Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
← Back to archive
2022 SDI Counterplan

CP - Bilateral CP - SDI 2022

CP - Bilateral CP - SDI 2022.docx

Download Word file
Indexed text preview
NEG Bilateral CP
1NC – NATO PIC
Counterplan:
The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the United Kingdom, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Albania, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Croatia, Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, Romania, Germany, Slovakia, Greece, Slovenia, Hungary, Spain, Turkey, Latvia and North Macedonia in one or more of the following areas: artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cybersecurity.
Solves case – AND spills up as consensus develops over time
Németh 22 Bence Németh, lecturer in the Defence Studies Department, King's College London, “Bilateralism and Minilateralism are Europe’s Secret Strengths,” War On The Rocks, 6-3-2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/bilateralism-and-minilateralism-are-europes-secret-strengths/ /GoGreen!
As a result of the war in Ukraine, policymakers in Europe and North America have scrambled to strengthen defense cooperation in Europe. The headlines inevitably focus on NATO and the European Union. Yet this ignores the reality of how European defense cooperation is actually established, fostered, and solidified. Indeed, the essence of defense cooperation in Europe is a web of hundreds of bilateral and minilateral collaborations. Often, NATO and the European Union work merely as a framework into which European countries upload their existing bi- and minilateral efforts.
To better enhance European defense, policymakers should appreciate the dynamics of these many collaborations. Taking advantage of the current circumstances to build more mini and bilateral ties, particularly where leadership and financial circumstances are most conducive, will strengthen Europe and make its multilateral institutions that much more formidable.
A History of Bilateralism and Minilateralism
In a few months, NATO countries have deployed thousands of troops and significant capabilities to enhance the defense of members on its eastern flank. In a stunning transition, two traditionally militarily non-aligned E.U. states, Sweden and Finland, re-evaluated their geostrategic position and submitted applications to join NATO. The debate about boosting the European Union’s “strategic autonomy” has become even more intense, and once again, member states are discussing coordinating their defense spending via joint procurements.
These vital initiatives could not work without existing, critical lower-level collaborations. For example, Russian military actions over the last several years in Ukraine prompted NATO’s eastern-flank allies to work swiftly together with their bi- and minilateral partners. The United Kingdom took on a leading role in Estonia, building on the close relations the two countries developed carrying out dangerous operations over a decade in Afghanistan’s Helmand province. Lithuania is a relevant defense market for Germany, and not surprisingly, the Bundeswehr leads NATO efforts there. Thanks to cultural similarity and extensive previous military cooperation, the Czech Republic has sent the most troops to Slovakia and oversees the international forces located there. For similar reasons, France deployed 500 troops to Romania. Such comparatively low-key actions were crucial in developing the necessary bottom-up relations, norms, and experiences upon which more recent grandiose announcements build.
Although Finland and Sweden intend to join NATO, they also found it essential to sign bilateral mutual security deals with the United Kingdom. This could happen quickly, mainly because Helsinki and Stockholm have built trust with London working together in the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force. The dynamics in the European Union are the same as in NATO. For example, in 2017, the European Union established the Permanent Structured Cooperation to strengthen defense cooperation among its member states after the Russian occupation in Crimea. However, most of its projects were based on existing bi- and minilateral defense initiatives, and the participating states often just rebranded them according to the new E.U. vocabulary.
The fact that existing bi- and minilateral relationships are the foundation of defense cooperation in Europe is not a new phenomenon. A survey of 70 examples of European defense collaboration highlighted that most have five or fewer participating states, and many are purely bilateral. These collaborations range from creating multinational units to cooperating on armaments, training, logistics, surveillance, operations, and/or command and control. More often than not, these collaborations are not part of NATO or the European Union, but they can be rebranded as E.U. and NATO projects quickly if it is necessary.
States can also use these collaborations to shape NATO and E.U. policies. For instance, the NATO operation in Libya in 2011 was basically an Anglo-French war, as France and Britain pushed for the intervention and took the brunt of the fight. They used NATO’s command structure to coordinate their war effort and the limited military support they gained from some NATO members helped fill their capability gaps. The background of this was a historical and overarching British-French bilateral defense agreement, the Lancaster House Treaties, which the leaders of the two European military powers signed a year earlier. The launch of the European Union’s European Security and Defence Policy in 1999 also stemmed from a British-French bilateral agreement in St. Malo in 1998 as well.
Strengthening the Network
Improving NATO and E.U. defense cooperation requires looking under the hood to appreciate the role of these efforts. Scholars have already pointed out that Europeans must recognize the minilateral foundations of Europe’s security architecture. This corresponds with my experience as a former defense official. European ministries of defense do not always think in terms of institutions like the European Union and NATO. They have their own considerations, and they are using the framework that fits their goals the best, which can be NATO, the European Union, or smaller formats. Starting an initiative at this level is often more effective and can provide results more quickly.
As I argue in my newly published book, while these forms of cooperation are not new, their recent proliferation is unprecedented in Europe’s history. Furthermore, they provide the substance of practical military cooperation in Europe, which NATO and the European Union can build on. Thus, comprehending the dynamics behind them is crucial to foster effective defense cooperation moving forward. The research in my book indicates that when European nations start new defense collaborations, five structural and situational factors are important to achieve success.
BUT, shields NATO cohesion by avoiding the need for consensus upfront
Shapiro 9 Jeremy Shapiro, non-resident Senior Policy Fellow, ECFR; and Nick Witney, Senior Policy Fellow, ECFR; “Conflicted Europe,” Chapter 2, Towards a Post-American Europe: A Power Audit of EU-US Relations, European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2009, ISBN 978-1-906538-18-7, https://ecfr.eu/archive/page/-/ECFR19_TOWARDS_A_POST_AMERICAN_EUROPE_-_A_POWER_AUDIT_OF_EU-US_RELATIONS.pdf /GoGreen!
In an effort to get beyond “mutual trust” and “consultations”, we asked our experts in each EU member state to tell us what they saw as the three most important issues in that state’s relationship with the US. The responses are tabulated at Annex 1. The lack of a common set of European priorities for the transatlantic relationship is well illustrated; the issues cited range across most regions of the world and also include global issues as diverse as climate change, democratisation, and nuclear non-proliferation. There is also a high incidence of “parochial” issues, especially for the smaller states (for example, Malta’s problem with illegal immigration), suggesting a tendency to look across the Atlantic for help on issues on which the EU seems to be of no help because it lacks either a remit or a consensus or both. Even when respondents cited the importance of “investment and trade”, they were actually referring to individual national interest; the collective EU interests that the Commission defends are seemingly so effectively delegated to the EU level that they slip out of national consciousness.
The big exception to this confusion of views and priorities is security and defence – listed among the top three issues by three-quarters of our respondents, and by many as the most important aspect of the transatlantic relationship. This preoccupation is by no means confined to those recently escaped from the Soviet empire; most western Europeans feel the same. Nearly all of our respondents judged bilateral counter-terrorism co-operation with the US to be close, productive, and largely immune to turbulence elsewhere.16 All regarded the continued engagement of the US in Europe’s defence as vital – with NATO, “the bedrock of our security” (see national defence white papers passim), as the key institution.
In general, therefore, European attitudes have evolved remarkably little over the 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Our audit suggests that, despite the expansion and evolution of the EU and, in particular, the development of its external identity – despite, indeed, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the global diffusion of power – member states continue to think of the transatlantic relationship in terms of NATO and of bilateral relations. The Cold War dispensation, whereby the US offered Europeans security and the role of junior associates in running the world in exchange for European solidarity, remains deeply ingrained. Europeans seem essentially to want more of the same – especially now that there is a US president who Europeans can believe shares their own instincts.
How do they aim to get it?
This picture of a Europe preoccupied with the defence and security dimension of transatlantic relations, reluctant in consequence to do anything that might rock the boat, and determined to pursue its interests bilaterally rather than collectively is reinforced by our enquiries into the various assets and levers that different European states felt they were able to use in attempting to get what they wanted from Washington. The results are set out at Annex 2.
Once again, it is striking that the vast majority of assets or levers identified by our respondents relate to their role in diplomatic and especially defence and security co-operation with the US. Many member states believe that they have particular regional expertise or connections that Washington values; others list their readiness to promote democracy, especially in the eastern neighbourhood and the Caucasus. A majority point to their support for US military operations or the hosting of US military bases (10 member states support a continuing US military presence in Europe of some 70,000). One-third of EU member states even regard their geographical location as a key asset vis-à-vis the US. Beyond that, the other widely perceived asset is what we have termed “cultural links” – affinities of history or ethnicity which Europeans believe to have enduring political value. In short, Europeans aim to present themselves to the US as useful and attractive – and more so than their peers.
So one answer to the question of how Europeans seek to advance their transatlantic interests is: for defence, through NATO; for trade and competition issues, through the EU; and for almost everything else, bilaterally.
This preference for the bilateral track is more easily understood when it becomes clear how many of the European member states believe themselves to have some particular comparative advantage in dealing with Washington (see table below). The UK is not alone, or even in a minority, in cherishing the idea that its “special relationship’” is more advantageous than any collective European approach.17
AT: Perm – Do CP
Perm: do counterplan – is severance – BOTH textually and functionally:
“With” requires NATO participation
Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, No Date, “With,” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/with /GoGreen!
Definition of with
1 a: in opposition to : AGAINST
had a fight with his brother
b: so as to be separated or detached from
broke with her family
2 a—used as a function word to indicate a participant in an action, transaction, or arrangement
works with his father
a talk with a friend
got into an accident with the car
b—used as a function word to indicate the object of attention, behavior, or feeling
get tough with him
angry with her
“NATO” is exclusively its institutional organizations, NOT its member states
Johnston 19 Seth A. Johnston, Fellow of the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, former chief of international security cooperation for intelligence at the U.S. Army Europe, former Task Force Commander in NATO’s Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan, PhD international relations, MA comparative politics, Oxford University, “NATO’s Lessons from Afghanistan,” Parameters, The US Army War College Quarterly, Autumn 2019, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/natos-lessons-afghanistan /GoGreen!
Today’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization is no Cold War alliance. Few developments illustrate NATO’s capacity for adaptation more than its 21st century role in Afghanistan.1 NATO allies invoked the collective defense provision—Article 5—of its founding treaty for the first and only time just one day after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.2 Few present at the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 could have imagined it would be invoked by European countries and Canada seeking to support the United States or that the Alliance’s largest and longest military operation would occur in central Asia. Fewer still might have predicted NATO allies would agree to the mission so soon after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, a crisis the then US ambassador to NATO described as a “near death experience” for the Alliance.3 Yet NATO assumed control of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003 and has remained in Afghanistan for the better part of two decades.
As the United States has begun negotiating a political settlement to the Afghanistan conflict with a view to the eventual withdrawal of international forces there, an assessment from the overall NATO perspective will complement the national initiatives.4 This effort will also support ongoing efforts to reassess NATO’s priorities in the face of other security challenges.5
Although NATO has undertaken formal studies of its activities in Afghanistan, recent scholarship by Heidi Hardt, Jörg Noll, and Sebastiaan Rietjens cast doubt on the efficacy of formal lessons learned processes in international organizations generally and in NATO specifically.6 This article offers an external and an unofficial assessment of the Alliance’s efforts and provides initial suppositions. In sum, NATO’s impact in Afghanistan may not have been enough to mitigate national shortcomings or to achieve victory on its own, but it was significant and positive. The Alliance’s adaptability and highly institutionalized character are at the root of these contributions.
Moreover, the mission in Afghanistan affected NATO in ways that promoted allied political cohesion, organizational effectiveness, and military interoperability. The chief implications of these findings are that while national political leadership and strategy formulation remain paramount in war, NATO remains a proven and effective instrument of organizing and implementing coordinated multinational efforts. The most important lesson learned from NATO in Afghanistan may therefore be about NATO’s more general value to the United States and other members.
NATO: Alliance and International Organization
In contrast to national assessments, this analysis focuses on the formal institutions of the Alliance. NATO is unique among alliances in that it is not only a treaty-based agreement among member states, but also an international organization—and a highly institutionalized one at that. Since its early years, NATO has been comprised of a permanently staffed formal political headquarters supported by a network of military and civilian organizations. Particularly noteworthy is NATO’s integrated joint multinational military structure, a unique innovation without equivalent among other alliances or international organizations.
This integration, capped by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium, extends through various echelons and included the ISAF headquarters and other NATO structures in Afghanistan.7 Thus, for this article, “NATO” refers to the various formal institutions and not the group of allied countries. Likewise, the focus is on the collaborative conduct and not that of the United States, other allies or partners, the government of Afghanistan, or other regional actors. Nor does the article address the efficacy of counterinsurgency warfare.
International relations theory would emphasize the formal institutions of NATO have very weak independent power and agency.
But although NATO consists of such formal institutions, the Alliance remains an alliance among states. All decisions at NATO Headquarters are taken by consensus among member states (which will soon number 30). Politics among those countries happens, and the relative influence of individual member states is closely associated with their power. NATO’s institutions matter chiefly because of how they facilitate and structure the relations among the states. Like any other international organization, states may derive value from such institutions because they provide benefits such as establishing predictable structures and routines for decision-making; increasing information sharing; improving efficiency and reducing transaction costs; and defining roles, status, and identity. The most important questions for NATO in the context of assessing its role in the Afghanistan conflict is whether and how well it has performed these functions.
Contextually, that makes the counterplan less than the plan
Tsuruoka 10 Michito Tsuruoka, Senior Research Fellow, Regional Studies Department, National Institute for Defense Studies, “Japan–Europe Security Cooperation: How to “Use” NATO and the EU,” English translation from the original Japanese version with the same title published in Boei Kenkyusho Kiyo, 13(1), October 2010, http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/2011/bulletin_e2011_3.pdf /GoGreen!
The first section will examine the value of NATO as a security partner for Japan from the following four perspectives: 1) a political partner; 2) an operational partner; 3) as a means of cooperation with the US; and 4) a multilateral school. The second section will use a similar method to examine the significance of security cooperation with the EU, viewing it from the following three perspectives: 1) a political partner; 2) an operational partner; and 3) as a “non-American” partner.
There are two things to be mentioned before going into substantial discussions below. First, from the perspective of “mutually using the other,” it would be necessary to examine the value of Japan as a partner for Europe. However, it goes beyond the scope of this article, which is focused on the Japanese side of the story. That said, it needs to be mentioned that it is necessary for Japan to be prepared and willing to be used by Europe as long as Japan wants to use Europe and that letting Europeans understand the value of Japan as a partner is in Japan’s interest.
Second, this article focuses on cooperation with NATO and the EU; however, that by no means implies that security cooperation with individual countries such as the UK, France, and Germany is insignificant. F

Preview shortened. Download the file for the full document.