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2022 SDI Affirmative

Aff - Cyber Info Sharing - SDI 2022

Aff - Cyber Info Sharing - SDI 2022.docx

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SDI Starter Packet --- Cyber Info Sharing Aff
1AC
Contention 1: Resilience
Contention 1 is Resilience:
First --- NATO lacks sophisticated cyber threat information (CTI) sharing – this undermines cyber resilience
--- relies too much on technical data
--- excludes classified data
Daniel & Kenway 21 --- Michael Daniel President & CEO Cyber Threat Alliance & Joshua Kenway Cybersecurity Associate Cyber Threat Alliance, “Repairing the Foundation: How Cyber Threat Information Sharing Can Live Up to its Promise and Implications for NATO”, in “Cyber Threats and NATO 2030: Horizon Scanning and Analysis”, 12 Jan 2021, NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE (CCDOE) https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/cyber-threats-and-nato-2030-horizon-scanning-and-analysis(3724c535-e782-45cf-9272-046670e7100f).html
Information sharing has become such an overused but under-performing concept that the term tends to provoke eye rolls within the cyber security community. Yet, most practitioners and policymakers agree that better information sharing would improve defences against rapidly evolving cyber threats. Virtually every relevant panel, study, or review over the last 20 years has recommended increased information sharing as a key step in improving cyber security. The logical question is why information sharing has not increased. Its lack remains a barrier to better cyber security, whether within NATO or the broader digital ecosystem.
This chapter will identify three faulty assumptions that have prevented cyber threat information sharing from living up to its promise that cyber threat information consists primarily of technical data, that every organisation should consume this technical data, and that information sharing is easy. It then establishes a framework for updating the current approach to information sharing by distinguishing the characteristics and value of different threat information types, using relevance and comparative advantage as the basis for producing and consuming threat intelligence, addressing key barriers to information sharing, and identifying trust as a necessary component of effective information sharing. Finally, the chapter explores the implications of these changed assumptions for more effective information sharing, including within NATO’s information sharing ecosystem.
A. Technical Level Cyber Threat Information Sharing in NATO NATO adopted technical cyber threat information sharing early on through an instance of the open-source Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP) (NATO, 2013; MISP, 2020a), which the Alliance leverages to privately share information with member states, industry partners, and national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERT) (Schrooyen, 2017). NATO uses MISP for the exchange of classified technical information with tactical and operational value and information sharing with participating partners is filtered according to its classification level (Schrooyen, 2017). Using MISP only for classified technical information sharing limits its value because it restricts the number of potential partners and excludes other valuable types of strategic and operational information. Over-classification impedes information sharing, something which NATO has acknowledged (NATO, 2012).
NATO also maintains a best practice and threat information sharing relationship with EU-CERT (NATO, 2016) and is building an Industry Cyber Partnership (NICP) (NATO, 2020). These two programmes provide NATO with the foundation needed to meet the challenges of information sharing explored in this chapter. Key industry partners include Oracle (NATO, 2019a), RSA Security (NATO, 2017), FireEye (Fireye, 2016), Cisco (NATO, 2016), CY4GATE, Thales, Vodafone (NATO, 2018), BT, Minded Security, Lockheed-Martin, Fortinet, and Symantec (Schrooyen, 2017). The NICP has broad goals, including improvements to the sharing of best practices, expertise, experience, and information ‘including […] on threats and vulnerabilities’ (NATO, 2020).
In parallel, the Alliance’s efforts to operationalise a Cyber Security Collaboration Hub by 2023 (NATO, 2019b), which will allow member states ‘to quickly and securely share information with each other, and with the [Alliance]’ (NATO, 2019c), could address some of the challenges raised in this chapter. However, this chapter argues that NATO should shift its approach to information sharing to assume a leadership position in this area.
2. FAULTY ASSUMPTIONS: OVERPROMISING AND UNDERACHIEVING
Underlying the slow progress on information sharing are three faulty underlying assumptions: (1) cyber threat information consists primarily of technical data; (2) every organisation should be producing and consuming technical cyber information; and (3) sharing cyber threat information is easy.1 These fallacies are implicit, rather than explicit, and so have largely avoided critical review or academic assessment. Further, they have resulted in counter-productive policy, misaligned incentives, and ineffective cyber security. To address these shortcomings, different foundational assumptions are needed. In turn, using better assumptions can make information sharing a more effective tool against cyber threats.
A. Cyber Threat Information Consists Primarily of Technical Data
Within the cyber security community, the term ‘information sharing’ primarily refers to the exchange of technical data that identifies malicious activity such as malware and malicious domain names. While several scholars (Friedman et al., 2015; Chismon & Ruks, 2015) acknowledge that such exchanges should also include other types of information, the emphasis is on technical data in practice. For example, the main use cases or core functionalities associated, respectively, with the two commonly used cyber information sharing standards, Structured Threat Intelligence eXchange (STIX) and the Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP), focus on technical information (MITRE, 2012; MISP, 2020b). Cyber threat information sharing ‘primarily focus[es] on sharing of indicators of compromise’ (Sauerwein et al., 2017: p. 838), leading to a situation in which the activities of almost every established sharing platform are ‘comparable to data warehousing’ (ibid: p. 849). Many US government programmes and existing statutes either explicitly or implicitly focus on this type of information sharing; meanwhile, companies are investing billions of dollars in an effort to consume and analyse technical cyber threat information (Verified Market Research, 2020).2
The assumption that cyber threat information is equivalent or primarily composed of technical data severely limits the potential value of information sharing. Technical data, while necessary, is not the only form of information that can provide value. For example, a warning from the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that a specific Chinese cyber group is targeting a US company with cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property would be a useful piece of non-technical intelligence for that company. Written advisories about vulnerabilities and associated patches are critical to organisations using vulnerable software or hardware; in fact, such information is far more useful to most organisations than technical data on one of the many variations of the LockerGoGo malware. The most common interpretation of information is too narrow.
B. Every Organisation Should Produce and Consume Technical Data
If the underlying assumption is that information sharing means technical information, then it logically follows that most policies, infrastructure, and programmes for sharing are built around the idea that most organisations should produce and consume technical information. If everyone were to collect, share, and consume such data, the thinking goes, security would improve across the ecosystem. The problem with this logic is that most organisations are lousy at collecting, producing, and consuming technical data—and always will be. Most companies do not have the capability to identify a malware binary, analyse it, and use the resulting information, nor would they know how to handle a malicious domain name. As a practical matter, this situation will not change; no country will have enough cyber security professionals for every organisation to have this capacity. Small and medium businesses do not and will not have the resources to collect, process, share, and consume technical data regularly. This limitation does not mean such organisations would not benefit from cyber threat information sharing; rather they need different information.
Neither is this approach economically efficient. Most organisations do not need access to technical data in real-time. Despite the rapidly changing nature of cyber threats in a technical sense, for most organisations, cyber security requirements and best practices do not change much from day to day. In addition, not every business has in-house technical accounting or legal skills—why should cyber security be different? Current practice does not sufficiently differentiate between organisations in terms of what information they should share under what circumstances and how frequently.
C. Information Sharing is Easy
In January 2008, the US government started the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), formalising it in National Security Presidential Directive 54 / Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (The White House, 2010). ‘Connect the Centers,’ one of CNCI’s twelve lines of effort, focused on information sharing with the goal of linking the US government’s cyber centres into one common operating picture; over the long-term, it was intended to incorporate the private sector. Everyone assumed that this element would be the easiest to implement and the first to be completed. However, thirteen years later, this element is arguably one part of the CNCI vision that remains unrealised as the cyber security centres are not seamlessly connected and many silos remain stubbornly in place.
A similar situation has played out in the private sector with the creation of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs). The assumption was that companies would eagerly join these organisations, share what they knew and consume the information shared by others. Yet, more than twenty years after the concept was formalised into national legislation, many sectors are just now forming an ISAC and, even in the most successful of them, the percentage of participants that actively share information is widely understood within the industry to remain low.
Public sector efforts to share information with the private sector have suffered analogous problems. The US government created the Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) programme as a free service for general businesses, but few organisations have signed up and even fewer contribute to the programme (Marks, 2018). This is unsurprising if we look at what is being shared; a US government report from 2018 suggested that just two or three out of the 11,447 indicators submitted to AIS by the Department of Homeland Security were ‘malicious and related to cyber incidents [… while] many of the indicators received were false positives or redundant information’ (DHS Office of Inspector General, 2017: p. 15).
The three examples highlight that information sharing is difficult for a variety of reasons. Simply creating programmes and establishing sharing mechanisms is insufficient without addressing obstacles to sharing actionable information. These include underlying factors such as over-classification, reputational risk, and legal concerns, as well as operational hurdles around validation, standardisation, timeliness, and automation (Zibak & Simpson, 2019).
3. REBUILDING INFORMATION SHARING: NEW IMPERATIVES
These incorrect assumptions have undermined information sharing as an effective tool against cyber threats, yet policies, structures, and processes must be based on assumptions about the overall environment in order to function. As a replacement for the faulty assumptions explained above, this chapter proposes four alternative presumptions to enable effective information sharing. First, cyber threat information consists of multiple information types across different levels, with distinct value to different consumers, meaning that information sharing needs to be tailored and nuanced. Second, for this reason, relevance and comparative advantage should drive sharing activities. Third, effective information sharing efforts must overcome context-specific technical, economic, legal, and cultural barriers; and fourth, trust is a necessary component of information sharing. The rest of this section will explore these alternative presumptions in greater detail.
Second --- Cyber attacks are inevitable --- lack of resilience ensures they are successful --- killing millions and collapsing society --- increased situational awareness is key to mitigate harms
Conklin et al 17 --- William Arthur Conklin, Associate Professor and Director of the Center for Information Security Research and Education in the College of Technology at the University of Houston, & Dan Shoemaker, Professor and Director of the Masters of Science in Cyber Security Program at the Center for Cyber Security and Intelligence Studies, a NSA Center of Academic Excellence, at the University of Detroit (313) Mercy, & Anne Kohnke, College of Management, Lawrence Technological University, “Cyber Resilience: Rethinking Cybersecurity Strategy to Build a Cyber Resilient Architecture”, International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, 2017, https://www.proquest.com/docview/1897660614/fulltextPDF/FE6EBF8A132A40C1PQ/1?accountid=12598
Von Clausewitz might have lived through the Napoleonic wars, but he could just as well have been writing about the present state of affairs in cyberspace. The fact is that the multitude of threats that populate the virtual eco-system is so all-embracing that it is impossible to defend against every form of attack (Symantec, 2015). The unfortunate reality is that every system can eventually be compromised and no computer is safe. Furthermore, America's electronic infrastructure is so riddled with vulnerabilities and there are so many adversaries out there, that "cybersecurity" is a relative term indeed (Brasso, 2016).
Adversaries in cyberspace range from state-sponsored hackers to the professional perpetrators of cybercrime, to any person with a grudge and an internet link. Moreover, because of the proliferation of adversaries and the inescapable vulnerability of the U.S. critical infrastructure, cyberattacks on its various elements are a daily fact of life. For instance, the Industrial Control Systems-Computer Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) reports that the U.S. industrial control systems were attacked at least 245 times over a 12-month period (OAS, 2015). In other parts of the world, a 2015 attack on Ukraine's power grid left 700,000 people without electricity for several hours [Brasso, 2016). And the perpetrators of the Ukrainian attack were observed conducting similar attacks against the U.S. energy sector (Brasso, 2016). Though there was never any actual disruption, many experts believe that those exploits were a reconnaissance for future moves on the U.S. infrastructure (Brasso, 2016). So they are still out there.
The reason why this topic is so worrisome is that a successful digital Pearl Harbor type cyberattack on the electrical infrastructure would leave the U.S. cloaked in darkness, with its people unable to communicate with each other and without any form of twenty-first century transport. It would likely kill many thousands of citizens, perhaps millions, either through civil unrest, failure of public systems, or mass starvation (Brasso, 2016). This could be the foreseeable situation if hackers successfully shut down the U.S. power grid. Consequently, in the larger sense, the key question is, "Could a catastrophic cyberattack in the U.S. infrastructure ever occur? The National Security Agency's former Director, Mike Rodgers, made his own evaluation of the possibility of a successful attack against critical infrastructure when he said; "It's a matter of, when, not if" (Smith, 2014).
To illustrate the reason why something as unthinkable as a digital Pearl Harbor could happen, the non-profit Privacy Rights Clearinghouse reports that we have lost over one BILLION records over the past decade and these are just the losses that were REPORTED. Since most companies do not like to publicize their security failures that number could be, and probably is, much higher. The running average of 100 million records lost per year has been subject to some variation overtime and the source of breaches has changed in common-sense ways as the technology has evolved. Nonetheless, the number of reported incidents rose annually from 108 in 2005, to 607 in 2013 (PRC, 2015). The important point to note is that while losses have increased at a rate of fifty-percent per year over the same period corporate budgets for security have increased at the rate of fifty-one percent (Symantec, 2014).
Consequently, it is probably safe to say that cyberattacks are going to happen, no matter how much money we throw at the problem. At the same time, notwithstanding the clear recognition of the disastrous nature of a successful cyberattack, none of the industries in our current national infrastructure have developed an effective standard strategy to protect themselves (Brasso, 2016). This includes the Chemical Sector; Commercial Facilities: Communications; Dams; the Defense Industrial Base; Emergency Services; Energy: Financial Services; Food and Agriculture; Government Facilities; Healthcare and Public Health; Information Technology; Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste; Transportation; and Water and Wastewater Systems (PPD-21, 2013, p.2).
So, what we are suggesting here is that the paradigm we adopted long before the internet needs to be seriously rethought. Right now, we secure systems at the logical points of access. Even defense-in-depth, which is the modern doctrine for doing that, simply involves several increasingly rigorous perimeters. Instead of throwing our resources into defending the system at all points of attack, perhaps we should devise ways to ensure that the system assets that we cannot afford to lose are unconditionally protected. In concept, this strategy would narrow the attack surface to the point where absolute assurance within available resources could be guaranteed, while reducing the impact and recovery time of non-essential assets. This selective versus universal approach to security is what sums up the difference between a cyberresilient strategy, and one that is based on cybersecurity.
2. Cyber resilience versus cybersecurity
It is important to make a distinction between present ideas about cybersecurity and the approach we are suggesting. Cyber resilience is a much narrower strategic vision than the more diffuse activities that fall under the generic heading of "cybersecurity." At its heart, cybersecurity ensures against unknown, or unwanted penetrations of protected space. In that respect, a cybersecurity solution deploys a comprehensive set of defenses to ensure against unauthorized access to protected objects, either from external or internal sources. To accomplish its mission, cybersecurity deploys a targeted set of protection measures at all viable points of entry, along with the appropriate detection mechanisms to respond to known forms of unauthorized access. Whereas, cyber resilience attempts to create a security architecture that will ensure the continuous effective functioning of just the organization's core functionality.
Thus, cybersecurity focuses on access control, while cyber-resilience focuses on identifying and securing just those assets that the organization can't live without. In many respects, the cyber-resilience concept is comparable to lo

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