre of Excellence was accredited by NATO in June 2020. 17
Turkish Armed Forces is amalgamated with NATO. Its broad participation necessitates a deeper integration, i.e. interoperability and capacity to conduct exercises, campaigns together with the other members of the Alliance. Almost all Turkish assets, whether they are made indigenously or exported, are produced according to NATO standards and contain critical components that are imported from Western allies. Moreover, maintenance and operating procedures, spare parts, technical manuals, field manuals, signals, messaging standards are generated and maintained as such, that requires a specific training and foreign language, i.e. English, know-how, all of which takes a long time to acquire.
NATO countries are Turkey's most critical foreign arms suppliers. Turkey imported/ordered all primary weapons from NATO countries between 2016-2019 except for a training aircraft from Pakistan and S-400 system, that is an extraordinary one with a top-down order as Egeli points out.18 For instance, Turkey is the number one customer for the German defence industry, accounting one-third of German arms exports.19
Substantial Turkish commitments to NATO entities as well as the active participation of TAF to the NATO missions and operations contradict with the Turkish government's (domestic) political discourse and hardliners in the Western community. This continuation indicates that traditional tendencies are still in place when it comes to defence and security priorities.
The plan’s inclusion solves – integrating Turkey into a unified NATO vision. Exclusion merely maintains squo conflict.
Jeffrey 6/15 (James, Former ambassador to Iraq and Turkey, and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition To Defeat ISIS, "The NATO Accession Crisis Risks Final Collapse of the Alliance-Turkey Relationship" June 25, 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/nato-accession-crisis-risks-final-collapse-alliance-turkey-relationship)
A new course
The first step out of this dilemma is for all sides to recognize that with Russian aggression, they face a unique international situation that requires subordination of all other priorities to the core objective. That sort of wisdom, familiar to Churchill, Roosevelt, Truman, military planners, and in a perverse way, Putin, has largely faded in the West since 1989, replaced by what has become conventional foreign policy thinking: nothing is critical and innumerable factors compete for consideration, for example moral, ideological, humanitarian, domestic, security, alliance, economic, personal, or usually some triangulation of them.
Both sides must prioritize vigorously containing Russia, seek transactional deals on those issues between them that can be resolved, and ignore the others.
In the impasse between Turkey and NATO, this conventional thinking encourages states, buffeted by various interests and negative voices towards Turkey, to treat it as a second class, suspect member of the alliance, while benefiting from its extraordinary NATO contributions. But conventional thinking also pushes Ankara, with its domestic pressures, to see the Ukrainian crisis as simply another opportunity to extort Europe over Turkey’s second-class status, EU accession, arms sales, and specific issues such as the PKK and the Aegean. Both sides thus must prioritize vigorously containing Russia, seek transactional deals on those issues between them that can be resolved, and ignore the others. In short, accepting partners as they are, not as they should be.
The immediate challenge is NATO accession. Here Turkey has to blink first and recognize that the stakes, not just stopping Russia but preserving its own relations with NATO, require accepting half a loaf (not always an Erdogan government trait). It cannot expect Sweden and Finland to extradite people to a state whose legal system is under continuous international criticism, nor for those countries to silence freedom of expression, even when it is sympathetic to the terrorist PKK cause. It should also be accepted that, while the fight against the PKK is truly important to Turkish security, it is still secondary to Russia advancing on its borders.
In return, Sweden should lift its ban on arms sales to Turkey (and the US Congress the same with its informal ban, now impacting the F-16 sale). Finland and especially Sweden, given their long affinity for “national liberation” movements, should cut official contacts with the PKK and its fronts, recommit to Helsinki Final Act on noninterference in others’ internal affairs and give assurances they would cooperate in NATO on issues important to Turkey.
Turkey’s partners should continue counseling it against a new incursion into northern Syria. But if Turkey compromises by only attacking PKK elements west of the Euphrates, away from US forces and the main anti-ISIS effort, Washington’s objections should be muted. Likewise, partners should urge Turkey to stop overflying Greek territory, but simultaneously speak out on provocative Greek policies.
While these steps can manage the immediate crises Turkey has launched, the longer-term solution, moving to a transactional relationship, needs highest level US leadership. First, such a relationship requires dealing with Erdogan; if Putin can do it with a geostrategic opponent, why cannot American and European leaders with an ally, however difficult, given the stakes. Second, the US needs someone at a very senior level to complement the American ambassador as the administration’s Turkish file lead, not to communicate with the Turks but to corral the undisciplined official and unofficial Washington policy worlds. That world can torpedo any foreign policy effort, but doing so regarding Turkey is child’s play in the absence of presidential engagement and a Washington champion.
NATO-Turkey co-op is the only way to deter Russia in the Black Sea and the Middle East.
Ellehuus 19 (Rachel, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow with Europe Program @ Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving", Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 12, https://www.csis.org/analysis/turkey-and-nato-relationship-worth-saving)
The first of these is the Black Sea, where Turkey, as well as fellow NATO Black Sea littoral states Romania and Bulgaria, are trying to balance an increasing Russian military presence. While previously resistant to a greater NATO role in the Black Sea for fear it would dilute its own influence in the region, Turkey now sees the dangers of leaving Russian influence and presence in Black Sea unchecked. With its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and entry into the Syrian civil war in 2015, Russia has significantly increased its presence and combat capabilities in both the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean.
NATO now faces an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) bubble that restricts allies’ freedom of maneuver in the Black Sea, with Russia capable of attacking from both land and sea. To effectively counter this, NATO should establish a more continuous presence in the Black Sea, revive the idea of a permanent NATO maritime fleet in the Black Sea, and consider basing more counter-A2/AD capabilities in Turkey and Romania. Importantly, Turkey holds unique power to control access to the Black Sea thanks to the 1936 Montreux Convention, which governs naval passage through the Turkish Straits, limiting the number of foreign vessels that can enter the Black Sea via the Straits and how long these vessels can stay. This access is important to both Russia and NATO. Whereas Turkey has proven to be an impartial and reliable enforcer of the treaty, Russia has pushed the boundaries of Montreux repeatedly since the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 and, more recently, impeded the course of NATO vessels that have entered and departed the Black Sea in compliance with the treaty. More behavior along these lines, or a Russian attempt to leverage its new, closer relationship with Turkey to secure more favorable access to the Black Sea, would likely increase Turkey’s unease and lead it to rely more on NATO as a counterbalance.
For its part, the European Union should closely watch Turkey’s proposed construction of the Istanbul Canal to connect the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara (and, as such, the Aegean and Mediterranean seas), which is reportedly drawing interest from Chinese as well as Russian investors. As the canal would allow ships to sail between the Mediterranean and Black Sea without transiting the Turkish Straits, and thus abiding by the restrictions of Montreux, the European Union and United States should consider investing in this infrastructure project to ensure they are in a position to work with Turkey to ensure free and fair transit through the canal.
A second area where Turkey’s immediate security concerns intersect with the majority of other NATO members is stability in the Middle East, most immediately in Syria. To be sure, Turkey’s anger over United States’ partnership with the YPG in the fight against the Islamic State—and NATO’s anger at Turkey for its unilateral incursion into northern Syria—will make progress difficult. But ultimately, the two sides share a mutual interest in seeing stability and pluralistic governance in Syria. This entails constraining Syrian president Bashar al-Assad; preventing the return of the Islamic State and Europe-based Islamic State fighters; and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid, reconstruction, and refugee return. More broadly, both sides also share an interest in limiting Russian and Iranian influence in the region. With the Russian military presence in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Crimea now supplemented by the Russian naval base at Tartus, airbases at Kobani and Khmeimim, and helicopter base at Qamishli, Turkey is effectively encircled by Russia. It is in this context that German minister of defence Kramp-Karrenbauer’s suggestion of an internationally-controlled security zone along the Turkey-Syria border, possibly NATO-led and backed by the United Nations in loose partnership with Russia, makes sense. It would address a situation that immediately and directly affects the security of Europe and Turkey and demonstrate that the NATO is invested in addressing Turkey’s security concerns.
NATO Reunification – L/T – Turkey PIC – 2AC
The aff’s strategic dialogue solves disputes with Turkey – shared values ensure the alliance will be repaired
Beyoghlow ‘20 – adjunct professor of international security at the George Washington University’s Elliot School of International Affairs, where he teaches courses on Turkish politics and foreign policy (Kamal, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, “TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE BRINK: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO AND THE US-TURKISH STRATEGIC AND MILITARY PARTNERSHIP”, January 2020, https://www-jstor-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/stable/pdf/resrep24340.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Af4722a403c137d09b5f6dc26ca56c20f&ab_segments=0%2FSYC-6442%2Ftest&origin=&acceptTC=1 )//RG
While the current standoff between Turkey and the United States appears to be moving from bad to worse, it has yet to reach a breaking point or a point of no return. Although tensions and policy differences continue to plague US-Turkish relations, efforts by well-meaning policymakers within the US government and Turkey’s civilian and military establishment point to perhaps better days to come, given the resilience and endurance of the ties that bind the two nations together. The US perspective on Turkey could be traced to many factors, starting with the refusal of the Turkish Parliament to allow US forces to transit Turkish territory to attack Iraq in 2003 and the slow Turkish support for the US-led coalition against ISIS. Turkey is also being put on notice by the United States for feuding against other NATO allies—namely, Germany, the Netherlands, Cyprus, France, and Greece. In the last case, tensions have been brewing in recent months over new border disputes in the Aegean and the refusal of Greece to extradite a group of Turkish officers allegedly involved in the failed coup. Although resolving the Cyprus issue remains high on the US agenda, tensions between Turkey and Cyprus over oil and gas exploration rights and access off the coast of Cyprus are forcing the United States and the European Union to side with Cyprus and even entertain sending US naval ships to protect Cypriot gas and oil tracks at sea. Despite these and other policy differences over Syria and other domestic problems facing Turkey, both sides seem reluctant to cause irreparable damage to their alliance. The United States, which has traditional ties with Turkey, does not want a military confrontation with the country over Syria. The most hopeful sign of addressing some of the protracted problems currently facing US-Turkish relations stems from the fact that Turkey is still seen by the United States as important to America’s national security interests, especially given Turkey’s geostrategic location and cultural familiarity with its volatile neighbors. Turkey is currently self-absorbed with its ambitions and Muslim neo-Ottoman nationalist revivalism, but its unique ballot-box democracy, albeit imperfect by Western standards, will work toward increasing harmonization toward the United States and its NATO allies in the long run. This can only happen through a sustained strategic dialogue. The idea is to keep Turkey and the United States engaged while trying to find solutions to the issues that separate them, because once the current tactical posturing is stripped away, the strategic alliance becomes more visible. There is indeed current evidence for better US-NATO-Turkish cross-cultural communication techniques to manage and resolve outstanding policy and strategic differences. In short, Turkey is not yet lost, but there are challenges facing America and its NATO partners in how to bridge the growing gap between them and Turkey. This challenge touches on a fundamental question: What kind of strategic relation- ship do the United States, NATO, and Turkey want or desire? Clearly, they

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