Neg - AI Ethics - Georgetown 2022
Neg - AI Ethics - Georgetown 2022.docx
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NEG Case *JOINT OPERATIONS ADV* Say No---1NC NATO allies say no---divergent demands and public opposition. HeikkilÄ 22, 7-4-2022, "NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.," POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/ On paper, NATO is the ideal organization to go about setting standards for military applications of artificial intelligence. But the widely divergent priorities and budgets of its 30 members could get in the way. The Western military alliance has identified artificial intelligence as a key technology needed to maintain an edge over adversaries, and it wants to lead the way in establishing common ground rules for its use. “We need each other more than ever. No country alone or no continent alone can compete in this era of great power competition,” NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană, the alliance’s second in command, said in an interview with POLITICO. The standard-setting effort comes as China is pressing ahead with AI applications in the military largely free of democratic oversight. David van Weel, NATO’s assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, said Beijing's lack of concern with the tech's ethical implications has sped along the integration of AI into the military apparatus. "I'm ... not sure that they're having the same debates on principles of responsible use or they're definitely not applying our democratic values to these technologies,” he said. Meanwhile, the EU — which has pledged to roll out the world's first binding rules on AI in coming weeks — is seeking closer collaboration with Washington to oversee emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. But those efforts have been slow in getting off the ground. For Geoană, that collaboration will happen at NATO, which is working closely with the European Union as it prepares AI regulation focusing on “high risk” applications. The pitch NATO does not regulate, but “once NATO sets a standard, it becomes in terms of defensive security the gold standard in that respective field,” Geoană said. The alliance's own AI strategy, to be released before the summer, will identify ways to operate AI systems responsibly, identify military applications for the technology, and provide a “platform for allies to test their AI to see whether it's up to NATO standards,” van Weel said. The strategy will also set ethical guidelines around how to govern AI systems, for example by ensuring systems can be shut down by a human at all times, and to maintain accountability by ensuring a human is responsible for the actions of AI systems. “If an adversary would use autonomous AI powered systems in a way that is not compatible with our values and morals, it would still have defense implications because we would need to defend and deter against those systems,” van Weel said. “We need to be aware of that and we need to flag legislators when we feel that our restrictions are coming into the realm of [being detrimental to] our defense and deterrence,” he continued. Mission impossible? The problem is that NATO's members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking about AI in the military context. The U.S., the world's biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in their national AI strategies. “It’s absolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI strategy," but the Europeans "did it exactly the other way around," said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said: That echoes familiar transatlantic differences — and previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over defense spending, but also highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly. The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate excesses and keeping citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen on defense, sees things differently. There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop, including lethal autonomous weapons systems — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy targets without human control. Powerful NATO members including France, the U.K., and the U.S. have developed these technologies and oppose a treaty on these weapons, while others like Belgium and Germany have expressed serious concerns about the technology. These weapons systems have also faced fierce public opposition from civil society and human rights groups, including from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, who in 2018 called for a ban. Geoană said the alliance has “retained autonomous weapon systems as part of the interests of NATO.” The group hopes that its upcoming recommendations will allow the ethical use of the technology without “stifling innovation.” NATO says no---political frition prevents unity on AI standards. Zoe Stanley-Lockman & Lena Trabucco 22, Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore; Lena Trabucco is a dual degree candidate pursuing a PhD in political science at Northwestern University and a PhD in Law at iCourts Center of Excellence in International Courts at the University of Copenhagen, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, edited by Justin Bullock et al., Oxford University Press, 03/18/2022, DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.013.69 On that note NATO, or any other international organization, is not exempt from these political hurdles. As EDTs increasingly become a focal point in the geopolitical space, any approach of AI governance in the international security environment will have global political undertones. This will undoubtedly be a significant hurdle for NATO as it balances responsible AI development and Allied coordination and cooperation in a changing geopolitical landscape. And certainly, the political realities may well represent the greatest challenge and disincentivize NATO to emerge as a leader in responsible military AI. Nevertheless, the three pillars indicate that NATO is an institution with considerable opportunity to shape responsible AI governance. More specifically, this entails urging and facilitating Allied standards and policies to establish foundations for emerging military technology built on informed and ethical principles and enhance the international security environment. Interop Fails---1NC Interoperability challenges are structural---they can’t be fixed through consultation or dialogue. Edward Hunter Christie 22, Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, “Defence Cooperation in Artificial Intelligence: Bridging the Transatlantic Gap for a Stronger Europe,” European View, vol. 21, no. 1, SAGE Publications Ltd, 04/01/2022, pp. 13–21 Interoperability challenges Interoperability can be defined as ‘the ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to, and accept services from other systems, units or forces and the use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together’ (Dufour 2018, 1). The first general challenge to interoperability is the overall gap between the US and Europe in terms of total defence investment, as well as in terms of civilian technological attainment with respect to AI and related technologies. There is no single solution to this problem, which is much broader in scope than traditional military–technical standards, such as those pursued in the NATO context through existing mechanisms. For this broad challenge, overall policy decisions relating to national investment choices and technology policy coordination between the two sides of the Atlantic are of particular importance. Further discussion of this follows in the sections on investment challenges and international security challenges. A second challenge to interoperability is that, as far as digital technologies are concerned, the civilian sector of the economy, on both sides of the Atlantic, is more advanced, more dynamic and also not especially oriented towards meeting military needs. For decades, the military sector has represented only a very small share of the total sales volume of the computing and semiconductor industries. The same pattern is repeating itself currently with AI. This stands in great contrast to narrower dual-use technologies, for example aerospace, where the military sector remains inherently important. With digital technologies, defence institutions are under much more pressure to either adapt to civilian industry products and standards or to pay a significant premium to suppliers to secure military-grade equipment and software. A third challenge to interoperability lies in how AI is implemented in practice. To set up a bespoke machine-learning algorithm in a given data environment, best practice in the software industry is to pursue some variant of ‘agile’ development. This involves a very different product-development cycle, essentially proceeding with multiple rapid iterations of an imperfect product that is released in preliminary versions and later revised—like software products released in various ‘beta versions’—with upgrades developed over time. This contrasts greatly with the traditional production of major military platforms, which puts a premium on strict quality control and compliance with requirements at every development step—an approach referred to in the software industry as ‘waterfall’ development (Christie 2021b, 87). Agile product development may pose challenges to interoperability. Unless very tight standards are applied, there is a considerable risk of divergences in how different national institutions go about solving a particular AI or data analytics problem. With large traditional military platforms there are long time frames during which states can take coordination steps, either by purchasing the same platforms, or by building consensus in terms of requirements and standards. However, when a comparatively small team works dynamically to generate an algorithmic solution to a particular problem in a matter of weeks or months, traditional coordination through existing consultation mechanisms may pose risks to the speed advantage inherent to agile development. Conversely, once a solution has been developed, its adoption in somewhat different environments may be challenging for a range of technical reasons. None of these issues is insurmountable, but they do pose, in a new light, classical trade-offs between the benefits of inventiveness and dynamism, on the one hand, and those of imposing constraints through standards and other harmonising measures to ensure that new products can be broadly used and shared on the other. In the case of AI, a typical observation is that there are many excellent prototypes and pilot projects in numerous defence institutions, but there are also serious outstanding challenges in terms of scaling up to enterprise-wide solutions, let alone Alliance-wide solutions. Alt Causes---1NC Tons of issues are fracturing NATO. It’s a structural problem of interest divergence, not something that can be solved through limited dialogue. Eugene Rumer & Richard Sokolsky 4/11, Rumer, a former national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the U.S. National Intelligence Council, is a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program; Sokolsky is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, “Putin’s War Against Ukraine and the Balance of Power in Europe,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 4-11-2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/04/11/putin-s-war-against-ukraine-and-balance-of-power-in-europe-pub-86832 Notwithstanding the allies’ early show of unity in the wake of the Russian attack on Ukraine, some of their differences and challenges to a more robust NATO posture have not disappeared entirely. These include the varying interests and priorities of the EU’s and NATO’s diverse members, as well as likely disagreements over which threats and challenges should be privileged in resource allocation decisions (among issues ranging from the Russian threat, China, climate change, pandemics, immigration, borders, refugees, or diversification of energy supplies). It would be prudent to not take for granted that Europe will forge the political unity and raise the billions of euros it will require to create a first-class military that might substitute for or provide a substantial addition to NATO’s military kit. Moreover, the unanimity with which Europe came together to impose sanctions on Russia and help Ukraine is likely due to the fact that Ukraine is not a NATO member, and demonstrations of solidarity with it do not involve defense commitments through NATO’s Article 5. In the event of a Russian attack against a NATO member country, the specter of an all-out war with Russia may lead some allies to demonstrate less resolve and more caution and hesitation. One headline is likely to become a trend line: Putin has confirmed that nuclear weapons are useful for a wide range of deterrence and coercive purposes to go along with what will still be formidable conventional capabilities in a short-war scenario, such as a quick land grab in the Baltic region. Several implications flow from this development. First, notwithstanding rhetoric about defending every inch of NATO territory and the alliance’s impressive show of resolve, NATO may be unable or unwilling to conduct an Article 5 intervention against a Russian attack. The alliance may choose instead to form a coalition of willing NATO countries to defend vulnerable countries on its eastern flank. AT: Russia War Impact---1NC Larger Russia war is impossible---they don’t have capabilities AND deterrence prevents going nuclear. Limor Simhony 22, policy advisor and researcher based in London, “NATO Intervention in Ukraine Won’t Spark World War III,” Foreign Policy, 4/1/2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/01/nato-intervention-in-ukraine-wont-spark-world-war-iii/ The main concern is any such escalation could lead to World War III. There are two reasons that this is unlikely. The first is that Russia’s military capabilities are poor relative to those of Western armies. Their forces are not sufficiently trained; their equipment and weapons are dated and inferior; they experience major logistical, operational, and tactical difficulties; and their soldiers have low morale. Damaging economic sanctions also mean that Russia may not be able to fund a wider war. The expectation that Moscow will be able to escalate the war into other theaters in an effective way, especially by conventional means, is unrealistic. It is possible that if the Russian military continues to struggle, Russian President Vladimir Putin will deploy chemical or even nuclear weapons to increase gains and deter the West from interfering—but that is unlikely. The second is that Russia has become isolated. To fight a world war, Russia needs powerful allies, which it does not have. Its strongest ally, China, has largely remained on the sidelines since the war started. It abstained from voting against the U.N. resolution demanding that Russia ends its offensive, and it is worried about secondary sanctions if it aids Russia. The only countries besides Russia that voted to reject the resolution were Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea, and Syria—hardly a winning alliance. Both world wars saw blocks of powerful allies fight one another. Currently, such a bloc does not exist on Russia’s side. These factors mean that there is not a high risk of substantial escalation into total global war. This should be enough to convince Western nations to change their engagement policy and help Ukraine win the war by repulsing an opponent that is considerably inferior militarily to their own forces. It is unlikely to happen for two main reasons: fear of Russian nukes and the West’s aversion to casualties. The most widely discussed reason is the concern that Russia will use nuclear weapons if NATO intervenes militarily. Putin has reasserted Russia’s right to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, making this a legitimate concern. However, it is more likely that nuclear deterrence—albeit different to Cold War deterrence—will hold. Russia’s deployment of nuclear weapons, either against Ukraine or against a NATO member state, could incur devastating consequences for Russia. As then-U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis said in 2018, dismissing the notion that tactical nuclear weapons are somehow a lesser threat, “Any nuclear weapon used … is a strategic game-changer.” Therefore, if NATO retaliates with a powerful response, either nuclear or conventional, it may target strategic Russian military positions and perhaps even sites of political power, aiming at wiping out Russian military capabilities and targeting those in positions of authority—a move that could threaten Putin’s leadership. A NATO retaliation should therefore be considered a major threat to Putin, especially because rivals include numerous nations with considerable nuclear capabilities, such as the United States, United Kingdom, and France. In addition, at the heart of this conflict stands national identity. Putin has little motivation to devastate a county that he wishes to annex and has not knowingly made any preparations for using nuclear weapons. Fear of the bomb accounts for one reason behind the West’s decision to leave Ukraine to fight on its own. Another consideration is fundamental to the West: casualty sensitivity. Sensitivity to casualties—specifically deaths among troops—has become a major element affecting liberal democracies’ war preparedness, use of force, and decision-making regarding participation in wars. The trauma of Britain’s so-called lost generation followed the loss of 750,000 troops in World War I. It overwhelmed the public and affected interwar foreign policy and military preparedness in a misguided attempt to avoid another war. The same happened in other liberal democracies scarred by the war, such as France, whereas countries with shallower liberal and democratic traditions—such as Germany, which suffered heavier losses than France and Britain—consequently gravitated toward fascism and reverted to militarism. Conflict behavior and public attitudes toward wars have undergone deep changes during the 20th and 21st centuries as a result of extensive liberalization and democratization processes. Liberal concepts of individualism, personal freedoms, a reduction in internal violence, and a comfortable lifestyle that includes longer life expectancy brought about changes in attitudes about war—primarily, that it is an undesirable way to resolve conflicts. Rejecting the violence and suffering that comes with it has made it difficult for leaders of liberal democracies to justify to the public participation in wars, especially wars of choice, in which the nation is not under direct threat. The United States’ interventions in Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia, and Iraq, for example, were shaped by the casualties incurred. The 1983 bombing of the Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon that killed 241 U.S. service members and the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, where 18 U.S. soldiers died, provoked powerful reactions against the missions, bringing them to an abrupt end despite them initially enjoying wide public support. A similar reaction came after the Tet Offensive in Vietnam in January 1968, which resulted in 1,500 American fatalities. It was a watershed moment that changed the debate about the war and led to the shelving o
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