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2022 Georgetown Affirmative

Aff - OCO Info Sharing - Georgetown 2022

Aff - OCO Info Sharing - Georgetown 2022.docx

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OCO Info-Sharing Aff-Neg---GDS 2022
Notes
What does the aff do/How does it work?
Currently NATO because of their defensive nature has determined that offensive cyber operations cannot be developed or deployed by NATO itself. Instead, they have adopted a policy where NATO will coordinate cyber effects from the individual members in NATO. I.e. think like how NATO doesn’t have an actual standing army, but uses forces from each individual country and coordinates them underneath the NATO flag. The main problem with this is approach is that while most states are willing to voluntarily lend their cyber capabilities/effects to NATO, the framework does not require states disclose the actual capabilities or other information regarding states offensive cyber operations. The plan would have the United States disclose information regarding their offensive cyber operations and their actual capabilities.
What are the aff advantages?
First is that disclosing information regarding the United States actual capabilities allows NATO generals to better plan around those capabilities. Under the current policy NATO generals can only request an effect take place without actually knowing whether the individual member states can produce that effect. This leaves NATO generals effectively “flying blindly”, which undermines cyber deterrence.
Second is that the current policy risks undermining the cohesion of the alliance. First is that the unwillingness of the United States to disclose what their capabilities are or lend useful information to allies regarding their OCO’s hurts their trust. Second is that because the United States doesn’t need to disclose information regarding their OCO’s, they are/will continue to hack into allies’ networks to disrupt adversaries’ cyber actions. This intrusion into allied networks also undermines trust and willingness to cooperate inside the alliance.
What are the neg controversies?
First is that there is a large debate ongoing inside the literature as to whether offensive cyber operations are good and whether they produce deterrence or instead provoke other countries into war.
Second is there are several authors who disagree about whether information sharing will increase trust. This is because the United States often spies on our allies and forcing information sharing will mean that we must tell our allies about the illegal actions we are currently undertaking. (What NATO allies don’t know can’t hurt them). These authors also believe that information sharing will disrupt the alliance as it means that our data and intel is more likely to be stollen as a result of hack on weaker allies with less cyber capabilities.
AFF --- OCO’s
1AC
1AC --- Plan
The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization through information sharing regarding its offensive cyber operations and capabilities
1AC --- Adv --- OCO’s
Advantage one is OCO’s:
Currently, NATO requires individual member nations to coordinate offensive cyber operations.
Freedberg, 18 (Sydney Freedberg, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. is the deputy editor for Breaking Defense. graduated summa cum laude from Harvard and holds masters' degrees from Cambridge and Georgetown., 11-16-2018, accessed on 6-17-2022, Breaking Defense, "NATO To ‘Integrate’ Offensive Cyber By Members - Breaking Defense", https://breakingdefense.com/2018/11/nato-will-integrate-offensive-cyber-by-member-states/)//Babcii
Independent Assets, Coordinated Action It’s crucial to understand that NATO doesn’t have its own combat units in any domain. It pulls together assets provided by its 29 members. “It’s the nations who actually provide the forces, through the NATO force structure,” Col. Lewis emphasized. “They bring their ships, their planes, their tanks…. Those sovereign capabilities are exactly that: sovereign.” “They’re responsible for defending those things,” including in cyberspace, Lewis continued. “It’s out job to make sure we have situational awareness of how they’re defending those things and how their success may or may not have an impact on the overall operation.” In cyberspace as on land, air, or sea, NATO member nations can act either collectively, through the alliance, or individually, as sovereign states. But acting outside alliance channels doesn’t bar them from coordinating with each other: Contrast the war in Afghanistan, which was long run as a NATO operation, and the war in Iraq, waged by a “coalition of the willing” outside the alliance but involving multiple nations that happened to be NATO members. A NATO member can even divorce itself from the alliance’s military structure but still participate in NATO operations, as France did from 1966 to 2008. So while NATO, by charter, renounces offensive operations, its members can still conduct them — on their own legal authority as sovereign states, but, if they wish, in coordination with each other and in consultation with NATO. With that in mind, here’s a more formal and precise description, which I drafted but which NATO officials read, revised and agreed is accurate: “In all domains — land, air, maritime, and (as of 2016) cyber — NATO relies on forces contributed by its member nations to conduct military operations. “In all domains, NATO operations are governed by the consensus of all 29 member states, executed by SACEUR and subordinate commanders in accordance with the constraints of the approved operation. “In all domains, if a NATO member state decides to conduct an operation using its own forces and its own legal authorities, it may choose to inform NATO command structures and coordinate with NATO plans and operations. “How this applies in the cyber domain specifically: NATO policy, as set by the consensus of the 29 members, is that the alliance itself, in keeping with its defensive mindset, shall not conduct offensive cyber operations. However, this does not restrict unilateral or multilateral offensive operations by NATO member states. NATO policy — again, by member consensus — does provide for the integration of sovereign cyberspace effects provided by Allies with the ability and willingness to provide them. That integration into Allied operations and missions will be orchestrated by the NATO CYOC (Cyber Operations Centre).” As I interpret this, a NATO commander, acting in his or her alliance capacity, couldn’t order anyone to conduct an offensive cyber operation. But the same commander could suggest an offensive cyber operation, and one or more of the member states could then voluntarily conduct it. Or a commander with a dual NATO and national role could simply take off his NATO hat and use the authority granted him by his own nation to order his own nation’s forces to conduct a cyber attack. The obvious candidate here is Gen. Scaparrotti, who is both NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Commander, US European Command (EUCOM). In either case, the national forces conducting the attack can coordinate with other alliance members, through NATO organizations, to “integrate” the attack with the alliance’s collective defense operations. For cyberspace specifically, this coordination and integration role is played by the new Cyber Operations Center. It’s as a logical extension of CYOC’s “situational awareness” mission to share information among the member states about what each of them is observing and doing in cyberspace. “NATO doesn’t do offense, but it will integrate sovereign effects from the nations that are capable and willing to provide them,” Lewis said. “Some nations have stated their willingness to provide those effects. The role of the CYOC is simply to integrate it into the operations in the same way we integrate all the other arrows in the quiver.”
The US contributes to NATO’s cyber capabilities now, but that’s worthless without increased info sharing – US cooperation is key.
Sophie Arts, 12-13-2018, [Sophie Arts is the program officer for security and defense policy (SDP) at The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) in Washington, DC, "Offense as the New Defense: New Life for NATO’s Cyber Policy," GMFUS, https://www.gmfus.org/news/offense-new-defense-new-life-natos-cyber-policy]
Deter, then Defend?
NATO’s defenses are only as strong as the sum of those of its members. Like in other domains, alliance cyber assets are not NATO-owned but provided by member states.[19] U.S. capabilities in the cyber domain are by far the most sophisticated among the allies. Besides having an edge over most competitors in the field of cyber security,[20] the United States tops rankings as a global leader in offensive cyber capabilities.[21] The recent announcement that it would contribute its capabilities to NATO operations consequently could help the alliance bolster its deterrence posture against hostile cyber-attacks.
Until recently, NATO and member states, including the United States, have relied on strictly defensive cyber tools to protect their infrastructure. However, given that this approach has done little to discourage hostile actors, the strategic value of incorporating offensive cyber operations has long been discussed. In late 2017, Stoltenberg announced that NATO would integrate cyber weapons of its members into military operations to deter and defend against threats, marking the “biggest overall policy shift in decades,” according to officials.[22]
The U.S. decision to commit offensive and defensive capabilities to NATO follows on the heels of this move. The addition of offensive cyber tools to the defense and deterrence toolbox is not only new for NATO, it also tracks a recent shift in the U.S. posture. The White House authorized the use of offensive cyber weapons to deter foreign adversaries in September with the publication of the Department of Defense’s 2018 Cyber Strategy.[23] The strategy also incorporates a new mission of “defending forward” as a means to “disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source, including activity that falls below the level of armed conflict.”[24] While defending forward is, as the name suggests, defensive in nature, it entails targeting foreign cyberspace infrastructure to pre-empt incoming attacks through offensive cyber operations.
"This shift from reactive to preemptive action in cyberspace marks the most significant departure from the previous U.S. cyber strategy.”
This shift from reactive to preemptive action in cyberspace marks the most significant departure from the previous U.S. cyber strategy, published in 2015, and comes in response to persistent cyber campaigns against the United States directed by Russia and China. Taken individually, these offenses may fall short of provoking an official response, but their cumulative impact over time is a significant concern and needs to be addressed. The new forward-leaning posture of the United States seeks to address this threat preemptively without risking an escalation to conventional military uses of force.[25]
Superior cyber capabilities will not be a deterrent per se, but they can add to NATO’s resilience against threats.[26] Aggressive cyber operations have already become an important element in the hybrid warfare tool kit of many adversaries. Adding offensive cyber capabilities will likely not stop this. That is why it is critical that deterrence against cyber threats not only relies on cyber operations, but also draws on the full spectrum of conventional and unconventional responses, as outlined in the 2018 Brussels summit declaration.[27]
Defensive and offensive cyber capabilities can reinforce NATO members’ ability to deter and deny cyber-attacks by disincentivizing other actors from developing cyber weapons in the first place, and by convincing those with or without offensive cyber capabilities that attacks will be largely ineffective or come at an equal or greater cost to them. Proactive cyber defense also can help to anticipate and prevent an attack on computers and networks, which requires active monitoring of hostile actors. This is where offensive cyber operations provide the most strategic value. For instance, they could interfere directly with operations of adversaries by manipulating their devices and infrastructure through malware, or by shutting off power and networks from which an attack originates. They can also affect the calculations of hostile actors who may judge that the potential cost of an attack outweighs its strategic gains.
"Countering cyber threats with offensive operations could have a cascading effect that eventually precipitates conventional conflict."
On the other hand, countering cyber threats with offensive operations could have a cascading effect that eventually precipitates conventional conflict.[28] A more assertive U.S. posture on cyber could thus potentially heighten the risk of an unanticipated crisis in the cyber and conventional domains. This could have serious implications for other NATO allies that might be pulled into a conflict, especially if the lines between NATO and U.S. cyber operations are blurred, based on Mattis' recent statement.
Challenges Remain
While there are still many unknowns in NATO’s cyber policy, the United States’ announcement did clarify how its capabilities would be used in the event of a joint NATO cyber operation. As indicated by the Pentagon, the United States would maintain control over its own personnel and capabilities. This is by no means unusual and not necessarily a surprise. As in most areas, NATO does not rely on commonly owned assets for cyber defense but on national capabilities.[29] Similarly, NATO members retain command and control of cyber operations they provide. However, as the former team leader of NATO’s Task Force Cyber (CISO), Col. Rizwan Ali, has pointed out, this poses a significant challenge to NATO commanders who may not have access to many critical details implicating their decision-making process. In effect, Ali explained, commanders “will request an effect using cyber weaponry during an operation and one of the allies will provide that effect without any further information.”[30] As a result, NATO commanders will be flying blind, lacking many important details regarding limitations of capabilities and potential conflicts with other ongoing operations.
Related to this challenge, NATO’s constraints on information sharing could hurt strategic decision-making processes and cyber operations. While most experts acknowledge that intelligence capabilities within NATO are significant, these remain isolated and well-guarded by national intelligence communities.[31] More advanced information sharing, among allies and with other partners such as the EU, is critical for situational awareness and NATO’s preparedness. Yet, due mostly to a lack of trust between allies, this process is far from being at an optimal level.[32]
When it comes to intelligence sharing, some allies fear that infiltration and attacks against countries with lower resilience could potentially compromise information shared by other member states. Pushback against greater transparency is especially strong on the part of the United States, which owns a large share of NATO’s intelligence capabilities, making it a critical player in alliance intelligence operations from a tactical as well as strategic perspective.[33] Due to the country’s outsized role in this field, NATO’s intelligence adaptation is largely dependent on U.S. inclinations to share capabilities and information with other allies.[34] Although efforts to protect intelligence by minimizing sharing may be justified, elevating the role of the United States in NATO’s cyber policy without increasing transparency could potentially limit tactical effectiveness.
US-NATO info sharing is key to set global cyber norms and prevent miscalc.
David Mussington, 2019, [David Mussington is a senior fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation, director of the Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise at University of Maryland, adjunct member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses, and former senior adviser for cyber policy in the US Department of Defense, later serving on the Obama administration’s National Security Council staff as director for surface transportation security policy., "Strategic Stability, Cyber Operations and International Security," Centre for International Governance Innovation, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep26129.13.pdf]
As a response to grey zone conflict and offence dominance in cyberspace, many national governments, such as the United States, Germany and Canada, have concluded that a static defence is no longer adequate and have been adjusting to allow pre-emptive cyber operations intended to disrupt hostile actors before they can act (Herpig 2018; Nakashima 2018; Grigsby 2017). Organizations at the international level have mirrored this trend. In 2017, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) adjusted its policy away from ambiguity on cyber effects to a more responsive stance, establishing a Cyber Operations Centre to integrate the cyber capabilities of its members into military operations (Ricks and Ali 2017). While this may be necessary to cope with the attribution problem and grey zone hostilities, whether or not this will re-enable effective deterrence or cause further destabilization through tit-for-tat escalation remains unclear.
Due to many of its members being on the receiving end of grey zone cyber attacks, NATO has been a leading light in trying to resolve the current uncertainty plaguing international governance of cyber conflict. It has attempted, through efforts such as the establishment of the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence and publication of the Tallinn Manual, to arrive at a clear interpretation of which acts in cyberspace are permissible or not under current international law (Arts 2018). The alliance relies on all members following through on their commitment to collective defence as stipulated under article 5 of the alliance’s treaty. This makes the attribution challenge in cyberwarfare especially problematic, as it can give members a plausible reason to demur on this potentially costly commitment. This is forcing NATO to consider what kind of activity in cyberspace would be serious enough to invoke the collective defence clause. While NATO has affirmed that article 5 could be triggered by a significant cyber attack, as of yet it has not determined a precise threshold (ibid.).
Implications and Policy Consequences
Global strategic stability is undermined by the failure of states to take seriously the erosion of defence capabilities caused by growing reliance on ICT technologies in critical infrastructures and weapon systems. At present, COTS and the ICT supply chain that services critical infrastructure present a particularly vulnerable point of entry for malicious actors. Existing governance and oversight mechanisms concerning the deployment of ICT will prove too lenient for the developing threat environment. Enhanced communication and tighter cooperation between government and the private sector will prove crucial to bolstering defences in this area. More arrangements like the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers, which facilitate intelligence sharing on cyber threats between the public and private sector, would be of great benefit (Lord and Mussington 2017).
Superior coordination and information sharing are also required at the international level. In the face of an offence-dominant environment, efforts must be taken to assuage the uncertainties felt by various actors as to each other’s capabilities and intentions. The technical and political difficulties in attributing cyber attacks, combined with their affordability, will continue to encourage attackers. Those defending against cyber attacks must therefore take a firmer, less equivocal stance than they have so far displayed. Absent an international consensus o

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