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2022 SDI Counterplan

AT - Dept of State CP - SDI 2022

AT - Dept of State CP - SDI 2022.docx

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AFF AT: CP—DoS SA
Perm: Do CP – 2AC
Perm: do counterplan – it’s plan-plus:
“Increase” is gross NOT net
Goldberg 19 Mitchell S. Goldberg, Judge, delivering the Opinion of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, Shire ViroPharma, Inc. v. CSL Behring LLC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198992, 11-18-2019, NexisUni /GoGreen!
[FOOTNOTE 14]
Defendants' citation to AstraZeneca AB v. Dr. Reddy's Laboratories, Ltd., No. 05-5553, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48844, 2010 WL 11414548, at *13 (D.N.J. May 18, 2010) is inapposite. In that case, the court construed the term "increased average plasma levels (AUC) per dosage unit" to mean "greater blood levels of (-)-omeprazole . . . compared to the typical or usual blood levels for omeprazole." 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48844, [WL] at *13. The court found such a construction necessary because the claim term "increased average plasma levels" provided no point of reference on which to determine what were "increased average plasma levels." Id.
By contrast here, the claim language provides a point of reference regarding what the term "increase" means by noting that the level of active C1 esterase in the blood must "increase" to "at least about 0.4 U/mL" regardless of where the C1-INH level started. Contrary to Defendants' argument, Plaintiff's refusal to accord any additional meaning to the term "increases" does not violate any well-settled canons of claim construction.
“Cooperation” includes “assistance” under State control – prefer legal precision
Serafino 16 Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs, Congressional Research Service, “Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense,” CRS Report for Congress, R44444, 5-26-2016, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R44444.pdf /GoGreen!
Terminology
The two terms most commonly used today for assistance to foreign military and security forces are “security assistance” and “security cooperation.” Security assistance is the term most frequently used, regardless of the agency providing that assistance.
There is no State Department definition for security assistance. The annual State Department congressional budget justification (CBJ), however, lists six budget accounts under the heading “International Security Assistance.” These accounts, with their underlying Title 22 authorities (the 1961 FAA and the AECA), are commonly regarded as the State Department’s security assistance portfolio.
DOD formally defines security assistance as the group of State Department 1961 FAA and AECA programs that a DOD organization, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), administers. These include programs conducted under two of the State Department international security assistance accounts and attendant authorities, as well as programs conducted under four related 1961 FAA and AECA authorities.
DOD uses the overarching term “security cooperation” to denote the State Department security assistance administered by DSCA through which the U.S. government furnishes defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, as well as all other DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments. The purposes of the interactions with foreign defense establishments defined as security cooperation are to “build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multilateral operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.”8
Perm: Do CP – 1AR
This is the DoD definition all of their ev and ours is referencing
DoD 16 U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 5132.03, “DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation,” 12-29-2016, https://open.defense.gov/portals/23/Documents/foreignasst/DoDD_513203_on_Security_Cooperation.pdf /GoGreen!
G.2. DEFINITIONS. Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this issuance.
country-specific security cooperation section. A section of the theater campaign plan in which the GCCs articulate their intent to apply time, money, and effort through security cooperation programs in a specific country to further U.S. defense objectives or set the theater for a potential contingency in their campaign plan. Country-specific security cooperation sections serve as the core organizing documents for articulating DoD country-level objectives for the application of security cooperation at the country level, and inform and are informed by corresponding Integrated Country Strategies.
Integrated Country Strategy. Defined in Presidential Policy Directive 23.
international agreements. Agreements binding under international law that facilitate defense and security cooperation with allied and partner nations and international organizations.
defense institution building. Defined in DoDD 5205.82.
SCOs. DoD organizations permanently located in foreign countries and assigned responsibilities for carrying out security cooperation management functions in accordance with Section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. SCOs may include military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, and Offices of Defense and Military Cooperation, designated to perform security cooperation functions. SCOs do not include units, formations, or other ad hoc organizations that conduct security cooperation activities, such as mobile training and education teams, or operational units.
senior defense official/defense attaché. The chief of mission’s principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, or the senior diplomatically accredited DoD military point of contact for all DoD matters involving the embassy or DoD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. The senior defense official/defense attaché in the U.S. Mission can be the defense attaché or the chief of the SCO, as designated by the Secretary of Defense.
security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is one element of security cooperation, which is funded and authorized by the Department of State and administered by the DSCA.
security cooperation. All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. This also includes DoD-administered security assistance programs.
security sector assistance. Defined in Presidential Policy Directive 23.
Yes legal precision – Title 10 of U.S. Code confirms the DoD definition
DoD 21 Defense Security Cooperation University, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, U.S. Department of Defense, “Chapter 1 Introduction to Security Cooperation,” Security Cooperation Management (aka DSCU Green Book), Edition 41.0, May 2021, https://www.dscu.edu/documents/publications/greenbook/01_Chapter.pdf /GoGreen!
Introduction
The term security cooperation was first introduced in 1997 by the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI). At that time, the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) already had day-to-day management responsibilities of many security assistance programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and the Armed Export Control Act (AECA). The DRI proposed that DSAA also manage certain Department of Defense (DoD)-funded international programs along with their personnel and associated resources. In order for U.S. government (USG) agencies, the private sector, and foreign governments to better understand DSAA’s enlarged mission and diverse functions beyond security assistance (SA), DoD re-designated DSAA as the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), effective 1 October 1998.
In recent years, DSCA has absorbed management responsibilities for many DoD international programs while also leading the wider USG security cooperation enterprise. However, many security cooperation programs continue to be managed by other elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the combatant commands (CCMDs), or the military departments (MILDEPs). Further complicating the management of security cooperation was the in-country point of contact between the USG and the host nation. This point of contact was either the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)- sponsored Defense Attaché Office (DAO) or the DSCA-sponsored Security Cooperation Office (SCO). These two spigots of security cooperation within a country required a broad knowledge and skill baseline of the very different international programs that are initiated, funded, and managed throughout the DoD, its agencies and the MILDEPs. Most disconnects regarding SCO-DAO coordination of in-country security cooperation were generally resolved with the establishment of the Senior Defense Officials/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT) having oversight over both the SCO and DAO organizations.
On 9 June 2004 that DoD published a formal, yet still very broad, definition of security cooperation in Joint Pub 1-02:
All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.
DODD 5132.03, DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, 29 December 2016, further defines security cooperation with assigned responsibilities:
All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. This includes DoD-administered security assistance programs.
According to Title 10 U.S. Code Section 301, the term “security cooperation programs and activities of the Department of Defense” means any program, activity (including an exercise), or interaction of the DoD with the security establishment of a foreign country to achieve a purpose as follows: (A) To build and develop allied and friendly security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations. (B) To provide the armed forces with access to the foreign country during peacetime or a contingency operation. (C) To build relationships that promote specific United States security interests. Other DoD policy statements identify DoD-managed or administered security assistance programs as components of security cooperation.
The purpose of this first chapter is to provide definitions of the various programs within security assistance and the broader area of security cooperation.
Most comprehensive independent review of both cooperation and assistance authorities agrees
GAO 17 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Building Partner Capacity: Inventory of Department of Defense Security Cooperation and Department of State Security Assistance Efforts,” GAO-17-255R, 3-24-2017, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-17-255r.pdf /GoGreen!
House Armed Services Committee Report 114-102, accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016 (H.R.1735), includes a provision for us to report on an inventory of DOD security cooperation programs intended to build partner security capabilities.3 DOD defines these programs as including DOD-administered State security assistance activities. According to DOD and State officials, no sanctioned U.S. government inventory of security cooperation and security assistance efforts exists.4 In this report, we provide a fiscal year 2016 inventory of DOD security cooperation and State security assistance efforts that may be used by the U.S. government to build foreign partners’ capacity to address security-related threats, including each effort’s name, description, associated legal authorities, and agency involvement as required by the associated authorities. This inventory includes efforts that have building partner capacity (BPC) to address security-related threats as a primary goal as well as efforts that may have BPC as an ancillary goal or effect.
[FOOTNOTE 4]
4 Various government and nongovernment entities have compiled lists of security cooperation efforts, including security assistance efforts administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), but none of the lists are sanctioned by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as both current and complete.
[/FOOTNOTE 4]
To develop an inventory of BPC security cooperation and security assistance efforts, we reviewed data, documents, and reports from DOD, State, RAND, and the Congressional Research Service (CRS); conducted searches of laws; and reviewed prior GAO reports. We interviewed DOD, State, RAND, and CRS officials about their research on, and listings of, security cooperation and security assistance efforts used for BPC and the efforts’ associated authorities; the methodologies they used; and the limitations they encountered. The efforts we selected for our inventory comprise what our sources referred to as “programs,” “subprograms,” “tools,” “funding accounts,” “authorities,” or “activities.” We used “efforts” as the most inclusive possible term, because the DOD and DOD-sponsored sources we consulted used undefined and varying terminology—for example, sometimes using terms such as “programs” and “activities” interchangeably and sometimes including funds and the names of authorities—and because these sources and DOD officials did not provide DOD-sanctioned definitions of the program and subprogram levels for security cooperation programs. We broadly defined building partner capacity to include efforts that were intended solely to build partner security capacity as well as those that could have a partial or ancillary effect on partner security capacity. For example, we included military exercises, training, and equipment as well as BPC-related personnel exchanges and military contacts. To focus our inventory on BPC efforts to address security-related threats, we excluded efforts whose sole purpose was humanitarian, health, disaster, or development assistance. To eliminate duplicative and expired efforts, we compared the data we obtained from these sources and reviewed associated authorities. We worked with DOD and State officials to resolve any discrepancies, to add additional efforts, and to group subefforts with overall efforts when the officials made such information available. See enclosure I for further information about our objective, scope, and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2015 to March 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Perm: Do Both – 2AC
Perm: do plan and the non-mutually-exclusive parts of the counterplan – “slippery slope” is a fallacy, NOT a link – fiat shields it
There’s no functional difference – especially if they include DoD implementation
Neptune 16 Neptune, veteran owned and operated strategy and advisory firm, “U.S. Security Cooperation Review,” February 2016, http://neptuneasc.com/site/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Neptune-Whole-of-Government-U.S.-Security-Cooperation-Review-20160208.pdf /GoGreen!
“Concurrence” vs. “Coordination.” The reality of the shift in authorities is more complex than a simple erosion of State’s traditional authority. The 1206 authority did provide Defense with a “train and equip” authority that had previously been a State responsibility under Title 22, but the 1206 authority did, as does the 2282 authority now, require State “concurrence” with the Defense-developed plan. So while the responsibility for the planning and programming has shifted to Defense, State also has a veto. In practice, this is not profoundly different than a State (Title 22) authority, such as FMS or IMET, which is implemented by DoD through DSCA. Previously, many DoD authorities had required either “coordination” or “consultation” with the State Department, which constituted a relatively weak requirement in practice, as those terms are poorly defined and could mean as little as a phone call notification. Concurrence, on the other hand, is a relatively formal requirement usually requiring written documentation. And the trend is toward joint, or “concurrence” authorities, where State has a stronger hand in the planning.
AT: NB – AT: Militarization Link
No net benefit – “militarization” is fake news – the structural irrelevance of diplomats in the face of technological change – NOT authority – is what matters
Quainton 18 Ambassador Anthony C. E. Quainton, Distinguished Diplomat in Residence at American University, “Militarization and Marginalization of American Diplomacy and Foreign Policy,” American Diplomacy, March 2018, https://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2018/03/militarization-and-marginalization-of-american-diplomacy-and-foreign-policy/ /GoGreen!
The issue of militarization of foreign policy is a common theme. One of the New York Times 100 notable books of 2016 was Rosa Brooks How Everything became War and the Military Became Everything. In the spring of 2016 Georgetown University Press published a collection of essays entitled Mission Creep designed to explore the Militarization of US Foreign Policy. As far back as 2003 Dana Priest, a journalist for the Washington Post, wrote a book entitled The Mission which asserted that American diplomacy was being outgunned by the military and that the United States was becoming increasingly dependent on the military to manage its role in world affairs. She claimed that “on (president Bill) Clinton’s watch the military slowly, without public scrutiny or debate came to surpass its civilian leaders in resources and influence around the world”. Specifically she identified the regional combatant commanders. (In Europe the Supreme Allied Commander Europe—SACEUR) as sources of increasing diplomatic influence. In the introduction to her book she assets that “U.S. leaders have been turning more and more to the military to solve problems that are often, at their root, political and economic.” This shift she argues “has been going on for more than a decade without much public discussion or debate.” Ms. Priest describes a world in which four star generals and admirals fly around the world in large jet aircraft, accompanied by substantial staffs to engage in diplomatic contacts not just with ministers of defense and force commanders but with heads of state and government as well. She asserts that they were eclipsing the role of hapless Ambassadors who lacked both resources and access.
It was and is still true that the Combatant Commanders have at their disposal substantial resources. They can offer foreign governments materiel, training and in some cases development assistance. They are also a remarkably well-educated and impressive group. Many have doctoral degrees. All have over thirty years of military service. They are not amateurs. In comparison, successive administrations of both political parties have regarded diplomacy as an amateur business, reflected in the fact that about a third of Ambassadors are appointed from outside the c

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