DA - DOD Overstretch - SDI 2022 PACKET
DA - DOD Overstretch - SDI 2022 PACKET.docx
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NEG DA—DoD O/S
FYI – SC Planners
What Happens After Fiat
Neptune 16 Neptune, veteran owned and operated strategy and advisory firm, “U.S. Security Cooperation Review,” February 2016, http://neptuneasc.com/site/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Neptune-Whole-of-Government-U.S.-Security-Cooperation-Review-20160208.pdf /GoGreen!
Plans Within Plans
Hartmayer 16 Michael S. Hartmayer, Analyst, Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL), “Security Cooperation: Lessons and Best Practices,” Security Cooperation Bulletin 16-09, March 2016, https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/16-09.pdf /GoGreen!
Every SC activity has to formally verify compliance with a bevy of required screenings, funding restrictions, and Congressional and interagency reporting requirements, and be scheduled in way that doesn’t disrupt other legally required activities – it’s a lot of paperwork!
DoD 17 Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (DISCS), U.S. Department of Defense, “Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) Responsibilities,” Lesson #0674, 2-21-2017, https://slideplayer.com/slide/11897298/ /GoGreen!
Planners are mostly military personnel on 2-year rotations, hence 75% have “no security cooperation experience”!
DoD 17 Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (DISCS), U.S. Department of Defense, “Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) Responsibilities,” Lesson #0674, 2-21-2017, https://slideplayer.com/slide/11897298/ /GoGreen!
FYI – AM&E
What AM&E is and why it’s hard
O’Mahony 18 Angela O’Mahony, associate dean for academic affairs at Pardee RAND Graduate School and a senior political scientist at RAND, former assistant professor of international political economy and economic statecraft at the University of British Columbia, PhD political science, UCSD; Ilana Blum, researcher at RAND; Gabriela Armenta, researcher at RAND; Nicholas Burger, senior economist at RAND and director of RAND’s Washington office; Joshua Mendelsohn, researcher at RAND; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; Steven W. Popper, researcher at RAND; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; and Thomas S. Szayna, senior political scientist and former director of RAND's Defense and Political Sciences Department at RAND, MA international relations, Claremont Graduate School; “Assessing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Army Security Cooperation: A Framework for Implementation,” RR2165, RAND Corporation, 2018, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1056354.pdf /GoGreen!
Evaluating the effectiveness of security cooperation in a systematic and rigorous way, however, is challenging, particularly at the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) and Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) levels. First, while security cooperation activities tend to be short term and specific, the strategic theater objectives that security cooperation activities are designed to accomplish are often long term and not well defined. Second, the causal relationships that link security cooperation activities to desired outcomes are often not well understood. Finally, collecting information relevant for evaluating security cooperation effectiveness can be difficult. Although all Army security cooperation activities should be assessed through objective and rigorous after-action reporting and all security cooperation tasks should be evaluated through measures of performance and measures of effectiveness, current Army security cooperation is constrained by poor collection of relevant information.
Regardless of the difficulties inherent in evaluating security cooperation activities, the Army and, more broadly, the Department of Defense (DoD) are facing congressional pressure for increased accountability. In response, the DoD is developing an assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) policy for its security cooperation enterprise. In the DoD’s AM&E construct, assessment refers to baseline assessments for leaders and planners that address questions like these: What is the security environment in which these activities will take place? What are the partner’s existing capabilities, and what does the United States want to improve? How well aligned are the partner’s interests and values with those of the United States? Monitoring means tracking efforts to determine whether inputs (e.g., money and effort) are translating into outputs (e.g., equipment, training, education, and information). These outputs then serve as the basis for tracking progress toward objectives (i.e., outcomes). Evaluation examines outcomes and is crucial to understanding what is working and what is not. Success is not ultimately measured by the provision of equipment or training; it is measured by the extent to which security cooperation activities help achieve U.S. objectives. Investments require following up to make sure that they yield the full potential benefits that were expected.1 This study provides a framework and a tool to help the Army improve its
security cooperation AM&E capabilities in line with emerging DoD guidance.
It’s an iterative process
DoD 17 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense, “Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy For The Security Cooperation Enterprise,” DoDI 5132.14, 1-13-2017, https://open.defense.gov/portals/23/documents/foreignasst/dodi_513214_on_am&e.pdf /GoGreen!
How AM&E relates to the different civilian and military stakeholders, each with different plans (see “plans within plans” above), involved in SC planning
McNerney 16 Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; S. Rebecca Zimmerman, Policy Researcher at RAND; and Ariel Klein, Naval Strategy and Policy Expert, U.S. Navy, MA Strategic Studies, Air War College, MA Organizational Management, The George Washington University; “SMART Security Cooperation Objectives: Improving DoD Planning and Guidance,” RR-1430-OSD, RAND Corporation, 2016, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1430.html /GoGreen!
1NC
1NC – DoD O/S DA
DoD planners are prioritizing assessment, monitoring and evaluation (AM&E) now
Gould 22 Joe Gould, senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, “For America’s security aid programs, who will run the show?” Defense News, 4-11-2022, https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2022/04/11/for-americas-security-aid-programs-who-will-run-the-show/ /GoGreen!
The Pentagon’s efforts
In an interview with Defense News, the assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans and capabilities, Mara Karlin, said the Pentagon is already undertaking significant organizational reforms aimed at better coordinating and scrutinizing security assistance programs.
The changes, spearheaded by Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl and executed in December, moved the Defense Security Cooperation Agency ― which manages foreign military sales as well as international military education and training ― under Karlin’s office. What had been the DoD’s security cooperation programs were combined with elements of the Office of Stability and Humanitarian Affairs.
“Hopefully that helps us take a more strategic approach to security cooperation more broadly,” Karlin said several weeks after she and Lewis testified together before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
As required by the 2017 defense authorization act, the Pentagon is critically reviewing its own efforts, Karlin said, noting several studies are underway to evaluate whether its security assistance programs were successful.
“The U.S. military, has worked with partner militaries quite robustly since World War II in particular,” she said. “There was a bit of a sea change in the post-9/11 era, and I think that now as we move forward into a different era, we see the urgent need to look at how and in what ways we’re achieving our goals.”
Beyond the 2022 defense policy bill’s mandate for a commission to study U.S. involvement in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021, the Pentagon is contracting with an outside agency for a comprehensive assessment of the strategic and operational lessons collected from the war there, Karlin said.
It has other efforts afoot to find and disseminate the lessons from its security cooperation efforts.
“We’re developing a learning and evaluation agenda for partnerships that focus on evidence-based policymaking, which will include the most critical learning questions for security cooperation, and prioritize a range of evidence-building activities, including evaluations, monitoring, research studies and tabletop exercises,” Karlin said. “These are hard issues to figure out, and you need to make some kind of a quantitative and qualitative approach.”
For example, the DoD made public a seven-page internal study of U.S. Africa Command’s maritime security cooperation activities in the Gulf of Guinea from 2007 to 2018. It found those efforts managed to spur Ghana and Senegal to an increased interest in policing their waters. But on the flip side, maintenance and parts issues plagued the effort, which included riverine patrols and offshore interdiction of illegal fishing and human trafficking.
Plan overstretches them
Thaler 16 David E. Thaler, Senior International/Defense Researcher at RAND, MIA International Security Policy/Middle East, Columbia University; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; Beth Grill, Senior Policy Analyst at RAND, MA Middle Eastern Studies and Economics, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; and Amanda Kadlec, RAND; “From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation,” RR1438, RAND Corporation, 2016, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1438/RAND_RR1438.pdf /GoGreen!
The proliferation of complicated authorities has led to a number of pernicious effects in DoD’s SC enterprise. Two deserve mention here. First, authorities and related programs require that staff in DoD stakeholder organizations—particularly the CCMDs, OSD, and the agencies—are available to plan their use and develop initiatives or events, shepherd them through the myriad justification and approval processes, and manage and report on their execution. The greater the number of authorities required to achieve stakeholder objectives, the larger the staff required to properly manage them. But at the same time, the catalog of authorities has expanded, while budget cuts have required staff contraction across DoD. This leaves stakeholders with “too many programs…and not enough people to execute” because “we are losing people who manage the programs.”28 While OSD has at times sought to hone a reach-back capacity to provide advice to the CCMDs, the expanding catalog of authorities still requires a larger staff to properly manage them. This forces SC personnel to consider the cost-benefit of doing some events with multiple funding sources given the man-hours and workload required to manage use of separate authorities, whereby “small programs aren’t worth the time.”29 This also leads to programs that are not executable in the field.30
Empirically halts progress on AM&E – key to effective strategic competition
Shah 18 Hijab Shah, research associate with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); and Melissa Dalton, senior fellow and deputy director of the CSIS International Security Program; “Security Cooperation as a National Defense Strategy Tool,” Commentary, Center for Strategy and International Studies, 10-3-2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/security-cooperation-national-defense-strategy-tool /GoGreen!
Ensuring Return on Investment
Pooling resources and sharing responsibility with partner forces is a critical aspect of U.S. efforts to best strategic competitors as described within the NDS. However, despite billions of dollars’ worth of grant-based security assistance to its allies and partners—with another $3.4 billion approved for FY 2019—the United States has yet to see the proportionate returns from its investment in foreign countries’ security capabilities. In several areas, U.S. partners are not yet ready to shoulder the burdens that the U.S. administration seeks of them with gaps in professionalization, modernization, and interoperability with U.S. forces. Growing assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) standards and mechanisms to enable the U.S. government to track how its investments are being utilized and to what extent shared U.S. and partner goals are being achieved, as mandated by the FY 2017 and 2018 National Defense Authorization Acts, will help. However, the lack of high-level policy prioritization for these tasks, exacerbated by staff capacity and workforce shortfalls, have resulted in some useful steps forward but slow progress overall.
The U.S. government should consider approaching security cooperation from a return-on-investment lens, articulating and implementing clear and practical AM&E standards, benchmarks, corrective measures, and results in support of strategic objectives. Better AM&E could pave the way for a greater return on investment and therefore result in reliable, capable partnerships that provide the United States an edge over its strategic competitors.
Conclusion
Security cooperation is not a strategy unto itself but is clearly a critical way to achieve strategic aims. The U.S. government should pursue security cooperation with a clear-eyed assessment of the risks and tradeoffs for the sake of “improving a relationship,” weighed against operational, economic, and humanitarian considerations. With growing impulses to burden-shift global security requirements onto allies and partners, the United States will have to resist temptations to rush into security cooperation commitments. It will have to build policy frameworks and technical approaches that are both rigorous and responsive to enable it to compete and secure its objectives in the twenty-first century.
Failure is existential – integrated deterrence is key – NOT any one tech
Shaw 21 Ryan Shaw, Senior Advisor and Professor of Practice in History and Strategy at Arizona State University, PhD, MA history, Yale University, BA American Government and Politics, US Military Academy at West Point, “In Defense of Competition,” Real Clear Defense, 11-11-2021, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2021/11/11/in_defense_of_competition_803143.html /GoGreen!
As the Pentagon readies its new National Defense Strategy, the commentariat—unsurprisingly—has some thoughts. While the perspectives are, no doubt, as varied as the array of think tanks and universities from which they spring, there seems to be a significant piling on against both the “Great Power Competition” that animated Trump-era guidance and the (allegedly distinct) “Strategic Competition” terminology advanced by the Biden administration. But “competition” is a rare instance of bipartisan continuity because it speaks to real and important dynamics in the international system, and it has led to important new thinking in our approach to national security. We should not be so quick to discard it.
Rather than abandoning competition, it is time now to double down. The Pentagon strategy should embrace a robust concept of integrated deterrence, and the White House should lead with a National Security Strategy (NSS) rooted in a holistic approach to Competitive Statecraft.
The critics are right that Great Power Competition (“GPC”) has become a vacuous catch-all, a magic word, as CNAS’s Wasser and Pettyjohn tell it, that can justify “every force, capability, or resource request.” But that’s a perennial bureaucratic tendency; the same was true of CT and then COIN in the Bush and Obama years, and probably any number of terms du jour in prior eras. We should always work to minimize these abuses, but we won't eliminate them as long as we use words to describe our priorities. Other critiques are less valid and far less helpful.
The idea that an emphasis on competition precludes the possibility of cooperation is an unhelpful reductio ad absurdum. Pundits may not be able to sustain two competing ideas at once, but the international system always does, and the military clearly can: emerging U.S. doctrine envisions a competition continuum, in which “the joint force… campaigns through a mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict calculated to achieve the desired strategic objectives.” As Daniel H. Nexon points out, “Even during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union worked out a variety of formal and informal rules that helped them manage competition, limit nuclear proliferation, and otherwise structure international relations.” (It is unclear how Nexon intends this observation to support his argument against competition.)
Equally unhelpful is the common complaint that the phrase “‘strategic competition’ reflects uncertainty about what that competition is over and what it means to win.” Here again, while it might stymie the pundits, this intellectual hurdle seems not to have tripped up our military leaders—they have been consistent in identifying the stakes of this competition as the “rules-based international order that brought prosperity and relative peace for the last seven decades.”
And “what it means to win” is just the wrong question—that’s the whole point. Echoing George Kennan ("We have been handicapped … by a popular attachment to the concept of a basic difference between peace and war…"), the competition discussion is enabling the military to finally—against all odds—shed the idea of war as a finite game that starts with an opening salvo of munitions and ends with a ceasefire and a treaty. The fixation on “winning” breeds fatal short-termism—see the common refrain that we didn't fight a twenty-year war in Afghanistan, but rather twenty one-year wars.
What all these simplistic critiques miss is the simple old truth that the enemy gets a vote. Nexon wants us to consider competition as a means rather than an end. But it’s neither—it’s just a plain fact of our strategic environment, and the last round of guidance intended to highlight it as the most salient one for U.S. strategy. It may or may not have been true, but we operated for much of the last thirty years as though we did not have any real competitors, ideologically or materially. The “end of history” trope after the Cold War was premised on the absence of an ideological alternative to liberal democracy; and if 9-11 proved that wrong, the “asymmetric” modifier we appended to the “warfare” of the Global War on Terror reassured us that proponents of radical Islam lacked the resources to make their vision an existential threat.
But the long-term ascendency of liberal, democratic ideals and rules-based international order is neither inevitable nor irreversible. There are alternatives on offer, and they are actively being pursued by adversaries whose capabilities across many domains th
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