Neg - Emerging Tech Innovation - SDI 2022
Neg - Emerging Tech Innovation - SDI 2022.docx
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Emerging Tech Innovation Negative Notes Explanation This is a case negative against the Emerging Tech Innovation aff. It includes four new counterplan options and case answers. Notes about the affirmative are included at the top of the aff file. User’s Guide The negative has the following off-case options against the Emerging Tech Innovation case: NATO Cohesion DA DOD AM&E Tradeoff DA AI Bad DA (from the AI case negative) Bilateral CP State Department CP Germany and Italy CP (with internal net-benefit) Quad CP (with internal net-benefit) Trilateral Israel-India-U.S. CP (with internal net-benefit) Unilateral/Domestic CP Security K Be careful when designing case frontlines. If you are reading one or more of the DAs, you should not read impact defense that would take out your DA impact(s). To prevent mistakes, the case frontlines in this file have intentionally omitted typical impact defense cards. During the season, the negative should attempt to construct negative strategies with more “external” impacts so they can fully challenge the 1AC’s impacts. For now, that wasn’t realistic. Germany and Italy CP 1NC — Germany and Italy CP Next off is the Germany and Italy Counterplan. The Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Italy should substantially increase their defense spending and joint defense investment, including investment in defense innovation hubs and research and development in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and cybersecurity, and should invite the French Republic to join these initiatives. The counterplan solves emerging tech innovation and European strategic autonomy. Antinozzi and Varvelli 22 — Isabella Antinozzi, Research Associate at the European Council on Foreign Relations, holds an M.A. in International Conflict Studies from King's College London (UK), and Arturo Varvelli, Senior Policy Fellow and Head of the Rome Office at the European Council on Foreign Relations, former Co-Head of the MENA Center and Head of the Terrorism Programme at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (Italy), former Lecturer in History and Institutions of the Middle East at IULM University (Italy), holds a Ph.D. in International History from the University of Milan (Italy), 2022 (“Armed for innovation: How to drive German-Italian defence industrial cooperation,” European Council on Foreign Relations, April 4th, Available Online at https://ecfr.eu/article/armed-for-innovation-how-to-drive-german-italian-defence-industrial-cooperation/, Accessed 07-13-2022) European defence is a team game. Following Germany’s decision on 27 February to massively increase its military budget in response to Russia’s all-out war on Ukraine, other European countries need to catch up – by adapting their own defence planning and spending accordingly. Italy was one of several EU member states that, soon after Berlin announced this huge shift in policy, called for a hike in defence spending to 2 per cent of GDP in line with its commitments as a NATO member. Yet, despite the initial fanfare over the move, the Italian government is now vacillating. The leader of the Five Star Movement, Giuseppe Conte, recently expressed reservations about the increase in military spending, explaining that “the priority must be to protect families and businesses from the crisis”. Conte’s statement is questionable not only because he participated in NATO summits at which Italy committed to more military spending but also because it suggests that increases in the defence budget and support for people’s livelihoods are mutually exclusive. As research by the RAND Corporation shows, the defence industry has a value that goes beyond the protection of a country and its population from adversaries – it also creates economic opportunities. Therefore, Italy should follow in Germany’s footsteps by increasing defence spending and developing a closer alliance with Berlin on military matters. Indeed, joint defence investment could substantially contribute to industrial development and integration in Europe. Defence industrial cooperation between Italy and Germany has two promising fronts, both of them in the air domain. The first is fighter jets. During his dramatic announcement of Germany’s new strategy, Chancellor Olaf Scholz indicated that his government would likely acquire the F-35 Lightning II instead of the F/A-18 Super Hornet as previously planned. From an Italian perspective, this is good news for two reasons. Firstly, it means more work for the FACO industrial plant in Cameri, where Lockheed Martin assembles F-35s. Secondly, and most importantly for Italy, Germany now seems more open to procuring the designated successor to the F-35, the Tempest. British firm BAE Systems and Italian company Leonardo lead the Tempest project, while France, Germany, and Spain are cooperating on the comparable Future Combat Air System programme. Germany’s new approach could encourage Paris to support a merger between the two initiatives – a move that Italy and Germany have long advocated. Political support for defence industrial cooperation European defence companies are already exploring potential opportunities for such cooperation. In a recent interview with Italian newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore, Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger indicated his firm’s willingness to expand its industrial networks in Italy by increasing investments and strengthening cooperation with Oto Melara, a subsidiary of Leonardo. Papperger explained that, “to underline the long-term nature of our commitment, we are also prepared to make a financial commitment by acquiring shares in Oto Melara.” In this way, the firm could become a springboard for a new role for the German defence industry in Italy. Rheinmetall wants to be involved in the modernisation of the Italian Army, including through the supply of new armoured fighting vehicles such as its Lynx models. The company would like to be the medium through which Italy participates in the Main Ground Combat System programme – which is designed to develop a European-made, next-generation heavy tank. Accordingly, there is considerable potential for Germany and Italy to begin a new era of defence industry collaboration – one characterised by what Italian ambassador to Berlin Armando Varricchio calls a “much more integrated dimension”. However, such a defence marriage can only take place with the blessing of the government in Rome. The government controls both Leonardo and Fincantieri. And it will have a say in the planned sale of Oto Melara and Wass, another Leonardo subsidiary. German defence companies are keenly aware of the need for Rome’s backing. “I am open to creating a partnership in Italy”, Papperger remarked in the interview with Il Sole 24 Ore, “but, of course, we need the agreement of the government, to which we have explained our position”. Italian leaders should recognise the political benefits of closer security and defence cooperation with Germany. In recent years, Italy and Germany have been at odds in areas ranging from migration to structural economic reform. Although Mario Draghi’s election as Italian prime minister has eased the tension between the sides, he and Scholz disagree on key policy issues such as the reform of EU debt rules. Determined to overcome these differences, Italy and Germany have pledged to sign an action plan for cooperation by mid-2022. By including defence industrial cooperation in this pact, they could match France’s leadership in the area and sustainably promote European strategic autonomy – an issue that is important to policymakers in Rome and Berlin. A bilateral foundation for pan-European cooperation German-Italian cooperation of this kind will need to be outward-looking if it is to avoid being perceived as a threat to other European defence industries, particularly that of France. Historically sceptical of German rearmament, France could regard such cooperation as a challenge to its leadership of EU defence policy. Germany and Italy should be open to expanding their joint defence industrial projects to include France. To this end, their efforts in the area should aim to promote complementarity between European defence industries, value chains, and technologies. As such, initially bilateral cooperation could drive broader European security and defence integration. Indeed, any ambitious defence initiative within the European Union will require the support of multiple member states. Undertakings such as the European Intervention Initiative and Permanent Structured Cooperation are valuable formats in which Italy and Germany can engage with other European countries on operational and industrial issues. As part of the effort, they should try to spur the development of European defence consortia – which would create a promising avenue through which to strengthen European strategic autonomy. While much technological innovation has traditionally started in the military realm before entering the civilian sector, it is now increasingly common for such innovation to begin with private and non-state actors before reaching the military domain. This trend calls for closer, more sustained cooperation between the civilian and military sectors across Europe, covering both government-owned and private companies. This is one of the key ways in which European governments can address the challenges of decreased state control of emerging technologies. By backing pan-European defence industrial cooperation, the EU can boost both economic innovation and its credibility as a geopolitical actor. There is no strategic autonomy without a strong defence industry. And cooperation between Italy and Germany can breathe new life into long-running attempts to integrate European defence industries. Italian leaders are right to consider how defence spending affects society as a whole, but they should not forget its benefits beyond the security realm. They have much to gain from becoming credible leaders in this increasingly important policy area. European strategic autonomy is crucial to de-escalate African and Middle East wars. Borrell 20 — Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice-President of the European Commission, former Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Government of Spain, former President of the European Parliament, holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the Complutense University of Madrid (Spain), 2020 (“Why European strategic autonomy matters,” European External Action Service—the diplomatic service and combined foreign and defence ministry of the European Union, December 3rd, Available Online at https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/why-european-strategic-autonomy-matters_en, Accessed 07-13-2022) Why is strategic autonomy salient more than ever? Because the world has changed. It is difficult to claim to be a “political union” able to act as a “global player” and as a “geopolitical Commission” without being “autonomous”. What are then the factors that make this concept more relevant than ever? The first is that the weight of Europe in the world is shrinking. Thirty years ago, we represented a quarter of the world's wealth. It is foreseen that in 20 years, we will not represent more than 11% of world GNP, far behind China, which will represent double it, below 14% for the United States and at par with India. The next two decades are going to be crucial because China will use them to become the first global power, before becoming itself confronted with new demographic constraints, which will slow its rise. The relay could then probably be taken over by India. The conclusion is straightforward. If we do not act together now, we will become irrelevant as many have argued cogently. Strategic autonomy is, in this perspective, a process of political survival. In such a context, our traditional alliances remain essential. However, they will not be enough. Since power gaps are shrinking, the world will become more transactional and all powers, including Europe, will tend to be more transactional too. This is an unescapable truth. The second factor has to do with the transformation of economic interdependence in which we, as Europeans, have invested a great deal, particularly through the defence of multilateralism. Today we are in a situation where economic interdependence is becoming politically very conflictual. And what was traditionally called soft power is becoming an instrument of hard power. The Covid-19 crisis has revealed the fundamentally asymmetrical nature of interdependence, and the vulnerability of Europe. Science, technology, trade, data, investments are becoming sources and instruments of force in international politics. This is a very important change, which should lead us to strengthen all the instruments beyond security and defence, in particular those competences and instruments of the Commission that we have at our disposal, to defend our interests. Another important reason is the shift in the world's focus towards Asia, particularly in US policy. This trend did not start with the Trump administration. The Obama administration initially decided to withdraw the last US tank in 2013. However, following the crisis in Ukraine it decided to bring back, on a rotational basis, an armoured brigade. Still, the wider point stands, as also the German defence minister said recently: “Only if we take our own security seriously, will America do the same.” I cannot agree more. Additionally, Europe is today confronted on its periphery with a certain number of conflicts or tensions in the Sahel, in Libya and in the Eastern Mediterranean. In these three cases Europe must act even more, and alone, because these problems do not primarily concern the United States. As one Polish scholar wrote, “the US will no longer be engaged in large-scale military operations in Africa and the Middle East and will leave to Europe crises and conflict resolution in the European neighbourhood”. Therefore, we need to close many capability gaps and loopholes and to be present and active in areas where our interests are at stake. In conflicts like Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya as well as Syria, we are witnessing a form of “Astanisation” of regional conflicts (in reference to the Astana format on Syria) which leads to the exclusion of Europe from the settlement of regional conflicts in favour of Russia and Turkey. Why is this? How can this be remedied? Should it be accommodated? These real questions must be asked within the framework of strategic autonomy. On these issues, the exclusive reference to NATO is no longer enough. Escalation causes global wars — they’re highly likely without active conflict management. Hiltermann 22 — Joost Hiltermann, Program Director for the Middle East and North Africa at the International Crisis Group, Research Affiliate at the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, former Consultant to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq, former Adjunct Professor in the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University, former Executive Director of the Arms Division at Human Rights Watch, holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of California-Santa Cruz, 2022 (“Managing Crises, the Least-Bad Option,” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Number 44, Winter, Available Online at https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/managing-crises-the-least-bad-option/, Accessed 07-13-2022) The year 2011 was a watershed in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as the popular uprisings that cascaded through the region precipitated the collapse of several regimes at astonishing speed. These developments in turn triggered civil wars in Libya, Syria, and Yemen that converged in dangerous ways, raising the potential for a wider conflict between regional actors, directly or through proxies, including potent armed groups supported by powers external to the region. Over ten years later, Yemen is going from bad to worse, but the big war in Syria is for now frozen. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a shadow of its former self, and the Libyan civil war isn’t raging on as it used to. Some of the intersecting disputes have calmed down—at least for the moment—as states in the region direct greater energies toward diplomacy. Yet, the situation remains fragile and could turn at the merest incident. This could be a rocket fired by Houthi rebels in Yemen landing in Abu Dhabi or Riyadh; a Hezbollah rocket striking a school in Israel; an Israeli raid on Iranian assets in Syria to which Iran retaliates by attacking the U.S. military base at Al-Tanf with drones; an accidental confrontation between the Iranian and U.S. navies in Persian Gulf waters; or any event of similar impact, including what may follow a possible Donald Trump return to the White House in 2025. The complexity of the region’s conflicts has created unprecedented challenges for conflict management and resolution. This is because wars may have more than one fundamental driver. Addressing one may aggravate another. Take Libya, for example: a deal to end the conflict by forming a unity government will likely come at the expense of improving governance and accountability, thus potentially giving rise to new popular protests. Or Iraq: when the United States and the Kurds fought ISIS together, Iraqi Kurdish leaders felt empowered to try for independence in 2017. But their bid escalated an old conflict over secession with the central government in Baghdad and neighboring countries, triggering a fight in disputed territories. External intervention also tends to exacerbate conflicts more often than help resolve them. Such meddling draws in competing forces, directly or by proxy— for example, Saudi Arabia and Iran in Yemen, or the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Turkey in Libya. Another challenge is that armed non-state actors, presenting themselves as state-like entities but without the true trappings of states, are less accountable. Meanwhile, the region’s states themselves often start to crumble through their partial loss of territorial control, sovereignty, and authority. An additional complicating factor is that the “international community” as a whole is going through a period of severe turbulence, in which multilateral institutions are increasingly driven by internal zero-sum competition and are losing legitimacy and influence. The continuation of conflicts in the MENA region without the prospect of a durable resolution—even if they are temporarily stalled—raises two critical dangers. One is that any conflict can metastasize at any point, covering even larger territories and involving a greater number of actors. The second is that external power interventions in places such as Syria where their interests collide can generate hair-trigger situations that could spiral rapidly out of control, possibly with global consequences. That is in addition to the constant presence of regional conflict drivers such as the struggle between Iran and the Gulf monarchies or the continued Israeli military occupation of Palestinian territories, which prevent conflicts from coming to a negotiated conclusion. Under these circumstances, there is no direct or optimal approach to tackling the region’s conflicts. What we are left with is trying to find ways to manage and contain conflicts before they intensify. This will require diplomatic efforts and tactical deals, as well as the creation of channels of communication and dialogue between adversaries that can help prevent unintended and uncontrollable escalations. Top-Level + Net-Benefit Explanation/Extension Instead of increasing U.S. security cooperation with NATO, the counterplan increases German and Italian defense cooperation. This solves the case by boosting European defense investment in emerging tech. German and Italian joint investment will jumpstart European defense industry integration, cementing interoperability and convincing other European countries to follo
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