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2022 SDI Affirmative

Aff - Emerging Tech Innovation - SDI 2022

Aff - Emerging Tech Innovation - SDI 2022.docx

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Emerging Tech Innovation Aff
Notes
Explanation
This is an affirmative case that proposes increased U.S. security cooperation with NATO over emerging technology innovation. The plan proposes that the U.S. strengthen NATO’s defense innovation hubs and research and development in AI, biotech, and cybersecurity. Specifically, it calls for the U.S. to increase its support of and participation in NATO’s Innovation Fund and Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA).
There are two advantages: RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) and Alliance Fragmentation. The RMA advantage claims that the plan is necessary to maintain NATO’s military superiority over its adversaries. This is critical to prevent great power war, deter Russia, and de-escalate global hotspots.
The Alliance Fragmentation advantage claims that U.S. support for the NIF and DIANA is crucial to integrate the various allied defense innovation ecosystems. This is crucial to effectively counterbalance China because it unites the U.S.’s European and Asia-Pacific allies and bolsters their military capabilities.
This case has strong “U.S. key,” “NATO key,” and “U.S. security cooperation key” advantages. NATO is already moving ahead with its NIF and DIANA, but U.S. support has so far been only pro forma and perfunctory. The affirmative can therefore argue that the status quo links to generic “NATO Bad” and “NIF/DIANA Bad” DAs, but that the plan is crucial to solve the advantages.
User’s Guide
This file includes two versions of the 1AC: an intentionally overhighlighted version and a more appropriately highlighted version. Time permitting, students should use the intentionally overhighlighted version as the basis for constructing their own version of the 1AC. During this process, students should remove redundant highlighting, improving highlighting efficiency, and revise tags to better suit their linguistic and stylistic preferences. Redundant or repetitive cards can also be removed from the 1AC for time purposes.
Backline materials to respond to the arguments in the negative file are organized by argument name. The “AT: CPs (General)” section includes materials that are useful against many counterplans, including the four specific counterplans in the case negative file.
There are significant interactions between this case and the other packet cases (about AI and cybersecurity). This affirmative could credibly claim to solve some/most of the advantages in those affirmative files, too. For the purposes of the camp tournament, your instructors will promulgate a set of rules/guidelines for what is allowed and what is not.
1AC (Overhighlighted)
1AC — RMA Advantage
Contention One: RMA
Emerging and disruptive technology (EDT) is creating a new Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), but NATO has been slow to adapt — this will decimate its technological superiority.
Havránek and Bagge 21 — Jan Havránek, Deputy Minister of Defense of the Czech Republic, former Policy Adviser at the Policy Planning Unit at the Office of the NATO Secretary General, holds an M.A. in International Relations from Tufts University, and Daniel P. Bagge, Independent Specialist in Emerging and Disruptive Technology, former Cyber Attaché of the Czech Republic to the United States, former Director of Cyber Security Policies in the National Cyber and Information Security of the Czech Republic, former Member of the Cyber Security Strategy Expert Group at the European Union, holds an M.A. in International Relations and National Security Studies from the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (Germany) and Bundeswehr University Munich (Germany), 2021 (“Technology Adoption: Are we too late to the party?,” Small Wars Journal, July 18th, Available Online at https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/technology-adoption-are-we-too-late-party, Accessed 07-12-2022)
Introduction
NATO and the West are experiencing a reversed kind of revolution in military affairs (RMA) with new technologies bearing far-reaching implications beyond the conduct of war. Past revolutions in military spilled from the battlefield to the civilian sector. They had an effect either by directly impacting the result of a given conflict or through adoption of military technical advantages in non-military aspects of life. Today, we see an opposite trend brought by the private and non-military, non-governmental actors. In their everyday lives, general publics and governments alike face military-grade technologies developed and applied by the commercial sector. And it is the private sector that enjoys exclusivity over these technologies while the military lags behind.
How information is gathered, processed, analysed, communicated, distributed, and utilized has always underlined military planning and assumptions for success in conflict. For example, the reconnaissance strike complex introduced by the Soviets was based on real-time intelligence gathering and underpinned by automated systems and fast data processing. Similarly, NATO’s deep attack concept assumed that commanders “would be given the automated assessment means necessary to rapidly analyse the enemy’s force array.”[1] Such concepts, however innovative and tech-based, assumed a relatively limited amount of data and relied heavily on the human factor. Today, in the era of cloud computing and artificial intelligence, there is a clear shift towards sensor-centric, automated processing. Reconnaissance and analysis are becoming as important as firepower and kinetic effects. Humans are being pushed out from the decision-making due to the quantity of information gathered/coming from the battlefield. The hyper-speed warfare (or the “hyper war,” a term linking the intensity of conflict with cybernetics) risks making the human factor almost obsolete. To a certain extent, human presence in the loop will consequently become more a question of morality and less of efficacy.
None of this is science fiction, as modern technologies enabling hyper war already exist. The question for NATO and the West is not whether they choose to adopt these technologies but how they should adopt them to their benefit.
The situation is even more complicated if we consider the myriad of actors involved in international security. In the past, timing and accuracy of decision-making depended on a system designed by the state, was utilized on the state level, and made for the state’s purpose. Today, external entities such as corporations, non-state actors, groups of citizens and individuals matter as well. They hold the power and the technological means to exercise significant pressure over state affairs. Some even have the ability to largely cripple the functioning of governments and state services.
This development poses a significant challenge to NATO’s ability to deliver on its core tasks. If the Alliance wants to successfully continue its political-military adaptation, it will need a new approach to decision-making, operational planning, and crisis management.
This article addresses some of the key issues the Alliance needs to consider as it navigates through the new kind of revolution in military affairs: 1) the changing character of warfare; 2) the domination of the private sector over the military in the deployment of commercial technology with military potential; 3) and the interdependence of decision-making and modern technology.
The Changed Nature of Warfare
Modern technologies are changing the nature of warfare, as they have throughout the human history. In many instances, introduction of new weaponry constituted for a tactical advantage on the battlefield, occasionally reaching a strategic-level impact. An example of that can be the introduction of the British longbow at the Battle of Agincourt. Other technologies changed profoundly how militaries operate and wage war. Among such examples are railroads, telegraph, radar, combustion engine, jet engine, or radio frequencies-based communication equipment. The revolutionary nature of these technologies usually brings about significant changes in defence planning, command and control, and force organization.
For any institution, be it a nation state, a large bureaucracy, or an international alliance such as NATO, the ability to adopt disruptive technologies is key. The adoption usually leads to a larger structural adaptation: The use of standardized calibres in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars allowed for greater flexibility and uniformity of the French forces. The first use of Marconi’s wireless telegraphy by the British armed forces in the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) changed the way how military communicated. The use of railroads in the 19th century wars had a strategic effect on the mobility and supply of forces. Finally, the deployment of radar technology during World War 2 improved both defensive and offensive capacities of the militaries, and, as a result, probably saved thousands of lives. In all these instances, the military advancement of technologies spilled over to the civilian side as well.
In the past five decades, military science theorists have been dealing with the evolution in warfare in more detail. Although the main focus was dedicated to the then-ongoing Cold War, scholars from the field made a number of predictions that have proven to be correct. They correctly understood that technological advancement was gaining momentum and that the upcoming changes were not going be evolutionary but would come in leaps.[2]
Three concepts also emerged from this thinking: military technical revolution (MTR), revolution in military affairs (RMA), and military revolution (MR). Even though they stand individually, all three concepts are closely interconnected. For example, technology or a weapon platform that has reached the level of military technical revolution can, in the end, reach the level of military revolution as long as it constitutes considerable changes to organizational structure and operational art. In several cases, the MTR, RMA and MR are seen as one concept altogether.[3]
Military Technical Revolution, Revolution in Military Affairs, and Military Revolution
An event has to meet several conditions to qualify as a MTR/RMA/MR. A revolution is defined by a profound change in military systems, operational art, and organizational adjustment. Simple introduction of new technology or military platform does not constitute an MTR.
As Andrew F. Krepinevich, a defence policy analyst, writes,[4] a real-world example of military technical revolution can be unmanned combat vehicles and their role in conducting combat and ISR operations. Another example are cyber defence/offense oriented forces that fulfil the following criteria: technological change—introduction of new military platforms; evolution of military systems; operational innovation (e.g., cyberspace defence planning); or organizational adaptation impacting force structure and organizational units.
A military revolution in effect alters the way in which power is projected. Apart from changing the shape and form of warfare, it spills over from the military organizational structures and battlefields into societal, economic, and political domains.
The above-mentioned enablers of military revolution, such as artificial intelligence and quantum technology applications, show promising potential in changing the current societal fabric and effectively impacting societal, political, and military affairs.
Among the decisive factors, universal to all combat operations, is time. As the pace of technological advancement increases, the potential effects of a technology are no longer the most important factor. Equally important is the pace of adaption: how fast a technology can be utilized and how it recalibrates the relation between action and reaction. As time remains of immense importance, the ability to share information and move forces around based on that information can be the decisive factor in conflict. The speed of information sharing can thus be considered a military revolution.[5] The introduction of combustion engines and the changes it brought to operational art, manoeuvring, and transport of forces, changed the time factor. Unparalleled sensory awareness, communication, and automation have the same potential.
Consequently, time available for decision-making will continue to shrink. Decision makers will have to be equipped with information and intelligence as accurate as possible. The “speed of information” will be critical to provide political guidance to commanders or even to conduct a pre-emptive strike. There may be instances when the pace of combat operations will increase to a threshold where defensive action will be rendered useless.[6] Technology that can process this “speed of information” will affect the entire decision-making algorithm and broader perception of security and defence in society.
Militarization of Technology and the Role of Private Sector
The 21st century introduced an unparalleled speed of innovation and dissemination of (digital) technology among the general population and the private sector. It also hindered states’ ability to remain the sole proprietor of military grade applications. This is due to an unprecedented redistribution of applied research from the government level towards the private sector. Today, private entities commercialize disruptive technologies and provide them directly to the customers, unleashing military level applications into the wild. The governments, namely national security and defence domains are lagging behind in adoption of innovative technologies. This is evident from the spending on military research and development, which is dim in comparison to its private sector equivalents.[7] For example, in 2004, the global spending on civilian research and development was approximately ten times as large as global military research and development.[8]
Emerging disruptive technologies are thus becoming more accessible. The interdependency between state instruments of power (including armed forces) and civilian technology is growing and is expected to grow even further. In the past, military platforms were developed by the private sector, but their sole purpose was defined by the military. Today’s world brings the challenge of dual-use technology that is researched, manufactured, and provided entirely by the private sector, while having military application. Which effectively impacts the competitiveness on the battlefield. With facial recognition, targeting, and other artificial intelligence-powered applications (including micro targeting on social networks), the interest of the private sector and state actors overlap and are often blurred. It is common for state actors to be dependent on private sector providers. Sometimes to the extent where the government is unable to adjust the technologies’ conditions for its purposes, as the usual customer base lies in the civilian business world.
The rise of corporations and digital tycoons brought about democratization of technologies and their global spread in an unprecedented speed, resulting in a digital interdependency. States have been replaced by private entities who hold the keys to information flow and disruptive technologies. These technologies are often introduced to the general public sooner than the governmental bodies even have a chance to understand them.
Technological superiority has always played a significant role in international relations. It usually derived from the use of force and was traditionally in the hands of the state. In the past few decades, non-state entities started surpassing the state’s control. Technology provided by corporations paired with ideology and strategic interests of various state actors. However, state actors were not equipped with proper organizational structures and decision-making processes to stay up to date. As result, they have been left behind not to lead, but to react to technological progress and innovations.
Quantum research on sensors[9] can be an example of the private sector’s success. Non-state actors currently both employ the leading scientists in the field and conduct research in cooperation with competing state interests. All that despite the efforts of the governmental bodies and the military to fund innovative research.[10] This substantially increases the prospects of quantum related applications being provided to the general population before they are utilized by the military, leading to a loss in competitiveness on the battlefield.
The issue is caused by the inability of governmental entities to appreciate the need to conduct basic and applied research competitively with the private sector. In order for it to be done correctly, it would require a substantial organizational change and the ability to understand the potential impacts of disruptive technologies. That is also necessary for proper resource allocation. Modern and disruptive technologies are part of the non-conventional military risks and destabilizing efforts that governmental structures fail to address. A number of technological platforms, social networks, and digital enablers have become tools of digital deceit. They have been used to target the general population, which was unaware of being exposed to hybrid tactics and military grade influence operations.[11] This was enabled by overlaps of influence-operation techniques from the military field into the private sector. Private companies also applied these techniques in target group advertising.
This is not the first time the West has had to deal with ideological competitors trying to gain supremacy. The Cold War was about both ideology and technology, with the stark example of Operation Farewell.[12] Even then, technological superiority was meant to promote ideological and strategic interests. The combination of ideology and technology continued to be a factor in the post-Cold War world. An example of that can be terrorist organizations and their use of basic available technology. The situation in 2021 is, however, starkly different from the 1980’s or the 2000s for a number of reasons:
* As argued earlier, the character of warfare has changed profoundly; technologically driven warfare has entered the soft power arena.
* The pace of military operations and general interactions has increased— he human capacity is now limited not only by the speed of events but also by the amount of information collected, processed, and analysed from the battlefield. The ISR platforms are collecting so much data and raw intelligence that it is necessary to automate processes previously not constrained by human capacity or reaction speed demands. The changes pushing the limits of human operators and analysts happen in leaps and are fast paced.
* What is more: private sector capacities play a significant role in international power competition. Technological tycoons represent stand-alone actors risen on the wealth and influence of the technology they provide. They have also become the tools of state influence. Understanding this shift is hard, as we tend to differentiate between private entities, corporations with presence on the global markets, and state actors. However, in many cases, the private corporations are bound by national legislation, hiding as agents of influence in plain sight.
* As a result, we see traditional technological powers (the West, led by the United States, with Europe lagging behind) and democratic tech tycoons, including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, capitalizing on the asymmetry provided by modern technologies. While China, Russia, and India aspire to supersede them, this aspiration is evident from both their official policies and their investment in new technologies and defence modernization. What started as mainly intellectual property transfer and theft[13] has now turned into a full-fledged technological adoption race.[14]
Implications for NATO
So where does all this leave NATO? In 2021,

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