Neg - Disease - UTNIF 2022
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Disease Neg – UTNIF Unilat CP Solvency – Pandemics R&D solves pandemic preparedness Riley 21- Homeland Preparedness News reporter based in the Washington, D.C., metro area where she has access to Capitol Hill lawmakers, lobbyists and other national change-makers (Kim, “Bolster R&D for improved pandemic preparedness and response, say experts,” Homeland Preparedness News, 11-29-21, Accessed Online at https://homelandprepnews.com/countermeasures/74931-bolster-rd-for-improved-pandemic-preparedness-and-response-say-experts/, Accessed Online on 7-4-22) Federal agencies, Congress and the White House must jointly foster improved research and development for pandemic preparedness and response, experts said during a recent webinar hosted by the Capitol Hill Steering Committee on Pandemic Preparedness & Health Security. “Over the last two years, the United States and the rest of the world have really seen the immense value of research and development in terms of new tools technologies, drugs and vaccines to combat infectious disease threats,” said panel moderator Anita Cicero, deputy director at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, which manages the steering committee. “It’s vital to examine how federal agencies, Congress and the White House can reimagine how they work with each other and the private sector to foster greater agility, speed, innovation and coordination in research and development for pandemic readiness,” Cicero said during the Nov. 17 webinar, “Modernizing Research & Development for Pandemic Readiness.” Former U.S. Rep. Susan Brooks (R-IN), an honorary founding member of the steering committee, pointed out that the United States is “completely and rightly” considered a global leader in R&D and in technological innovation. “Yet, during my tenure in Congress, it was clear that the federal bureaucracy was often not known for being nimble or for its transparency or its ability to work outside the rigid guidelines and meet funding mechanisms with non-federal partners,” said Brooks. “However, what the COVID-19 pandemic did show us is that the federal government is quite capable of harnessing biomedical innovation with the private sector to deliver effective vaccines and therapeutics faster than we ever thought possible.” In fact, during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. government has robustly funded public-private partnerships, which Brooks said have the potential to improve the nation’s ability to detect and contain deadly pathogens. “So, in order to be better prepared for future threats and potentially prevent future pandemics, we have to modernize our research and development, we have to leverage new technologies and incentivize collaboration,” she said. “And we must incorporate this reality across the many federal agencies that are involved.” Toward that goal, said Brooks, the questions now are: What structural changes are needed; what funding is required; what strategies must be institutionalized; and how can the government efficiently lead and coordinate these efforts? One answer, according to Dr. Eric Lander, director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, is the American Pandemic Preparedness Plan, which the Biden administration released in September for transforming U.S. capabilities to prepare for and respond rapidly and effectively to future pandemics and other high-consequence biological threats. Lander said the whole-of-government plan, which among numerous goals authorizes $65 billion over a decade, aims to achieve these capabilities by a systematic effort and shared vision for biological preparedness across the federal government. For instance, many agencies must be involved along with Congress, which provides the legislative authority, and the White House, including the Department of Defense, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Lander said. Together, they must coordinate on getting out vaccines and therapeutics quicker; providing early warning systems to identify earlier the appearances of viruses with pandemic potential; providing real-time monitoring on where such viruses are headed; and innovating on personal protective equipment (PPE), for example. Specifically, several of the five key areas necessary to protect the United States against biological threats, according to the plan, include dramatically improving and expanding the U.S. arsenal of vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics; ensuring situational awareness about infectious-disease threats, for both early warning and real-time monitoring; and building core capabilities, including PPE, stockpiles and supply chains, biosafety and biosecurity, and regulatory improvement. US biotech investment alone solves Borja et. al. 20- postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory AND** Fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) AND** research associate at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory AND** postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Search Research AND** postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) (Lauren, Alexander Campbell, Marigny Kirschke-Schwartz, Brian Radzinsky, Brandon Williams, “Rethinking U.S. Biosecurity Strategy for the Decade Ahead (Workshop Summary),” Center for Global Security Research, 10-29-20, Accessed Online at https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1735810, Accessed Online on 6-21-22) Leading in biotechnology is crucial for many U.S. economic and strategic goals; however, the U.S. must balance these with necessary regulation and oversight. Geopolitical events, such as global pandemics or great power competition, can also influence this balancing act. How can leaders strike the right balance to attain maximal benefit and prosperity for the United States? It was also clear that professionals in the biological sciences should play a role in determining this balance, potentially through organizations such as the National Academies that bridge the scientific and policy communities. 12 Responsible leadership is a central factor in establishing the necessary oversight starting at labs and extending to the intergovernmental sphere. Biotechnology and biosecurity regimes call for principled leadership that is responsive to scientists, policymakers, and stakeholders across institutions. Engaged leaders devise whole of enterprise solutions, an issue noticeably lacking with COVID-19 and a theme which will certainly appear in the future. Accordingly, oversight from knowledgeable leaders is a vital force in crafting policy that will spur innovation to build trust across sectors. Leaders and bureaucrats setting the regulatory tone should be mindful of striking the right balance: scientists who labor under burdensome regulatory regimes may be stymied in their pursuit of technological advancement. Leaders should avoid counterproductive measures such as layers of oversight, redundant paperwork, or a distrustful culture that hinder scientists’ spirit of risk taking or engagement beyond a stovepiped world. One troubling reality exists: much of global oversight falls between seams of multinational organizations, and cooperation from scientists and policymakers is essential to remedy a dilemma brought further into relief by COVID-19. There is no ambiguity on the necessary role of scientific expertise in biosecurity and biotechnology: to leverage cooperation to play an outsized role in working beyond the sphere of geopolitical competition. Panelists were unanimous in scientists’ power to work effectively across borders, to make friends via science. Forging relationships based on like-minded scientific expertise creates the possibility for the scientific community to harmonize interests that may sit uneasily between sparring nations’ heads of state. A basis for a Track 2 or 1.5 dialogue between different governments may run through the long-standing friendships that were cultivated by scientists before the return of great power competition. Scientist-to-scientist bonds offer policymakers with a foundation to utilize not only for diplomatic ends, but also in the possibility of a future global pandemic that necessitates collaboration. Scientific relationships will be the cornerstone for future cooperation, even when the fires of geopolitical competition flare up. Biotechnological competition with China represents a rupture from the past and threatens American primacy in this domain. Chinese policymakers identified biotechnology as a key space for China to dominate. China’s prioritization of biotechnology meets multiple ends for a state poised to shape geopolitics: Chinese biosecurity, the nation’s economy, and the health of the Chinese people. China’s strategic whole of nation investment in biotechnology aims to unseat the United States from its place of historic control over the material and intellectual production of biotechnology. In a break from historic competitors, a rival nation-state is pouring resources into technology development at levels that are comparable with the United States’ publicprivate funding streams. With the arrival of a near peer competitor in biotechnology, how should U.S. policymakers strike the right policy balance? On the one hand, stakeholders in government, philanthropy, and the private sector cannot underestimate the magnitude of the challenge. The implications for the United States extend beyond facing a competitor. China’s military-civil fusion, alongside torrents of state funding, aspires to fuse agents across China into the mission of overtaking America’s global position. The stakes are clear, and the consequences of losing preeminence for American biosecurity and economy should not be underestimated. 13 On the other hand, engagement with Chinese scientists and policymakers should not be dismissed out of hand. The experts agreed that China should be encouraged to take up a partnership role in the global biosecurity and biotechnology architecture. Evidence of Chinese willingness to participate exist at the institutional and personal level, and the voices on both sides of the Pacific urging cooperation should not be squelched. An American whole of enterprise solution to compete with China can exist in parallel with outreach efforts to prevent future pandemics. Striking the right balance between engaging and competing with China will not be easily executed, yet it is a policy solution that leaders in Beijing and Washington must embrace. A whole of sector push to facilitate developing nations’ biotechnology and biosecurity development can garner influence for the United States. Developed countries no longer hold a monopoly over biotechnologies. Developing countries are increasing investments in biotechnology, and this represents an opportunity for the United States to assert global leadership. Leveraging the United States’ scientific expertise to compete against China, shape norms, and usher in a global regulatory regime is not only a positive series of outcomes. It gestures to a policy agenda for the America’s role in the world’s biotechnology and biosecurity frontier. Nation-state competition is not the only challenge facing the United States. A pattern of panic and neglect historically led policymakers and the public to abandon investments in biosecurity of the order required to overcome COVID-19 and future pandemics. Institutions that preserve focus on biosecurity and biotechnology must be built that strike the right balance between encouraging oversight, elevating scientific expertise, competing with China, and cooperating internationally. The United States’ security, health, and economy are tethered to a biotechnological future that demands attention, not neglect. Solvency – Data Collaboration Using data science solves Bollyky and Patrick 20- director of the global health program and senior fellow for global health, economics, and development at the Council on Foreign Relations AND** James H. Binger senior fellow in global governance and director of the International Institutions and Global Governance (IIGG) Program at the Council on Foreign Relations (Thomas J. and Stewart M., “Improving Pandemic Preparedness: Lessons From COVID-19,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020, Accessed Online at https://www.cfr.org/report/pandemic-preparedness-lessons-COVID-19/recommendations/, Accessed Online on 7-5-22) In a global crisis involving a highly transmissible novel pathogen, some heterogeneity in national responses is to be expected. Yet the current pandemic demonstrates that an international framework for pandemic detection and response that relies so heavily on the transparency, judgment, and discretion of individual national governments leaves too many opportunities for failure. The Task Force recommends the following measures to improve the availability and reliability of early epidemic threat surveillance and to enable rapid identification, characterization, and tracking of emerging infectious diseases. First, the United States should work with other governments and civil society partners to build and integrate national and global epidemic surveillance systems, which would detect, share, and publicize early signs of an outbreak in near real time. This framework should establish a voluntary, international sentinel surveillance network, founded on health-care facilities around the world that regularly share hospitalization data, using anonymized patient information, to identify unusual trends. National voluntary sentinel surveillance systems could target vulnerable communities—such as nursing homes or low-income neighborhoods—which could allow for the detection of new, dangerous outbreaks within these groups before they became unstoppable. Participation in these international and national sentinel networks should be incentivized with grants and technology transfers. Other surveillance methods being used in this and previous outbreaks are worth expanding. Wastewater surveillance to detect the presence of certain viruses was pioneered in polio eradication and is now being harnessed in some settings to track coronavirus trends. Kinsa, which uses internet-connected thermometers to predict the spread of the flu, has been used to identify anomalous fever spikes that could be COVID-19 related. These and similar methods, known as syndromic surveillance, could be used more broadly to identify presence of pathogens with outbreak potential, even before people start becoming sick. Just as national security agencies have expanded their activities to include and rely on data surveillance expertise, so should public health communities. Since 2013, the CDC has fostered an open collaboration, called FluSight, to improve the science and usability of epidemic forecasts of influenza for public health decision-making. Proposals to create similar systems for sharing data on epidemic threats are worthy of support.125 This data should feed into an integrated global disease surveillance data platform, created under the auspices of the Health Security Coordination Committee. This platform should enlist participating government agencies and relevant nongovernmental agencies to standardize assessment of data and characterization of threats. It should share the results of those assessments and raise the alarm over any unusual trends with the UN coordinator, WHO Emergency Program, and the general public. This global surveillance architecture should be linked to public health agencies in participating nations, including the CDC, so that the data can be used to directly inform preparedness and response activities to both global and domestic threats. Detection and early warning solves spread Borja et. al. 20- postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory AND** Fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) AND** research associate at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory AND** postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Search Research AND** postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) (Lauren, Alexander Campbell, Marigny Kirschke-Schwartz, Brian Radzinsky, Brandon Williams, “Rethinking U.S. Biosecurity Strategy for the Decade Ahead (Workshop Summary),” Center for Global Security Research, 10-29-20, Accessed Online at https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1735810, Accessed Online on 6-21-22) Biological threats are inherently difficult to calibrate. In the natural environment, emerging and re-emerging pathogens are constantly evolving and spread opportunistically. The intentions and capabilities of human actors to exploit biological agents for purposes of terrorism and war are also in flux as advancing biotechnologies enable both state and nonstate actors to develop new threats. Thus, bio surprise is inevitable, even when the risk is generally acknowledged. Following the initial surprise, rapid detection and assessment are critical to staying ahead of the threat. a. Looking ahead a decade, emerging infectious diseases will likely intensify. A combination of factors, including increased human encroachment into remote habitats and the effects of global warming, can be expected to increase the frequency of epidemics and pandemics. Participants agreed that the United States does not have the luxury of preparing for one or the other (naturally-occurring or man-made); it must be prepared for both. b. Early warning can make a huge difference in mitigating human and other consequences. This requires broad surveillance, reliable information, and broad information sharing. The United States and the international community have multiple capabilities in place to look for early warning signs of an emerging public health crisis, but these depend on a high degree of scientific competence and credibility. Both have diminished in recent years or have failed to adapt in the face of growing political and societal challenges to authority and expertise. Divestment, disinformation, and outright attacks have all been contributing factors. c. With early indicators in hand, the role of the scientific community is to out-race the unfolding public health crisis by rapidly characterizing the biological source, openly sharing epidemiological data, implementing public health measures (such as maskwearing, contact tracing, and isolating the sick), and developing medical therapeutics. The ability to do these has greatly advanced in recent years, with improved international cooperation within the scientific community a contributing factor. The potential pathways to medical solutions have also increased significantly (e.g., there are currently 44 vaccines for COVID-19 in clinical evaluation and another 154 in preclinical stages). 3. Looking to the future, specific actions should be in place to enable an effective crisis response. This includes steps to enable the rapid production and deployment of diagnostic tests, monoclonal antibodies, antivirals, and anti-inflammatory drugs. It also includes steps to maintain a capacity for large-scale development and production of vaccines and new therapeutic drugs. In addition, better predictive models would improve the analysis of alternative interventions; however, these models require access to well curated and prepositioned data sets. A key challenge in accelerating responses by the medical research community is the improved use of research that has not yet been peer reviewed; some innovative mechanisms to rapidly review, assess, and make available worthy research are now up and running. 4. In addition, many of the global and regional partnerships needed to respond effectively have not worked as desired during COVID-19 and are in need of repair. These partnerships include the following: public
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