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2022 Georgetown Affirmative

Aff - OCO Info Sharing 3 - Georgetown 2022

Aff - OCO Info Sharing 3 - Georgetown 2022.docx

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Cohesion
NATO cohesion necessary to maintain stable world order
NATO 20 (Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General, NATO 2030; United for a New Era, 11/25/2020, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf) -LH
In spite of these challenges, NATO remains indispensable. In fact, the fundamental purpose of NATO is more demonstrably clear today than it has been for decades. NATO has weathered stormy times before, surviving the Soviet threat, the Suez Crisis, divisions among Allies over the Vietnam war, dictatorships in its own ranks, the Euromissile debates, disagreements over enlargement, and the Iraq War—just to name a few. Now, as then, Allies have remained bound together by a combination of shared principles, democratic institutions, and the benefit that all Allies derive from collective security. Looking out to 2030, the need for a collective defence Alliance to protect Europe and North America against threats to their physical security and democratic way of life is as strong as ever.
Yet NATO will have to continue to adapt. In a world of systemic challengers and proliferating threats, the Alliance, in complementarity with the comprehensive military adaptation it has undergone, must cement its ability to act as the principal political forum for the strategic and geopolitical challenges facing the transatlantic community. Fulfilling this role will require even greater cohesion than NATO has possessed in recent years. As it has since NATO’s founding, cohesion resides in the ability and will to act collectively against shared threats. This is the lifeblood that ensures the vitality, credibility, and durability of the Alliance; it becomes all the more important in a sharpened competitive environment that requires collaboration and effective networks to deal with growing threats.
In recent years, Allies have strengthened the military component of NATO and should continue to do so. But in parallel, they must move decisively to bolster the political dimension of NATO, including its foundations of shared democratic principles, mechanisms of consultation, processes of decision-making, and political tools for responding to current and emerging threats. If they do so, NATO will be in a strong position to protect the freedom and security of its members and act as an essential pillar of an open and stable international order.
Cohesive NATO approach to cyber operations will be critical in dealing with cyber threats
Shea 18 (Jamie Shea, Dr. Jamie Shea is deputy assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges at NATO, “Cyberspace as a Domain of Operations What Is NATO’s Vision and Strategy?” MCU Journal, vol 9, no 2, Fall 2018, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1068701.pdf)- LH
In sum, 2016 was the year when the cyberthreat ceased being a concern primarily for individual entities, such as banks, critical infrastructure providers, or hospitals worried about losing data, to become an instrument of hybrid warfare, where the state and society are virtually under permanent attack. The problem with cyber is that, because it is so easy to use, states may decide to attack targets and risk an increase in international tensions that they would probably refrain from doing if they had to use more conventional and overtly aggressive means. So cyber blurs the clear distinction between war and peace and creates a sense that everything a state normally believes it has under control (its administration, election processes, critical infrastructure, key supply chains, and economy) is now being contested or is even under permanent siege.
Given this multiplicity of cyber threats and attack vectors, the concept of what a state needs to defend has shifted. It is now no longer a specific strategic asset, such as an oil refinery or airfield, or a particular invasion route, such as the Fulda Gap in Germany during the Cold War, but it becomes virtually any kind of critical national infrastructure—from undersea internet cables to banks; electricity grids; industrial control systems (ICS); telecommunications; and gas, oil, and water pipelines.13 The scope is almost endless. The state cannot hope to achieve full protection of all these complex and often interdependent networks alone. It has to prioritize and delegate protective responsibilities to the regional or local level or to the private sector that owns and operates much of this critical infrastructure. In terms of basic cybersecurity, it becomes the duty of care and risk calculation of the individual citizen. Cyberspace has rapidly become a domain where everyone is calling upon everyone else to take action. The individual calls on the bank to provide better protection, the bank demands better software from the tech company, the tech company recommends better insurance coverage, while claiming that it is only a platform to post and transmit data and has no particular responsibility for the content. Meanwhile, the state has to decide whether regulation or voluntary effort is the best way to induce companies and individuals to improve their cyber hygiene and restore trust in a cyberspace that is an increasingly important part of economic growth.
For military establishments and an organization such as NATO, fully establishing cyberspace as an operational domain imposes clear cultural shifts and organizational adaptations, with the follow-on impacts for all other operational domains. Cyberspace cannot be a separate silo but has to be integrated with all these other operational domains. Operations in cyberspace need to be designed to support conventional military activity, as a force multiplier, and vice versa. This means that commands must understand, trust, and be prepared to employ all capabilities and determine those situations where the use of a cyber effect would perform a military task more quickly, efficiently, or more cheaply than a conventional weapon. An example is the debate in the Barack H. Obama administration during the Libya conflict in 2011 over whether to use cruise missiles or cyberattacks to take down Muammar Gaddafi’s air defenses.14 This debate revolved around cost-effectiveness, durability of impact, and the international precedent that might be created by the U.S. use of military cyber capabilities. Essentially, it means understanding the characteristics of offensive cyber and what it can and cannot achieve and the risks in terms of cost-benefit analysis. Collateral damage is one such risk as cyber tends to have horizontal rather than vertical effects through the nature of the hyper-connectivity of the internet. When the Stuxnet worm was used in 2010 against the Siemens operating software at the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran, it was introduced via a USB stick outside the internet and was designed to infiltrate only one type of software.15 It was seen as preferable to military actions, because it was covert, highly specific, and a way to minimize violence even if hundreds of Iranian centrifuges would be incapacitated. Yet, it ended up on the internet and traces of Stuxnet were found subsequently in 36 countries. Thus, greater transparency will be needed between those allies, such as the United Kingdom, that have publicly announced their willingness to voluntarily contribute national cyber effects to NATO. Additionally, NATO commanders will need to identify which effects are potentially available, what are the targets to which they apply, and how quickly they can be generated in a crisis or conflict scenario, but above all what the actual impact and fallout of such cybereffects are likely to be.
NATO has defined a mechanism for this transfer of cyber effects from the nation to the NATO command structure under the political oversight and control of the alliance. A Cyberspace Operations Centre (CYOC) is being established at Allied Command Operations (formerly SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, to enhance early warning, carry out strategic and operational planning, factor cyber realistically into NATO training and exercises, and define the scope of joint cyber/conventional operations. Soldiers, sailors, airmen and airwomen, and NATO civilians who operate in other domains must be as ready to support cyberspace operations as those who regularly operate in cyberspace are ready to support any other joint operation. This will without a doubt generate the need for more cyber defense specialists and also more training and education for senior military and civilian leaders across the NATO enterprise in both the military and political ramifications of using cyberspace. For instance, a recent crisis-management exercise organized by Estonia for EU defense ministers (called CYBRID), which simulated a series of cyberattacks against an EU maritime force in the central Mediterranean, revealed several weaknesses. First, one weakness was the reticence of attributing the attacks and the amount of evidence required to attribute them properly. Second, it was difficult to determine whether the characteristic of the attack was simply hostile behavior or actual armed aggression. Third, there was a weakness in the political willingness to assign blame, as well as weaknesses in the usefulness of a number of possible response or retaliatory options (the “toolbox”). This pointed to a need for better coordination from the top.
So, as with the evolution of nuclear deterrence in the 1950s, it makes little sense to develop cyber capabilities and technical expertise if the leadership has a poor grasp of the conditions determining if, when, and how a cyber effect can be used. There is also the possibility that cyber effects are designed foremost for deterrence purposes and signaling rather than for actual battlefield use. This means regular crisis management exercising to synchronize military and political thinking and decision-making cycles is required. Such exercises can help to develop a comprehensive set of crisis response options involving cyber and/or combined cyber and conventional actions. Over time, a basic understanding of attribution methodology needs to be acquired so that what is deemed sufficient at the national level is also adequate for other nations to adhere to and express solidarity through collective action. A good example of this, albeit in the area of 2 chemical weapons, is the attribution by the British government to Russia of the Novichok nerve agent, used against two Russian citizens in Salisbury, United Kingdom, in March 2018.16 Once the UK’s findings were presented to NATO and the EU, the member states simultaneously expelled a significant number of Russian diplomats and agreed to clamp down on Russian intelligence operations in their territories.
As these retaliatory actions become more frequent (e.g., Special Prosecutor Robert Mueller’s grand jury recently indicted 12 Russian Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU] officers for their alleged involvement in hacking into the U.S. election campaign), it will also be important to analyze which of this expanding toolbox of responses below the threshold of an Article 5-type of military response actually has an impact in changing the strategic calculus and behavior of our adversaries.17 Or, in other words, what can be done to change the current calculus of cyber as a low-risk, high-gain operation into one that is high risk and low gain? For instance, do unilateral or collective retaliations work better over time than bilateral agreements, such as the 2013 U.S.-China agreement on restraint in cyberspace?18 What is the practical benefit of international norms and confidence-building measures, such as the two packages endorsed by the Vienna-based Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)?19 At all events, it is clear that we still have a long way to go before states recognize the essential red lines of effective cyber deterrence and stability; for instance, noninterference in political processes, refraining from attacks on critical national infrastructure, refraining from attacks on the “public core” of the internet, agreeing on common standards for attribution, and agreeing that attacks on nuclear command and control or vital space observation and communication satellites are impermissible. Even if a universal agreement establishing these red lines (i.e., by the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts) still seems a long way off, embedding them in regional or “mini-lateral” frameworks such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Commonwealth, or the African Union seems possible, and NATO could usefully take them up in its own partnership frameworks. For instance, a mutual agreement on certain norms could be embedded in NATO’s individual cyber cooperation agreements with partner countries, alongside the technical exchanges such agreements usually provide. A memorandum of understanding with Finland has already been concluded and can lead the way to similar agreements with like-minded countries, such as Sweden, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.
Cohesive NATO is Critical for Deterrence of Russia and China
Marcus Kolga 21, Marcus Kolga is a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute’s Centre for Advancing Canada’s Interests Abroad., 10-5-2021, accessed 6/28/2022, "Improving NATO’s cohesion is critical to combat Russia and China’s threat: Marcus Kolga for Inside Policy," Macdonald-Laurier Institute, https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/improving-natos-cohesion-critical-combat-russia-chinas-threat/ //3AM
A united NATO is critically important to projecting credible deterrence. The erosion of domestic trust and confidence in the Alliance among its member states, including Canada, represents a threat to this cohesion. A proposal to withdraw Canada from NATO was tabled at a recent policy conference for one of Canada’s three major political parties. The proposal was defeated, but it represents a fringe anti-NATO narrative within Canada’s illiberal left; if left unaddressed, such a narrative could grow.
If countries like Russia perceive NATO as an atomized collection of states with varied priorities rather than a unified front, the Alliance is exposed to a significant risk of miscalculation in which a foreign adversary might believe they can cross a red line and only face a limited response. Thus, gaps in cohesion within the alliance directly threaten to undermine political and military deterrence. The Alliance and members states must work towards improving communications strategies to foster greater basic general understanding of NATO’s purpose, its missions and its role in protecting its members against external threats.
Similarly, if we see threats as atomized or disparate, we may lack the capacity to adequately respond. Organized GRU terrorist attacks in Czechia, the Salisbury poisonings, transnational repression and censorship, cyberwarfare, disinformation, and overt military posturing all pose threats that are aimed at the same essential goal: undermining and supplanting the power of liberal democracy and advancing authoritarianism. Through this lens, challenges posed by other actors, including China, must also be considered as part of the broader range of shared threats posed to the democratic community as a whole.
If we are to succeed in tackling these shared threats, greater transatlantic cooperation is needed. It cannot remain stagnant, however; it must evolve and expand. The serious nature of the threats, their potential to become kinetic, and the possibility of adversarial coordination (whether formal or informal) means that we must expand our tools to meet these challenges.
In the case of Ukraine, on whose border the Kremlin mobilized over 100,000 troops this past summer, the Alliance should consider extending a Membership Action Plan despite the skepticism of some allies. Ukraine must also be empowered in a similar fashion to frontline NATO states like the Baltic states and Poland. After all, the eFP mission in Latvia not only provides military deterrence, but strengthens interlinkages, develops societal resilience, and provides clear and sustained solidarity.
Finally, the growing threats of foreign interference, information warfare, cyber attacks and emerging threats to Canada’s Arctic requires a coherent long-term strategy and an evolved notion of collective defence, which includes strengthening our partnerships with non-NATO allies in Europe, Asia, and around the world.
Until we impose consequences that force Moscow and Beijing to strategically reconsider their ongoing efforts to probe the extreme boundaries of our threat tolerance, they will continue to test our capacity and political will to confront their aggression. This requires a common understanding and acknowledgement of the threats. It took Russian aggression in 2007 in Estonia, 2008 in Georgia, and the invasion of Ukraine in 2014 to achieve a basic common understanding of the threat posed by Vladimir Putin’s government. Since then, NATO’s eFP missions have thus far deterred Vladimir Putin’s neo-imperialist ambitions in the Baltic Sea region.
We must work towards achieving a similar consensus on the threats posed by Russia and China’s use of information and influence operations, as well as economic, cyber and political warfare against the community of democracies and the developing world at large in order to develop resilience and a common defence against them.
NATO intelligence sharing key to allied response
Maigre 22 (Merle Maigre is a Non-resident Senior Fellow with CEPA's Transatlantic Leadership Program and CEPA's Digital Innovation Initiative, 4/6/22, accessed 6/24/22, “NATO’s Role In Global CyberSecurity”,
https://www.gmfus.org/news/natos-role-global-cyber-security (JB)
Four sets of actions for NATO are proposed. First, denying covertness by attribution: NATO should persuade opponents that they cannot be clandestine in their cyber actions. NATO and its members need to demonstrate that it is difficult or impossible to act covertly and be clear about attributing responsibility for cyberattacks.
Until recently, governments did not publicly release details on cyber incidents. But since 2018, public disclosures of cyberattacks by several Western powers indicate a new multinational policy of state transparency. The growing relevance of attribution is partially due to states becoming better at attributing cyber operations. Greater public knowledge of cyberattacks heightens awareness of cyber conflicts and leads to greater public acceptance of cyber countermeasures.
Ultimately, what matters is that states engaging in unlawful actions using cyber means will face consequences. With attribution, policymakers show that they know what is happening in these networks and can investigate incidents. It also clearly spells out unacceptable behavior and can help create state practice. The best way to implement the international norms is by calling out behavior and having consequences when these norms are breached. Attribution will make clear to the malicious actor that their actions will be seen and addressed. It is the basis, under international law, for countermeasures and self-defense.
When should states publicly attribute cyberattacks? Effective public attribution requires a clear understanding of the attributed cyber operation and the cyber-threat actor, but also the broader geopolitical environment, allied positions and activities, and the legal context. The public attribution framework put forward by Max Smeets and Florian Egloff in March 202127
distinguishes four factors that act as enablers or constraints in public attribution. These factors are intelligence, incident severity, geopolitical context, and post-attribution actions. The combination of these four components enables consistent decision-making about whether to publicly disseminate information about an adversary’s actions, privately tell the adversary, or restrict knowledge of the intrusion to

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