CP - Bilateral CP - Georgetown 2022
CP - Bilateral CP - Georgetown 2022.docx
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Research Research Terms Best hits: “distraction” current nato cooperation initiatives “traditionalists” vs “wideners” “nato” “out of area” operations “"offensive cyber operations"AROUND(5) -less expensive” “nato strategic concept” nato climate strategy NATO “Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence” Current initiatives Cyber nato cooperative cyber defense center of excellence "NATO" "cyber" "funding shortfall" https://www.npr.org/2022/05/02/1095008257/estonia-nato-cyber-war-games-russia Cooperation and exercises key to cyber defence, says Nato centre (computerweekly.com) Climate “nato” “climate” “distraction” NATO Needs Realistic Goals Toward Russia - Carnegie Europe - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Neg Clearing house infosharing link Nato not doing info sharing now, Priorities Make CP file,, DA Infos-sharing link AT: link turn Cites "Major Power Failures Hit Brazil." BBC News,2009. The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys, Summary Report. Maxwell Airforce Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1945. Adams, James. "Virtual Defense." Foreign Affairs 80, no. 3 (2001). ———. "Virtual Defense." Foreign Affairs (2001). Albright, David. "Did Stuxnet Take Out 1,000 Centrifuges at the Natanz Enrichment Plant? Preliminary Assessment." ISIS Reports (2010). Arendt, Hannah. On Violence. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1970. Blainey, Geoffrey. The Causes of War. New York: Free Press, 1973. Borg, S. "Economically Complex Cyber Attacks." IEEE Security and Privacy 3, no. 6 (2005). Clover, Charles. "Kremlin Backed Group Behind Estonia Cyber Blitz." Financial Times- Europe (2009). Devost, Matthew and Neal Pollard. "Taking Cyber-Terrorism Seriously." Terrorism Research Centre (2002). Gartzke, Eric. "The Myth of Cyberwar." International Security 38, no. 2. Goodman, Will. "Cyber Deterrence." Strategic Studies Quarterly (2010). Gray, C. S. Another Bloody Century, Future Warfare. London: Phoenix, 2005. Hart, Liddell. Strategy. New York: Penguin Books, 1991. Hesseldahl, A. "Computer Worm may be Targeting Iranian Nuclear Sites." Bloomberg (2010). Jackson, William. "Fuss Over Cyber War Distracts from Real Threats, Security Pioneer Says." Gcn (2012). Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Info Ops (2006). Kirschner, S. "I Love You...Not." Popular Science. (2000). Krepinevich, Andrew. "Cyberwarfare: A "Nuclear Option"?" Centre for Strategic and Bugetary Assessments (2012). Kuehl, Daniel. "From Cyberspace to Cyberproblem: Defining the Problem." In Cyberpower and National Security. Vol. 48, 2009. Langner, R. Cracking Stuxnet: A 21st Century Cyberweapon. Anonymous 2011. (Ted.com). 27 Lee, M. and L. Hornby. "Google Attack Puts Spotlight on China's "Red" Hackers." Reuters (2010). Libicki, Martin. Conquest in Cyberspace Cambridge University Press, 2007. ———. "Why Cyber War Will Not and should Not have its Grand Strategy." Strategic Studies Quarterly (2014). Liff, A. "Cyberwar: A New Absolute Weapon? the Strategic Proliferation of Cyberwarfare Capabilities and Interstate War." War of Strategic Studies 35, no. 3 (2012). Lin, Patrick. "Is it Possible to Wage just a Cyberwar?" The Atlantic (2012). Loeb, Vernon. "Pentagon Computers Under Assault." Washington Post,2001. Lucas, George R. "Postmodern War." Journal of Military Ethics 9, no. 4 (2010). Lupovici, A. "Cyber Warfare and Deterrence: Trends and Challenges in Research." Military and Stategic Affairs 3, no. 3 (2011). Maurer, Tim. "The Case for Cyberwarfare." Foreign Policy (2011). McGlaun, Shane. "DARPA Wants More Money for Cyber Weapons." Daily Tech Magazine (2011). Messick, Graham. "Cyber War: Sabotaging the System." CBS News,2009. Nakashima, Ellen. "Defense Officials Discloses Cyberattacks." The Washington Post,2010. ———. "US Cyberweapons had been Considered to Disrupt Gaddafi's Air Defenses." The Washington Post,2011. Nazario, Jose. "Politically Motivated Denial of Service Attacks." Arbor Networks. Nye, J. "Cyber Power." Belfer Centre for Science and Int'l Affairs Harvard Kennedy School (2010). O'Donnell, B. T. "Humanitarian Law:Developing International Rules of The Digital Battlefield." Journal of Conflict and Security Law 8, no. 1 (2003). Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. National Military Strategy. Washington, D.C: 1997. Rantanen, Miska. "Virtual Harassment, but for Real." Helsingin Sanomat (2007). Rid, Thomas. "Cyber War Will Not Take Place." Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 1 (2012). ———. Cyber War Will Not Take Place. London: Hurst and Company, 2013. ———. "Cyberwar and Peace." Foreign Affairs (2013). Rid, Thomas and Peter McBurney. "Cyber-Weapons." Rusi Journal 157, no. 1 (2012). 28 Rowe, Neil. "The Ethics of Cyberweapons in Warfare." International Journal of Cyberethics 1, no. 1 (2009). Rustici, Ross. "Cyberweapons: Leveling the International Playing Field." Strategic Studies Institute (2011). Schmitt, M. "Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack and Jus in Bello." International Review of the Red Cross 84, no. 846 (2002). Schneier, Bruce. "Want to Evade NSA Spying? Don't Connect to the Internet." Wired (2013). Schreier, Fred. "On Cyberwarfare." DCAF Horizon (2015). Sommer, Peter. "Experts Say, Iran has Neutralized Stuxnet." YNet News- Middle East (2012). Suciu, Peter. "Why Cyberwarfare is so Attractive to Small Nations." Fortune Magazine (2014). UNSC Resolution 1113 (2011). von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. Weimann, Gabriel. "Cyberterrorism: How Real is the Threat?" USA Institute of Peace (2004). Weinberger, Sharon. "How Israel Spoofed Syria's Air Defence System." Wired (Oct 2007). CP – EU CP – Bilat Strategic case D Current OCOs sufficient to deter Russia No follow on have internal link and impact defense to Russia low level cyber u r wrong that there is fratricide cohesion OK now DESPITE alt causes to mistrust Hybrid war naur escalate To cut AT: L2NB t/c AT: turns Notes “NATO bilateral intelligence sharing” US unilaterally – disclosing without security coop US bilaterally do OCOs with NATO member countries US do unilat things that solve internal links/impacts Reduce fratricide Smooth stuff over w/ allies Proportionate response options that is not cyber Process Look at internal links Adv cp stuff later ----- Ask bk about info sharing bw non-US allies This card possible answer? 1NC – CP The United States federal government should substantially increase its bilateral cooperation with the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization through establishing an interoperable network for information sharing regarding its offensive cyber operations and capabilities. Bilateral intel-sharing solves best – controlled cooperation overcomes gaps in perception and capability. Ballast, '17 – Jan Ballast MA is a senior staff member, involved with foreign intelligence, mission support and national security, working for the Ministry of Defence of The Netherlands. He has held numerous analytical and operational positions in both The Hague and missions abroad. The views expressed here are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Government of The Netherlands or any of its departments or agencies (Jan Ballast; "Trust (in) NATO The future of intelligence sharing within the Alliance"; No Publication; https://rieas.gr/images/rieasnews/NATOarticle17.pdf; 09-2017, Accessed 6-25-2022)//ILake-NoC Sharing secrets To outsiders (counter)intelligence – the (often covert) collection, analysis, sharing and operationalization of sensitive information of military or political value – is shrouded in mystery.7 Non-intelligence personnel always find it hard to fathom why joint operations, return on investment and comprehensive approach leave their intelligence colleagues with eyes glazed over. They are ignorant of intelligence’s obscure characteristics such as trust, risk mitigation, national interest, deception and quid pro quo. For instance, intelligence is a trade-off between trusting a partner enough to share information that could endanger one’s own source, against the benefits of doing so. In the protection of national interest allies are deceived and intelligence cooperation is carefully weighed even with partners (quid pro quo, meaning ‘tit for tat’). This section of the paper outlines why reluctant attitudes to multilateral exchange will remain pivotal in intelligence. Intelligence is, as a rule, executed by national (civilian, military and hybrid) intelligence and security services that use a combination of intelligence sources to answer Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) of national operational commanders and other decision-making authorities. In the collection process, open sources set the information stage, whereas secret intelligence tends to explain the behavior of the main actors.8 States and their national services are reluctant to share sensitive, classified information with international organizations and favor cooperation on a more controllable, bilateral, case-by-case basis.9 In fact, intelligence is shared only when there is a common threat perception, mutual trust, a demonstrable added value, the right type of diplomatic relationships or a combination of incentives.10 The most successful bilateral secret intelligence collaboration is the AngloAmerican UKUSA Agreement, originally signed in 1946, which evolved into the exclusive multilateral so-called ‘Five Eyes’ cooperation.11 Examples of beneficial intelligence cooperation by states within international organizations, such as NATO, are much harder to find. Friedrich Korkisch noted that during the last decades of the twentieth century, intelligence within the Alliance was “the result of the early years of NATO, when it was assumed that all NATO forces would remain under national command, and strategic intelligence would be mainly national intelligence.”12 From the outset Member States shared secret information bilaterally on political and military issues with NATO; however, major countries within the Alliance, afraid of the non-secure Brussels apparatus, kept intelligence from other Members.13 Chris Clough warned that, “within recent military coalitions, intelligencecontributing nations have been mindful of the dangers of compromise by less security-conscious partners, while knowing that a degree of sharing is essential.”14 Some argue that international institutions like NATO play a major role in encouraging and facilitating intelligence sharing among their member states.15 Although, “even in the UN intelligence is no longer a dirty word,”16 others remain of the opinion that nations are unable to overcome mistrust, making them reluctant to engage in multilateral intelligence cooperation. The focus of the intelligence world changed profoundly following 9/11 with the emergence of counterterrorism (CT) and non-state actors as dominating global themes.18 Nations witnessed the introduction of collection coordinating mechanisms, such as the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in the United States,19 and target-oriented intelligence fusion centers, such as the Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC) in the UK.20 Due to the perceived common threat, bilateral exchange of intelligence intensified and alignments were formed even with non-traditional partners. Although this new collaboration with states in Africa and the Near, Middle and Far East resulted in challenges in the realms of oversight and human rights, access to raw data and insights on CT was deemed too relevant not to engage – ‘gains’ outweighed ‘risks’.21 Following the terrorist attacks on major European cities, cooperation between the security services deepened and nations realized that solidarity as well as sharing intelligence on CT should be the norm.22 On a multilateral level, NATO, lacking its own sources by design, responded by introducing intelligence liaison and fusion elements and reaffirmed its commitment to intelligence sharing.23 However, different languages, cultures, capabilities and infrastructures proved to be structural constraints.24 Unlike the Alliance, the leadership of the European Union (EU) claimed a coordinating role in support of all state-level courses of action on CT through a combination of its law enforcement agency Europol, judicial cooperation agency Eurojust and border management agency Frontex.25 The EU, not questioning state actors as first responders to terrorism and its related criminal networks, strengthened its intelligence structure and joint multilateral intelligence collaboration was suggested.26 John Nomikos noted that “while Belgium, [The Netherlands] and Austria demanded a CIA-style EU agency, powerful member states including Britain, Germany, France, Spain and Italy showed a reluctance to share intelligence.”27 Following the Paris 2015 attacks, German Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière shattered Belgian, Dutch and Austrian dreams; “We should not focus our efforts on creating a new European intelligence service now. I cannot imagine we will be willing to give up our national sovereignty.”2 1NC – Jones The United States federal government should make blunt and regular warnings to Russia that their information campaign will be met with equally forceful response; further invest in offensive cyber operations to deter Russia. The threat of US OCOs alone sufficiently deters Russia. 1AC Jones 18 – Harold Brown Chair and Director of the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Seth G. Jones, “Going on the Offensive: A U.S. Strategy to Combat Russian Information Warfare,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, October 2018, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/181002_Russia_Active_Measures_FINAL1.pdf It is important to play defense—including protecting U.S. and allied cyber networks, exposing Russian bots and trolls, and preparing for cyberattacks and disinformation. But Russia will continue to target the United States at home and abroad until the U.S. government implements a more aggressive offensive information campaign. The goal should be to coerce Russia to curb its information warfare campaign, punish Moscow when these incidents occur, and exploit Moscow’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities. An offensive U.S. campaign might include several steps. The first involves blunt and regular U.S. warnings to Russian leaders, both in public and private, that their information warfare campaign will be met with an equally forceful response. Senior U.S. officials like President Donald Trump have not seriously threatened Moscow despite substantial evidence of Russian activism in the 2016 U.S. elections; Russian efforts to exploit issues like gun control, Black Lives Matter, and the #MeToo movement; and cyberattacks against even conservative U.S. organizations like the Hudson Institute and the International Republican Institute. Following the Soviet Union’s global active measures campaign against the United States, U.S. President Ronald Reagan vowed to respond in kind and, ultimately, to “leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history.” Moscow understood that Reagan and his administration were deadly serious about combating Russian active measures, which is what Reagan did in authorizing effective overt and covert action programs against the Soviet Union. Second, the United States needs to continue developing its offensive cyber capabilities and—just as important—it needs to use them if necessary. President Trump’s decision to sign National Security Presidential Memorandum 13, a directive facilitating offensive U.S. cyber operations, is a helpful step. This directive rescinded the Obama administration’s more cautious approach under Presidential Policy Directive 20.46 But this change means little if the U.S. fails to use—or, more importantly, to threaten to use—cyberattacks to protect itself from cyber operations by countries like Russia. In his influential work “Arms and Influence,” the Nobel Prizewinning economist Thomas Schelling wrote that “it is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply.” Moscow needs to understand that the United States is prepared to use all available instruments—including cyber operations—if it continues to be threatened. 2NC – Solvency Solves mistrust How to explain that it overcomes fratricide. 2NC – S – T/L Bilateral cyber partnerships already exist and guarantee an interoperable cyberspace. Williams, '21 – Brandon Kirk Williams is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Center for Global Security Research (Brandon Williams; "U.S. and Allied Cyber Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific"; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/US_and_Allied_Cyber_Security_Cooperation_in_the_Indo-Pacific.pdf; 04-01-2021, Accessed 6-27-2022)//ILake-NoC The Transatlantic relationship illustrates the complexities of cyber security cooperation. The United States, NATO, and the European Union (EU) share common ground based on decades of partnership across issue areas. All parties agree on the necessity of a free, open, and interoperable cyberspace free from authoritarian state control. NATO members declared that collective defense—enshrined in Article 5 of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement—applies in cyberspace. Within NATO, the United States supports NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) and support for cyber missions. Separately from NATO, the United States retains strong bilateral cyber security partnerships with EU member states. USCC conducted Hunt Forward missions in EU nations to glean intelligence on malicious cyber activities. That’s key to tailor to country-specific needs. Williams, '21 – Brandon Kirk Williams is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Center for Global Security Research (Brandon Williams; "U.S. and Allied Cyber Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific"; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/US_and_Allied_Cyber_Security_Cooperation_in_the_Indo-Pacific.pdf; 04-01-2021, Accessed 6-27-2022)//ILake-NoC Key lessons emerge from assessing progress in the Transatlantic cybersecurity experience. Europe’s foundation for cybersecurity cooperation began in recent years. CCDCOE regularly assists Australia and Japan, and South Korea partners with the EU’s Malware Information Sharing Platform. The EU and NATO took the lead on responding to the request for cyber capacity by Indo-Pacific allies. Panelists concluded the United States and Europe must respect that local context triggers country-specific demand signals. The United States can commit to dialogue that will tailor solutions to country-specific needs. Countering APTs may take time. CCDCOE exercises and capacity building missions demonstrated that knowing local context sets a baseline, and one that will be essential for changing the perception of the cyber threat ecosystem and the solutions necessary to confront adversaries in cyberspace. Bilateral collaboration solves better – NATO cyber resources are stretched too thin. Pernik, '21 – Piret Pernik is a researcher at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE). She has researched cybersecurity strategic and policy aspects since 2013. She has published research reports and analyses on cyber resilience, military 5G security, cyber commands, and cyber defence training (Piret Pernik; "Cyber deterrence: A case study on Estonia’s policies and practice"; Hybrid CoE; https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/20211012_Hybrid_CoE_Paper_8_Cyber_deterrence_WEB.pdf; 10-2021, Accessed 6-27-2022)//ILake-NoC Based on the Estonian case study, a policy recommendation for EU and NATO countries is to apply a three-layered deterrence model.73 First, EU and NATO countries should participate in entanglemen
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