Aff - OCO Info Sharing 2 - Georgetown 2022
Aff - OCO Info Sharing 2 - Georgetown 2022.docx
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Wave 1 – Aff Compiled
Adv 1 – OCOs
UQ – Integration
NATO has intent to integrate offensive cyber operations now but its request-based system undermines efficacy – unification of protocols and intel-sharing is key
Lonergan and Montgomery 22 – Dr. Erica Lonergan is an assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute at West Point. She is also a research scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Erica previously served as a senior director on the Cyberspace Solarium Commission. Retired Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, US Navy, is the senior director of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Mark previously served as the executive director of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission. ("Pressing Questions: Offensive Cyber Operations and NATO Strategy"; Modern War Institute; https://mwi.usma.edu/pressing-questions-offensive-cyber-operations-and-nato-strategy/; 1-25-2022, Accessed 6-24-2022)//ILake-AZ
Offensive Cyber Operations in NATO Strategy Above and Below the Level of Warfare
Historically, NATO’s cyber posture has largely focused on defense and resilience—and this continues to form the bulk of NATO’s approach. The alliance maintains that its “main focus in cyber defence is to protect its own networks (including operations and missions) and enhance resilience.” At the 2014 Wales summit, NATO endorsed the Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy, which affirmed that cyber defense is part of collective defense and that the alliance would incorporate cyber defense into its planning and operations. In 2016, NATO members pledged to improve their cyber defenses through training, education, exercises, and information sharing.
But the seeds were also planted in 2016 for NATO to consider a potential role for offensive cyber operations. That year, the alliance recognized cyberspace as a domain of military operations, comparable to land, sea, and air. At the 2018 Brussels summit, NATO began to more seriously consider offensive cyber operations. Specifically, NATO created the Cyberspace Operations Centre to coordinate requests for member states to provide offensive cyber effects through the Sovereign Cyber Effects Provided Voluntarily by Allies process. Following the 2018 summit, then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis stated in a press conference that five states—the United States, the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Estonia—were contributing cyber forces to “help NATO fight in this important domain.” More recently, in June 2021, NATO convened in Brussels and committed to a Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy. A key feature of the new policy is the prominent role of offensive cyber operations. In Brussels, member states committed to “employ the full range of capabilities at all times to actively deter, defend against, and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats.”
NATO’s shift to incorporating offensive cyber operations into existing strategy and policy has focused on integrating offensive effects into conventional military plans and operations in the context of a conflict. While NATO’s updated strategy is a positive development,—particularly the mismatch between the alliance’s clear distinction between wartime its limited focus on conflict scenarios for employing cyber power fails to accurately account for the cyber threat environment NATO faces and peacetime and the approach of adversaries like Russia, who adopt a competition-conflict continuum. Additionally, the focus on employing offensive cyber during a high-end conventional fight is also not consistent with how several NATO members are already engaged in gray zone offensive cyber operations.
The primary threat to NATO allies in the cyber domain is not from high-end, decisive cyberattacks. Instead, cyber threats more frequently and effectively manifest as gray zone tactics designed to have a corrosive effect without rising to the level of warfare. There are numerous examples of this type of threat. For instance, in July 2021, NATO publicly condemned a range of malicious cyber behavior, including the Microsoft Exchange hack (which NATO attributed to China) and ransomware attacks targeting critical infrastructure. Russia has leveraged cyber and disinformation operations to interfere in democratic elections in the United States in 2016, 2018, and 2020; France in 2017; and Germany in 2017 and 2021—to name just a few examples. Russia also conducted distributed denial-of-service cyberattacks against government websites in Montenegro during the lead-up to, and following, Montenegro’s ascension to NATO in 2017. And when NATO forces were positioned in the Baltics beginning in 2017 as part of NATO’s enhanced forward presence, two threat actors, GhostWriter and Secondary Infektion, conducted a range of disinformation campaigns.
Additionally, the reality is that several NATO members are already speaking publicly about offensive cyber operations below the level of warfare and their statements and actions have an effect on the entire alliance. In particular, NATO member nations have not reached a political consensus about the role of offensive cyber operations. In 2018, the US Department of Defense and US Cyber Command issued new strategy and policy documents that articulated a role for the military in conducting offensive cyber operations below the level of armed conflict outside of US-controlled cyberspace (part of the “defend forward” strategy), and there has been some reporting about US offensive cyber operations. For instance, in 2018 the United States disrupted the Russian-linked Internet Research Agency from interfering in the midterm elections. And, more recently, in December 2021 General Paul Nakasone, commander of US Cyber Command, publicly acknowledged that the military played a role in disrupting ransomware groups targeting critical infrastructure. The United States has also worked with other NATO allies, such as Estonia and Montenegro, to conduct “hunt forward” cyber operations on allied and partner networks to uncover and disrupt malicious cyber activity.
Other NATO allies have also been more transparent about offensive cyber operations. In 2020, the United Kingdom announced a significant investment in its National Cyber Force, its organizational arm for offensive cyber operations, and its 2022 National Cyber Strategy emphasized the role of offensive cyber operations. In November 2021, General Nakasone and the director of Government Communications Headquarters—the UK government’s principal signals intelligence agency—stated jointly that the two governments were collaborating to “impose consequences” in cyberspace to disrupt adversary operations. The Netherlands has also publicly alluded to conducting offensive cyber operations.
Next Steps: Addressing Challenges and Mitigating Risks
Given the threat environment facing NATO, as well as the activities of several NATO members, the alliance should deliberately—but purposefully—consider incorporating offensive cyber operations below the level of armed conflict into its deterrence strategy. Any effort to explore a role for offensive cyber operations should also consider the challenges and risks that may come with doing so. A central challenge is that, at the political level, NATO allies lack consensus on the appropriate application of offensive cyber power—especially below the level of armed conflict. Addressing these disagreements among member states is essential because conducting offensive cyber operations often requires maneuvering through or operating on networks controlled by an ally or allies. Right now, NATO members do not collectively agree on the protocols and processes for partner actions in allied networks—and they also disagree on how to define sovereignty in cyberspace, or when an offensive cyber operation would rise to the level of an armed attack.
Offensive cyber operations for NATO also present real interoperability challenges. The role of intelligence in cyber operations is likely to complicate NATO planning processes. Even close allies are likely to be wary about sharing sensitive intelligence for a number of reasons. For instance, they may be averse to sharing information gleaned from signals intelligence collection or because a member state may be using the same exploits for both offensive action and their own espionage—including intelligence collection against allies. Or, allies may simply be worried that sensitive information may become exposed. On top of this, it’s challenging to adjudicate intelligence requirements among allies and to deconflict intelligence and military priorities. It is also not clear whether the alliance has established consensus thresholds that specify the conditions and timeline under which a state would have to notify others of its activities on their networks—if at all.
The alliance should account for, and address, these issues as NATO explores the prospect of incorporating offensive cyber operations below the level of armed conflict into existing NATO simulations and exercises that span the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. A number of important questions about how to coordinate offensive cyber operations and define roles and responsibilities remain unanswered. For instance, how could allies improve intelligence sharing to conduct more rapid attribution, enabling one state or the alliance to respond to adversary cyber activity? What are the conditions under which allies should consider dividing responsibilities for cyber campaign planning and developing accesses and capabilities against strategic targets in, for example, Russia? If some allies are responsible for offensive cyber operations against certain targets, what are the information-sharing and notification requirements?
Analysis of NATO countries proves opposite
Marrone and Sabatino 21 – Alessandro Marrone is the Head of the Defense Program at the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome and Ester Sabatino is Research Analyst for Defence and Military Analysis at the The International Institute for Strategic Studies. “Cyber Defence in NATO Countries: Comparing Models” Published 2021. https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/65693094/iaip2105-with-cover-page-v2.pdf?Expires=1656100418&Signature=GHDFg-q6Oy29igACe~s1a00WuObIobCutomMJMI5t90rwn8AItAiAmfGvzOiRtoREH2y1Pusv9Q6VI06Pa8zA0rtsxcza1XWLk-u2djuFKb~e86ZbgwJI7~YI~gKSeH3C9dPNWTc8ikBNkD4E7bdCwlX6JjhocJu0XXlzbPO5c89uOV7FkQlQgMB1OV1WTVXOEwept~mTrHrQGZJk~Ny2YiVdNuh4qmA8kyluwEMAF~TUIOfCM-qFria7gpup2Wz4O2bC4W-D6oBREg9lqeeuU7l53Aoog196oK7F1~Fh1dBEgsvQoEhkTuox18akvt-Ar90yOWFnnBR0qTgLjK1hA__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA // DG
The analysis of five national case studies has resulted in the identification of different approaches towards cyber defence, as proof of how much has yet to be accomplished in defining shared doctrines and procedures. Among the countries taken into consideration, a substantial divide can be traced between states that envisage the possibility of carrying out exclusively defensive actions, and those that count on the ability to perform offensive operations also in the absence of a cyber-attack.
Among the first group are Germany and Spain, which envision cyber deterrence as the country’s ability to promptly and adequately respond to a cyber-attack, enacting what is defined as hack-back. Additional differences between Berlin and Madrid concern the possibility of deploying the armed forces on national territory in the event of an attack, which would need prior authorisation by Parliament in Germany. It is important to note, however, that this procedure poorly matches the speed of reaction necessary to limit or avoid the damage of a cyber-attack: parliamentary timeframes, in cases that require rapid and tailored actions, could mean the state’s inability to protect its primary interests and thus hinder national defence.
London, Paris and Washington, by contrast, have a different understanding of the possibilities deriving from an active use of cyber defence. For the three capitals, cyber defence and deterrence are about ensuring not only reaction capabilities in the event of a cyber-attack, but also the possibility of a preventive action against potential adversaries, be they state or non-state actors. Following this logic, for instance, the UK carried out a cyber-attack to the detriment of ISIS in 2016.
Despite these differences, it is possible to outline shared necessities among the five countries take into consideration, which can be summed up as follows: • Necessity to have a shared regulatory and doctrinal framework at the NATO, EU and international level; • Better integration of the cyber element in national and allied command structures; • More structured and strategic collaboration with enterprises and research entities; • Specialised training of military personnel devoted to protection from the cyber threat; and • Increased awareness about the use of cyberspace among state officials, critical infrastructure managers and the population in general.
I/L – OCOs = Deterrence
OCO’s = deterrence + traditional deterrence theory doesn’t assume OCOs
Oolup 22 – Master’s degree from the University of Tartu (Laura Oolup; " CYBER AS A DETERRENT: UTILIZING OFFENSIVE CYBER CAPABILITIES IN NATO’S DETERRENCE POSTURE "; Modern War Institute; https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/223009731.pdf; 1-25-2022, Accessed 6-24-2022)//ILake-AZ
In this context, classical deterrence theory in regards of utilizing offensive cyber capabilities as a deterrent, should be improved by considering the secretive nature of offensive cyber capabilities and not requiring their exposure the same way as it is expected from using conventional means as deterrent. In this context, it should be more emphasized that the capability and willingness of relaying different types of cyber effects is there. This can be done through exercises but also through previously conducted offensive cyber operations in other domains.
Another feature that the classical deterrence theories do not address - but need to in order to explain how the offensive cyber capabilities can be used as means of deterrence - is taking into account the time constraint. The latter in the sense that deploying those cyber weapons which have the potential to generate greater strategic effects by targeting the functionality of critical infrastructure for instance, tends to be a long-term process. In order to instantly retaliate the enemy with this kind of operation, the deterrer needs to be in the adversary’s systems beforehand. Notably, as it was described in the theoretical section above, developing a sophisticated cyber weapon that could inflict damage on the industrial control system for instance, involves numerous time-consuming steps. The question that needs to be considered in this regard is how to hold the enemy at risk by threatening to harm the critical infrastructure through offensive cyber means in case it should decide to attack. Subsequently, if it requires the presence-based approach, then how to communicate that to the adversary to ensure the credibility of the threat, but without increasing instability between the actors?
However, in general, the mainstream deterrence theories seem to remain applicable to utilizing offensive cyber capabilities as means of deterrence. Because despite the different means to be used, it is still necessary to reflect to the potential enemy which kind of retaliatory capabilities one has and thereby which costs the enemy can expect in case it decides to attack. Therefore, the following recommendations can be given to NATO on how it could bolster its deterrence posture through the utilization of offensive cyber capabilities as means of deterrence.
First, NATO should take a step further and not limit itself considering the offensive cyber capabilities only as measures to deter the enemy from carrying out malicious activity in cyberspace. The strategic value of offensive cyber capabilities has been presented in this paper and thereby NATO should seek for options to include offensive cyber capabilities as means of cross-domain deterrence. This should accordingly be reflected in its strategy documents. However, for effective deterrence the identified credibility issues need to be mitigated.
NATO and its member states – particularly those that have offered their capabilities for the NATO’s use – need to achieve a common terminology and understanding of the offensive cyber capabilities and offensive cyber operations. Analysing the public documents from this angle, it was identified that the degree of effects Allies considered to be generated through the offensive cyber operations did differ. These different perceptions need to be aligned to make sure the enemy perceives that the Alliance has unified position on how the offensive cyber capabilities could be deployed and what kind of cyber effect it is willing to relay.
Third recommendation would be to have a clearer message on which kind of costs the enemy could expect from the deterrer’s offensive cyber capabilities. The actions alone are not enough. Words complement the actions and enable to prevent misperceptions and thereby mitigate the potential security dilemma that may occur. As noted in the theoretical part, relaying kinetic effects has greater strategic value, especially by targeting the critical infrastructure that the military also relies on. In this case – as it was also illuminated on the existing deterrence theory – it could be necessary to have access in the enemy’s systems before the crisis should erupt. Because NATO has emphasized its defensive posture also while talking about the offensive cyber capabilities, then it is particularly important to create the right narrative to avoid increasing the instability, contributing to security dilemma, and enabling the enemy to have a misperception on this. Finding the right balance here is probably the most difficult task. Thus, having an improved version of deterrence theory that can explain and guide how to make the cyber threat credible without increasing the instability, would be extremely valuable.
However, logic effects should not be left aside. Depending on the target, this could be the way to go as well. Concerning Russia – the subject of NATO’s deterrence – should be vulnerable to logic effects that intend to affect the stability of internal politics. This is presumed based on Rivera’s work on to which kind of cyberattacks countries are vulnerable to based on their power position and social cohesion (Rivera 2015:9-11). However, this should be further examined in the future on what would be strategically the most valuable targets to hold at risk as part of the deterrent threat related to Russia.
To sum up, NATO has the potential to bolster its deterrence by considering the offensive cyber capabilities as means of deterrence. It can be partly achieved by starting with meeting the conditions classical deterrence theories have set, like having a clear and unified message about the cyber capabilities as retaliatory measures. Yet, to ensure the total effectiveness, the classical deterrence theory needs to be improved by acknowledging the secretive nature of offensive cyber capabilities and answering questions on how to hold the enemy at risk by threatening to harm its critical infrastructure through offensive cyber means and if presence-based approach is required, how to communicate that to the adversary without increasing instability between the actors.
NATO intel-sharing is key to deter increasingly aggressive Russian cyberattacks
Lewis and Warner 22 – James Andrew Lewis is the Senior Vice President and the Director of the Technology and Public Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Senator Mark Warner is the senior United States senator from Virginia, first elected in 2008. He is a member of the Democratic Party, vice chair of the Senate Democratic Caucus, and chair of the Senate
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