DA - NATO Cohesion - Packet - SDI 2022
DA - NATO Cohesion - Packet - SDI 2022.docx
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NATO COHESION DA CORE 1NC — NATO Cohesion DA NATO unity deters Chinese invasion of Taiwan Jash, 22 -- Manipal Academy Geopolitics and International Relations professor [Amrita Jash, "Unity on Ukraine war deters China," Taipei Times, 3-27-2022, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2022/03/27/2003775514, accessed 6-4-2022] Unity on Ukraine war deters China Undoubtedly, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has provided Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) with the biggest opportunity in disguise to scrutinize the reaction of the international community. For Xi, it comes at the right time and, to some extent, as the only point of reference for his own permutation and combinations of “unification” tactics toward Taiwan. The Russia-Ukraine crisis has put forward the best worst-case scenario for Xi for assessing miscalculations, and the kind of responses and countermeasures that one can expect from the international system. Unlike for any other leader, the lessons Xi can draw from the Ukraine crisis are significant because they can be linked to any form of China’s future adventurism in Taiwan. The US Department of Defense in 2020 notably said that the Chinese military is “likely preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the mainland by force.” China’s increasing aggressive posture has only added to speculation over China’s plans to invade Taiwan. In January, Chinese Ambassador to the US Qin Gang (秦剛) issued a stern warning, saying that the US could face “military conflict” with China over the status of Taiwan. If this is the case, then the Ukraine crisis aptly serves as a litmus test for Beijing. Putin’s assault on Ukraine is vital for Xi’s calculations in two ways: First, there are diverging perceptions of Ukraine’s sovereignty in Kyiv and Moscow. Ukraine considers itself a sovereign nation, while Putin is inclined to adopt a “Soviet Union mentality.” On similar terms, Xi’s actions dovetail China’s “Middle Kingdom mentality” under the “Chinese dream” of “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” through “reunification with Taiwan.” The logic is that of an “unfinished business” of getting foreign territories “back” into one’s geopolitical orbit — Ukraine for Putin and Taiwan for Xi. Second, and most importantly, there is the leadership factor, wherein Putin’s Russia appears synonymous with Xi’s China — with the countries respective leaders being the chieftain of all things under their autocratic political apparatus. While similarity between Taiwan and Ukraine cannot be drawn in a linear fashion, strong deductions can be made with regard to China’s behavior toward Taiwan and the Russia-Ukraine crisis. That is, for China, and Xi in particular, the big lessons will be drawn from a careful reading of the international community’s reaction toward what Putin calls Russia’s “special military operation” aiming to “demilitarize and de-Nazify Ukraine” under the logic that “Russia cannot feel safe, develop and exist with a constant threat emanating from the territory of modern Ukraine.” The outcome has so far been international condemnation and boycotts of Russia, and the imposition of economic sanctions by the US and the EU — resulting in Russia becoming a “pariah” state. In contrast to full economic embargoes on countries such as North Korea, Iran, Cuba and Syria, the US has adopted a selective approach on Russia, imposing measures in a phase-by-phase manner. The US Office of Foreign Assets Control has imposed financial sanctions and restrictions on a majority of Russian oligarchs and state-owned banking and financial service providers, and added various Russian banks, as well as Putin and many of his associates, to the asset control office’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List. The US Department of Commerce has targeted Russia’s oil refining sector with stringent export controls and identified 91 entities that support Russian military activities — a measure to cut off Moscow’s access to US goods it needs to sustain its military aggression against Ukraine. Furthermore, the US has imposed an import ban on Russian alcoholic beverages, seafood and nonindustrial diamonds. To deter Russia, the US has also imposed sweeping export controls on Belarus, which supports Russia, as a preventive measure to ensure that technology, software and other goods used in the defense, aerospace and maritime sectors are not passed on from Minsk to Moscow. The EU’s sanctions on Russia include financial restrictions, an assets freeze, bans on Russian planes flying in EU airspace and landing at EU airports, a ban on transactions with the Russian central bank, a ban on seven Russian lenders from the SWIFT bank-to-bank messaging system, and suspensions of Russian state-media Russia Today and Sputnik, as well as individual sanctions against Putin and his associates. The bloc also imposed individual and economic sanctions on Belarus. Joining the US and EU, Japan imposed sanctions on Russian and Belarusian officials and oligarchs, as well as on Russian organizations and companies, and it is discussing a ban on exports of oil refining equipment to Russia and dual-use products to Belarus. However, unlike the US, Japan remains reluctant to close its airspace to Russian planes. On March 11, the US along with its NATO allies, the G7 and the EU, revoked Russia’s “most-favored nation” status — one of the hardest blows to the already downgraded Russian economy. Germany halted the certification of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to condemn Russia’s actions against Ukraine. These international sanctions and measures are aimed at weakening Russia’s will to fight and putting Moscow in a difficult position by isolating it. With the value of the ruble plummeting, the international community’s economic boycott of Moscow holds significant repercussions for domestic instability in Russia, which will be fostered by the growing financial crisis and Moscow’s isolation from the international system. However, the sanctions have so far failed to deter Russia’s military actions; they have only emboldened Putin’s aggressive posture on Ukraine. It is noteworthy though that the global backlash against Russia carries a strong message for China. That is, if China plans to take Taiwan by force, it will have to be ready for the punitive measures. Can China afford isolation, especially when China wants to take the “center stage,” as outlined by Xi at the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2017? That question acts as a red flag for Beijing. In the context of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, it is also noteworthy that while major powers are not reluctant to impose sanctions and build up their defenses, they are hesitant to otherwise confront Russia, or even to engage NATO to do so. While the US and its allies have called Putin the “aggressor,” no one seeks to confront Russia directly, as evidenced by US President Joe Biden saying: “Our forces are not engaged and will not engage in the conflict with Russian forces in Ukraine. Our forces are not going to Europe to fight [in] Ukraine, but to defend our NATO allies in the event that Putin decides to keep moving west.” This brings in a potential miscalculation for China. Can the US’ reluctant posture to fight Russia over Ukraine be applied in the case of a Chinese adventure in Taiwan? The answer lies in the US’ policy of “strategic ambiguity” over Taiwan, meaning that Washington is deliberately vague about what it would do if China were to attack the nation. However, this vagueness leaves room for the US to come to Taiwan’s defense. Giving some clarity, Biden in October last year answered the question whether “the US would come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack by China” by saying bluntly: “Yes, we have a commitment to do that.” Taiwan holds severe reputational costs for the US; it cannot afford to act reluctantly against any Chinese action, but would have to retaliate. Hence, taking copious notes of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, China under Xi will be cautious and calibrated in its behavior toward Taiwan. It disturbs China’s larger geopolitical plans that there is a growing united front between the US and Europe — with the crisis in Ukraine bridging the gap. If this united front strengthens, it will not only be a debacle for China’s global ambitions; it will also have ramifications for China’s plans for Taiwan. Besides, Taiwan will be a much harder bargain for China. At this juncture, Beijing — given its leanings toward Moscow — cannot afford to be caught in the crosshairs of the US and Europe. NATO inherently resists tech changes- pursuing consensus consumes significant time and resources even if it fails Gojowsky, 18 -- U.S. Army officer [Torsten; Ben Haspels is a Royal Netherlands Army officer; Flemming Haar is a Danish Navy officer; and Sebastian Koegle is a German officer; Sverre Wetteland is a Norwegian officer, "Resistance to Innovation in NATO," Strategy Bridge, 8-16-2018, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/8/16/resistance-to-innovation-in-nato, accessed 6-4-2022] Resistance to Innovation in NATO Military leaders need to understand the symbiotic relationship between risk-taking and innovative progress. It may be commonly assumed that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—one of the most durable and best-funded multinational defense organizations in history—has sufficient communication systems in order to operate effectively as an alliance of many disparate forces. One might then also assume that NATO-member special operations forces—the elite units of the alliance—have the best and most effective communication systems to coordinate and react to crises rapidly. However, this is not the case. If a crisis were to occur today, communication across the partner forces would be difficult. Technological solutions to these problems do exist and could be implemented with relative ease. Why are they unlikely to be adopted? The authors argue that institutional resistance to innovation at NATO is driven by the inherent characteristics of managing and maintaining a large, heterogeneous alliance among sovereign entities. This resistance can only be overcome if decisive, flexible, and adaptive military leaders are bold enough to allow an organization to accommodate new, sophisticated technologies. Otherwise innovation in the military grinds to a halt. Solving problems like this will not be easy, but it is necessary for NATO to adapt to the rapidly changing strategic environment and technological landscape in which it finds itself. Innovative technologies that can effectively connect multiple NATO special operations forces, such as multilateral online and offline mapping, military radio controlling, text messaging, targeting, calling for fire, etc. already exist. Currently, the Tactical Assault Kit application for Android and Windows allows for all of these capabilities. The Tactical Assault Kit platform permits for a wide range of methods for establishing connectivity, even blending military satellite communication and commercial equipment. The Tactical Assault Kit communication system has been field tested by U.S., Norwegian, and Danish special operations forces in support of operations against ISIS. NATO special operations forces partners were initially restricted from accompanying Iraqi or Syrian partner forces on the battlefield, but they were allowed to support them with close air support. The communication chain, however, was too slow and led to some delayed direct support for the counter-ISIS forces on the battlefield. All this changed when a couple of bright minds saw the potential in Tactical Assault Kit and managed to put together tactical field kits, using the existing mapping tool as the technical medium to speed up coordination and target acquisition between counter-ISIS forces and NATO special operations forces elements. It thus became a success story, and the system is being actively used in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. For a comprehensive employment of Tactical Assault Kit within NATO special operations forces, every allied country will have to change the way they look at military communication. In order to best explain the concept of scalable connectivity in this context, one needs to consider how military missions are planned. The military mission consists of three fundamental parts: shoot, move, and communicate. Ahead of a mission, how to shoot and move are thoroughly analyzed in order to utilize the best tools in the toolbox. For instance, if a unit is planning an urban special reconnaissance mission, there are several tools to choose from. A civilian car can be chosen over a tactical vehicle to maintain a low profile when inserting the special reconnaissance team into the target area. To maximize the freedom of movement without being compromised, the team might select civilian clothes and easily concealed weapons. Using this approach, the likelihood of being detected is minimized, whereas the chance of success is maximized. In short, it comes down to the calculation of risk versus gain. Communications deserve as much attention and investment as the weapon components for the mission to be effective, but this is not currently the case. Only a few tools are available as communication options, which restrict military elements to primarily utilize encrypted push-to-talk radios. The typical military communication plan, the so-called PACE (primary, alternate, contingency, emergency) plan, is mainly composed of different frequencies, predetermined satellite or VHF/HF communication channels, and regular cellphone use as emergency backup. However, current and near future peer adversaries all have electronic warfare capabilities. This means that the choice of NATO communication equipment and its integration into the planning phase of battle determines mission success or failure. Scalable connectivity can be an effective tool when the area of operations’ frequency spectrum is analyzed and appropriate communication tools are utilized. Despite the aforementioned benefits, NATO has been slow, if not resistant, to leveraging communication solutions that can connect its respective special operations forces. Furthermore, NATO members are prone to purchase equipment from large military communication corporations. This industrial base supply chain problem stems from corporations that offer rigid, comprehensive solutions that offer little to no flexibility by having proprietary software and hardware. It also leads to transmitting a large military fingerprint easily detectable by adversaries. To move past the problem of inflexible military communication equipment, NATO needs to rethink the concepts of what is secure and classified and how this will impact the risk to a mission and force. NATO special operations forces have been slow to adopt innovative solutions such as Tactical Assault Kit, despite its attractive and innovative features. What explains this resistance? Resistance to innovation is at once puzzling, intellectually intriguing, and a commercially interesting phenomenon. In the 1940s, the German psychologist Kurt Lewin was the first to introduce a systemic understanding of the resistance phenomenon. The cause, according to Lewin, is not found in the mind of the individual employee, but in the dynamics of opposing forces, including the behavior of leadership. According to the political economist Josef Schumpeter, “Innovation is the creation of new combinations that represent a departure from established practices.” In other words, a technological tension between the need to innovate and the desire to maintain order and stability will always exist. Wendell Wallach nicely defines the problem as “the pacing gap” between the introduction of a new technology and the establishment of laws, regulations, and oversight mechanisms for shaping its safe development. Wallach believes that modern technological innovation is occurring at an unprecedented pace, making it harder than ever to govern using traditional legal and regulatory mechanisms. NATO as a whole suffers severely from the pacing gap, due to the fact that it consists of 29-member countries. If a new communication technology is proven highly successful by one country, the product still has to be vetted by each country’s security and intelligence services. A process like this takes time and consumes resources, forcing poorer nations to evaluate the importance of a new technology versus the old. This process exacerbates the pacing gap within NATO as standardization becomes a protracted process of having to generate consensus among the member states. That emerging tech debate destroys NATO unity Walsh, 13 -- President of the Emerging Science and Technology Policy Centre [Eddie Walsh, Senior Fellow at the School of Foreign Service – Georgetown University, "Danger of Emerging Technologies Dividing NATO," Atlantic Council, 8-16-2013, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/danger-of-emerging-technologies-dividing-nato/, accessed 6-4-2022] Converging technologies also pose fundamental human security challenges. As Francis Fukuyama once argued in Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution, converging technologies could inequitably transform the world we live in and, in the process, undermine the very foundations that underpin liberal democracies. Whether or not such a future unfolds, it is clear that their application raises serious ethical and moral issues that are proving divisive for allies and enemies alike (eg: the debates over armed drones and cyber espionage). Even where common approaches can be achieved (eg: combatting designer drugs), converging technologies are growing “faster than our ability to legislate or regulate” them. These developments are putting new stresses on the NATO alliance. According to a recent experts workshop, the NBRIC Revolution is threatening NATO unity. “As warfare is outsourced to only those who are ‘near peers’ in technology and societal views shift,” NATO will likely experience “decreasing political tolerance for alliance security efforts”. If NATO member states want to sustain “the traditional transatlantic compact [European political support in return for US military guarantees]”, they must change the way NATO approaches cooperative security around emerging technologies. And, they need to do it now. Taiwan war goes nuclear- most recent war games prove Pettyjohn, 22 -- Center for a New American Security defense program director [Stacie L., and Becca Wasser, fellow in the defense program and co-lead of The Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security, "A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear," Foreign Affairs, 5-20-22, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-20/fight-over-taiwan-could-go-nuclear, accessed 5-26-22] A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear War-Gaming Reveals How a U.S.-Chinese Conflict Might Escalate Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if China attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe. A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance
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