AT - Dept of State CP - UTNIF 2022
AT - Dept of State CP - UTNIF 2022.docx
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Aff Answers 2AC – PDB Perm do both – coordination key to access high-demand experts – the counterplan alone fails to solve deterrence Kreuttner et al. 18 (Col. Tim Kreuttner, U.S. Army; Lt. Col. Sami Alnaqbi, United Arab Emirates Navy; Lt. Col. Jarrod Knapp, U.S. Air Force; Maj. James Woodard, U.S. Marine Corps“A Joint and Operational Approach for Security Assistance to Georgia and Ukraine,” Military Review, March-April 2018, WC) The U.S. and NATO’s ability to deliver training, education, and advice at the operational level will face challenges. Synchronization of operational maneuver and the ability to integrate joint capabilities in a coherent campaign is something that even the best militaries have to work hard at to do well. The requisite expertise to train partners in operational planning and execution is not plentiful and usually resides in combatant command or other major command staffs, with the majority not dedicated to training, exercises, or other security cooperation activities. Subject-matter experts capable of leading training are low-density, high-demand assets whose own organizations are often reluctant to part with for “secondary” security cooperation tasks—namely planners, strategists, joint-fires-qualified experts, and other joint doctrine and technical experts. The United States needs to manage the joint and operational expertise closely to leverage the right expertise at the right time while not levying an undue burden on owning organizations. But, for partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia to progress, this is necessary. Conclusion Ukraine and Georgia are on the front lines of strategic competition. While the United States and NATO have provided robust tactical training and strategic development over the last twenty years, there is a gap in joint training and development at the operational level. The U.S. and NATO security assistance to these geopolitically key nations contributes to deterrence of Russia while improving the interoperability and capability of important partners. An integrated joint approach to security cooperation focusing at the operational level will strengthen Ukraine and Georgia and serve as an appropriate deterrent to Russian aggression. A joint approach to partnership programs would significantly enhance the defense capability and interoperability of Ukraine and Georgia to participate in NATO operations and exercises. Expanding combined, joint interoperability at the operational level should be the next critical focus of our partnerships. 2AC – PDCP Perm do the counterplan – normal means security cooperation includes the state department Anderson et al. 16 (R. Reed Anderson, Patrick J. Ellis, Antonio M. Paz, Kyle A. Reed, Lendy “Alamo” Renegar and John T. Vaughan “STRATEGIC LANDPOWER AND A RESURGENT RUSSIA: AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH TO DETERRENCE: Chapter 4 THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE,” Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, May 1, 2016, pp. 117-142, http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep12082.11, WC) ***Foreign internal defense (FID) is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security*** Although the United States TSC efforts are facilitating many of the military-focused assurance and deterrence tasks NATO has recently undertaken, there is room for improvement in gaining U.S. interagency support for conducting FID training. The goal for this type of FID would be to assist with strengthening the resilience of a NATO ally to ensure they are less vulnerable to Russian ambiguous actions. The challenge for conducting what might be thought of as “interagency FID” would be establishing priority countries, identifying focus areas, and getting the appropriate trainers in place. The key in every case is for the United States and allied or partner countries to jointly determine the lines of effort necessary to achieve specific and attainable objectives while considering NATO defense planning process priorities. The United States must be cognizant of the strategic end states for each Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) and associated country specific Security Cooperation Sections, which should lay out the end states and the ways to achieve them, and should be coordinated with the U.S. Embassy Integrated Country Strategy and associated foreign assistance plans. There are several challenges to employing an interagency FID effort to build resilience among NATO allies. First, the U.S. Department of State (DoS) and EUCOM must ensure that the DoS Regional Strategies and EUCOM’s TCP are mutually supporting. There is no clear chain of command in this process, and it will certainly involve intense personal engagement from leaders across the interagency. The primary stakeholders, DoS and EUCOM, operate differently with respect to generating strategy. The presidentially appointed ambassadors are the lead for developing their country plans, which are then forwarded to the DoS in Washington for inclusion in the regional strategies. In the DoD, the policy offices of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSDP) and EUCOM generate the strategy and then push it down to subordinate elements for execution. The common ground for decision-makers can be hard to determine since the Ambassador is the lead for DoS and is country focused and the EUCOM commander is the lead for DoD and is regionally focused. Achieving unity of effort toward building resilient partners will require a constant, integrated engagement from both bureaucracies. Additionally, it would be invaluable to generate some form of interagency resilience strategy that would synchronize efforts.23 2AC – CP links to NB Perm shields the link and the CP links to DoD DA – their budgets are synchronized and DoD is essential to security assistance Doubleday 17 (Justin Doubleday, managing editor of Inside the Pentagon until June 2021, where he focused on defense-wide topics including budgets, acquisition policy, combatant commands, missile defense and cyber, “DOD, State Department establish security assistance steering committee,” Inside the Pentagon , September 28, 2017, Vol. 33, No. 39, pp. 1, 10-11, WC) The Pentagon and the State Department have set up a high-level group to help synchronize the two agencies’ control over billions of dollars’ worth of security assistance to foreign countries. The Security Sector Assistance Steering Group was established this past spring by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, according to Todd Harvey, acting assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans and capabilities. Harvey testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Sept. 26. The steering committee will help “oversee a collaborative planning process, identifying top national security priorities and synchronizing investments to maximize results,” according to Harvey’s written testimony. One of the committee’s immediate priorities is to develop a process for fiscal year 2018 security sector assistance planning to “permit State and DOD to validate security assistance requirements for countries that directly support this administration’s top priorities,” according to Tina Kaidanow, acting assistant secretary of state for the bureau of political military affairs. Kaidanow and Harvey are co-chairs of the new steering committee. The committee will also ensure DOD’s expanding security assistance programs match up with the State Department’s traditional lead role for that function, according to Kaidanow’s testimony. The State Department requested $5.1 billion for Foreign Military Financing in FY-18, with $3.1 billion earmarked for Israel and $1.3 billion planned for Egypt. But Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Ben Cardin (D-MD) expressed concern over the growing security assistance role played by the Pentagon. DOD oversees several security assistance programs, including the $1.5 billion Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria fund and the $4.2 billion Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. Cardin called such programs “necessary and important,” but worried about the control over security assistance shifting from the State Department to the Pentagon. “My chief concern, however, is that DOD is setting up an essentially parallel security assistance structure without sufficient State Department oversight, input and coordination,” Cardin said. “Combine this with the current administration’s profoundly unwise proposal to slash the Department of State’s budget, opaque reorganization efforts and increasing loss of experienced personnel, and one could easily see us in a scenario in which the Department of Defense could become the dominant source of U.S. security assistance.” Cardin pointed to section 333 of Title 10, which mandates the secretary of state concur with any train-and-equip program proposed by the Pentagon. The new steering committee will “optimize section 333 military assistance and [Foreign Military Financing] resources to effectively advance national security objectives, leverage each Department’s expertise and authorities, and reinforce our respective requests to Congress,” according to Kaidanow’s testimony. “In the longer term, the intent is to strategically integrate State and DOD planning and resourcing processes for a wider range of SSA resources, including by synchronizing budget requests and rationalizing and refining the use of SSA authorities,” her testimony added. -- Justin Doubleday 2AC - DoD key - AI DoD action better than DoS – leaders have already allocated leadership to them Horowitz and Kahn 22 (Michael C. Horowitz and Lauren Kahn – Professor on American foreign policy at John Hopkins – “Why DoD’s New Approach to Data and Artificial Intelligence Should Enhance National Defense” – March 11, 2022 – https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-dods-new-approach-data-and-artificial-intelligence-should-enhance-national-defense//daxw) The ability of the United States to compete in the 21st century depends on U.S. leadership in data and artificial intelligence (AI). In response, the Department of Defense (DoD) is taking a new and much-needed approach to U.S. defense efforts in data and AI. David Spirk, the departing Chief Data Officer of the Pentagon, made clear yesterday that the office of the Chief Digital and AI Officer (CDAO), in addition to its other functions, will be the successor organization for and replace DoD’s much-touted Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC). While the JAIC symbolized DoD’s efforts to get smart on AI beginning in 2018, the integration of data and AI represents a maturation of the U.S. AI approach—one that elevates the importance of AI in national defense. The JAIC itself was not as important as what the JAIC stood for—DoD’s commitment to U.S. defense AI leadership. In paving the way forward and getting AI on the agenda, the JAIC succeeded. From this point on, a more cohesive approach to AI and data through the CDAO is more likely to accelerate AI adoption throughout the U.S. military because it links DoD’s AI efforts with data, the fuel AI requires. For U.S. defense AI adoption, in particular, aligning these organizations could be game-changing. Addressing DoD’s siloed data, standardizing and improving its quality and access, is a precondition to having the data necessary to train algorithms for many defense uses, and any future technologies that rely on collecting, processing, and using information. Implementation will be critical and heavily dependent on two things. First, to catalyze AI adoption, the CDAO will need to develop close relationships with the military services and combatant commands. Second, the CDAO will need to coordinate with DoD’s research and development organizations, such as the Defense Innovation Unit, leading on AI experimentation and research. There is hard work ahead, but the new organizational design is promising. The office of the CDAO brings together previously independent components of DoD: the JAIC, the office of the Chief Data Officer, the Defense Digital Service (DDS), and the Office of Advancing Analytics (ADVANA). The office of the Chief Data Officer is in charge of data management and coordination, DDS finds digital solutions for internal data and security issues, and ADVANA aggregates data and conducts data analytics. The combination of these offices raised questions about whether an independent JAIC was necessary for U.S. defense AI leadership. Departing CDO Spirk says that the CDAO will be “taking the best parts of all the organizations it is overseeing and redistributing them for faster and better decision-making.” We agree. At present, not only is DoD’s data siloed but its AI efforts and initiatives are as well. According to the company Govini, in FY21, fifteen separate departments and organizations funded and worked on AI and AI-adjacent technologies, often without formal coordination or throughlines. This has led to redundancies, gaps, inconsistencies in application and access to data and resources, and an overall hodge-podge of AI efforts. DoD has acknowledged this and is making organizational changes necessary to accelerate AI adoption even more by restructuring its AI approach from the ground up. Now, CDAO will have teams working on policy and governance, technology development, and rolling out data and AI for the Pentagon and the military services, to avoid bureaucratic duplication and confusion that could undermine the CDAO’s overall authority. In particular, bringing the data and AI teams together will improve the data DoD needs for AI development. Some might fear that the reorganization of the JAIC’s functions within the CDAO means the United States is not as committed to the role of AI in the future of U.S. national defense. Based on current information, this concern is misplaced. First, the JAIC was created so the U.S. military could effectively take advantage of the way AI will shape the future of war. It succeeded in many ways. Recognition of the importance of AI for the future of U.S. defense, and national security in general, is much more widespread. The JAIC made headway on AI adoption and data literacy, with initiatives like “AI 101,” and on the data integration issue, as part of the Artificial Intelligence and Data Initiative (AIDA). The military services are investing more in AI and related technologies such as autonomous systems. This, ironically, makes an independent JAIC less necessary. Renewing America Ideas and initiatives for renewing America’s economic strength. Email Address View all newsletters > Second, the JAIC has also faced challenges that the CDAO approach can address. The JAIC had multiple missions, including advising DoD on AI adoption, funding AI research, and building AI tools itself. The JAIC also lacked the authority to advance military service adoption of AI on its own, or to itself transform the connection between AI and overall DoD policy and strategy. The JAIC ended up arguably not policy-focused enough to lead on policy, and not technically equipped enough to lead on algorithm development. While the JAIC encouraged AI investment within DoD, its existence also highlighted how the uncoordinated DoD AI portfolio required even more organization. The CDAO approach will address some of these issues by fusing DoD data and AI efforts, as will a growing focus on AI in other DoD components, from Research & Engineering on the technology development side to OSD-Policy (Office of the Secretary of Defense Policy) on the strategy and governance side. Third, it is difficult to get things immediately right when it comes to converting emerging technologies into adopted innovations, especially for conservative institutions like militaries. We think about experimentation as a critical part of how the technology invention process works, but the same is true when it comes to transforming organizations. Given the way data access and integration are essential to innovation, consolidating data and AI, rather than having a specific JAIC only focused on AI, will make technological adoption across DoD more likely. While it will hopefully spur AI forward within the department, subsuming the JAIC into the CDAO does come with some risks. Currently, there is a widespread understanding that AI is essential for U.S. success in strategic competition and defense leadership. However, we may be taking the prioritization of AI for granted, and future DoD leaders might have a different perspective even if the capabilities of AI tools continue to mature and advance. If that were to happen, the absence of an independent JAIC could lead to a withering of focus on AI, and a downplaying of its importance and relevance, just at the key moment advances in algorithms become more relevant for many military functions. Reward requires risk, especially when it comes to innovation with emerging technologies like artificial intelligence. Technology development is not a linear process and often involves failure along the way. Innovation becomes even more challenging when it requires organizational change to facilitate adoption. Saying goodbye to the JAIC will be bittersweet—the JAIC played a critical role in advancing the U.S. military’s emphasis on AI and set the table for what is next. Moving forward, however, bringing the JAIC into the CDAO will create a more integrated approach to AI and data that is likely to help the United States achieve defense AI leadership. Counterplan can’t solve hybrid warfare - DoD key to harden capabilities and deter cyber attacks Anderson et al. 16 (R. Reed Anderson, Patrick J. Ellis, Antonio M. Paz, Kyle A. Reed, Lendy “Alamo” Renegar and John T. Vaughan “STRATEGIC LANDPOWER AND A RESURGENT RUSSIA: AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH TO DETERRENCE: Chapter 4 THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE,” Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, May 1, 2016, pp. 117-142, http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep12082.11, WC) Another challenge will be getting the right interagency trainers in the right country at the right time. With no overall decision-maker across the interagency other than the President, organizations will have to choose to contribute to the effort versus being compelled to contribute. In a resource-constrained environment, the ability of agencies to surge people forward will remain difficult. A potential DoD contribution in this area would be to leverage the unique capabilities and relationships that exist in the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP). Although it would not be a systemic fix, the National Guard frequently has citizen soldiers who have unique skills from their civilian life that would transfer over to assisting with FID efforts. Stereotypically, there are a high number of police officers in the Guard who would have the ability to train in civil disturbance response. Information technology professionals would also be invaluable assets in assisting the Allies with hardening their networks against Russian cyberattacks. Additional funding and authorities would be required to effectively pursue this course of action but, in the short term, the National Guard could assist with filling this gap. The relationships already built through years of the SPP would serve to enhance this type of training. The United States must also take into account the nature of the threat and the operational environment facing each ally when it considers training and equipping efforts. Each ally will use their forces in a manner informed by culture, history, geopolitics, and other factors, which ideally should shape the scope and breadth of U.S. efforts. For example, FID activities could enable the Baltic States in their efforts to counter ambiguous threats ultimately emanating from Moscow, but U.S. planners must be cognizant of Baltic State sensitivities toward t
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