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2022 SDI Counterplan

AT - Bilateral CP - SDI 2022

AT - Bilateral CP - SDI 2022.docx

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AFF AT: Bilateral CP
Perm: Do CP – 2AC
Perm: do counterplan
“With” only requires association, not participation
Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, No Date, “With,” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/with /GoGreen!
Definition of with
1 a: in opposition to : AGAINST
had a fight with his brother
b: so as to be separated or detached from
broke with her family
2 a—used as a function word to indicate a participant in an action, transaction, or arrangement
works with his father
a talk with a friend
got into an accident with the car
b—used as a function word to indicate the object of attention, behavior, or feeling
get tough with him
angry with her
c: in respect to : so far as concerns
on friendly terms with all nations
“NATO” refers to member countries – the “North Atlantic Council” is the institution
Masters 22 Jonathan Masters, Deputy Managing Editor, Council on Foreign Relations, MA social theory, the New School, BA political science, Emory University, “What Is NATO?” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, last updated 5-4-2022, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-nato /GoGreen!
Established during the Cold War, NATO is a transatlantic security alliance composed of thirty member countries, including the United States.
NATO has focused on deterring Russian aggression in recent years, but it has also conducted security operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and Somalia.
Amid Russia’s 2022 offensive in Ukraine, many NATO allies are providing Kyiv with extraordinary quantities of military supplies, and the alliance could expand to include Finland and Sweden.
Introduction
Founded in 1949 as a bulwark against Soviet aggression, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains the pillar of U.S.-Europe military cooperation. An expanding bloc of NATO allies has taken on a broad range of missions since the close of the Cold War, many well beyond the Euro-Atlantic region, in countries such as Afghanistan and Libya.
Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, a nonmember, in early 2022 has shaken Europe’s security architecture and prompted a major reevaluation of NATO members’ foreign policies and defense commitments. The threat from Russia has generated the greatest tensions with the alliance in the post-Cold War era. It is driving up defense spending and pushing some longtime NATO partners, namely Finland and Sweden, to seek formal membership, which would mark another historic expansion of the alliance.
A Post–Cold War Pivot
After the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, Western leaders intensely debated the direction of the transatlantic alliance. Some in the Bill Clinton administration initially opposed expanding NATO, wary it would upset relations with President Boris Yeltsin’s fragile government in Russia and complicate other U.S. foreign policy objectives, such as nuclear arms control. Others favored expansion as a way to extend NATO’s security umbrella to the east and consolidate democratic gains in the former Soviet bloc.
European members were also split on the issue. The United Kingdom feared NATO’s expansion would dilute the alliance, while France believed it would give NATO (and the United States) too much influence. Paris hoped to integrate former Soviet states via European institutions.
As a first step, Clinton chose to develop a new NATO initiative called the Partnership for Peace (PfP), which would be open to all former Warsaw Pact members, as well as non-European countries. Seeing this nonmembership framework as a means to allay some of Russia’s concerns about alliance expansion, NATO launched PfP at its annual summit in 1994. More than two dozen countries, including Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine, joined in the following months.
However, Clinton soon began speaking publicly [PDF] about expanding NATO’s membership, saying in the Czech Republic just days after the launch of PfP that “the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members but when and how.” Yeltsin warned Western leaders at a conference later that year that “Europe, even before it has managed to shrug off the legacy of the Cold War, is risking encumbering itself with a cold peace.”
Beyond Collective Defense
Many U.S. officials felt that a post–Cold War vision for NATO needed to look beyond its core defense commitments—Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty states that “an armed attack against one or more [member states] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”—and focus on confronting challenges outside its membership. “The common denominator of all the new security problems in Europe is that they all lie beyond NATO’s current borders,” said influential U.S. Senator Richard Lugar in a 1993 speech.
The breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and the onset of ethnic conflict tested the alliance on this point almost immediately. What began as a mission to impose a UN-sanctioned no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina evolved into a bombing campaign on Bosnian Serb forces that many military analysts say was essential to ending the conflict. In April 1994, during Operation Deny Flight, NATO conducted its first combat operations in its forty-year history, shooting down four Bosnian Serb aircraft.
NATO's Structure
Headquartered in Brussels, NATO is a consensus-based alliance in which decisions must be unanimous. However, individual states or subgroups of allies can initiate action outside NATO’s auspices. For instance, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom began policing a UN-sanctioned no-fly zone in Libya in early 2011 and, within days, transferred command of the operation to NATO once Turkey’s concerns had been allayed. Member states are not required to participate in every NATO operation; Germany and Poland declined to contribute directly to the campaign in Libya.
NATO’s military structure comprises two strategic commands: the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, located near Mons, Belgium, and the Allied Command Transformation, located in Norfolk, Virginia. The supreme allied commander Europe oversees all NATO military operations and is always a U.S. flag or general officer; U.S. Air Force General Tod D. Wolters currently holds this position. Although the alliance has an integrated command, most forces remain under their respective national authorities until NATO operations commence.
NATO’s secretary-general, Norwegian politician Jens Stoltenberg, is serving a second four-year term as the bloc’s chief administrator and international envoy. However, NATO leaders extended his service for one additional year (until September 2023) amid the war in Ukraine. The alliance’s principal political body is the North Atlantic Council, which is composed of high-level delegates from each member state.
Perm: Do CP – 1AR
It’s a group of countries
Jacobson 12 Alice Jacobson, member of Task Force 2012, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, “Human Rights Watch & the Arab Spring,” Chapter 13.3, Can NATO React to the Arab Spring? Democracy, Human Rights, & the Rule of Law, 2-27-2012, https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/19668/J+Jones+Task+Force+Final+Report.pdf?sequence=1 /GoGreen!
Human rights violations as outlined in broad terms in the 2011 World Report, and pressure from organizations such as Human Rights Watch most certainly add to the international pressure on NATO to intervene. This has led to the discovery that military power may not be a useful instrument in dealing with specific country by country issues in the region. NATO is a group of democratic countries who in turn each have an individual agenda when dealing in the Middle East and North Africa, and are tied to the region by their oil dependency; but protection of human rights as justification for military intervention must be across the board or not at all. Military intervention in Libya was completed swiftly based largely on the economic incentives of NATO’s democratic powers, whereas in Syria, NATO has been immobilized as more people die everyday.
Contextual use proves
Alanis 22 Kaitlyn Alanis, McClatchy National Real-Time Reporter, graduate in journalism and agricultural communications, Kansas State University, “What is NATO, and what role will it play in Russia’s attack on Ukraine? 5 facts to know,” Miami Herald, 2-25-2022, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/article258743163.html /GoGreen!
WHAT IS NATO?
NATO is a group of 30 member countries that agree to work together to ensure the security of the Northern Atlantic area.
“NATO’s purpose is to guarantee the freedom and security of its members through political and military means,” according to its website. Politically, the alliance promotes democracy, and it allows its members to “consult and cooperate on defence and security-related issues to solve problems, build trust and, in the long run, prevent conflict.”
Perm: Do Both – 2AC
Perm: do both – plan’s just an offer, choice shields the net benefit
Counterplan alone does NOT spill-up – it collapses NATO – perm solves
--MDC = multinational defense cooperation
Németh 14 Bence Németh, Teaching fellow in the Defence Studies Department, King's College London, “Why won't Europeans use NATO and the EU?” Friends of Europe, 3-19-2014, https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/why-wont-europeans-use-nato-and-the-eu/ /GoGreen!
Although regional MDCs have been proliferating and strengthening in Europe, they remain fragile and this fragility will have a significant impact on the landscape of European defence. The weakness of regional MDCs is that they are driven mostly by national Ministries of Defence and do not have a well-grounded, strategically sophisticated background for collaboration. Countries often co-operate on defence issues without defining their common foreign policy goals. This can undermine the raison d’être of defence cooperation, even in the short-term, and cause significant problems in situations where participating states of regional MDCs are divided on the necessity of military action.
Another difficulty for sub-regional MDCs is that although they face financial pressure to find multinational partners to mitigate the capability decline of European armed forces, they cannot develop these collaborations without significant political and social support. These problems of regional MDCs may have a negative impact on defence co-operation in NATO and the EU as well, because Ministries of Defence will be even less inclined to work together in large organisations if they cannot even succeed in smaller frameworks. However, if these difficulties can be overcome by certain regional MDCs, the participating states will have to bring their foreign policy goals closer to underpin their co-operation. Accordingly, emerging regional blocs may become more assertive in achieving their goals, and thus regional solidarity could replace transatlantic or pan-European solidarity in more and more cases. This may undermine the relevance of NATO and the EU, and result in a much weaker EU.
To avoid these outcomes, NATO and the EU have to pay more attention to the regional MDCs and must attempt to channel the results of regional MDCs into their processes as much as possible. NATO has a comparative advantage in this regard, as it possesses a much more sophisticated and effective defence planning system (NATO Defence Planning Process – NDPP) than the EU. The NDPP is not perfect, but it provides a flexible enough instrument to tackle multinational military collaborations as it has already done with multinational projects in the framework of the Smart Defence initiative.
NATO should therefore, via its NDPP, support and embed the projects of regional MDCs into its own processes and ensure that MDCs work to fulfil NATO commitments and contribute to the Level of Ambition of the Alliance. This way NATO could mitigate the chance of the development of regional interests in Europe and at the same time provide political impetus for regional MDCs to overcome the hardships of day-to-day practical collaboration.
For the last several years NATO and the EU have tried to push together countries ‘artificially’ to make them co-operate on certain capability areas. Yet, European nations created and reenergised regional MDCs. Thus, NATO should look to its other options and rather follow the ‘organic’ evolution of European military collaborations and channel that into its defence planning process.
Perm: Do Both – 1AR
CP alone trades off with NATO – whether it solves or not
--MDC = multinational defense cooperation
Németh 14 Bence Németh, Teaching fellow in the Defence Studies Department, King's College London, “Why won't Europeans use NATO and the EU?” Friends of Europe, 3-19-2014, https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/why-wont-europeans-use-nato-and-the-eu/ /GoGreen!
Instead of using NATO and EU institutional frameworks, European nations have recently established a series of new regional ‘multinational defence co-operations’ (MDCs) and reenergised old ones. Although policymakers and analysts support all kinds of defence co-operation, they have not taken into consideration the negative consequences of unstructured defence collaborations. For instance, if the emerging regional MDCs do not prove successful, they will hinder defence co-operation in Europe in general, including within NATO and the EU, as nations become even less willing to work with larger organisations where co-operation is slower and more complicated.
However, if these MDCs succeed, they are likely to create common views and interests among regional partners on defence issues, thereby strengthening regional bodies and weakening transatlantic ties and pan-European solidarity. Thus, NATO and the EU should revise their policies which attempt to foster defence co-operation based exclusively on common military capability requirements, and should instead focus on exploiting the changing European defence co-operation landscape by channelling regional MDCs into their planning systems.
Perception of using bilats to circumvent NATO snowballs
Tylaz 22 Tylaz, Professional News Platform, “Why does Russia not simply invade Ukraine and need to build a pretext?” Tylaz, 2-18-2022, https://www.tylaz.net/2022/02/18/why-does-russia-not-simply-invade-ukraine-and-need-to-build-a-pretext/ /GoGreen!
How to “read” the Russian reference to the missile shield
Of course, in what Moscow proposes here, Romania is included – we can read the anti-missile shield between the lines quite obviously. And not because the Americans would like to withdraw it – it is an American-Romanian project, but it has been assimilated and legitimized by NATO decisions. Let it be clear, it is a NATO project, it is not a bilateral agreement, as I heard from a party in Romania, that we kissed the ring of the Americans in 2013 (allusion to Călin Georgescu, honorary president of AUR – no. ).
Here the issue is very clear: Vladimir Putin does not want to discuss arms control with the Americans, but political issues. Political issues, Americans say, are discussed in NATO, not bilaterally. Because if it is discussed bilaterally, in practice, the North Atlantic Organization, in one form or another, falls into disuse.
AT: Spill-Up
NO spill-up – YES trade-off – it’s a serious threat to NATO broadly
Donaghy 16 Aaron Donaghy, Visiting Scholar 2016-2017 & EU Marie Curie Global Fellow, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, “Panel 3: Europe’s Security and Foreign Policy Challenges,” Summit on the Future of Europe 2016, Europe and the Forces of Disunion, Executive Summary, 2016, https://ces.fas.harvard.edu/uploads/files/Event-Papers/Summit-2016-Executive-Summary-Final.pdf /GoGreen!
Rawi Abdelal, Herbert F. Johnson Professor of International Management at Harvard Business School and Director of Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, warned of the trend towards bilateralism at the expense of multilateralism. The ability of European institutions to multilateralize challenges was one of the foundations of its long history of success. Now, however, there is an increasing danger of the United States negotiating bilaterally rather than on collective terms (e.g. defense and trade arrangements), bypassing Brussels in the process. The spread of bilateralism is a growing threat to transatlantic security cooperation, particularly in lieu of recent Russian activities in what it sees as its sphere of influence. Abdelal points out, however, that Russia also has its weaknesses. Chief among them is its heavy dependence on the European market. He cites the example of Gazprom, the state-run gas company, whose supply of fuels to Europe provides Russia with roughly two-thirds of its government revenue.
Isolated instances of policy “uploading” does NOT equate to solvency at the level of the plan – “uploads” have been empirically superficial and strategically useless to NATO
Arts 21 Sophie Arts, senior program coordinator for security and defense policy, German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Steven Keil, fellow for security and defense policy and future of geopolitics, German Marshall Fund of the United States; “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships,” GMF Policy Paper, February 2021, https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/Arts%2520%2526%2520Keil%2520-%2520NATO%2520partnerships%2520formats.pdf /GoGreen!
Despite this impressive list, NATO’s partnership mechanisms are not currently achieving their full potential and are due for a rethink. Many major issues are being neglected. This is not to say that partners no longer play a role in NATO’s operations and priorities. On the contrary, some—such as Sweden and Finland— are about as closely integrated in NATO’s planning as they could possibly be short of membership. But, as is also true with Georgia and Ukraine, most of these activities take place in bilateral or trilateral formats, although these countries are also part of other, larger partnership frameworks.
This reality reveals some flaws in NATO’s partnership policy. There are not only redundancies, but many of the broader frameworks have lost momentum and purpose. Many formats lack clear processes and goals, lumping together diverse groups of nations that have very different hopes and expectations in how they engage with NATO. In addition, formats like the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which aim to catalyze broader cooperation beyond the traditional Euro-Atlantic area, continue to fall short of their intended purpose and lack a clear agenda for the future. While these frameworks demonstrate their usefulness by building political ties and space for dialogue, they are less effective when it comes to driving actual outcomes that benefit NATO’s interests or strategy, or those of its partner countries.
AT: NB – Cohesion – 2AC
Net benefit’s backwards – perception alone tanks cohesion
Economist 3 “European defence: Divide and fall,” The Economist, 10-23-2003, https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/2155692-recklessness-both-sides-atlantic-threatening-undermine-nato-divide-and-fall /GoGreen!
Are Europe and America having doubts about their decades-long habits of common defence? America's ambassador to NATO darkly describes the current spat between NATO and the European Union (and for that matter within the EU itself), over what military things Europeans might plot to do together and where they might plot them, as “one of the greatest dangers to the transatlantic relationship”. France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, who started the quarrel by announcing that the EU should build its own operational-planning headquarters in Tervuren, a previously inoffensive suburb of Brussels, claim that causing a rift in the alliance could not be further from their minds. But more is at stake than bricks and mortar. How the row is settled will affect the way Europe and America can work together in the future.
They have supposedly already agr

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