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2022 UTNIF Counterplan

CP - Turkey PIC - UTNIF 2022

CP - Turkey PIC - UTNIF 2022.docx

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Turkey PIC – CP Gripe – UTNIF 2022
1NC
Top-level (Must-read)– 1NC
Turkey PIC – 1NC
The United States Federal Government should increase its security cooperation with
Albania
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Montenegro
Netherlands
North Macedonia
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
United Kingdom
in [insert plan language].
US and EU solve without Turkey
Hamilton 22, Daniel S. Hamilton, Co-leads the Johns Hopkins University SAIS postdoctoral program on “The United States, Europe, and World Order,” President of the Transatlantic Leadership Network, Senior Fellow at the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute, Founding Director of the SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations, served as Executive Director of the American Consortium for EU Studies, Director of the Atlantic Basin Initiative, served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, served as U.S. Special Coordinator for Southeast European Stabilization, served as Director for Policy in the Bureau of European Affairs and Senior Policy Advisor to the U.S. Ambassador and U.S. Embassy in Germany, “Promoting U.S.-EU Coordination and Cooperation on Technology Standards: Recommendations for Action”, 2022, https://www.transatlantic.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/TTC-tech-standards-January-2021.pdf // AB
International technical standards define the technological frontier. Those who determine the standards are those who shape the competition. Technical standard-setting in critical and emerging technologies also have direct bearing on key U.S. and EU foreign policy goals, such as the protection of human rights and democracy, and on their foreign economic and trade policies.2 In the past, the United States and Europe have largely been the world’s standard-makers. However, in a new world of disruptive innovation and diffuse power, they could quickly become standard-takers – unless they can leverage their mutual strengths to set the global regulatory framework for the standards of the future. In this context, the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) takes on strategic importance.
Global technical standards are established in various ways. A de facto standard can be developed by a first- mover company and then accepted more broadly. Size also matters; users tend to flock to the biggest providers and use the standards they create.3 Formal standards are adopted through industrial consortia and global standard development organizations (SDOs), such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Once standards are locked-in, they tend to remain rather durable, since changing them can be very costly.4
The United States and Europe are accustomed to being global standard-setters. Each boasts innovative companies that define many of the world’s technical standards. Through mutual investment and R&D links, those companies’ operations are deeply integrated across the transatlantic space. The $6.3 trillion transatlantic economy is also massive; aligned or interoperable standards across this vast market would generate economies of scale in some critical sectors that could largely determine global standards. European and U.S. firms remain the most influential participants in SDOs due to their leadership and their technical expertise, in-depth knowledge of standards-setting processes and rules, the quality of their contributions, and their continuous participation over time.5 Traditionally, both parties have been strongly represented in global standardization organizations, although U.S. participation has lagged of late. Both agree that international standards for emerging technologies should be developed in accordance with core principles established by the WTO, and as affirmed by the G7 and the G20. If the United States and the EU can use the TTC to harness these complementarities, they are in a good position to define the technological frontier.
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The counterplan solves – Turkey materially breached Article 60 – cooperation with all other members is justified and ensures deterrence
Sari 19 (Dr. Aurel Sari, an Associate Professor of Public International Law at the University of Exeter and the Director of the Exeter Centre for International Law, “Can Turkey be Expelled from NATO? It’s Legally Possible, Whether or Not Politically Prudent,” Just Security, October 15, 2019, https://www.justsecurity.org/66574/can-turkey-be-expelled-from-nato/, WC)
These passages confirm that maintaining and furthering the principles on which the Alliance is based — democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law — forms part of the object and purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty. This, in turn, suggests that a failure to comply with these principles may amount to a material breach of the treaty within the meaning of Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Pursuant to Article 60, a material breach consists of:
(a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; or
(b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.
To constitute a material breach pursuant to sub-paragraph (a), the violation of the principles underlying the treaty would have to be so extensive in scope, so severe and so persistent as to effectively “disavow” or repudiate the treaty (cf. Namibia Advisory Opinion, para. 95). Turning to sub-paragraph (b), there can be little doubt that continued compliance with the values set out in the preamble and Article 2 is essential for the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the treaty.
Official statements issued by the member states, including at the Brussels Summit in 2018 and more recently on the occasion of NATO’s 70th Anniversary, repeatedly affirm these principles. A member nation that violated them in a systematic and egregious manner would thus cast doubt on the very resolve of the allies to “unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security” (preamble, North Atlantic Treaty).
Should the conditions for the existence of a material breach be satisfied, NATO’s member states would be entitled, by unanimous agreement, to suspend the operation of the treaty in whole or in part or to terminate it either in their relations with the defaulting state or among them all (Article 60(2) of the Vienna Convention). For these purposes, a unanimous decision of the North Atlantic Council, excluding the defaulting state, would suffice. No further procedural requirements apply, including those laid down in Article 65 of the Vienna Convention.
Whether or not Turkey is in material breach of its commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty is therefore a question to be determined by the other members of the Council. As Klaus Kress has observed, there is a “very serious possibility that Operation ‘Peace Spring’ could constitute a manifest violation of the prohibition of the use of force.” Coupled with President Erdoğan’s threat to “open the gates” for Syrian refugees to migrate to Europe, a threat fundamentally at odds with the unity and solidarity of the Alliance, characterizing these developments as a material breach is not entirely far-fetched.
In any event, they entitle other NATO nations to suspend or scale back their military cooperation with Turkey, even without declaring Turkey to be in material breach. Although Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty commits the parties to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack, this obligation is meant to pursue the objectives of the treaty. The duty to develop military capabilities and to cooperate to this end therefore does not override the commitment to further the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. A number of Allies, including France, Germany and Norway, as well as official NATO partner Finland, are reported to have suspended the sale of military equipment to Turkey.
Overall, the absence of a suspension and expulsion mechanism in the North Atlantic Treaty does not prevent the North Atlantic Council from suspending or terminating the membership of an ally found to be in material breach of the treaty. However, with the 70th anniversary of the treaty just past, this is a sorry position for the Council to be in by any measure. Suspending, let alone terminating, a nation’s membership of NATO would be an extreme measure to be contemplated only once other attempts to restore unity and respect for the Alliance’s founding principles have been exhausted.
Entrapment – ! – Kickout – 1NC
Expulsion avoids NATO entrapment in Turkish aggression vs Russia and Iran
GM 19 (Geopolitical Monitor, “Point Counterpoint: Turkey Should Be Expelled from NATO,” https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/point-counterpoint-turkey-should-be-expelled-from-nato/)//BB
Ousting Turkey: The Benefits
These multiple divergences between Turkey and its Western allies cast doubt on the validity of Ankara’s ongoing membership in NATO. Despite its official stance, Ankara has proven resistant when called to intervene in defense of the Organization’s common interest; however, it has not hesitated to pursue its own objectives, even when this meant contravening the NATO line. Turkey often behaves like an unreliable and ambivalent partner, and its participation in the Alliance creates more problems than benefits:
First, any attack on Turkish territory would be considered an attack against all members, which would leave the Alliance facing the dilemma of either being involved in a war or losing the credibility of its collective security guarantee. While an attack from Russia is a calculated risk since NATO mainly exists to deter this scenario, it is also true that Turkey’s occasional recklessness – such as the downing of a Russian military aircraft in 2015 – could lead to an escalation with unforeseeable consequences. Yet Ankara can pursue its assertive policy largely because it is part of the Alliance, meaning that it exposes the collectivity to useless risks for its own benefit. In addition, Russia is not the only potential antagonist: any standoff between Turkey and Iran could produce the same effects. At present, Turkey’s improving relations with both powers would seem to exclude the possibility, but it cannot be ruled out in the future.
Entrapment risks outweigh any benefits
Saleh 20- Researcher, Political analyst , US foreign policy , Syria conflict, Kurds affairs and the Middle East issues.(John Saleh, “Turkey’s Authoritarian Policy on NATO Principles,” Modern Diplomacy, July 22 2020, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/07/22/turkeys-authoritarian-policy-on-nato-principles/)//mcu
Protecting Europe from any further expansion of the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence and interference was the main argument for expanding NATO membership, to include Turkey in 1952. Turkey, in turn, sought to be part of the European club and approached the West. That is why the US military presence in Turkey with conventional and nuclear forces was against the Soviet threat as well as against the potential effects of instability and conflicts in the Middle East. Where the strategic interests of the allies always dominate relations between Turkey and NATO, during and after the Cold War. That is why Turkey was under the protection of NATO and its supply of advanced weapons. Turkey is an important member of NATO because of its strategic location between East and West, and its control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles to prevent Russia from reaching the Mediterranean Sea. Also hosting the Turkish Incirlik base for the American forces and the Patriot missiles, Turkey’s contribution to NATO with its soldiers in Kosovo and Afghanistan and supporting NATO’s military and financial tasks. That is why Erdogan takes advantage of all this to use him in his despotic policies and practices that are angering NATO countries and increasing their division. The preamble to the 1949 NATO Treaty states that NATO members are “determined to protect the freedom, shared heritage, and civilization of their people, based on the principles of democracy, individual freedom, and the rule of law.” That is why the member states of NATO are very concerned about the changes taking place in Turkey, but nonetheless NATO seeks to preserve the relationship with Turkey and not leave the alliance. This policy towards Turkey tarnishes the alliance’s image and mission, weakens democracy and the rule of law, and further weakens the alliance. It contributes to encouraging Erdogan to escalate his influence by supporting extremist Islamic movements, ISIS, Al-Qaeda and Al-Nusra Movement, and thus the terrorism industry in the Middle East, and its export to Europe. So, they should deal Turkey practices as a “frenemy” and adopt the term that has been applied to Pakistan. As a result, if NATO remains silent toward Erdogan’s authoritarian policies, which are hostile to liberal and democratic values, and his cooperation with Iran and Russia, we will find NATO implicated and responsible for Turkey’s crimes, where war crimes inside Syria and ethnic cleansing of the Kurds, as well as its interference in Libya. This will send NATO into wars to defend a member of the alliance. This will bring disaster, instability and the possibility of Iran and Russia affecting NATO’s security and military affairs through their relations and strategic cooperation with Turkey.
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Admonishment – No Kickout – L – 1NC
Treating Turkey as a normal ally is bad
Kardaş 19 (Şaban Kardaş, Professor of International Relations at TOBB University of Economics and Techology. Uncertainty, Power, and Rethinking Turkish-U.S. Relations after S-400 Debacle, German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2019, Pg. 1-5 https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep21246.pdf) – ED
Turkey’s determination to move ahead with the procurement of the Russian S-400 missile-defense system at the risk of sanctions by the United States has revived the debate on the future of its relations with its long-term ally. There has been a flourishing array of views on how things got to this point and where they might be heading. While much responsibility is put on Turkey’s unyielding strategic choices, the United States is also complicit for its inability to handle the relationship. Moving beyond the blame game, Nicholas Danforth identifies two broad narratives to explain Turkish conduct: “frustration” with an insensitive ally and “fear” from the threatening actions of an adversarial power. These two narratives correlate with the levels-of- analysis framework academics use to explain state behavior. In it, different factors at the individual, state, or systemic levels account for why states act the way they do, including forming alliances. Danforth’s “frustration” narrative is grounded in a state or systemic level of analysis, whereas the “fear” one relates mainly to the individual level of analysis. Until the recent delivery of components of the Russian weapons platform in Turkey, system- and state-level analyses prevailed in evaluations of the unfolding crisis. Many in Turkey and abroad had assumed that by opening new channels of communication the United States would convince, if not pressure, Turkish decision-makers to make a last-minute deal and change course. In addition to various mutual visits by official delegations, for instance, Senator Lindsay Graham and other lawmakers met President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to discuss issues affecting the Turkish-U.S. relationship. But this did not suffice to affect the outcome. President Erdoğan, having emphasized on many occasions his promises to his Russian counterpart, showed his strong conviction to go ahead with a “done deal” despite pressure to change course. Moreover, he stressed his unease with Turkey’s Western partners especially after failed coup attempt of 2016. In that respect, taking delivery of the S-400s turned out to be a counterintuitive move by Turkey, reflecting how individual-level considerations can shape state behavior and override systemic imperatives. Perhaps what enabled the individual-level—or “fear”— factor to carry the day in Turkish decision-making is its coalescence with the system-level—or “frustration”— factor. Systemic transformations weakened the fundamentals of the Turkish-U.S. alliance and created an environment within which a new thinking came to dominate Turkey’s external conduct. Since the structural causes of divergence were already there, it is no surprise to see the “frustration” argument being widely embraced in Turkey to justify the S-400 decision. What is striking, however, is that it is not only adopted by the bureaucracy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by moderate commentators, as suggested by Danforth, but also by the major opposition parties. For instance, the leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, reacted to the pressure by the U.S. Congress on President Donald Trump to impose sanctions by arguing that the risks posed by Turkey’s geography justified the S-400 purchase. What Went Wrong? The root causes of the divergence between Turkey and the United States long predate the S-400 saga. They foreshadowed the fracturing of the relationship throughout the Syrian crisis, which many analysts mistakenly treated as the main trigger for the strategic decoupling by the two allies. At least for a decade now, the Turkish-U.S. relationship has required a proper redefinition, if not a new guiding framework. There was no scarcity of calls for this to happen either. For example, I argued in 2010 that “It might be time for the United States to abandon the search for redefining the relationship [with Turkey] on ‘partnership’ models.” The sea change in the relationship is the product of various factors. Harboring a regionally driven understanding of international relations in the post- Cold War era, Turkey has opted to base its external conduct on the quest for strategic autonomy. Likewise, a desire to adjust to global power transitions has lurked in the background. In its strategic thinking, especially with the AK Party at the helm, Turkey already lives in a world of multipolarity and seeks flexibility when it comes to alliance choices. Moreover, a deliberate attempt to challenge the power asymmetry inherent in the relationship with the United States shapes the worldview of Turkey’s current leadership. Consequently, every foreign policy issue has been framed as yet another battleground for correcting the “unequal” and “unfair” treatment by the United States and for breaking the dependence on Turkey’s senior partner. Furthermore, the cycle of insecurity following the Arab Spring of 2011 overwhelmed Turkey’s strategic thinking to such an extent that concerns for state and regime survival came to the forefront. The fragmentation of states and collapse of central authority in the region posed direct challenges to Turkey, and a concern to prevent spillover effects came to dominate its thinking. Last but not the least, the reconfiguration of Turkey’s domestic political scene—in terms of governance model and body politic—under the pressures of the post-Arab Spring regional turmoil brought about a new political culture, altering the normative fabric and personal dimensions of the relationship with the United States. In particular, the redesign of the domestic political system into a presidential one and the reconfiguration of the governing bloc with the alliance between the AK Party and the Nationalist Action Party to cater to the needs of the ruling elite precipitated a search for new external allies and weakened the traditional domestic pillars and constituencies of the alliance with the United States. Uncertainty, Leadership, and Alliances in a Post-U.S.

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