CP - OSCE CP - Georgetown 2022
CP - OSCE CP - Georgetown 2022.docx
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OSCE CP OFF [PLAN TEXT BUT OSCE INSTEAD OF NATO] Only the CP solves---it taps the same stakeholders, but as part of an inclusive security architecture that can spill over to include adversaries---it broadly revitalizes the OSCE Anna Nadibaidze 22, PhD fellow at the University of Southern Denmark’s Centre for War Studies, “Commitment to Control Weaponised Artificial Intelligence: A Step Forward for the OSCE and European Security,” Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Issue 22, January 2022, https://dam.gcsp.ch/files/doc/ssa-2022-issue22 Strengthening human control: the role of the OSCE Reaching a common position on weaponised AI regulation is challenging. The current global and European political atmosphere is one of distrust, particularly between two major European security players: Russia and the United States. In June 2021 both President Joe Biden and President Vladimir Putin said that the bilateral relationship “has deteriorated to its lowest point in recent years”.34 There is also distrust of technologies such as the Internet, AI, 5G, and robotics, not least because they can be weaponised and used for threatening activities such as cyber attacks. This environment makes it difficult to attain a common understanding and commit to agreed principles on the use of weaponised AI. Nevertheless, the OSCE possesses some key advantages that could make it the platform for taking a step forward in the global debate. Just like the CCW, the OSCE operates by consensus, which requires it to seek a compromise among participating States on whatever issue is being discussed. However, the organisation has been historically known for its ambition to form an inclusive security community and to build practices that “suggest a new model of international security” that is “comprehensive”, “indivisible”, and “cooperative”.35 The OSCE’s predecessor, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, was a symbol of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, and a place for two rivals to find compromise on security issues, demonstrating the possibility of coexistence on the European continent.36 The OSCE has not only been able to survive, but also to adapt to the rising security challenges of the new world order. Its broad membership and comprehensive approach to security make it a key – if not the most – legitimate institution for European security.37 At a time when some experts debate whether Russian-US relations have entered a new cold war, the OSCE’s inclusive approach is needed to show that tensions can be dealt with in a forum rather than on the battlefield. Other international institutions have demonstrated their ambitions to create some form of AI regulation. In April 2021 the European Commission presented its legal framework proposal, which could lay down a path towards defining a regional approach to governing weaponised AI.38 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has also set out its principles for the responsible use of AI in the area of defence.39 The key difference is that these institutions have favoured exclusive membership in terms of which prospective countries need to fulfil specific conditions to join. However, the OSCE has relatively broad accession rules because it was initially based on the concept of geopolitical diversity.40 Settling the differences and misunderstandings between different actors, especially Russia and the United States, is a key step in achieving a security agreement such as a commitment to human control over weaponised AI. In recent years the Russian discourse has expressed disappointment that Western countries have made NATO the main European security organisation.41 By engaging with Russia on the issue of weaponised AI within the OSCE framework, the United States would contribute to easing the tensions between it and Russia, while also diminishing the chances of misunderstanding and misinterpretation. The OSCE’s inclusive membership is thus a valuable advantage in terms of building trust and mitigating the security implications of modern technologies.42 What should be the way forward? In the 2019 Luxembourg Declaration on Advancing Sustainable Development to Promote Security, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly urged “participating States to support international negotiations to ban lethal autonomous weapons with a view to establishing international, legally binding rules”.43 A legally binding treaty banning the development of weaponised AI would be challenging, given that, unlike nuclear weapons or blinding lasers, AI is not a specific type of weapon and can also be applied for civilian use.44 Some participating States hold the position that a ban will affect the development of useful civilian technology. Within the framework of the CCW, Russia has argued that banning LAWS too hastily could “hinder technological progress”,45 while the UK government believes that “a legally binding instrument which hampers the legitimate development and use of such technologies would be counterproductive”.46 As a realistic starting point, the OSCE’s confidence- and securitybuilding measures (CSBMs) could provide a framework to exchange information and observations on the use of weaponised AI, in order to facilitate communication and dialogue.47 The OSCE already has CSBMs for information communication technologies, which, like weaponised AI, create “an area with much room for speculation, doubt, and ambiguity” and “increase the potential for tensions between States”.48 There is also the potential to go further than exchanging information informally within the CSBMs framework. Based on the recommendations of the International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons, the next step should be to “focus on the obligation to maintain human control over the use of force”, which would “apply to all conventional weapons”.49 Taking this path will avoid the debate on defining LAWS, which has been hindering the progress of the CCW discussions. In 2019 the GGE on LAWS adopted a set of guiding principles that are broad, have no legally binding force and do not clarify the concept of human control, only stating that “human responsibility for decisions on the use of weapons systems must be retained since accountability cannot be transferred to machines”.50 While OSCE member States accept in principle the importance of human control, they have until now not been able to agree on a common definition of this concept. The commitment to human control should be enshrined in a normative framework such as a political declaration or a manual of best practices. Any such document would already be a step forward. It could be part of the Vienna Document or the result of a new OSCE working group. Importantly, an OSCE political declaration or guide on human control and weaponised AI would not undermine or negate the efforts at the CCW but would build on them. Shifting the discussion towards the current impacts of weaponised AI rather than the potential future impact of “killer robots” would help to mitigate the risks inherent in these technologies. It would demonstrate that finding consensus, especially in an atmosphere of political distrust, is possible. While debates at the CCW continue, the operational trend towards further autonomy in the armed forces of OSCE participating States is a reality. Practices related to the use of weaponised AI have the potential to shape warfare norms. Yet this trajectory is not inevitable, and with the right approach, a political declaration containing a common definition of human control would be a realistic achievement. A political declaration should therefore contain a commitment to retaining human control over AI-driven weapons systems. This would be a crucial step towards addressing regional security threats and creating an international framework on weaponised AI. The history and membership of the OSCE make it the most appropriate organisation to build trust and take a key step forward on weaponised AI when global discussion at the UN is stalling and operational trends continue to increase the use of autonomous weapons systems. Conclusion Current practices related to the use of weaponised AI are already impacting European stability and security. Operational trends that reflect a reduction in the level of human control over weapons with increasingly autonomous features pose significant legal, ethical and security risks. Moreover, the lack of definition of LAWS and agreement on an appropriate level of human control among states creates uncertainty and potential misinterpretation. However, the trajectory of AI is not permanently set to be an “arms race”. Finding a common agreement is a challenging, but not impossible task. The OSCE is a promising platform to build on the stalled discussions at the CCW, because it has a history of acting as a bridge between various perspectives of European security. It is an inclusive organisation that brings together the key developers of weaponised AI and players in European security. By debating this issue at the OSCE and agreeing on a political declaration containing a commitment to human control, participating States will address some of the risks of autonomous weapons systems and demonstrate the relevance of the OSCE in tackling the impact of modern technologies and their use in conventional weapons. That’s the only path to a sustainable European détente---failure causes escalating conflict in numerous hotspots Olesya Vartanyan & David Lanz 22, Vartanyan is Crisis Group's Senior Analyst for the South Caucasus region; Lanz is Crisis Group’s Representative for Dialogue Promotion, trained mediator with fifteen years’ experience supporting international mediation processes and leading dialogue efforts, “Preserving the OSCE at a time of war,” ReliefWeb, 3/21/2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/preserving-osce-time-war Russia’s invasion of Ukraine risks incapacitating one of the only remaining multilateral spaces for cooperation between Russia and the West, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Participating states must work to prevent this outcome and preserve the OSCE’s critical role in containing conflicts. Russia’s 24 February invasion of Ukraine has sent shock waves through the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), a body that has been instrumental in containing conflicts that erupted after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Russia’s actions in Ukraine are a glaring violation of the OSCE’s commitment to respecting sovereignty, territorial integrity and human rights, memorialised in its founding principles. They have poisoned the atmosphere at the organisation’s seat in Vienna – which hosts the 57 participating states, including Ukraine and Russia as well as all European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members – and compromised its ability to take decisions on matters big and small. But for all the challenges it faces, the OSCE remains an essential forum. It is one of the only remaining multilateral spaces outside the UN for dialogue between Russia and the West; in the words of an OSCE official, the organisation has been “sort of an airbag that opens any time we face echoes of tensions” between Russia and the West. The OSCE is one of the few international organisations with the potential to play an important role in implementing any ceasefire arrangement that the conflict parties might reach in Ukraine, where prior to the war’s current phase it led a sizeable monitoring mission. It also helps manage the risk of escalation in conflicts from Moldova to Georgia to Central Asia. Governments should do all they can to prevent the OSCE’s incapacitation. Russia must refrain from holding the OSCE hostage and letting core operations collapse. Western states, in turn, should resist pushing for Russia’s suspension from the OSCE. Suspension would likely lead Russia to withdraw, as it did on 15 March from the Council of Europe. The OSCE in Ukraine With roots that date back to the 1970s, the OSCE assumed its current institutional form in 1994 as a forum for peace, stability and democracy issues. It runs fifteen field operations that perform a range of tasks, from monitoring conflict situations and violence prevention to promoting governance reform. Even before recent events, Ukraine was an important theatre for the OSCE. In 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the onset of a Russia-backed separatist insurgency in eastern Ukraine, the OSCE mounted a far-reaching response. It deployed a monitoring mission – one of the largest field operations in its history – that served as eyes and ears on the ground and helped to reduce violence along the line of separation between government-controlled Ukraine and the separatist entities in Donetsk and Luhansk. When Russia’s invasion began on 24 February, that mission still had close to 500 international monitors on the ground and continued its reporting as evacuation commenced. The mission has now essentially paused activities, although some Ukrainian staff remain present to carry out limited office functions in some locations. Aside from monitoring, the OSCE acted as a mediator bringing together Russia, Ukraine and the de facto entities in eastern Ukraine within the so-called Trilateral Contact Group. The negotiations failed to settle the conflict in line with the 2014 and 2015 Minsk Agreements, which brought the war’s first phase of major fighting to a halt. But they did broker truces, for example in July 2020, which led to a marked reduction in hostilities. The talks also helped improve the situation of the civilian population in the areas affected by the conflict in eastern Ukraine, for example by enabling civilians to cross the line of separation. The framework for these mediation efforts no longer exists. Russia’s recognition of the de facto separatist entities, and its 24 February invasion, have rendered meaningless the Minsk Agreements, which foresaw the reintegration of Donetsk and Luhansk with Ukraine. The OSCE still has a special representative for Ukraine, Mikko Kinnunen, who was the main mediator within the Trilateral Contact Group, but his role is unclear at this point. Since the start of the war, Poland, which chairs the organisation in 2022, has suspended all regular business, holding meetings only of two political bodies – the Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Cooperation – which were entirely dedicated to Ukraine. These meetings featured strongly worded condemnations of Russia and coordinated walkouts. Along similar lines, in the annual address of the OSCE Chair-in-Office at the UN Security Council on 14 March, Polish Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau likened Russia’s actions in Ukraine to “state terrorism”. Beyond symbolic acts, the OSCE has only a handful of available tools for responding to the war in Ukraine, given the polarisation among its participating states and its convention of operating by consensus. On 3 March, it mandated a fact-finding expert group to collect information about violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed during the war. But this enquiry will be limited, as the group has to submit its report within a few weeks. Another tangible and important step it might take would be to preserve the OSCE’s monitoring mission in Ukraine, whose mandate expires at the end of the month. Participating states will shortly commence negotiations, but it is questionable they will extend the mission’s mandate as doing so would require Russia and Ukraine to agree. Absent consensus, they can and should at least agree to “hibernating” it, rather than shutting it down completely. Hibernation would mean preserving the mission as a legal entity and maintaining core administrative functions, even as its operations remain paused. In the event of a ceasefire, hibernation would allow for rapid reactivation, saving precious time. Another, though less likely, possibility is that a reactivated OSCE monitoring mission could serve as a stopgap until the deployment of a more robust UN or hybrid UN-OSCE peacekeeping mission. When it comes to diplomatic engagement, the OSCE is unlikely to serve as the main mediator aiming to broker a settlement between Russia and Ukraine, given that Poland – which has an especially tense relationship with Moscow – now holds the chair. But the OSCE special representative for Ukraine could use his good offices to address specific issues, for example facilitating agreements on humanitarian access. Beyond Ukraine In countries beyond Ukraine, the OSCE continues to play a crucial conflict management role. A prime example is Georgia, whose two breakaway regions – Abkhazia and South Ossetia – Russia has recognised as independent states. Since the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, the OSCE has acted as one of three international mediators, along with the EU and the UN. Together, the trio are responsible for organising the Geneva International Discussions, a negotiating format that brings together Georgia, the de facto entities, Russia and the United States. The talks in Geneva have kept communication channels open and helped address incidents that otherwise could have escalated. In South Ossetia, the OSCE’s role has been particularly important. Much less visible than the EU, which runs a 200-person monitoring mission on the territory controlled by the Georgian government, the OSCE is considered an acceptable interlocutor by Russia and the allied de facto leadership in South Ossetia. The OSCE has therefore been able to broker deals, for example on water supply and access to farm land, which have reduced the risk of violence and improved the lives of people on both sides of the line of separation. The Ukraine war risks reopening wounds from 2008 and could upend the OSCE’s diplomatic efforts. Both breakaway regions have demonstrated strong support for Russia’s actions in Ukraine, while Georgia, although not joining sanctions against Russia, has still sent in an application for EU membership and voted to condemn Russia’s aggression within international institutions. These developments could have an impact on prospects for future cooperation and even on negotiation formats that have helped keep these conflict zones stable for over a decade. A worrying sign is that the UN, EU and OSCE co-chairs decided to cancel the forthcoming round of the Geneva talks scheduled at the end of March, following postponement of their pre-talks visit to the region and to Russia. The absence of regular talks undermines the OSCE’s ability to act as a mediator just when its role as a go-between may be most needed to maintain communication between the conflict parties and help address incidents that could spark violence. In Moldova, the OSCE plays an important role, too, acting as a mediator between the Moldovan government and de facto authorities in separatist Transdniestria. Its work has helped contain the conflict, stabilising the situation in a country that is vulnerable to being inflamed by tensions between Russia and the West. Likewise, the OSCE runs field operations in the Western Balkans and in Central Asia that perform local conflict management functions and aim to promote governance reforms, though the results in each place vary. The Need to Preserve the OSCE The deepening rift between Russia and the West threatens the OSCE’s very functioning. As noted, the organisation requires consensus to take decisions, which in effect bestows veto power on all participating states. The war in Ukraine risks not only paralysing the OSCE but also unravelling its core operations. For example, absent agreement among participating states, the OSCE’s field operations, which work to advance stability and governance reforms across the region, will collapse as they require annual mandate extensions. It is both possible and essential to avoid this scenario. Russia bears the primary responsibility. It must r
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