Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
← Back to archive
2022 UTNIF Counterplan

CP - Unilateral CPs - UTNIF 2022

CP - Unilateral CPs - UTNIF 2022.docx

Download Word file
Indexed text preview
CP – Unilat
1NC
AI
Text: The United States federal government should substantially increase funding for research, development, and implementation of [insert].
R&D funding solves
Rasser et. al. 19- Senior Fellow and Director of the Technology and National Security Program at CNAS AND** Associate Fellow for the Technology and National Security Program at CNAS AND** former Research Associate for the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security AND** former Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Intern with the Executive Team at the Center for a New American Security AND** former Adjunct Senior Fellow in the Technology and National Security Program AND** Vice President and Director of Studies at CNAS (Martijn, Megan Lamberth, Ainikki Riikonen, Chelsea Guo, Michael Horowitz and Paul Scharre, “The American AI Century: A Blueprint for Action,” CNAS, 12-17-19, Accessed Online at https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/the-american-ai-century-a-blueprint-for-action, Accessed Online on 6-21-22)
Greater investments in AI R&D are essential to maintaining American leadership in AI. Throughout the 20th century, the federal government played a critical role in fueling technological innovation by funding pivotal basic research. Government funding was essential to developing the transistor, the Global Positioning System, and the Internet—inventions that transformed the world economy. Yet over the past several decades, federal government spending on R&D as a percentage of GDP declined from about 1.2 percent in 1976 to around 0.7 percent in 2018.3 This is a worrisome trend as the federal government remains the main funder of basic research.4 Government support again could be pivotal both in fostering new AI breakthroughs and ensuring that the U.S. government has access to those breakthroughs.
U.S. government entities already are pursuing important AI R&D initiatives. The National Science Foundation funds an array of basic research and partners with stakeholders across government, academia, and the private sector to foster advances in the field.5 The National Institutes of Health are incorporating deep learning to improve disease screening and natural language processing for information retrieval and discovery.6 In 2018, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Department of Defense organization charged with developing emerging technologies, launched a $2 billion multi-year campaign to incentivize the creation of a range of new AI capabilities and applications.7
Unclassified federal government spending on defense AI R&D in FY2020 will be about $4 billion, according to a Bloomberg analysis from March 2019.8 In September 2019, the White House announced an FY20 non-defense AI R&D budget request of nearly $1 billion.9
In contrast, the level of Chinese government spending on AI R&D is not clear. Complete annualized figures for Chinese government spending are not publicly available. Instead, only announcements of planned, multi-year spending offer a window into the scale of overall government R&D spending at the national, provincial, and local levels.10 For instance, two Chinese cities alone announced the creation of RMB 100 billion (approximately $15 billion) multi-year AI development funds while Beijing unveiled plans for a $2 billion AI research park in 2018.11
The United States enjoys robust private sector R&D funding. Precise figures are hard to discern because companies typically do not divulge details for R&D expenditures in their financial statements and privately owned firms do not have such reporting requirements. That said, looking at overall R&D expenditures by major AI-intensive companies gives a sense of the scale of private investments in AI R&D. The combined 2018 R&D expenditures by U.S. firms Alphabet, IBM, Facebook, Microsoft, and Amazon was $80.5 billion.12
China’s tech giants also report significant R&D investments, although they are considerably smaller than those of their U.S. counterparts. Leading Chinese AI firms Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent collectively spent $9.1 billion on R&D in 2018.13 These firms are also major investors in Chinese AI startups.14
In contrast, Europe is a laggard. Combined R&D spending by the EU (national governments and private investments) is projected to be EUR 20 billion (approximately $22.1 billion) in 2020, up from about EUR 3.7 billion (approximately $4.1 billion) in 2016.15
The United States’ dominant position in startup funding, a key driver of technological innovation, is starting to erode. In 2017, the U.S. share of global AI startup funding was less than half of the world’s total—ceding the lead to China—for the first time ever.16 This happened despite venture capital funding of American AI startups growing at a 36 percent compound annual growth rate since 2013.17
Figures are clearer for all national R&D spending, beyond simply AI, and indicate worrisome trends. Other countries are outpacing the United States with faster growth of their national R&D budgets. Total U.S. national (public and private) R&D expenditures as a share of GDP have been mostly stagnant since 1996. China quadrupled its R&D expenses as a share of GDP over the same time frame, and countries like Israel and South Korea also significantly ramped up spending.18 As a result, the U.S. share of global R&D has declined over the past several decades, falling from 69 percent in 1960 to 28 percent in 2016. From 2000 to 2015, the United States accounted for 19 percent of global R&D growth, while China accounted for 31 percent.19 China is on track to top the United States in total R&D investments (in purchasing power parity-adjusted dollars) as soon as 2019.20
R&D is a key driver of long-term economic growth.21 The Congressional Budget Office reaffirmed in 2018 that federal R&D spending is a positive influence on private R&D spending and increases macroeconomic growth.22 Authors of a ten-year study of 28 EU economies concluded that a 1 percent increase in R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP would cause an increase of real GDP growth rate of 2.2 percent.23
The United States gains further benefits from federal R&D spending through effective technology diffusion. Technology transfers from the public to the private sector are stipulated in several laws.24 This legislation gives ownership and title to federally funded research by universities and small businesses and has resulted in thousands of spin-off companies, increased technology transfer, and greater innovation.25 Under these laws, the U.S. receives government royalty-free access to the research.26
Biotech
Text: The United States federal government should substantially increase funding for research, development, and implementation of [insert].
New biosecurity measures solve
Berger et. al. 18 - Associate Director of the Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy at the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and Ph.D. in in genetics and molecular biology at Emory University AND** Senior Research fellow at National Defense University, and PhD in biology from the University of Delaware AND** interdisciplinary biologist with a BA summa cum laude in chemistry from Harvard and a PhD in biochemistry from Stanford AND** former Program Director for Health Strategies at Parsons Federal Business Unit, and PhD in Biochemistry and two master’s degree, one in Pharmacology and the other in Toxicology (Kavita M. Berger, Diane DiEuliis, Corey Meyer, and Venkat Rao, “Roadmap for Biosecurity and Biodefense Policy in the United States,” Gryphon Scientific, 2018, Accessed Online at http://gryphonsci.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Full-Report_Roadmap-of-US-Biosecurity-and-Biodefense-Policy_2018.pdf, Accessed Online on 6-22-22)
During the analysis of U.S. biosecurity and biodefense policy, several capability, implementation, and infrastructure gaps were identified. That is, goals which are plainly stated in biodefense legislation, presidential directives, or other policy instruments, are found to be associated with few implemented programs or actions. These gaps include: • Capability Gaps: o Microbial forensics is an underinvested field in the United States and internationally, but could be enhanced by leveraging technologies such as bioinformatics and next generation sequencing. Two U.S. government policies highlight the need for microbial forensic capabilities: HSPD10/Biodefense for the 21st Century (2004) and the National Strategy to Support Research in Microbial Forensics Attribution Investigations and National Security (2009).(56, 57) These strategies, along with recent reports completed by the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine and the Government Accountability Office can help define nearterm recommendations for addressing this gap. Leveraging new biotechnologies may enhance capabilities for microbial forensics at a lower overall cost and/or higher throughput than traditional forensics methods. o Systems for scanning scientific advances that could lead to new technology developments exist in offices that support or conduct research and advanced development. However, end-users often do not have access to these systems or have similar systems of their own, which limits field application and relevance to biodefense activities. o Despite significant investment in biosurveillance approaches and platforms, the underlying data used to develop effective early warning methods is highly variable and uncertain. This challenge suggests a gap in robust approaches for generating reliable, curated input data. In addition, this challenge highlights the lack of communication and interaction between scientific experts and policy-makers, which may be needed to ensure that existing, verified data is included in the decision-making process of preparedness activities and potential emergency situations. o The increasing convergence of scientific disciplines, changing funding paradigm, and expansion of biotechnology practitioners suggests that greater attention is needed on evaluating the security implications of biological and biotechnological advances and applications that are not only focused on pathogens and toxins. In 2014, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, FBI, and United National Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute published a report on the national and transnational security implications of Big Data in the Life Sciences. This report acknowledged the increasing production of genomic data by research, clinical, and direct-to-consumer organizations throughout the world; the continuously advancing computational and data science capabilities; and the frequency of cyberattacks of health care and insurance databases. This combination of factors led the FBI and others to evaluate more closely the potential national security risks presented by these activities and approaches for reducing the risks while not adversely affecting commercial, research, and clinical innovation. • Infrastructure Gap o Despite investment on basic research on pathogens, the academic research sector, including the biocontainment laboratories, are not considered a critical infrastructure and therefore, have little to no external financial or expert support to prepare for, respond to, and recover from potential events. However, the basic knowledge about pathogens are generated by this sector and the capabilities to identify newly-emerging or never-beforeseen pathogens are resident within this sector. o Very few policies and programs exist for promoting resiliency in the biodefense, health, and research sector. But, resiliency is a local issue, which suggests that the federal government role may be in facilitating preparedness, planning, and recovery efforts. No policy appears to include outreach efforts to the scientific community to promote resiliency. o Although the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 includes a section on support for applied biosafety, very little, if any, funding has been appropriated for research to generate the data needed to evaluate effectiveness of biosafety measures. • Implementation Gap o Several sectors and organizations do not have sufficient funds to support compliance with biosecurity regulations so they choose not to participate in activities involving restricted agents. The most significantly affected sectors are public health and veterinary diagnostic laboratories, which require external funding and technical support to maintain compliance with the Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT) Regulations. o The continuous changes to the BSAT Regulations have resulted in significant challenges and delays in federal implementation and local compliance. Although federal regulators previously have met with the regulated community to discuss changes to federal BSAT policies, these outreach activities seem to have ended. Instead, the Federal Select Agent Program directors have initiated new efforts that involve interaction and engagement with local Federal Bureau of Investigation Weapons of Mass Destruction Coordinators. o Practical resources for enabling program managers, research reviewers, and scientists to assess the risks and benefits of research do not exist. These resources would ensure that science and technology investments for promoting biodefense and health security objectives can be leveraged maximally while risks are addressed adequately. o Annual and inconsistent investment in nonproliferation activities, specifically for cooperative threat reduction programs, limits long-term sustainability of partnerships and outcomes. Threat reduction or bioengagement programs require long-term planning, engagement, and funding to increase the likelihood of sustainability of activities (e.g., through financial support of the recipient country), enabling an exit strategy for U.S. government funding. o Effective measures for evaluating biosecurity policy implementation have not been developed. Members of the scientific and security community routinely have stated that the development of measures are not feasible because measuring the absence of an event (i.e., measuring a negative result) is impossible. Conversely, measures for evaluating some biodefense investments do exist, each different from another. This variability highlights inconsistencies that may arise from the different, often ad hoc evaluation metrics used to assess biodefense investments. o No analytic framework currently exists for assessing opportunity costs of biosecurity policy. Often direct costs are calculated in advance as part of regulatory impact assessments. But, indirect costs and downstream consequences, which represent opportunity costs of a policy, resulting from these direct costs are not calculated. However, many in the regulated community use arguments about opportunity cost when engaging in policy discussions, highlighting the importance of considering costs downstream of direct time and financial investments.
2NC
General – Unilat
US policy alone is better
Bandow 19- Senior Fellow at the CATO Institute (Doug, “NATO No Longer Serves American Interests,” CATO Institute, 12-5-19, Accessed Online at https://www.cato.org/commentary/nato-no-longer-serves-american-interests, Accessed Online on 6-21-22)
Ultimately the alliance decided to expand its membership, even though the enemy had disappeared. Doing so violated multiple assurances given to Moscow. NATO also initiated “out‐​of‐​area” activities, which meant defending other than member states. This ironically turned the pact into an offensive instrument, first used to dismember Serbia in 1999. In essence, NATO had gone from a means to an end, with war the new means. Said Sen. Richard Lugar, then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the organization would “go out of area or out of business.” And, as public choice economists would predict, no one involved in the alliance wanted the latter. The Soviet Union’s collapse triggered European disarmament, which in turn intensified American demands for greater burden‐​sharing, which the Europeans continued to ignore. The process continued for years, demonstrating, perversely, that the less Europe did the more America would. Hence the bizarrely named “European Reassurance Initiative” after Russia’s intervention in Ukraine: the Europeans were essentially promised that even if they did nothing Washington would remain at their side—though whining all the way. U.S. policymakers appeared to accept the need to subsidize the Europeans in order to keep them dependent. Washington opposed any proposals for independent spending and action, preferring that Europe do more, but only under America’s direction. The alliance continued to add members. Most recently it accepted Montenegro, with North Macedonia awaiting treaty approval by the 29 current members. Next up, the Duchy of Grand Fenwick, featured in the novel The Mouse that Roared! The latest out‐​of‐​area wars have been distant, unconventional conflicts: Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria, of which the latter triggered French President Emmanuel Macron’s complaint about a lack of allied coordination. Some NATO fans call the organization a “global alliance,” presumably ready to act as global cop. In every case, of course, the heavy lifting inevitably falls on Washington. Every recent president criticized Europeans for failing to make sufficient contributions for the common defense. Defense Secretary Robert Gates suggested that the alliance itself was at risk, since “there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress, and in the American body politic writ large, to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources … in their own defense.” President Trump expressed similar sentiments, though more crudely. Alas, the burden‐​sharing debate is unproductive. The issue should be burden‐​shedding. Even when President Trump does the right thing, he does so badly. So it is with NATO. But the alliance’s “brain death” reflects its inherent problems, not his dreadful management. Quite simply, it makes no sense for U.S. taxpayers to subsidize the defense of nations capable of defending themselves. Shared interests will continue to justify military cooperation. However, the alliance as today constituted no longer serves American interests. NATO’s problems are many and fundamental. First, America and Europe no longer face an existential threat, let alone a common one. Which makes united action by such a diverse membership so difficult. Russia is no Soviet Union. Vladimir Putin is no Joseph Stalin. The Russian Federation is an unpleasant actor but has reverted to a pre‐​1914 great power, insisting on border security and international respect. There is no prospect of a Russian attack on the U.S. and little more chance of one on Europe, Old or New. Although plausible, even a successful grab of the Baltic States would yield little benefit for much cost. Russia’s, Europe’s, and America’s interests often clash—they understandably have different perspectives on economic predominance in Ukraine and political predominance in Syria, for instance—but most such issues are of only limited importance. Even the disputes over Georgia and Ukraine are peripheral matters for Europe and America. However, the latter is existential (in the case of the latter) security concerns for Russia. NATO expansion moved the transatlantic alliance a thousand miles eastward; Western‐​backed “color revolutions” placed unfriendly governments in neighboring states; Ukraine was heartland territory for the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union; and Crimea, transferred in 1954 to Ukraine as part of an internal Soviet political deal, contains the important Black Sea military base at Sebastopol. Moscow views its “near abroad” rather like Washington views Latin America. The U.S. officially does not believe i

Preview shortened. Download the file for the full document.