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2022 SDI Counterplan

CP - Dept of State CP - SDI 2022

CP - Dept of State CP - SDI 2022.docx

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NEG CP—DoS SA
1NCs
1NC – Abolish SC
Counterplan:
The United States federal government should
abolish its security cooperation, transferring relevant resources and responsibilities to the Department of State,
substantially increase its security assistance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in one or more of the following areas: artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cybersecurity,
and reform and resource the Department of State, adapting best practices from the Department of Defense.
It competes – plan’s under DoD authority
Gwinn 22 Jeremy Gwinn, U.S. Army infantry officer currently in the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq, multiple tours in Afghanistan and Iraq conducting counter-insurgency and security force assistance as well as teaching economics in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point, PhD international relations, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, “Sweeter Carrots and Harder Sticks: Rethinking U.S. Security Assistance,” War On The Rocks, 4-19-2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/sweeter-carrots-and-harder-sticks-rethinking-u-s-security-assistance/ /GoGreen!
The What, Why, and How of Security Assistance
“Security assistance” refers to a specific set of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act. These programs are overseen by the State Department in cooperation with the Department of Defense. “Security cooperation” describes separately authorized Defense Department-led activities such as “global train and equip” programs. The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which has provided military aid to that country since 2016, is one such example of these programs run by the Pentagon. I will use the more common term here, security assistance, in reference to either type. When security assistance works well, it gives partner nations the tools to address internal instability and deter and defend against external adversaries, reducing the likelihood that direct U.S. intervention will be called for in the future. It also helps to ensure that the United States maintains access, basing, and overflight privileges, strengthens interoperability, and accrues the less tangible benefit of military-to-military personal relationships.
DoS assistance solves case
Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/ /GoGreen!
U.S. security assistance is broken and in need of an overhaul. Over the past two decades, the bureaucratic system developed to deliver billions of dollars of military aid to partner nations has evolved and expanded not by design but as the result of a series of ad hoc legislative and policy changes. Though the U.S. Department of State was initially in charge of security assistance policy and accounts, since 9/11, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has established a separate, well-funded security assistance bureaucracy at the Pentagon. This has inhibited effective congressional oversight, harmed coordination between diplomacy and defense, and contributed to the growing militarization of U.S. foreign policy. It has created a dysfunctional and bifurcated security assistance system.
Under the current security assistance system, the returns on America’s security investments are limited, inconsistent, and not strategic. The consequences of today’s broken system include increased reliance on the military to solve foreign policy challenges; a perpetuated status quo whereby nondemocratic partners receive U.S. assistance and where human rights abuses are ignored; and an ineffective and unwieldy bureaucracy. This matters because the United States depends on capable allies and partners as a core component of its national security strategy, but the current system is not suited to the task. A new administration can change this by embracing wholesale reform of the security assistance system. To do so, however, a Biden-Harris administration must move quickly to work with Congress and include such reforms in any effort to rebuild and revive U.S. diplomacy. This will require talking not only about security assistance authorities, but fundamentally about money and resources as well. Any reform efforts intending to bolster the role of the State Department must start by examining how funding is oriented and balanced between the departments. This necessitates close cooperation with the Hill.
There must be a dramatic realignment of U.S. security assistance. This report provides an overview and a systemic critique of the current bureaucratic structure of U.S. security assistance and outlines how transferring resources and responsibilities for security assistance back to the State Department will better advance U.S. interests and address the current geopolitical challenges America confronts. It calls for reviving the centrality of diplomacy by restoring the State Department’s role, as originally intended under U.S. law, as the overseer of all U.S. foreign assistance. It also offers recommendations for expanding and training the security assistance workforce, improving interagency coordination, elevating human rights concerns in security assistance policy, and adapting best practices from the DOD.
BUT perm’s retention of DoD authority is a slippery slope to bureaucratic militarization – turns solvency AND causes democratic backsliding
Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/ /GoGreen!
Contributes to the militarization of foreign policy
The current security assistance system contributes to the militarization of U.S. foreign policy. Militarizing foreign policy entails the increasing use of the military to solve foreign policy challenges and results in a bloated DOD budget with more resources and authority. Researchers describe it as a phenomenon whereby “the military more and more becomes the primary actor and face of U.S. policy abroad,” leading to a cycle in which the DOD requires and receives significantly more resources than any other foreign policy agency and is thus increasingly relied on to solve U.S. foreign policy problems.62 There are several elements of a militarized foreign policy in today’s security assistance system, but primarily, the DOD’s control of significantly more security assistance resources puts the Pentagon—rather than diplomats—in the driver’s seat in policymaking.
The Pentagon’s significant resources also distort the face of U.S. security assistance on the ground. Gordon Adams, a former White House budget official, warned, “Who owns the ball matters here because it colors the way the U.S. engages overseas. If American engagement wears a uniform … that’s one form of interaction. If it involves the ambassador and the [U.S. Agency for International Development] and people doing governance work, it’s a different set of missions and there’s a hugely different perception.”63 Recipient countries can utilize this to their advantage; foreign officials may more eagerly seek to follow through or make progress on DOD requests or priorities, such as going through with a significant military exercise or a ship visit, while ignoring or slow-rolling State Department requests or priorities, such as releasing a dissident or altering an economic regulation. And if the interlocutor that matters in relations with the United States is the military, the subject that matters is defense. The Pentagon’s priorities can therefore end up carrying more importance with partners than the State Department’s broader foreign policy concerns, making combatant commands more powerful than any diplomat. When the State Department is deprived of resources, or cut out of the decision-making process entirely, diplomats cannot effectively weigh in on whether a proposed sale or package makes sense given a range of other nonmilitary concerns that may exist in a bilateral relationship. In short, money is power, and the DOD has the money.
The net effect is that U.S. foreign policy is less coherent, with Pentagon policy more likely to be out of sync with broader foreign policy concerns. For example, the DOD’s U.S. Africa Command posture review is being conducted with little to no coordination with the State Department, and the rumored outcome is to call for reduced U.S. presence and security investments in order to free up DOD resources to focus on competition with Russia and China.64 Yet the United States still has serious security and geopolitical interests in the continent that are likely not reflected in traditional military-only decision-making. Rachel Stohl, managing director at the Stimson Center, warned that developing military-to-military security assistance programs is “an important relationship, one that should be cultivated, but it is not separate from the diplomatic and foreign policy relationships that have to be developed and take time. If you lose the foreign policy piece and just focus on the security piece, you’re doing a disservice to the larger strategic objectives.”65 The siloed security assistance system leads to disjointed U.S. foreign policy, divorces security concerns from broader economic or diplomatic concerns, and can end up promoting militarized solutions.
Perpetuates the status quo in security relationships
The current security assistance framework at the State Department and the DOD often perpetuates the status quo by creating incentives to continue providing assistance to the same partners. Between congressionally mandated allocations to large security partners in the State Department’s FMF assistance and specific authorities created for certain countries, there are often few built-in incentives to reexamine a partner’s record or backsliding. And when reviews are done, there is strong resistance to shift funding due to the potential fallout. Rarely is the top consideration the effectiveness of assistance. In an interview with the authors in June 2020, Anthony Wier, a former deputy assistant secretary in the State Department’s Bureau of Legislative Affairs, explained, “Right now, the best predictor for what we propose to spend this year is what we proposed last year – in other words, the whole system is basically just drifting from year to year.”66
This greatly affects the perception of other U.S. security assistance partners. Countries know that the United States is unlikely to cut assistance, even despite bad behavior, in order to avoid harming a bilateral relationship. Recipients take note of such reluctance to pull aid even when gross abuses occur and thus ignore U.S. chastising on bad behavior. As long as the United States is unwilling to cut off assistance or move funds elsewhere after a country commits actions that U.S. officials oppose, security assistance will provide no foreign policy leverage.
Harms democratic progress and enables human rights violators
Current security assistance policy, divorced from other foreign aid considerations, hampers pursuing this values-based policy and does not effectively elevate human rights and democracy concerns in the decision-making process. This is dangerous because the United States ends up supporting autocratic regimes with serious governance and stability challenges. Yemen, for example, received more than $300 million in security assistance through the DOD’s train and equip authority between 2010 and 2015, yet researchers documented human rights abuses perpetrated by the government and possible diversion of U.S. aid.67 Worse still, the perception that U.S. aid was fueling conflict led much of the Yemeni public to believe that the United States was primarily responsible for the destruction of the Saudi-led coalition in the current war.68 Today, the conflict in Yemen is the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.
An overly militarized security assistance policy makes it harder to support emerging democracies. Building up security forces without accompanying reforms to strengthen civilian oversight can lead to coup-proofing or consolidation around a political leader, rather than the development of a competent force.69 Often, these impacts are not prioritized by security assistance practitioners; for example, the DOD’s relative spending on building up partner security institutions, such as the Defense Institution Reform Initiative, was $32.6 million in fiscal year 2019, compared with $1.9 billion of overall spending.70 At the same time, the DOD’s investment in institutional capacity building far exceeds the State Department’s investment in these efforts—an example where the State Department will have to incorporate and improve on the DOD’s practices.
While U.S. laws technically prohibit providing security assistance to units found to violate human rights—the Leahy laws—the provisions are riddled with loopholes and are too weak to effectively prioritize human rights in U.S. security assistance.71 Offices and agencies responsible for elevating human rights in U.S. foreign policy, such as the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, are too often cut out of the decision-making process for security assistance programs—especially those run out of the Pentagon. At the same time, the Pentagon maintains its own security assistance accounts, such as Section 127e, that are not required to conduct human rights vetting and operate with little transparency—furthering opportunities to militarize foreign policy.72 And often, such as in the case of Egypt, security assistance is accompanied by paltry amounts of democracy, human rights, and governance funding (DRG), or certifications on human rights are waived entirely, to make providing arms more palatable.73 These small DRG funds or certification stops do little to change the underlying political challenges or are sometimes even hampered by the regime the United States is funding.
NATO backsliding risks existential threats
Berzina 21 Kristine Berzina, senior fellow and head of the geopolitics team at the Alliance for Securing Democracy, MA international relations, University of Cambridge, BA political science and history, Yale University, “Democratic Resilience and Cooperation at the Core of NATO’s Future,” testimony before the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, November 2021, https://www.nato-pa.int/sites/default/files/2021-11/2021%20-%20TESTIMONY%20ON%20DEMOCRATIC%20RESILIENCE%20AND%20COOPERATION%20AT%20THE%20CORE%20OF%20NATO.docx /GoGreen!
NATO is at a critical moment of re-invention. The alliance survived the tumultuous years of the Trump presidency – in practice, U.S. commitments to collective defense remained strong, and defense spending across the alliance has been growing every year since 2015. The next question is how the alliance can not only survive but thrive. NATO will need evolve to adapt to an ever-increasing array of threats, from disruptive technologies to renewed great power competition with China and Russia. And because adversaries target not only NATO’s borders but strike society within NATO countries, the alliance will need to give more attention to defending against threats at home. Improving NATO’s resilience needs to go beyond shoring up critical infrastructure and cyber capacity to bolstering the democratic principles and systems that underpin the alliance.
The North Atlantic Treaty that set up NATO in 1949 explicitly recognizes the NATO allies’ determination to “safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” My colleagues and I at the Alliance for Securing Democracy called on NATO to uphold these values within the Alliance and with partner countries in a policy blueprint for countering authoritarian interference in Europe.
Establishing a Center for Democratic Resilience at NATO would be one way to achieve the goal of safeguarding democracy and upholding the values on which the alliance was founded. The exact structure of a NATO body focusing on democratic resilience can vary, yet the need to address both external and internal threats to democracy is paramount.
Democracy: Not outside the scope of NATO
Democracy does not go beyond the scope of NATO. The alliance’s founding treaty foresees NATO not only as a body for collective defense but also for political consultation. And this provision would allow NATO members to draw on each other for support and guidance on countering threats to their democratic processes and institutions.
NATO exists to help its members protect themselves and assist each other in countering existential threats – those against territorial integrity as well as political independence. Article Five’s collective defense provisions against armed attack are well known. But Article Four of the Washington Treaty calls on members to “consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”
Russia and other authoritarian states seek to undermine democratic and electoral processes in NATO countries through cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns, economic coercion, among other tactics. These asymmetric efforts can erode the political independence of NATO states, undermine their sovereignty, and if successful, alter the direction of NATO policy. This is at the heart of the question of political independence for individual allies and NATO as a whole.
The need to counter threats to democracy is growing. The Alliance for Securing Democracy’s Authoritarian Interference Tracker logs 600 instances in which Russia or China have sought to undermine democracy across forty NATO and non-NATO democracies in North America and Europe. Russia began using many of these tools, from economic coercion to information manipulation, in the Soviet era. But in recent years, other autocratic states including China are learning from Russia’s example. In the Covid-19 pandemic, China has increasingly piggybacked off Russia’s information network and imitating its tactics.
Being vocal about the values of democracy, liberty, and the rule of law matters in and of itself. If these values were put forward more prominently at the alliance, as a Center for Democratic Resilience could do, NATO members would feel more accountable on the question of values and democratic health to their fellow allies. Expectations on good governance should be made clear in routine NATO operations. Moreover, focusing on these values may allow NATO countries to build confidence and support for democratic systems at home.
Not only external threats
The external dimension of threats against democracy may be fairly straight-forward to address at NATO. Allies could come together, ideally in a regular manner such as that which 

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