AT - OSCE CP - Georgetown 2022
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AFF OSCE CP---2AC The OSCE fails---they can’t paper over fundamental differences AND Russian propaganda undermines their credibility Andrew Lohsen 22, fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., “Can the OSCE Help Resolve the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?,” CSIS, 1/12/2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-osce-help-resolve-russia-ukraine-crisis Why the OSCE Is the Wrong Platform . . . for Now Despite these indications of the positive role the OSCE could play in resolving the current situation, there are strong counterarguments. The first is that Russia and the West remain too far apart on basic positions to make use of the OSCE’s good offices. As a veteran U.S. diplomat and former OSCE mission head concluded, the organization, like any other multilateral institution, “reflects the state of relations among the nations that make up its membership. When relations are good or most of the member states are like-minded, the organization works well. When relations are bad and there are major disagreements among members, that same organization will not function.” For the OSCE to serve as a useful platform for discussions, Russian officials and Western counterparts will need to come to Vienna with the belief that it is possible to bridge their divergent positions, and they must have an idea of where common ground might be found. It is unclear whether the faint glimmer of optimism after the January 10 bilateral meeting between U.S. and Russian leaders in Geneva will endure. While Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov remarked on the serious and businesslike tone of the meeting, little headway was made to narrow the negotiating margins. The OSCE’s new chair-in-office, Polish foreign minister Zbigniew Rau, who assumed the one-year position at the beginning of the year, has indicated his readiness to hold a dialogue on a revised security paradigm—“provided that countries do not violate existing norms in order to gain a privileged position in such a discussion.” Unless Russia drops its more strident demands, negotiations in the OSCE track will yield the same results as talks in Geneva and Brussels. A second concern is that disagreement on fundamental principles could lead to a crisis within the organization. In its recent proposals to the United States and NATO, and in statements by top officials, Russia offered far-fetched interpretations of “indivisible security” according to which Ukraine’s right to apply for membership in NATO presents a “legitimate” threat to Russia’s security interests. However, its disregard of the specific commitments outlined in the Decalogue suggests that Moscow is inclined to view comprehensive security as a rhetorical fig leaf rather than a shared principle guiding relations between states. Accordingly, if OSCE participating states were to engage in a deep, formal discussion of these principles, it is unclear whether they would be able to reach consensus on previous shared positions that heretofore were considered the least common denominator. Parallels between the current context and the ill-fated Corfu Process of 2008–2010, which ultimately led to a “near death experience” for the OSCE, will likely prompt several delegations to refrain from convening for a summit to consider existential questions regarding European security. Finally, Russia has systematically undermined public confidence in the OSCE through disinformation and obstructionism. In recent years, Russia has leveled accusations of bias against the OSCE, particularly its Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), which was established in 2014 to report objectively on the situation in the country at a time when “little green men” began to appear in Crimea. Russian officials and press outlets frequently accuse the organization of ignoring alleged violations by Ukrainian authorities, but in reality, many of these allegations are hyperbolized or cannot be corroborated according to the mission’s strict reporting standards. Elsewhere, Russia undermined the organization’s long-standing effort to achieve a political resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute by unilaterally brokering a hasty ceasefire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020, despite serving as a lead facilitator of OSCE peace talks. Further examples abound. The Kremlin’s tendency to undermine the OSCE, cast aspersions on its credibility, and question its competence when it cannot be manipulated to serve Moscow’s aims has taken a toll on the organization’s reputation, particularly in Russia. This makes it more difficult for an OSCE-brokered outcome to be presented to the public or to be respected by officials and military leaders in Russia. Perm do both---regulatory fora are complimentary, NOT competitive Daniel Mügge 21, Professor of Political Arithmetic at the University of Amsterdam, “Cooperation á la carte is the way forward for EU AI regulation,” London School of Economics, 11/26/2021, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/11/26/cooperation-a-la-carte-is-the-way-forward-for-eu-ai-regulation/ Earlier this year, the EU became the first major jurisdiction to publish a set of draft rules for artificial intelligence (AI). There are good reasons to keep close legislative tabs on AI technology. Concerns range from algorithmic discrimination and distorted democracy to ubiquitous surveillance and outright oppression. Beyond these questions loom deeper concerns. A world saturated with machines able to predict and exploit our fears and desires fundamentally challenges human autonomy. At the same time, AI-led automation has the potential to deprive many people of their jobs once the government debt-fuelled post-pandemic boom peters out. Already, automation has driven a wedge between the upper and lower echelons of labour markets. Aided by smart machines, many highly educated workers have seen their productivity rise, while jobs with more routine tasks, in contrast, have slowly disappeared. The European Commission proudly touts a European third way on AI regulation: rather than letting algorithms serve the state (as in China) or large corporations (as in the United States), the Brussels approach aims to put them at the service of people – ‘trustworthy AI’, as the EU slogan puts it. This entails curtailing the freedom afforded to the masters of AI – be they governments or companies. This European approach will encounter two key obstacles. First, by most measures the EU tech sector already lags those in China and America. Slamming the breaks on AI applications is bound to widen that gap. After all, algorithms thrive on ‘learning by doing’. The creation of a European data space and coordinated seed investment by EU member states is meant to boost the homegrown sector. But whether that’s enough to make European AI more than a sideshow on the global stage is anybody’s guess. Second, American politicians and pundits alike increasingly frame AI as a security issue. Earlier this year, the final report issued by the US National Security Commission on AI portrayed AI as a tech race between China and the United States, with the loser vulnerable to the winner’s AI supremacy. Such a dog-eat-dog tech world has little patience for the finer points of AI ethics. Hence, the report implies that Europeans would be well-advised to climb into the passenger seat of a US-led alliance of ‘freedom-loving’ tech powers and leave the steering to Washington and Silicon Valley. These forces are pulling European states in opposite directions. Ethical concerns inspire caution, competitiveness concerns encourage European boldness, while the security-framing of AI suggests Europe should play a junior role in a Western alliance. So, what is the way forward? Cooperation á la carte Much of the current debate on the global dynamics of AI regulation is unduly simplistic, treating ‘AI regulation’ as though it were a single, monolithic block, to be approached either alone or in cooperation with one or the other partner. Instead, a nuanced perspective would be to recognise the enormous breadth of uses and regulatory concerns currently lumped under the AI-heading. To be sure, with open economic borders the effectiveness of European AI rules hinges on what other major jurisdictions do – the AI field is rife with ‘regulatory interdependence’. What good are EU rules against invisible discrimination in automated CV-sorting when clients can simply use US-based services instead? What good are tight privacy rules when we can import AI systems trained on data unethically harvested from citizens abroad? Yet this regulatory interdependence is variegated: in some domains – say, the global spread of automated weapons systems – the EU is entirely dependent on cooperation with other major powers. In others, such as safety standards for self-driving cars, it can craft its own rules and testing procedures, quite irrespective of what others do. Some applications, such as the resilience of AI-powered infrastructure, have direct relevance for NATO as a security alliance; others, like rules for Twitter-algorithms or automated loan approval, are not security-relevant at all. This variegated regulatory interdependence – high in some cases, low in others – invites a differentiated approach to global AI regulation. Where global standards might align with European regulatory goals, they are clearly preferrable. When such agreement is out of reach, second-best options emerge: mini-lateral solutions such as shared standards crafted in the newly minted Transatlantic Technology Council. Mutual recognition of different but equally stringent standards are also an option, as is support for private tech-industry standards. But where EU ethical goals are best served by Brussels forging ahead on its own – as it did with the General Data Protection Regulation – it should have the courage to do so. There is no reason to think the EU will be well-served by a one-size-fits-all-AI-uses approach to international regulatory cooperation. It should not blindly give in to the ‘are you with us or against us’ logic prominent in American thinking. The diverse ethical trade-offs AI raises weigh too heavily to be tackled well in a uniform international mould. Always heedful of which approach allows it to maximise its digital sovereignty on any particular issue, the EU should cooperate where feasible and dare to go it alone where it must. Such an á la carte approach to global regulation has served the EU well in many other fields, from finance and food safety to pharmaceuticals. There is no reason to think it would fail in relation to AI. OSCE CP---NATO Key---Interop NATO is key---they have unique institutions for facilitating legal interoperability Zoe Stanley-Lockman & Lena Trabucco 22, Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore; Lena Trabucco is a dual degree candidate pursuing a PhD in political science at Northwestern University and a PhD in Law at iCourts Center of Excellence in International Courts at the University of Copenhagen, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, edited by Justin Bullock et al., Oxford University Press, 03/18/2022, DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.013.69 One vital and unique contribution for NATO is facilitating legal interoperability among the Allies to resolve some of the most pressing legal barriers for AI implementation in future Allied operations. Legal interoperability, a subset of larger coalition interoperability, refers to the operational coordination around partner legal obligations and interpretations.75 It ensures “that within a military alliance, military operations can be conducted effectively consistent with the legal obligations of each nation.”76 Legal interoperability is a critical component of multilateral operations that has thus far been under-examined, despite its centrality to successful military operations. This is largely because “legal factors have a bearing on everything in alliances and coalition operations—from determining basic ‘troop-to-task’ considerations to decisions regarding the targets to be engaged—and the types of ordinances that may be used.”77 To enhance legal interoperability, NATO can exert its influence on how Allies can develop and deploy AI consistent with their legal obligations through its unique standardization capacities. Historically, NATO has taken significant steps to bridge the legal gap between Allies on critical procedures that bridge responsible state behavior with such “troop-to-task” considerations. One instructive example from past operations is detention policies in non-international armed conflicts.78 The promulgation of detention standards illustrates the operational significance of NATO’s common legal procedures, even for coalitions of the willing that formally operate outside NATO structures. By way of background, the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan had internal debates regarding the 96-hour security detention time period.79 The United States advocated extending the 96-hour rule, where coalition partners insisted adhering to the NATO standard, even though it was not a NATO operation.80 Generally the detention example illustrates NATO legal standards providing clarity to non-NATO operations; in some cases, Allies adopt NATO standards as accepted thresholds that continue to inform coalition policies beyond NATO structures and operations. Implementing AI in future military operations will almost certainly complicate legal interoperability as there is a lack of uniform standards, as in the detention example. Even some of the more basic implementation measures will garner legal uncertainty and Allies will inevitably navigate with minimal legal clarity and no standard procedures. Despite the roots of the legal debate stemming from the question of lethality, the most pressing (and urgent) legal issues will address the integration of necessary AI-enablers, such as data gathering and sharing. Furthermore, NATO has coordinated initiatives to promote awareness of Allies’ legal obligations and has a dedicated office focusing on legality. This centralizes the institutional capacity to focus on alignment not only between the policies of NATO Allies, but coherence with the international community more broadly. Among others, the NATO Legal Practitioners’ Workshop and inter-organizational dialogue between NATO, the UN, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the latter of which has a delegation to NATO that provides legal training and education to practitioners.81 The NATO Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) itself can also play a central role in navigating the challenges to legal interoperability. As the example of detention standards illustrates, NATO has been successful in implementing legal standards which translated into operational clarity and coalition policy outside NATO operations. As part of its focus on responsibility in its EDT agenda, NATO has opportunities to facilitate AI legal standard-setting and coalition policies to ensure safer and responsible use of AI in Allied operations. OSCE CP---NATO Key---OSCE Fails The OSCE fails---it can’t mediate conflicts if the parties aren’t open to mediation. Philip Remler 21, nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “The OSCE as Sisyphus: Mediation, Peace Operations, Human Rights,” Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), 2021, JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep30942 Over the past decade, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has unwillingly been returning to its origins as a Cold War–era Conference – a forum where states and blocs, often antagonistic to one another and espousing opposing ideals, can air their frictions and hostilities and look for ways to overcome them. A brief historical review is necessary. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) established by the 1975 Helsinki Final Act was one manifestation of Europe’s aspiration to establish an international order to keep the peace and, as Andrei Sakharov wrote in his Nobel speech that year, to stress “the link between defense of peace and defense of human rights”.1 However, the CSCE was created without the legal personality other international organisations possessed, and operated on the principle of consensus – i.e., all “participating States” (members) must agree to every decision. The lack of legal personality, a US demand at the time, prevented the development of a strong executive and professional cadre along UN lines, and made such basic operational issues as diplomatic immunities and customs clearances dependent upon individual states. The consensus principle, advocated by the Soviet Union, blocked most unified action except in narrowly defined and relatively uncontroversial areas. To this day, these two characteristics render the organisation heavily dependent on and constrained by its participating States. The end of the Cold War temporarily loosened those constraints and after 1989 the CSCE flowered in the prevailing spirit of pan-European cooperation. Consensus was the norm, allowing the OSCE to establish missions throughout the former Soviet Union and Balkans despite the absence of legal personality. Based on the Charter of Paris (1990), accepted by all participating States, the CSCE eventually became the OSCE in 1994 and acted as an executive organisation in matters of mediation, peace operations and the promotion of human rights and democratic governance. Russia even allowed the OSCE to establish a mission in 1995 in wartorn Chechnya; and the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) deployed election monitoring missions in states that had not held free elections in living memory, if ever. The lack of legal personality and requirement for consensus were moot – for a time. But as attitudes towards Charter of Paris commitments fragmented over the last decade, these constraints resurfaced, shrinking the OSCE’s room for manoeuvre. Missions closed, mediation – never very successful – returned to individual states, and the promotion of human rights and democratic governance met a backlash that brought the organisation to a standstill. In essence, the OSCE is returning to its origins as a permanent forum for dialogue only – with extremely constrained executive action capabilities – among states and blocs, often hostile toward one another. The OSCE’s efforts span a broad range of activities within the three “dimensions” of its original mandate: security and political-military affairs (with an emphasis on mediation), economics/environment and the “human dimension”, including human rights and governance. The three overlap and “cross-dimensional” activities are frequent. Conflict mediation, peace operations and the promotion of human rights and democracy remain among OSCE’s most important activities to this day and offer evidence to assess the state of the organisation. 1. Mediation Mediation became crucial to OSCE efforts in the 1990s with the outbreak of armed conflicts in the wake of the Soviet collapse. The OSCE has mediated in several “frozen conflicts” in the former Soviet space (namely Karabakh in Azerbaijan, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia and Transdniestria in Moldova) and in Ukraine, a conflict that was on its way to becoming frozen even as intense fighting raged. As an OSCE Head of Mission succinctly put it, “the conflicts themselves are not frozen – only the peace processes are”.2 The last ten years have seen progress through international mediation in only one of the four “traditional” frozen conflicts listed below. Because the OSCE’s efforts regarding the conflict in Ukraine are so boun
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