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2022 UTNIF Counterplan

CP - Dept of State - UTNIF 2022

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Department of State CP – UTNIF 22
1NCs
1NC – DoS CP - Generic
The Department of State should increase security assistance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization over [insert plan mechanism].
The counterplan competes and avoids the DoD disad – security assistance pulls from the state department’s budget
Epstein and Rosen 18 (Susan B. Epstein, Specialist in Foreign Policy. Liana W. Rosen, Specialist in International Crime and Narcotics,“U.S. Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs: Overview of Funding Trends” Congressional Research Service,” Congressional Research Service, Feb. 1, 2018, https://crsreports.congress.gov R45091, WC)
U.S. security sector assistance to foreign countries is funded primarily in the foreign affairs and defense budgets. As the 115th Congress considers its spending priorities for the coming fiscal year, the magnitude, trends, and uses of such assistance may be examined and debated. The Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations; the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA); and the Department of Defense (DOD) appropriations all contain provisions that could affect security assistance funding in FY2018 and beyond. While the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Defense (DOD) are the primary actors in the provision of such assistance to foreign countries—and the primary focus of this CRS report―other U.S. agencies may also conduct related programs, including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the Departments of Energy (DOE), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and the Treasury; and parts of the intelligence community.
With the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA, P.L. 87-195) and later the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA, P.L. 90-629), as amended, Congress established the foundational authorities for contemporary U.S. security assistance programs. These authorities charged the Secretary of State with responsibility to provide “continuous supervision and general direction” of foreign assistance and contained specific reference to “military assistance, including military education and training,” to ensure its coherence with foreign policy. Over time, the Secretary of State’s security assistance authorities expanded to include international narcotics control, peacekeeping operations, antiterrorism assistance, and nonproliferation and export control assistance. The State Department’s authorities were codified in Title 22 of the U.S. Code (Foreign Relations and Intercourse), and funds for such assistance programs are largely appropriated through State Department accounts. Such assistance to foreign governments, security forces, and militaries covers a wide spectrum of activities, including the transfer of conventional arms, training and equipping regular and irregular forces for combat, law enforcement training, defense institution reform, humanitarian assistance, and engagement and educational activities. These activities may serve multiple purposes for both the United States and the recipient country.
DOD has long played a crucial role in the implementation of Title 22 security assistance programs and activities, but for many decades, it otherwise relegated the training, equipping, and assisting of foreign military forces as a secondary mission on its list of priorities, far below warfighting.1 Beginning in the 1980s, Congress began providing DOD with additional authority in Title 10 of the U.S. Code and annual NDAAs to conduct a range of programs and activities funded by DOD appropriations. Congress began providing such authorities in the 1980s for counternarcotics and humanitarian assistance; authority for nonproliferation and counterterrorism programs was subsequently added in the 1980s and 1990s.
In recent years, the international security environment, and the associated perceived threats to the United States homeland, has led DOD increasingly to give greater priority to building and strengthening security partnerships in a variety of contexts around the world. Particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress has granted DOD new authorities in annual NDAAs and in Title 10 (Armed Services) of the U.S. Code to engage in “security cooperation” with foreign militaries and other security forces—now considered by DOD to be an “important tool” for executing its national security responsibilities and “an integral element of the DOD mission.” 2 This trend underlies a significant expansion of DOD direct engagements with foreign security forces and an accompanying increase in DOD’s role in foreign policy decisionmaking. As the United States undertook military action and increased the scope of its foreign counterterrorism operations, Congress provided a number of DOD crisis and wartime authorities, some providing new global authority and some specific to certain geographic areas.3
In enacting these new authorities and appropriations, Congress has bolstered an expanding global DOD role in building foreign partner capacity through programs to train and equip foreign security forces, notably in the realms of counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and defense institution building. In addition, DOD is authorized to carry out various security cooperation and logistical support activities, as well as advise and assist missions that may have the added impact of boosting partner country capabilities. DOD’s security cooperation authorities were most recently and significantly modified in the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (P.L. 114-328; signed December 23, 2016), which enacted several new provisions that modify the budgeting, execution, administration, and evaluation of DOD security cooperation programs and activities. Implementation of these provisions remains a work in progress.
The expansion of DOD’s engagement with foreign partner militaries over the past decade has both policy and budgetary implications. These include the overall size and scope of U.S. security assistance activities worldwide, the geographic distribution of such activities, and the relative influence of DOS and DOD in interagency security policymaking processes. Another implication relates to congressional committees of jurisdiction, as primary oversight and funding prerogatives have progressively extended and migrated from foreign relations to defense authorizers and appropriators. Yet, challenges continue to exist in the development of consistent interagency action and terminology to describe the range of security assistance and cooperation programs and activities funded by the U.S. government.
DOS-controlled security assistance solves
Bergmann and Schmitt 21- senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy AND** senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress, 3-9-21, Accessed Online at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/, Accessed Online on 7-1-22)
U.S. security assistance is broken and in need of an overhaul. Over the past two decades, the bureaucratic system developed to deliver billions of dollars of military aid to partner nations has evolved and expanded not by design but as the result of a series of ad hoc legislative and policy changes. Though the U.S. Department of State was initially in charge of security assistance policy and accounts, since 9/11, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has established a separate, well-funded security assistance bureaucracy at the Pentagon. This has inhibited effective congressional oversight, harmed coordination between diplomacy and defense, and contributed to the growing militarization of U.S. foreign policy. It has created a dysfunctional and bifurcated security assistance system. Under the current security assistance system, the returns on America’s security investments are limited, inconsistent, and not strategic. The consequences of today’s broken system include increased reliance on the military to solve foreign policy challenges; a perpetuated status quo whereby nondemocratic partners receive U.S. assistance and where human rights abuses are ignored; and an ineffective and unwieldy bureaucracy. This matters because the United States depends on capable allies and partners as a core component of its national security strategy, but the current system is not suited to the task. A new administration can change this by embracing wholesale reform of the security assistance system. To do so, however, a Biden-Harris administration must move quickly to work with Congress and include such reforms in any effort to rebuild and revive U.S. diplomacy. This will require talking not only about security assistance authorities, but fundamentally about money and resources as well. Any reform efforts intending to bolster the role of the State Department must start by examining how funding is oriented and balanced between the departments. This necessitates close cooperation with the Hill. There must be a dramatic realignment of U.S. security assistance. This report provides an overview and a systemic critique of the current bureaucratic structure of U.S. security assistance and outlines how transferring resources and responsibilities for security assistance back to the State Department will better advance U.S. interests and address the current geopolitical challenges America confronts. It calls for reviving the centrality of diplomacy by restoring the State Department’s role, as originally intended under U.S. law, as the overseer of all U.S. foreign assistance. It also offers recommendations for expanding and training the security assistance workforce, improving interagency coordination, elevating human rights concerns in security assistance policy, and adapting best practices from the DOD. Specifically, this report calls for transferring the following programs and funding from the DOD to the State Department: The relatively newly created Section 333 train and equip authority, which replicates the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) authority The DOD’s security assistance authorities that focus on long-term security force reform to the State Department, including the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative fund This would result in a roughly $7 billion transfer, significantly augmenting the State Department’s budget and capacity to guide security assistance policy. Putting the State Department back in charge of security assistance will be a major reform and will require significant operational changes within the department, as well as a dramatic expansion of its administrative capacity. This will take time to implement and require significant reform within the agency. The DOD has done an admirable job in setting up a new institutional structure, in implementing assistance, and in coordinating with the State Department. However, officials across the U.S. foreign policy world acknowledge that the system is not working. Tommy Ross, a former DOD official in charge of overseeing the Pentagon’s security assistance, recently argued that U.S. security assistance is “not fit for purpose” and is “out of sync with U.S. priorities when it comes to where resources are needed most and the types of capabilities required by America’s allied and partners.”1 Indeed, throughout much of the last decade, it has been DOD officials who publicly argued for increased funding for the State Department.2 Ultimately, the current bifurcated security assistance system is suboptimal and results in the bureaucratic diminishment of the State Department relative to the military considerations of the DOD. Transferring resources and responsibility to the State Department would centralize responsibility for foreign aid under diplomatic control, while improving interagency cooperation, as DOD would remain the primary implementer of U.S. assistance. Some of these ideas will likely be met with innate skepticism from a generation of security professionals whose experience in Washington has been characterized by an ever-withering State Department and an ever-strengthening Pentagon. This report anticipates and rebuts likely arguments against reform, including the capacity of the State Department to take on this responsibility, the benefits of the Pentagon’s current management, or the unnecessary disruption that would result from significant bureaucratic change laid out in this proposal. Failing to reform security assistance not only leaves the United States with a wasteful and inefficient status quo, it also perpetuates the marginalization of diplomacy and locks in the military’s newly found dominance in driving U.S. foreign policy. The current security assistance system evolved to address the threats posed by the post-9/11 era and is now outdated and ill-suited for a new geopolitical environment characterized by competition. If the next administration is to revive U.S. diplomacy and rebuild the State Department, it must empower the agency to oversee and direct foreign assistance. The Biden-Harris administration should seize the opportunity to work with a new Congress to reform the system from its first days in office and restore an effective tool in the U.S. foreign policy arsenal. A new security assistance system, centralized and coordinated within the State Department, would allow the United States to wield its security assistance more effectively and responsibly in today’s competitive geopolitical environment. Arms transfers, training, and support could also better support U.S. foreign policy goals, in particular bolstering democratic partners and emerging democracies, making them stronger U.S. partners to counter threats from authoritarian actors. Empowering the State Department to oversee and manage security assistance would also ensure that aid is used to advance a values-based foreign policy that respects and supports human rights.3 It would also give U.S. diplomats greater clout and leverage and potentially create greater coherence to the provision of foreign assistance overall. The result would be to strengthen a key tool in the U.S. foreign policy toolbox and increase the clout and authority of America’s diplomats, which is badly needed in this new era of geopolitical competition.
1NC – DoS CP- AI Aff
The Department of State should increase security assistance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization over the use of artificial intelligence in military logistics and sustainment.
The counterplan competes and avoids the DoD disad – security assistance pulls from the state department’s budget
Epstein and Rosen 18 (Susan B. Epstein, Specialist in Foreign Policy. Liana W. Rosen, Specialist in International Crime and Narcotics,“U.S. Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs: Overview of Funding Trends” Congressional Research Service,” Congressional Research Service, Feb. 1, 2018, https://crsreports.congress.gov R45091, WC)
U.S. security sector assistance to foreign countries is funded primarily in the foreign affairs and defense budgets. As the 115th Congress considers its spending priorities for the coming fiscal year, the magnitude, trends, and uses of such assistance may be examined and debated. The Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations; the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA); and the Department of Defense (DOD) appropriations all contain provisions that could affect security assistance funding in FY2018 and beyond. While the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Defense (DOD) are the primary actors in the provision of such assistance to foreign countries—and the primary focus of this CRS report―other U.S. agencies may also conduct related programs, including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the Departments of Energy (DOE), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and the Treasury; and parts of the intelligence community.
With the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA, P.L. 87-195) and later the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA, P.L. 90-629), as amended, Congress established the foundational authorities for contemporary U.S. security assistance programs. These authorities charged the Secretary of State with responsibility to provide “continuous supervision and general direction” of foreign assistance and contained specific reference to “military assistance, including military education and training,” to ensure its coherence with foreign policy. Over time, the Secretary of State’s security assistance authorities expanded to include international narcotics control, peacekeeping operations, antiterrorism assistance, and nonproliferation and export control assistance. The State Department’s authorities were codified in Title 22 of the U.S. Code (Foreign Relations and Intercourse), and funds for such assistance programs are largely appropriated through State Department accounts. Such assistance to foreign governments, security forces, and militaries covers a wide spectrum of activities, including the transfer of conventional arms, training and equipping regular and irregular forces for combat, law enforcement training, defense institution reform, humanitarian assistance, and engagement and educational activities. These activities may serve multiple purposes for both the United States and the recipient country.
DOD has long played a crucial role in the implementation of Title 22 security assistance programs and activities, but for many decades, it otherwise relegated the training, equipping, and assisting of foreign military forces as a secondary mission on its list of priorities, far below warfighting.1 Beginning in the 1980s, Congress began providing DOD with additional authority in Title 10 of the U.S. Code and annual NDAAs to conduct a range of programs and activities funded by DOD appropriations. Congress began providing such authorities in the 1980s for counternarcotics and humanitarian assistance; authority for nonproliferation and counterterrorism programs was subsequently added in the 1980s and 1990s.
In recent years, the international security environment, and the associated perceived threats to the United States homeland, has led DOD increasingly to give greater priority to building and strengthening security partnerships in a variety of contexts around the world. Particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress has granted DOD new authorities in annual NDAAs and in Title 10 (Armed Services) of the U.S. Code to engage in “security cooperation” with foreign militaries and other security forces—now considered by DOD to be an “important tool” for executing its national security responsibilities and “an integral element of the DOD mission.” 2 This trend underlies a significant expansion of DOD direct engagements with foreign security forces and an accompanying increase in DOD’s role in foreign policy decisionmaking. As the United States undertook military action and increased the scope of its foreign counterterrorism operations, Congress provided a number of DOD crisis and wartime authorities, some providing new global authority and some specific to certain geographic areas.3
In enacting these new authorities and appropriations, Congress has bolstered an expanding global DOD role in building foreign partner capacity through programs to train and equip foreign security forces, notably in the realms of counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and defense institution building. In addition, DOD is authorized to carry out various security cooperation and logistical support activities, as well as advise and assist missions that may have the added impact of boosting partner country capabilities. DOD’s security cooperation authori

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