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2022 Georgetown Disadvantage

DA - NATO Tradeoff DAs - Georgetown 2022

DA - NATO Tradeoff DAs - Georgetown 2022.docx

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DA – NATO Tradeoff
DA – NATO Tradeoff [Collective Defense]
Notes
At: Ukraine/thumpers
Ukraine did not require shift priorities, just shifting where existing budget is spent
Plan requires rewriting military strategy
Do not read climate & collective together
L- INFO
Clearinghouse – NATO orgnaizationa focused on logistics (set of requirements for what we need to communicatE) bureaucratized, takes time, incentivzes ppl to ofocus on how much they r compling w/ those rules.
Bilateral info solves – much more flexible,
Competition – aff must do it through NATO process
Disrupts NATO’s rpiroities as an instituionT
NOTES
Low-level cyber ops (spreading disinfo, getting data, etc.)
OCOs are credible deterrent b/c they are proportionate
Credibly threaten to impose costs/
Deterrence by punishment
SANCTIONS similar – not credible & Russia invaded ukraine anyway, sanctions very costly – deterrnec by punishment, signaling
Alternative is do nothing or overreact
Current OCOs sufficient to deter Russia
No follow on
AF===
Conventional military responses to what Russia does in Baltics not credible b/c Russia believes they would be disprorpotinate or bluff
Small towns in eastern slice of Baltic country – Russia could get to Estonia in a couple of hours, invading nato member
If they take town and stop, what do we do? Do we just let thme keep it, lahout w/ military? – OCOs = FINE GRAIN
CP that imposes other credible deterrence
Deterrence by denial vs punishment – make it extremely difficult for thme to do the thing vs. threat of imposing costs – IRL deterrence is both
Conventional = NOT NUCLEAR and physical exchange of fire.
US beefing up forward presence throughout eastern europe
If Russia push further, have to go thru US, creates tripwire, much more likely to make them think twice
DA not great at deterring low level cyber
have internal link and impact defense to Russia low level cyber
1. Russia sufficiently deterred now
2. conventional stuff matters more – and cyber stuff doesn’t –
- limitations of cyber what are the limits of what we can accomplish through OCOs – plan prevents exposing each other more effectively do OCOs, but can’t make OCOs more capable of more than they can do. Maybe we can trun off power grid for a couple days, but is that really enough of a cost to not do something that threatens NATO – no
- conventional warfare key “forces postured” in Estonia – need to beat Russia
VERY intrinsic physical forces = tripwire
TURN OFF POWER GRID RELIES ON THEM THINKING THAT’S SOMETHING THEY CARE ABOUT
3. even insofar as cyber are able to deter, current cyber sufficient to do that already
-- AT: takeout I/L – current OCOs do as much as they could. Conventional operations/focus on NATO force posture key –
READ on case – u r wrong that there is fratricide, doesn’t actually disrupt operations why did they happen to conclude that current OCOs are fine. b/c they were wrong
Blockade black sea – care about continued flow of foods and goods etc.
If current OCOs are working well, 2NR can just say we need combo of all of these things, aff is wrong that they make other thing that much better, but they do sacrifice the other key piece of the puzzle that is in place – ONLY cyber stuff ONLY slightly better – neg = enough cyber stuff + other things we need to.
CP about force posture – do not go for w/ tradeoff
sanctions, posturing forces, position long-range strike capabilities far forward, destroy individual tanks – PROPORTIONAL
goes with OCOs bad
focusing NATO’s attention around sharing info to cyber stuff
1. do not fiat set of stuff that impact is about
2.
1NC – DA [Russia]
NATO will double down on collective defense against Russia now.
Kochis & Spoehr, 6/23 – senior policy analyst in European affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom (Daniel Kochis and Thomas W. Spoehr; "NATO Summit Madrid: Reinforcing Deterrence at This Crucial Time Is in the U.S. National Interest"; The Heritage Foundation; https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2022-06/IB5276_0.pdf; 06-23-2022, Accessed 6-25-2022)//ILake-NoC
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) summit in Madrid on June 29 and 30 comes at a consequential moment for the Alliance. Russia’s unprovoked second invasion of Ukraine, the ensuing war that has resulted in the deaths of at least 4,000 Ukrainian civilians,1 and the displacement of over 14 million people is very likely a fulcrum in history. The transatlantic community will not return to the pre-invasion relations with Russia and must plan accordingly. As the shock of Russia’s invasion on February 24 has evolved into the realization that the war is likely to grind on, the transatlantic community must steel itself for the long haul.
For NATO, the Madrid Summit is an opportunity to expand upon the initiatives announced at the Brussels Summit in April, fulfilling the immediate need for further deterrence measures in Eastern Europe with a clear-eyed resolve, while putting in place plans to ensure that NATO has the capabilities to continue tackling challenges over the long term. While the summit provides a historic opportunity, the danger is that the summit will merely repackage half measures—which Russia would see as a sign of weakness, inviting further aggression. The U.S. must ensure that the Madrid Summit fulfills its potential. For the United States, a stable, secure Europe is firmly in U.S. national interest, and a stable and secure Europe begins and ends with a vigorous NATO capable of deterring Russian aggression against its member states.
The past few months have underscored the reality that, while many European nations have stepped up, there is no substitute for U.S. leadership within NATO. As such, the U.S. should ensure that NATO implements measures that bolster deterrence immediately while laying the groundwork for retaining strength in the long term through robust defense investment. The U.S. should propel its allies toward a wholesale recommitment to collective defense and all that entails: robust, lasting commitments to defense spending, moving beyond tripwire forces in Eastern European member states toward a force posture of deterrence with broad participation across the Alliance; swift consideration of Finland and Sweden in NATO; and support for member states that are aiding Ukrainian forces.
In the U.S. National Interest: A Robust NATO
For economic, political, and security reasons, the U.S. maintains a central interest in the peace and security of the European continent. While Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine has proven profoundly destabilizing, the core mission of NATO, to deter aggression against member states, remains intact, and Russia has thus far shied away from any direct military action against a NATO member state. To avoid further miscalculations and lessen the chance that Vladimir Putin strikes a NATO member, the Alliance must bolster its deterrence posture, starting with fleshing out the promises of the Brussel Summit to put in place new forces to deter Russian aggression and, if necessary, defeat an invasion of a NATO country.
In response to Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, NATO created an Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) of four multinational battalions in each of the Baltic states and Poland. While the force size in each battalion, typically 1,000 to 1,500 troops, is small, the idea was to deploy a multintional force as a signal of resolve as well as a so-called tripwire to ensure that, should Russia invade, the battalion would not only slow down any advance but also provide critical political insurance that member states contributing troops would literally have skin (or, more accurately, lives) in the game to galvanize their sustained involvement in the conflict. This spring in Brussels, the Alliance announced the creation of four additional battalions, one each stationed in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. While the Alliance’s decision to create additional battalions is helpful, it is clear that a small tripwire force does not provide the deterrence effect that a larger force, complete with enablers, such as air defenses, could. Recently, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz backed the calls of Lithuanian officials (where Germany leads the EFP battalion) to create a brigade-size presence (usually 3,000 to 5,000 troops).2
The aff overcommits NATO to broad info-sharing responsibilities, which trades off with a focus on collective defense.
Moller, '20 – Assistant Professor at the School of Diplomacy and International Relations (Sara Bjerg Moller; "It Will Take More Than a Biden Victory to Solve NATO’s Strategic Malaise"; War on the Rocks; https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/it-will-take-more-than-a-biden-victory-to-solve-natos-strategic-malaise/; 9-25-2020, Accessed 6-24-2022)//ILake-NoC
If and when the Biden team embarks on its grand European tour, it seems virtually certain that, beyond the expressions of gratitude for America’s “return” that will surely follow them wherever they go, the delegation can expect to be met with a lengthy list of items requiring their immediate attention. Moreover, appeals for Washington’s assistance are likely to differ from capital to capital, with each NATO ally arguing that their particular issue or concern represents the most pressing challenge and therefore requires the most attention and resources. In Warsaw and the capitals of the Baltic states, the U.S. delegation will hear that, despite a new U.S. rotational troop deployment, a revanchist Russia necessitates additional NATO (but especially U.S.) military commitments along the Eastern flank of the alliance. In Rome, Athens, and Madrid, U.S. policymakers will learn that the Mediterranean countries represent the “soft underbelly” of NATO and that the alliance must do more to project stability along its southern arc of instability. In Ankara, the message will be one of anger directed at what the Erdogan government perceives as NATO’s collective failure to support Turkish actions in Syria and elsewhere. In Paris, the message for the U.S. delegation will be that the alliance must strengthen its counter-terrorism efforts in the Middle East and North Africa, while in Berlin the focus will be on reforming NATO’s nuclear posture and salvaging expiring arms-control agreements. Meanwhile, securing the Arctic and halting the effects of climate change will be at the top of the agenda in Copenhagen and Oslo.
In short, wherever the Biden presidential delegation goes, it will be met with requests that Washington — and with it, the NATO alliance — prioritize everything, thereby fulfilling the old adage that, “When everything is a priority, nothing is a priority.” Given the precarious state of international relations today, the temptation to do more is understandably strong. It is easy to understand why, in the present climate of global instability, calls for the transatlantic alliance to reinforce and strengthen its existing commitments while simultaneously adding new mandates, missions, and programs are popular. Rather than adding more items to its already crowded agenda, however, the time has come for not just the United States but also NATO to consider doing less but doing it better.
When More Is Less, and Less Is More
For an alliance that has long prided itself on its commonality of purpose and interests, the truth is that NATO is in danger of losing both. On paper and in public, the members still agree the core purpose of the 71-year-old alliance is deterrence and defense of the North Atlantic region. When internal disagreements are aired publicly, other allies are quick to dispel reports of rifts by pointing out that differences of opinion are nothing new. But unlike during the Cold War, when a single adversary occupied all of the alliance’s attention, today’s security environment — as the allies routinely remind each other — is multifaceted and complex. In an effort to address members’ often disparate security requirements, NATO has taken on additional tasks over the past three decades almost as quickly as it has taken on additional members. The NATO-ization of every security challenge has meant that issues once considered the purview of individual nations or other international organizations — such as migration, terrorism, and foreign security force assistance — are now lumped onto NATO’s agenda under the guise of fulfilling its ambitious (and potentially limitless) post-Cold War mandate of “projecting stability.”
For far too long now, alliance leaders have tasked the NATO military infrastructure with a seemingly impossible undertaking: weighing down the military organization with new responsibilities like peacekeeping and counter-terrorism while simultaneously allowing members to shirk on contributing the resources required to fulfill old and new alliance missions. To date, much of the criticism surrounding NATO’s current strategic deadlock has focused on the resource issue and the strains caused by uneven burden-sharing within the alliance. Far less attention has been paid to the first part of the “ends-means-ways” formulation of strategy, namely NATO’s original purpose. While addressing “means” and “ways” are crucial elements in any strategic enterprise, it is past time the Allies got around to focusing on NATO’s strategic ends once more.
Confronting NATO’s present strategic dilemma will require looking beyond existing strategic documents like the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, which proclaimed the signatories’ commitment to the “preservation of peace and security” in the North Atlantic area. As the past three decades of NATO transformation have shown, there is not much that does not fit under the rubric of fostering “peace and security” and consequently cannot be tacked onto the alliance’s agenda. True strategy requires setting (and adhering to) actual goals and priorities, as well as developing plans to achieve them. Although the alliance’s past strategic documents have often sought to define NATO’s evolving strategic purpose with more precision than the founding treaty, the alliance has not adopted a new strategic concept since 2010 for fear that embarking on such an exercise would only further inflame the deep rifts within the alliance that such strategic endeavors are meant to help address.
Officially, NATO members still assert collective defense is the alliance’s primary task, despite the inclusion of two other core tasks — projecting stability and cooperative security/crisis management — in all three of its post-Cold War Strategic Concepts (1991, 1999, 2010). The addition of these latter two core tasks — coupled with members’ differing threat perceptions about what rises to the level of an existential security threat — has clouded the organization’s focus. After three decades of continual adaptation, the danger that the alliance’s original raison d’étre of collective defense gets further downgraded to the point where it risks becoming primus inter pares among NATO’s many other responsibilities is real. As with previous critical junctures in transatlantic relations, it will take American leadership to change NATO’s future course. Come January 2021, a Biden administration should move swiftly to announce its intention to commission a new NATO strategic concept by 2022. Should Trump win, all bets are off.
Defenders of NATO’s post-Cold War emphasis on projecting stability and collective security argue that NATO has a proven track record of crisis management and capacity-building beyond its borders in places like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The alliance’s cooperative security track record, however, is hardly stellar. This past June, the NATO-led international peacekeeping force in Kosovo entered its 22nd year of operation. Almost 17 years after the alliance’s Integrated Military Command first assumed responsibilities in Afghanistan, the NATO flag continues to fly in Kabul, where some 15,000 allied troops remain as part of NATO’s Resolute Support mission. Nor can the alliance’s intervention in Libya in 2011 be considered a resounding success, judging by the state of affairs there today. That NATO remains engaged in some of these places decades afterward is not an impeachment of the men and women who served in these operations and performed the tasks demanded of them. It is, howevwer, evidence of NATO’s failure to give sufficient consideration to its core strategic purpose.
While one can debate the wisdom of NATO having accumulated such an expansionist security agenda in an era marked by American unipolarity, an all-encompassing approach to security is harder to justify in a time of waning American power. Just as the diminishing threat of great-power competition in the 1990s and early 2000s freed NATO to take on additional security tasks beyond its traditional mission of collective defense, its return should prompt a reexamination to determine whether NATO is still the appropriate entity for handling such tasks.
Another center of excellence, special representative, or office will not fix what ails NATO. As the authors of a recent Heritage Foundation report on “NATO in the 21st Century” put it, it is time for NATO to get “back to the basics.” There are limits to what an international institution — even one as successful as NATO — can accomplish: “When policymakers expect or want NATO to do what it was never designed to do, that is when the Alliance risks failure.”
The launch of NATO Secretary Gen. Jens Stoltenberg’s #NATO2030 reflection process earlier this year to address political reforms within the alliance presented just such an opportunity to tackle these and other big-picture questions. It is still unclear to what extent the pandemic has delayed the work of the group of experts begun last March. The Biden team will have to move quickly if it hopes to help shape the working group’s deliberations, as Stoltenberg is slated to brief members on the path forward for the alliance at the April 2021 Leaders’ Summit.
Back to the Future: Narrowing (Not Broadening) NATO’s Remit
Looking ahead, alliance leaders should consider ways to streamline current NATO missions and tasks so that responsibilities that fall below the threshold of existential challenges can be unloaded onto other multilateral institutions or global partnerships. In addition to bringing an end to the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, alliance leaders should consider getting NATO out of the security assistance and stabilization business altogether. Calls for NATO to look for opportunities to do more in the MENA region should also be rebuffed. Few would dispute that this region poses real security challenges to European states or that these challenges are particularly acute for the southernmost members of the alliance, some of whom might even view migration and refugee flows as rising to the level of existential threats. But while the 21st century challenges to the “stability and well-being” of member states may be numerous and growing, there is only one NATO. A single organization cannot tackle every national security challenge its members face. To remain useful, the alliance must choose which threats to prioritize.
Doing so requires recognizing that not every security issue rises to the level of an existential threat to the alliance. Terrorist attacks were a common occurrence in many West European nations in the 1970s and 1980s, yet NATO did not fundamentally transform its agenda back then because members recognized that the threat posed by the Soviet Union was greater. While neither Russia nor China as yet represents a threat on par with the Soviet Union, NATO should prepare for the possibility that the latter (either alone or in combination with Moscow) could pose an existential challenge to the Atlantic community in the coming decades.
Nor is it evident that NATO was ever the appropriate venue for tackling threats like terrorism in the first place. Effective counter-terrorism requires intelligence-sharing; local p

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