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2022 SDI Counterplan

CP - Dept of State Simplified - SDI 2022

CP - Dept of State Simplified - SDI 2022.docx

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NEG CP—DoS SA—Simplified Version
1NCs
1NC – DoD PIC
Counterplan:
Without increasing its security cooperation,
the United States federal government should substantially increase Department of State security assistance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in one or more of the following areas: artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cybersecurity,
and reform and resource the Department of State, adapting best practices from the Department of Defense.
It competes – plan’s under DoD authority
Gwinn 22 Jeremy Gwinn, U.S. Army infantry officer currently in the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq, multiple tours in Afghanistan and Iraq conducting counter-insurgency and security force assistance as well as teaching economics in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point, PhD international relations, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, “Sweeter Carrots and Harder Sticks: Rethinking U.S. Security Assistance,” War On The Rocks, 4-19-2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/sweeter-carrots-and-harder-sticks-rethinking-u-s-security-assistance/ /GoGreen!
The What, Why, and How of Security Assistance
“Security assistance” refers to a specific set of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act. These programs are overseen by the State Department in cooperation with the Department of Defense. “Security cooperation” describes separately authorized Defense Department-led activities such as “global train and equip” programs. The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which has provided military aid to that country since 2016, is one such example of these programs run by the Pentagon. I will use the more common term here, security assistance, in reference to either type. When security assistance works well, it gives partner nations the tools to address internal instability and deter and defend against external adversaries, reducing the likelihood that direct U.S. intervention will be called for in the future. It also helps to ensure that the United States maintains access, basing, and overflight privileges, strengthens interoperability, and accrues the less tangible benefit of military-to-military personal relationships.
DoS assistance solves case
Pierce 14 William G. Pierce, Harry A. Tomlin, Robert C. Coon, James E. Gordon, and Michael A. Marra, Professors in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the U.S. Army War College, “Defense Strategic Guidance Thoughtful Choices and Security Cooperation,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 74, 3rd Quarter 2014, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-74/jfq-74_72-79_Pierce-et-al.pdf /GoGreen!
Determine Who Else Can Help.
Determine if others are engaging (or are willing to engage) to achieve similar SC objectives in the combatant command’s AOR. This analysis should be conducted from two perspectives. The first is to determine if other agencies of the U.S. Government are working with a focus nation. A way to decide that is through the recently constituted Promote Cooperation series of meetings initiated by the combatant command and hosted by the Joint Operational War Plans Division of the Joint Staff J5. These meetings are designed to foster interagency perspectives and contributions to combatant command planning efforts. Representatives from the other executive branch agencies participate in the Promote Cooperation meetings. These participants have discovered that DOD is not necessarily the only U.S. Government entity working to achieve specific national security objectives within a focus nation.16
Another way is through the “3-D Planning Methodology” and meetings being held periodically and representing the efforts of “Diplomacy, Development and Defense,” which are, respectively, the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and Department of Defense.17
NB—Politics
PTX – CP Unpopular
CP costs PC – DoD and Senate Armed Services oppose
Gould 22 Joe Gould, senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, “For America’s security aid programs, who will run the show?” Defense News, 4-11-2022, https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2022/04/11/for-americas-security-aid-programs-who-will-run-the-show/ /GoGreen!
Any effort to uproot authorities and funding, to then shift them toward the State Department, would likely face an uphill fight with the Pentagon and potentially with the Senate Armed Services Committee. The committee has on its side the only reliable annual legislative vehicle in the National Defense Authorization Act.
Max Bergmann, a former State Department official who authored security assistance reform recommendations last year, said efforts to shift greater authority to the State Department will succeed only if the White House prioritizes them. In a high-stakes competition with China, the U.S. can’t afford for parallel security-assistance bureaucracies to undermine statecraft, he said.
“What is critical is that we have full control over that lever, and not have it be a bureaucratic mess where one hand doesn’t know what the other is doing and it’s difficult for any senior policymaker in the White House to know what the hell’s going on,” said Bergmann, now a senior fellow at Center for American Progress.
CP costs PC – the support their ev assumes (Foreign Relations/Affairs committees) will evaporate during the process – their author
Bergmann 21 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, formerly served in the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs and special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security, MA comparative politics, London School of Economics; and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, MPP Harvard Kennedy School; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center For American Progress, 3-9-2021, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/ /GoGreen!
Hypothetical costs of reforming the system and disrupting current implementation of U.S. security assistance are likely to be significantly outweighed by improvements in the policymaking process and well worth the political capital a new administration and Congress would need to expend.
Landscape of the security assistance system today
Security assistance has been a critical foreign policy tool for decades.24 Today, the United States provides assistance to a range of allies and partners to achieve its security goals. The primary objective of U.S. security assistance is to advance U.S. national and global security by empowering allies and partners to effectively confront shared security challenges.
The State Department system
The State Department provides security assistance primarily through the FMF program, an account with about $6 billion annually for military equipment and training to partners.25 The State Department’s other authorities receive about half that amount, averaging around $3 billion annually for professional military education, peacekeeping, counternarcotics, and other programs.26
[Figure 2 OMITTED]
The State Department’s security assistance funds, primarily FMF, provide little flexibility for diplomats. More than 80 percent of FMF flows to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, the top three recipients of U.S. security aid.27 After these partners, the State Department is generally left with about $1 billion to distribute among the remaining countries around the world, though most of this founding is already earmarked by Congress for specific countries.28 While State Department officials could in theory request more funds or flexibility, the department’s legislative affairs office has often failed to even ask Congress for more resources or flexibility. To that point, funding for the State Department has declined in real terms—compared with significant growth in the Pentagon budget—since 9/11.29
State Department security assistance programs
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE)
Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR)
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)
International Military Education and Training (IMET)
There are several challenges with today’s State Department security assistance:
It’s not flexible. The majority of FMF’s funds are earmarked in appropriations for specific partners, such as Egypt and Israel. The top-down direction of FMF funding leaves very little available funding for State Department programmers to grant to countries in the event of crises or new political dynamics. This makes it difficult for the State Department to reallocate significant enough funds to provide useful security assistance in times of crisis, especially when compared with some of the DOD’s resources and more flexible authorities. Senior State Department officials have warned, “The more money and more authority you move out of traditional accounts we have used for decades to work with our partners, the more you lose the ability to balance.”30 For example, after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, the State Department wanted to provide urgent security assistance but was only able to reallocate a few million dollars from its FMF account.31
This lack of flexibility stands in stark contrast to allocations of DOD resources, some of which are granted to combatant commands and security cooperation officers in country to decide when and to whom funding is granted based on more immediate security considerations.32 As a result of this lack of flexibility, the State Department is largely seen as slow and bureaucratic and unable to respond to security crises within the U.S. government. But the State Department is no slower or faster than the DOD. Often, the State Department is seen as being slow in acting when it is actually holding on a decision due to policy reasons or due to congressional concerns. This was the case, for instance, in providing security assistance to partly fund Pakistan’s acquisition of additional F-16s.33
Bureaucratic incentives favor the status quo. The State Department’s regional-functional bureaucratic divide—a perennial problem within the agency—inhibits its effectiveness in managing security assistance. In practice, the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs shares decision-making authority on security assistance with regional bureaus that are loath to cut funding for the countries under their purview. Many regional bureaus also needlessly maintain their own separate security assistance offices, reducing their reliance on the Political-Military Affairs Bureau and complicating internal policymaking. Critiques of the State Department’s internal disfunction are valid, and lessons learned within the U.S. government and the DOD about how best to implement security assistance should be incorporated into State Department reforms.
The State Department’s leadership has in the past refused to ask Congress for more money for security assistance. This has created an odd juxtaposition where Pentagon officials and military officers plead with Congress for more money for the State Department, while State Department officials do not.34 The department’s silence, however, was largely due to fears that a conservative Congress would not increase the State Department’s overall budget but instead take funds from other accounts such as development, undercutting the agency’s other missions.
To address these challenges, there should be a review of the security assistance structure at the State Department to centralize decision-making in order to inform better, more coherent policy that aligns with the secretary of state’s objectives for U.S. foreign policy. The reforms should also build more agility and flexibility into the State Department’s FMF program, in part by reducing the influence of some regional offices that can distort broader foreign policy goals.
The DOD system
While the DOD has long played a role in implementing security assistance—usually as directed by the State Department—the provision of expansive authorities to the DOD, enabling it to manage its own assistance programs, is relatively new. Beginning in the 1980s, the DOD was granted funds to conduct its own security assistance programs—separate from the State Department—under Title 10, with programs for counternarcotics, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism activities.35 After the 9/11 attack, the Bush administration sought to expand the DOD’s role to focus on counterterrorism and expanding partner special operations capabilities. In the following years, Congress more than doubled the number of DOD security assistance programs, granting new authorities and resources to the executive branch to bolster counterterrorism efforts and combat emerging threats.36
There are several challenges of this duplicative security assistance system at the DOD:
The DOD’s authorities duplicate authorities originally granted to the State Department. Congress originally granted long-term efforts to develop another country’s security forces to the State Department and put these efforts under the purview of diplomats. But in the post-9/11 security environment, rather than fix the State Department’s lack of resources to handle counterterrorism issues, appropriators gave the funds to the DOD, contributing to more bifurcation of security assistance policy. This was exemplified by the 2006 creation of Section 1206: a $350 million annual authority for the secretary of defense to support counterterrorism efforts and assist coalition partners. Though it required cooperation with the State Department, it was explicitly designed to empower the DOD, in part because some DOD officials thought the State Department was too slow and lacking expertise to carry out counterterrorism activities.37 In 2014, a Congressional Research Service report found that “government personnel state that Section 1206 has been used as a substitute for FMF, especially in the early years, given what many analysts believe is a shortage of FMF funds to meet legitimate foreign defense equipment needs.”38
Congressional barriers exacerbated the DOD-State Department imbalance. The 2011 Budget Control Act and a Republican-controlled Congress skeptical of the State Department made giving more resources to the department a nonstarter.39 Senior DOD officials urged Congress to grant the agency new authorities, such as in a 2008 House Armed Services Committee hearing with the secretary of defense and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff.40 Faced with these constraints, the Obama administration opted to create more authorities at the DOD through the annual must-pass National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Meanwhile, the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs committees, with jurisdiction only over the State Department’s security assistance programs, did little to correct the imbalance.41 According to one study before the recent consolidation efforts, the DOD managed 48 out of 50 new programs created after the 9/11 attacks.42 Of the 107 existing security assistance programs today, the DOD manages 87—a whopping 81 percent.43
DOD officials can work around the State Department’s diplomats. In part due to restrictions from the Budget Control Act and with new programs at the DOD, Pentagon officials had more flexibility on security assistance programs than their State Department counterparts. The DOD had budgetary space to reallocate significant funds from the substantial Pentagon budget to respond to sudden emergencies or new crises, something that is virtually impossible for the State Department, making the DOD often the lead actor in a crisis.44 Regional combatant commands aggressively sought more resources from Congress to conduct their own security assistance programs, giving them added flexibility to work with partners in the field that their State Department counterparts lacked.45 A Government Accountability Office report found that 56 DOD security assistance programs do not require any involvement from the State Department.46
Temporary programs become permanent. The majority of the new DOD security assistance authorities were premised as temporary, operational programs, designed to tackle immediate threats and challenges.47 But in practice, many programs have endured. Once a multiyear, multimillion-dollar program is established, it has a tendency to become entrenched, becoming a permanent assistance program with its own invested bureaucracy to sustain and expand it.48 The Section 1206 authority exemplifies this phenomenon: A 2017 DOD inspector general report found that “DoD officials stated that the temporary nature of the authority made it infeasible to commit the resources necessary to effectively manage Section 1206 as a ‘program’”—despite the fact that it was annually authorized and funded for 10 years until fiscal year 2015. Some $2.2 billion was appropriated for Section 1206 before it became law. Section 333 funding now replicates many of the same functions today.
The DOD’s duplicative security assistance programs complicate overall foreign policymaking. Reforming security assistance by centralizing resources at the State Department—and coupling the move with necessary reforms at the State Department—would go a long way toward improving this policy process.
DOD security assistance programs
Assessing total DOD funding for security assistance programs remains a challenge.49 Today, in addition to implementing State Department security assistance, the DOD operates a range of its own security assistance programs. This contributes to a system that is less coherent, less integrated, less transparent, and less subject to effective congressional oversight.
DOD security assistance programs related to train and equip include:50
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)
Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF)
Section 333 Building Capacity of Foreign Security Forces (formerly Section 1206)
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)
Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF)
Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund
Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF)
Coalition Support Fund (CSF)
Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI)
European Reassurance Initiative (ERI)
Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF)
Logistic Support for Allied Forces in Combined Operations
Ministry of Defense Advisors Program (MODA)
Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI)
Regional Centers for Security Studies (RCSS)
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI)
Wales Initiative Fund (WIF)
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Past attempts to reform the system
Recent efforts to reform the security assistance architecture tend to get bogged down by the complexity of the current system. This has led to an inevitable focus on incremental tweaks that address tactical-level concerns. These weedy discussions, while useful, often take the current structure of the U.S. security assistance system as a given—and therefore, do not address the broader strategic and budgetary issues and imbalance between diplomacy and defense. Furthermore, policymakers and politicians often get lost in the technical nature of these discussions, lack broader historical context, and are easily persuaded by officials with a stake in largely preserving the status quo and in protecting their offices, who tout the complexity of the challenge; as a result, they quickly lose interest in reform. A new administration should be wary of these past mistakes when embarking on suggested reforms in this report.
No support
Thompson 21 Natalie Thompson, PhD candidate, political science, Yale University, former research analyst for the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission, research assistant and James C. Gaither junior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and Laura Bate, senior director with the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commiss

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