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2022 Georgetown Negative

Neg - OCO Info Sharing 2 - Georgetown 2022

Neg - OCO Info Sharing 2 - Georgetown 2022.docx

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Case Neg—Wave 1 Complied
Politics
1NC
Search: Do republicans like NATO being an offensive organization?
The GOP despises NATO---empirics, Kremlin sympathy, and isolationism all prove
Saletan 22 – Saletan, William: “Putin Wants to Break NATO. Republicans Want to Help Him.” The Bulwark, 12 Apr. 2022, www.thebulwark.com/putin-wants-to-break-nato-republicans-want-to-help-him/. Accessed 24 June 2022.
Vladimir Putin’s central objective in Europe isn’t to capture Kyiv, the Donbas, or any other part of Ukraine. It’s to weaken the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which protects most of the continent against him. And in that longstanding campaign, Putin scored two significant victories this week.
One was in France, where Marine Le Pen, a Putin sympathizer, finished a close second to Emmanuel Macron in Sunday’s French presidential election. Le Pen is running almost even with Macron in polls for the April 24 runoff. She has said that if she wins, she’ll withdraw France from NATO’s command structure.
The other victory was in the United States, where 63 House Republicans, nearly a third of the GOP conference, voted against a resolution of support for NATO.
The House vote, taken on April 5, is a warning sign. Putin may be losing ground in Ukraine, but he’s gaining ground in the U.S. Congress. Three years ago, 22 House Republicans voted against pro-NATO legislation. That number has nearly tripled.
The “Putin wing” of the House GOP—useful idiots such as Madison Cawthorn and Marjorie Taylor Greene, who openly spout Russian propaganda—is only a tiny fraction of the Kremlin’s target audience in Congress. They’re joined by a larger crowd of Ukraine bashers, hardcore isolationists, and right-wingers who say we shouldn’t worry about anyone else’s borders until we “secure” our own. Together, that coalition adds up to more than 20 lawmakers.
That’s a problem. But when you combine them with the NATO skeptics who voted against last week’s resolution—another 40 or so House Republicans who don’t trust alliances and who view Europeans as America’s rivals or adversaries—the problem gets a lot bigger.
The GOP’s turn against NATO is particularly worrisome because Congress has been warned, explicitly and repeatedly, about Putin’s goal of dissolving the alliance. In March 2017, after a U.S. intelligence report confirmed that Russia had interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs—which was then, like the rest of Congress, under Republican control—held a hearing on this subject. The hearing was titled, “Undermining Democratic Institutions and Splintering NATO: Russian Disinformation Aims.” Analysts and former officials explained to the committee how Russia had, in the words of one witness, persistently funded propaganda in the West to “fracture allied security, stoke public distrust against democratic institutions, and discredit the alliance structures that defend Europe.”
Over the next two years, other reports documented the same problem. The European Council on Foreign Relations noted Russia’s efforts to undermine support for NATO in Finland, the Czech Republic, and other countries. Foreign policy journals and articles in the American press noted rising alarm in Europe at President Donald Trump’s threats to withdraw U.S. troops from the continent or to abandon the American commitment to defend NATO allies.
On January 14, 2019, the New York Times reported that “several times” in 2018, Trump had “privately said he wanted to withdraw” from the alliance. The article said Trump had “told his top national security officials that he did not see the point of the military alliance, which he presented as a drain on the United States.”
A few days after the Times report, House Democrats filed and brought to the floor the NATO Support Act, which reaffirmed that the U.S. was “solemnly committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s principle of collective defense as enumerated in Article 5.” The bill couldn’t completely bind Trump, but it expressed the sense of Congress that “the President shall not withdraw the United States from NATO” and that American policy was “to reject any efforts to withdraw the United States from NATO.” It also prohibited the use of federal funds “to take any action to withdraw the United States” from the alliance.
Every Democrat voted for the bill; 22 Republicans voted against it.
One of the 22 Republicans, Rep. Scott Perry, explained why he and other self-styled hawks had voted no. In a statement to constituents, he complained that “the bill prevented the U.S. from ever leaving NATO . . . unless Congress first voted to repeal this would-be new law.” Perry wanted Trump to be free to pull America out of NATO, on his own.
Perry also argued that Trump should be free “to negotiate better terms for the United States in NATO,” as though the alliance were a trade deal. And he warned that “an ally of ours today may not be an ally tomorrow.”
That’s how Perry and many of his colleagues viewed the world. They saw alliances as entanglements and burdens. They worried that even friendly countries couldn’t be trusted. They believed that America should hedge its commitments because our allies might screw us.
And that was all Putin needed. He didn’t need American lawmakers to love him the way Trump did. He just needed them to constrain or withhold support from NATO.
Perry’s defection was a particularly good sign for Putin. The congressman wasn’t just an Iraq war veteran. He had also chaired part of the 2017 hearing on Russia’s strategy to undermine NATO. So he must have known he was doing what Putin wanted.
But he did it anyway, because he thought he was protecting America from Europe.
In the three years since that vote, Congress has seen even more evidence of Russia’s operations to sabotage NATO.
In April 2019, the Justice Department released the Mueller report. It detailed how Russia had lobbied Trump campaign officials against NATO; how the Trump campaign, according to one of its own former co-chairs, had shifted away from “the NATO framework”; and how the Trump team had blocked Republican platform language that would have endorsed “providing lethal defensive weapons” to Ukraine.
In October 2019, the Senate Intelligence Committee released an analysis of Russian propaganda techniques. The report showed how the Kremlin had sought to “drive wedges in the Western community alliances of all sorts, particularly NATO.” One of Russia’s tricks, the report noted, was “discouraging United States support” for accepting eastern European countries into NATO by portraying those countries as “free riders.”
In August 2020, the Senate committee issued a report that showed how Kremlin sympathizers had lobbied the Trump campaign against NATO. The report found that in April 2016, then-New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie had advised Trump to affirm in a speech that “our commitment to our NATO allies in Eastern Europe is absolute” and that “we need to stand up to Russian aggression together.” The Trump campaign had rejected this language.
In September 2020, New York Times journalist Michael Schmidt reported that during Trump’s presidency, his then-chief of staff, John Kelly, had struggled to stop Trump from pulling out of NATO. In July 2021, Washington Post reporters Carol Leonnig and Philip Rucker revealed that Trump had told advisers he would abandon the alliance in his second term. And last month, Trump’s former national security adviser, John Bolton, told the Post that “Putin was waiting” for Trump to do just that.
After all these warnings, and after Putin’s latest invasion of Ukraine, one might have expected the congressional caucus of NATO critics to shrink.
Instead, it multiplied.
Why did so many Republicans vote against the latest pro-NATO resolution?
Some openly reject the alliance. “NATO is a relic of the Cold War,” said Rep. Thomas Massie. “Why should Americans pay for Europe’s defense?”
Others said the U.S. should be wary of overcommitment. “We shouldn’t say that our support for NATO is unconditional,” said Rep. Warren Davidson.
But others, including Perry, complained that the resolution threatened American sovereignty. In a video statement, Perry told his constituents that the resolution “politicizes NATO” by saying “if you’re not supporting socialism, then we’re going to use NATO against you.”
This is a bizarre misrepresentation. The resolution affirmed that NATO was “founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.” Those words are literally in the alliance’s founding treaty. The resolution also called for “unwavering support to the people of Ukraine.” And it endorsed a project, jointly proposed by Democratic and Republican lawmakers, to build “NATO’s capacity to strengthen democratic institutions within NATO member, partner, and aspirant countries.”
To make sure nobody misconstrued that language as an attack on sovereignty, the resolution stipulated that any NATO monitoring of “challenges to democracy” within member states would be undertaken only “when requested.”
Perry ignored that stipulation and caricatured the resolution. So did several of his colleagues. Representative Chip Roy described the resolution as “empowering international organizations to target the internal activities of sovereign nations.” Davidson described it as “using NATO to try to undermine America’s sovereignty.”
Some members who opposed the measure also expressed hostility toward Europe. Davidson said “global commitments” to accords on climate, banking, and other issues were forcing the U.S. to adopt the “inferior system” of “the Europeans.”
Roy fretted that NATO, empowered by the House resolution, would subject Americans to “the leftist orthodoxy that now unfortunately permeates most of Western Europe.”
These lawmakers think they’re patriots. They think that by voting to limit NATO and America’s commitment to it, they’re protecting us. And that’s what makes their subversion of the alliance, from Putin’s point of view, so delicious.
It’s so much easier to serve evil when you think you’re doing good.
OCOs Turn
OCOs Bad
Trying to use OCOs for signaling causes miscalculation and nuke war
Erica Longergan and Keren Yarhi-Milo 22 (Lonergan is an assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute at West Point and a research scholar at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University; Yarhi-Milo is the Arnold A. Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Studies in the political science department and the School of International and Public Affairs, “Cyber Signaling and Nuclear Deterrence: Implications for the Ukraine Crisis,” War on the Rocks, 4/21/22, https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/cyber-signaling-and-nuclear-deterrence-implications-for-the-ukraine-crisis/)
So far, the Biden administration has attempted to dismiss Russia’s announcement as irresponsible saber-rattling. But as Putin continues issuing nuclear threats, policymakers are likely to feel growing pressure to respond. In particular, they may be tempted to find ways to signal to Russia to deter the use of nuclear weapons. One way this might be done is through cyber operations. In fact, some cyber experts are already calling for the United States to consider cyber attacks for signaling purposes. For example, writing in the Washington Post, Dmitri Alperovitch and Samuel Charap call on the Biden administration to consider a cyber “shock-and-awe demonstration” in response to a major Russian cyber attack against the West. They claim that such a response, which could include disrupting the Internet throughout Russia, would signal U.S. resolve and help prevent further escalation that they fear “could result in nuclear war.”
However, conducting cyber operations to signal deterrence would, paradoxically, increase risks of escalation. This risk is not just hypothetical, especially in light of Russia’s updated declaratory policy for the first use of nuclear weapons, which may include responses to cyber attacks. Russia has reinforced this message during the war in Ukraine. In early March, a hacking group affiliated with Anonymous claimed that it had shut down the control center of Russia’s space agency. While denying that the attack took place, Russia nevertheless warned that a cyber attack against its satellites would be a justification for war.
The Biden administration should clearly communicate that cyber operations for nuclear signaling are out of bounds, just as it declared restraint in other aspects of this conflict, like the deployment of American troops to Ukraine.
How Cyberspace Is Creating Nuclear Risks
Policymakers and academics are attuned to the cyber risks to nuclear command and control. The practitioner community has largely focused on U.S. vulnerabilities and how to mitigate them. Scholars, in turn, worry about how cyber operations could have unintended escalatory consequences. But less attention has been paid to another likely scenario: the use of cyber operations for signaling purposes (operations with visible effects that aim to convey a message to another state) in a nuclear context. The ambiguity of cyber operations can sometimes be useful for signaling — but the same ambiguity can be dangerous during a nuclear crisis. The problem is that civilian leaders in particular, distinct from the military, are inclined to see cyber attacks as effective signaling tools.
Cyber operations could have nuclear implications, especially because modern nuclear command and control systems, like those in Russia and the United States, are becoming increasingly dependent on digital infrastructure. Nuclear command, control, and communications systems, which include early warning, information collection, and communications capabilities, alert decision-makers to impending nuclear strikes and also enable leaders to control decisions about nuclear use (or non-use). But their digital dependencies are creating opportunities for exploitation using cyber means. In a 2020 report, the Nuclear Threat Initiative found that “almost 9 out of 10 planned nuclear modernization programs involve at least some new digital components or upgrades.”
Vulnerabilities inherent in the digital infrastructure that undergird modern nuclear systems provide opportunities for actors to engage in cyber espionage — gaining access to a network or system to steal information — or even conduct cyber attacks. Hypothetically, a cyber power like Russia could conduct a cyber attack against a U.S. early warning satellite to degrade its functionality. This has become an urgent concern for practitioners. U.S. Strategic Command, for instance, is currently working to “operationally harden NC3 systems against cyber threats.” Congress has also gotten involved, requiring the Defense Department to evaluate the cybersecurity of major weapon systems. And the Government Accountability Office has published multiple reports decrying the state of cybersecurity and scope of vulnerabilities of weapon systems, including elements of the nuclear triad.
From an academic perspective, scholars have investigated how cyber operations targeting nuclear systems could exacerbate escalation risks. Focusing on nuclear forces, early research, such as work by Martin Libicki, was skeptical of the dangers posed by cyber operations. Nuclear forces were seen as being largely immune from digital attacks because they were “air gapped,” meaning that they were separated from information technology systems.
However, as nuclear systems have become increasingly intertwined with the digital environment — not to mention the dual-use nature of many elements of nuclear command, control, and communications systems (like early warning or position, navigation, and timing satellites) — the protection offered by being segregated from the internet is less robust. Jacquelyn Schneider, Benjamin Schechter, and Rachael Schaffer, for instance, ran a series of wargames demonstrating that decision-makers in hypothetical crises are likely to use their cyber exploits against an adversary’s nuclear systems. They found that this could have negative effects on states’ respective nuclear strategies, especially decisions to pre-delegate nuclear launch authority or automate nuclear responses. Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay argue that the clandestine nature of cyber operations means that one state could secretly gain access to an adversary’s nuclear command, control, and communications systems, giving the former an information advantage or even creating an incentive for the latter to use its nuclear weapons out of the fear that it may lose them. James Acton notes that the difficulties of distinguishing between cyber espionage and attack could lead a state to misperceive the intent behind a cyber operation, generating a similar “use it or lose it” calculus.
The Limited Escalation Risks of Cyber Operations
But all of this focus on cyber operations causing nuclear escalation may be misplaced and, more importantly, distract policymakers from the dangers of a more plausible scenario: the use of ambiguous cyber signals during nuclear crises. Specifically, the nature of cyber operations reduces their inherent escalatory potential, particularly when compared to other ways a state could attack an adversary’s nuclear forces or command, control, and communications systems, like a direct counterforce strike or employing anti-satellite weapons. But their misuse as a signaling tool could do more harm than good.
First, successfully conducting cyber operations against strategic targets, like nuclear systems, is harder than the conventional wisdom might suggest. It requires a means of gaining access to a particular system and developing an exploit to cause a desired effect — and then maintaining persistent (and stealthy) access to be able to conduct an offensive operation at the desired time. Moreover, the overall outcome may be unpredictable and net less-than-desirable results.
Second, even if a state is able to conduct these kinds of operations, they typically prefer to do so in secret — and this mitigates some escalation concerns. That’s because, to cause an escalatory response, a state like Russia would have to uncover a cyber operation during a particular time period — such as while the Ukraine conflict is unfolding. For example, Russia would have to detect a cyber operation against a nuclear command and control system to cause Putin to perceive a “window of vulnerability,” perhaps assessing that it is part of a U.S. or NATO counterforce strategy to disable Russia’s ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons. But the likelihood of these circumstances arising is low because — unless a state is trying to signal with a cyber capability — it will try to keep these kinds of sensitive operations secret. Therefore, the chances of such an operation being discovered at a particular time period are relatively small.
Finally, even if, hypothetically, Russia was to discover a cyber operation taking place, the likelihood of it leading to escalation is low. This is due to the virtual nature of cyber “weapons” — they rarely cause destruction in the physical world, let alone permanent damage. For example, even Russia’s 2015 cyber attack against Ukraine’s power grid, an important example of a strategic cyber attack against civilian critical infrastructure, only resulted in service disruptions for a few hours. During the current conflict, Russia-linked actors have so far been stymied in using cyber operations for strategic impact, such as the failed cyber attack by the group Sandworm against Ukraine’s power grid.
Taken together, this reasoning suggests that, in practice, cyber operations may not rise to a level that would cause a state like Russia to actually fear the integrity of its nuclear command, control, and communications systems, creating few reasons to escalate to the level of nuclear employment.
Civil-Military Relations and the Risks of Cyber Signaling in Nuclear Crises
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