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2022 UTNIF Negative

Neg - AI Logistics - UTNIF 2022

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NEG – AI – Neg vs. AI Aff – Case Debate
1NC Frontlines
NATO Advantage
1. Their ev fearmongers
Valeriano and Maness 15 – co-authors of Cyber War versus Cyber Realities, AND *Senior Lecturer in Social and Political Sciences at the University of Glasgow, AND **Visiting Fellow of Security and Resilience Studies at Northeastern University (Brandon and Ryan C., The Coming Cyberpeace: The Normative Argument Against Cyberwarfare, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-05-13/coming-cyberpeace)
The era of cyberconflict is upon us; at least, experts seem to accept that cyberattacks are the new normal. In fact, however, evidence suggests that cyberconflict is not as prevalent as many believe. Likewise, the severity of individual cyber events is not increasing, even if the frequency of overall attacks has risen. And an emerging norm against the use of severe state-based cybertactics contradicts fear-mongering news reports about a coming cyberapocalypse. The few isolated incidents of successful state-based cyberattacks do not a trend make. Rather, what we are seeing is cyberespionage and probes, not cyberwarfare. Meanwhile, the international consensus has stabilized around a number of limited acceptable uses of cybertechnology—one that prohibits any dangerous use of force. Despite fears of a boom in cyberwarfare, there have been no major or dangerous hacks between countries. The closest any states have come to such events occurred when Russia attacked Georgian news outlets and websites in 2008; when Russian forces shut down banking, government, and news websites in Estonia in 2007; when Iran attacked the Saudi Arabian oil firm Saudi Aramco with the Shamoon virus in 2012; and when the United States attempted to sabotage Iran’s nuclear power systems from 2007 to 2011 through the Stuxnet worm. The attack on Sony from North Korea is just the latest overhyped cyberattack to date, as the corporate giant has recovered its lost revenues from the attack and its networks are arguably more resilient as a result. Even these are more probes into vulnerabilities than full attacks. Russia’s aggressions show that Moscow is willing to use cyberwarfare for disruption and propaganda, but not to inflict injuries or lasting infrastructural damage. The Shamoon incident allowed Iran to punish Saudi Arabia for its alliance with the United States as Tehran faced increased sanctions; the attack destroyed files on Saudi Aramco’s computer network but failed to do any lasting damage. The Stuxnet incident also failed to create any lasting damage, as Tehran put more centrifuges online to compensate for virus-based losses and strengthened holes in their system. Further, these supposedly successful cases of cyberattacks are balanced by many more examples of unsuccessful ones. If the future of cyberconflict looks like today, the international community must reassess the severity of the threat. Cyberattacks have demonstrated themselves to be more smoke than fire. This is not to suggest that incidents are on the decline, however. Distributed denial-of-service attacks and infiltrations increase by the minute—every major organization is probed constantly, but only for weaknesses or new infiltration methods for potential use in the future. Probes and pokes do not destabilize states or change trends within international politics. Even common cyber actions have little effect on levels of cooperation and conflict between states.
2. Squo solves – DIANA is already producing AI necessary for NATO to compete with Russia and China – that’s their 1AC Parrikar evidence.
3. Actors self-deter --- cyber is unique because defenders have the absolute defense of disconnecting. If attacks get strong enough, the internet itself becomes a bad deal for the defender, which also screws the attacker by denying lower-level cyber coercion and espionage
Jon Lindsay and Erik Gartzke 14, Jon R. Lindsay is an assistant research scientist at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and an assistant adjunct professor at the University of California, San Diego School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, AND Erik Gartzke is Professor and Director of cPASS at the Department of Political Science @ UCSD, Lindsay, Jon R., and Erik Gartzke. “Coercion through Cyberspace: The Stability-Instability Paradox Revisited.” The Power to Hurt: Coercion in the Modern World, Oct. 2014.
Perhaps the simplest form of cross domain response to cyber threats is to forgo the use of the cyber domain altogether. While it is hard if not impossible to limit exposure to nuclear weapons and even a determined conventional assault, the risk of cyber attack can be completely eliminated by disconnection from digital networks. The internet is an artificial environment and connection to it is voluntary. Individuals, organizations, and states retain the ability to unplug completely, limit their online transactions, or erect various barriers to connection. Obviously disconnection is not very feasible commercially, socially, and militarily today, but this is more of an indicator of how positive the benefits of interconnection are compared to the perceived risks. If the risks were perceived as extreme, then firms and states could go back to making a living as they did before 1991 (when WWW went public). This is a cross-domain threat because it entails exiting the cyber domain altogether to leverage more traditional economic and military transactions. The threat of disconnection follows from the more general logic of international organizations, where contracts must be self-enforcing.44 On the internet as in institutions, ties among egoistic actors under anarchy must be mutually beneficial. If the internet is a bad deal for actors, they can throw up boundaries or exit cyberspace altogether. If repeated exposure to adversarial exploitation causes states to lose more than they gain from being online, then they can undermine the attacker’s very means for accessing the victim. The threat of voluntary disconnection is especially relevant for repeated interactions, or repeated exploitation, rather than a one-shot “bolt from the blue” cyber attack (which is better countered with cross-domain retaliation). The threat of disconnection is implicit in the voluntary nature of connection to the internet, and the potential loss of the ability to make future attacks exercises a deterrent effect on attacks in the present. An aggressor who does not want to lose the cyber adjuncts for espionage and disruption it has invested so much in developing will show restraint in their employment. This does not mean that coercion cannot take place online, but it is bounded by excess value. One implication is that the countries that can be most coerced on the internet will be those that have the most to lose by leaving it.
4. Alt causes to miscalculation – war in Ukraine and Biden’s posture shift over Taiwan have already heightened US-Russia-China tensions.
5. There are diminishing returns on cyber escalation because stronger attacks are more likely to provoke disconnection.
Jon Lindsay and Erik Gartzke 14, Jon R. Lindsay is an assistant research scientist at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and an assistant adjunct professor at the University of California, San Diego School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, AND Erik Gartzke is Professor and Director of cPASS at the Department of Political Science @ UCSD, Lindsay, Jon R., and Erik Gartzke. “Coercion through Cyberspace: The Stability-Instability Paradox Revisited.” The Power to Hurt: Coercion in the Modern World, Oct. 2014.
The combination of cross domain deterrence and voluntary connection to the internet gives rise to a variant of the classic stability-instability paradox. In Glenn Snyder’s original articulation of the paradox, mutually assured destruction could deter nuclear war. However, MAD was not credible for, and might even encourage, limited conventional war.56 Or as Robert Jervis puts it, “To the extent that the military balance is stable at the level of all-out nuclear war, it will become less stable at lower levels of violence.”57 Cyber capacity is a poor substitute for nuclear weapons, myths of paralysis notwithstanding, yet there is a similar logic constraining the distributions of harms which are possible via information technology. To extend this logic to the cyber domain, there are a variety of deterrent mechanisms contain the most disruptive types of cyber attacks yet fail to contain, and even enable, a wide variety of online espionage, subversion, symbolic protest, and criminal predation. In cyberspace we observe a rather stable damage contest (i.e., no “paralysis” and limited “disruption”) but a very unstable intelligence-counterintelligence contest (lots of “espionage” and “fraud” vying with efforts at “control” and “mobilization”). Thus the actors that have the ability to carry out highly destructive cyber attacks (mainly state actors for now) lack the motivation to attack; by contrast, these same actors as well as many different actors have both the ability and motivation to inflict irritant aggression with little fear of suffering consequences By and large, cyber options fill out the lower end of the conflict spectrum where deterrence is not as credible or reliable. The very few cases of physically disruptive cyber attack we do observe—mainly powerful states conducting covert action or battlefield support operations against militarily weaker opponents—have notably involved stronger actors who not only have the capacity to plan and conduct a sophisticated attack but also have the ability to deter retaliation against their use of cyber attack. This cyber variant of the stability-instability paradox has a slightly different logic, however. In the nuclear realm, actors cannot disconnect from the threatened harm, and this is what makes the threatened destruction both mutual and assured. When there are many missiles with many warheads, the chance of intercepting them on the ground through a disarming counterforce strike or in the air through ballistic missile defense with any confidence becomes vanishingly small. Not so in cyberspace, where connection to the internet or acceptance of connections through it is voluntary. There is “no forced entry in cyberspace” in Libicki’s phrase, and so the hundredth cyber attack against a closed vulnerability is as ineffective as the first. Attackers thus rely on deception to exploit vulnerabilities and ensure that they stay open. However, offensive deception can fail in the “fog of cyberwar” and defenders can be deceptive as well, both of which are more likely against high-reward targets (where cross domain deterrence also more credible). The need to preserve internet connections to facilitate ongoing and future deception as well as the need to preserve stealth to avoid the consequences of getting caught imposes discipline on attackers. Actors cannot enjoy the substantial benefits of interconnection without accepting some risk of exploitation (hacking to spy) and attack (hacking to disrupt). Thus the successful “lockout” of the internet, with advantage accruing exclusively to one political group or another, is not realistic. Moreover, because these harms share similar techniques, the observed abundance 39 of the former represents a latent potential for the later. The latent escalatory potential of even minor irritants leads to rampant fears of unrestrained catastrophe, to be sure. Yet this latent potential is difficult to harness for targeted coercion because the threat is self-effacing. Declared cyber threats that highlight the vulnerability to be exploited are readily mitigated. Instead, the ineradicable threat of cyber catastrophe (ineradicable as long as the internet continues to be useful) creates a general if diffuse deterrent effect among all parties who value their connection to the internet. No one who wants to make money on the internet really wants to have a cyberwar, and this includes states as well as criminals. Which types of actors are most able to benefit through internet coercion and which are most vulnerable to coercion? Large powers like the U.S. are highly dependent on the internet but also highly skilled at inflicting harm, both through cyber and traditional military force. Poor powers across the digital divide may have little vulnerability at all, while medium powers may have vulnerability but lack a range of forces to deter attacks. This might imply a “curvature” to the utility of cyber coercion. Big-capable countries are vulnerable to cyber harm but can deter through other military instruments. Poor states are not vulnerable. It may be the prosperous small or digitally developing who are in trouble, since they cannot credibly deter and have high dependence on the internet. The information revolution is often thought to be a boon to non-state actors, and indeed it is, but mainly in the irritant class of cyber operations. Moreover, the increasing ubiquity and sophistication of information technologies can be expected to have something of a democratizing effect on intelligence and counterintelligence techniques whereby firms and citizens will have access to and be concerned about the types of things that were historically the purview of obscure state intelligence agencies. However, it would be a mistake to use the increasing ferment of low-intensity information contests to infer the shape of higher 40 intensity activity. On the contrary, the traditional logic of war will continue to dominate the expression of cyber aggression. Because threatened internet harms depend on voluntary connections in the first place, and as many actors have alternative means to inflict (cross domain) harm in retaliation, the coercive utility of cyberspace is actually somewhat limited. At the same time an ever increasing variety irritants and more temperamental adjuncts becomes available for global political interaction. The “net” result is that opponents have strong incentives to impose costs via the internet but also to keep those costs low enough to preserve interconnection and avoid retaliation. Therefore, contests in damage will remain relatively stable while contests in intelligence will be increasingly unstable. The human-built world is becoming more complex, to be sure, but it is not necessarily more dangerous. As long as it is desirable to connect to the internet tomorrow, there will be only limited harm via the internet today.
Democracy Advantage
1. Regulations are bad –
A.) Regulation destroys AI control by driving it underground, abroad, or into higher-risk areas
Dr. Nell Watson 21, PhD in Engineering from the University of Gloucestershire, Degree in AGI Safety Fundamentals from the University of Cambridge, Senior Scientific Advisor to The Future Society at Harvard University, Fellow at the British Computing Society and Royal Statistical Society, “Regulatory Challenges to Catastrophic AI Risk”, ExO Insight, 11/24/2021, https://insight.openexo.com/regulatory-challenges-to-ai/
Rick Increase Factors:
Obfuscation: Regulations may drive research underground where it is harder to monitor, or to ‘flag of convenience’ jurisdictions with lax restrictions, by embedding dangerous technologies within apparently benign cover operations (multipurpose technologies), or by obfuscating the externalized effects of a system, such as in the vehicle emissions scandal (Wikipedia).
Arms race: Recent advances in machine learning such as multimodal abstractions models (aka Transformers, Large Language Models, Foundation Models) such as GPT-3 and DALL-E illustrate that dumping computing resources (and the funds for them) in colossal models seems to be a worthy investment. So far, there is no apparent limit or diminishing return on model size, and so now state and non-state actors are scrambling to produce the largest models feasible in order to access thousands of new capabilities never before possible. An arms race is afoot. Such arms races can lead to rapid and unexpected take-off in terms of AI capability, and the rush can blindside people to risks, especially when the loss of a race can mean an existential threat to a nation or organization.
Perverse incentives: Incentives can be powerful forces within organizations, and financialization, moral panic, or fear of political danger may cause irrational or incorrigible behavior of personnel within organizations.
Postmodern Warfare: Inexpensive Drones and other AI-enabled technologies have tremendous disruptive promise within the realm of warfare, especially given their asynchronous nature. Control of drone swarms must be performed using AI technologies, and this may encourage the entire theatre of war to be increasingly delegating to AI, perhaps including the interpretation of rules of engagement and grand strategy. (Lsusr, 2021)
Cyber Warfare: Hacking of systems is increasingly being augmented with machine intelligence (Cisomag, 2021), through GAN-enabled password crackers (Griffin, 2019) and advanced social engineering tools (Newman, 2021). This is equally the case in the realm of defense, where only machine intelligence may provide the swift execution required to defend systems from attack. A lack of international cyberwar regulations, and poor international policing of organized cybercrimes, may increase the risk of catastrophic risks to societal systems.
Zersetzung: The human mind is becoming a new theatre of war, through personalized generative propaganda, which may even extend to gaslighting attacks on targeted individuals, significantly leading to destabilization of societies (Williams, 2021). Such technologies are also plausibly deniable, being difficult to prove who may be responsible.
Inflexibility: The German Military after WW1 was not allowed to develop their artillery materiel, and so developed powerful rocket technologies instead, as these were not subject to regulation. Similarly, inflexible rules may permit exploitable loopholes. They may also not be sufficiently adaptive to allow for the implementation of new technologies and even improved industry standards.
Limitation of problem spaces: – It may be taboo to allow machine intelligence to work on sensitive issues or to be exposed to controversial (if potentially accurate) datasets. This may limit the ability of AI to make sense of out complex issues, and thereby frustrate finding solutions for crises.
B.) That causes catastrophic AI since it’ll be controlled by rogues with no precautions AND without defensive countermeasures
Robert A. Freitas 22 Jr., JD from the University of Santa Clara (Santa Clara, CA), School of Law, Research Fellow at the Institute for Molecular Manufacturing, Won the 2009 Feynman Prize in Nanotechnology for Theory, BS in Physics and Psychology from Harvey Mudd College, “Molecular Manufacturing: Too Dangerous to Allow?”, Nanotechnology Perceptions, Volume 2, Number 1, Republished at The Lifeboat Foundation, https://lifeboat.com/ex/molecular.manufacturing
Attempts to block or “relinquish” [3, 12] molecular manufacturing research will make the world a more, not less, dangerous place [13]. This paradoxical conclusion is founded on two premises. First, attempts to block the research will fail. Second, such attempts will preferentially block or slow the development of defensive measures by responsible groups. One of the clear conclusions reached by Freitas [4] was that effective countermeasures against self-replicating systems should be feasible, but will require significant effort to develop and deploy. (Nanotechnology critic Bill Joy, responding to this author, complained in late 2000 that any nanoshield defense to protect against global ecophagy “appears to be so outlandishly dangerous that I can’t imagine we would attempt to deploy it.” [12]) But blocking the development of defensive systems would simply insure that offens

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