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2022 Michigan Counterplan

AT - War Powers Act CP - Michigan 7 2022 FMPS

AT - War Powers Act CP - Michigan 7 2022 FMPS.docx

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aff answers
2ac – exec flex good
Executive flexibility solves terror AND prolif – extinction – Congress is structurally incapable at crisis response
John Yoo 17, John Yoo is the Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkeley, a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, 4-13-2017, "Trump’s Syria Strike Was Constitutional," National Review, https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/04/trump-syria-strike-constitutional-presidents-have-broad-war-powers/, *added [undermine], nihara
The Framers realized the obvious. Foreign affairs are unpredictable and involve the highest of stakes, making them unsuitable to regulation by preexisting legislation. Instead, they can demand swift, decisive action — sometimes under pressured or even emergency circumstances — that is best carried out by a branch of government that does not suffer from multiple vetoes or that is delayed by disagreements. Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required in wartime. Our Framers replaced the Articles of Confederation, which had failed in the management of foreign relations because they had no single executive, with the Constitution’s single president for precisely this reason. Even when it has access to the same intelligence as the executive branch, Congress’s loose, decentralized structure would [undermine] paralyze American policy while foreign threats grew.
Congress has no political incentive to mount and see through its own wartime policy. Members of Congress, who are interested in keeping their seats at the next election, do not want to take stands on controversial issues where the future is uncertain. They will avoid like the plague any vote that will anger large segments of the electorate. They prefer that the president take the political risks and be held accountable for failure.
Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required in wartime.
Congress’s track record when it has opposed presidential leadership has not been a happy one. Perhaps the most telling example was the Senate’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I. Congress’s isolationist urge kept the United States out of Europe at a time when democracies fell and Fascism grew in their place. Even as Europe and Asia plunged into war, Congress passed the Neutrality Acts designed to keep the United States out of the conflict. President Franklin Roosevelt violated those laws to help the Allies and draw the nation into war against the Axis. While pro-Congress critics worry about a president’s foreign adventurism, the real threat to our national security could come from inaction and isolationism.
Many point to the Vietnam War as an example of the faults of the “imperial presidency.” Vietnam, however, could not have continued without the consistent support of Congress in raising a large military and paying for hostilities. And Vietnam ushered in a period of congressional dominance that witnessed American setbacks in the Cold War and the passage of the ineffectual War Powers Resolution. Congress passed the resolution in 1973 over President Richard Nixon’s veto, and no president has ever accepted the constitutionality of its 60-day limit on the use of troops abroad. No federal court has ever upheld the resolution. Even Congress has never enforced it.
Despite the record of practice and the Constitution’s institutional design, critics nevertheless argue that we should radically remake the American way of war. They typically base their claim on Congress’s power to “declare war.” But these observers read the 18th-century constitutional text through a modern lens by interpreting “declare war” to mean “start war.” When the Constitution was written, however, a declaration of war served diplomatic notice about a change in legal relations between nations. It had little to do with launching hostilities. In the century before the Constitution, for example, Great Britain — where the Framers got the idea of declaring war — fought numerous major conflicts but declared war only once beforehand.
Our Constitution sets out specific procedures for passing laws, appointing officers, and making treaties. There are none for waging war because the Framers expected the president and Congress to struggle over war through the national political process. In fact, other parts of the Constitution, properly read, support this reading. Article I, Section 10, for example, declares that the states shall not “engage” in war “without the consent of Congress” unless “actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.” This provision creates exactly the limits desired by anti-war critics, complete with an exception for self-defense. If the Framers had wanted to require congressional permission before the president could wage war, they simply could have repeated this provision and applied it to the executive.
Presidents, of course, do not have complete freedom to take the nation to war. Congress has ample powers to control presidential policy, if it wants to. Only Congress can raise the military, which gives it the power to block, delay, or modify war plans. Before 1945, the United States had such a small peacetime military that presidents who started a war would have to go hat in hand to Congress to build an army to fight it. Since World War II, Congress has authorized and funded our large standing military, one primarily designed to conduct offensive, not defensive, operations (as we learned all too tragically on 9/11) and to swiftly project power worldwide. If Congress wanted to discourage presidential initiative in war, it could build a smaller, less offense-minded military.
Congress’s check on the presidency lies not just in the long-term raising of the military. It can also block any immediate armed conflict through the power of the purse. If Congress feels it has been misled in authorizing war, or it disagrees with the president’s decisions, all it need do is cut off funds, either all at once or gradually. It can reduce the size of the military, shrink or eliminate units, or freeze supplies. Using the power of the purse does not even require affirmative congressional action. Congress can just sit on its hands and refuse to pass a law funding the latest presidential adventure, and the war will end quickly. Even the Kosovo war, which lasted little more than two months and involved no ground troops, required special funding legislation.
The Framers expected Congress’s power of the purse to serve as the primary check on presidential war. During the 1788 Virginia ratifying convention. Patrick Henry attacked the Constitution for failing to limit executive militarism. James Madison responded: “The sword is in the hands of the British king; the purse is in the hands of the Parliament. It is so in America, as far as any analogy can exist.” Congress ended America’s involvement in Vietnam by cutting off all funds for the war.
Our Constitution has succeeded because it favors swift presidential action in war, later checked by Congress’s funding power. If a president continues to wage war without congressional authorization, as in Libya, Kosovo, or Korea, it is only because Congress has chosen not to exercise its easy check. We should not confuse a desire to escape political responsibility for a defect in the Constitution.
A radical change in the system for making war might appease critics of presidential power. But it could also seriously threaten American national security. In order to forestall another 9/11 attack, or take advantage of a window of opportunity to strike terrorists or rogue nations, the executive branch needs flexibility. It is not hard to think of situations where congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act. Time for congressional deliberation, which can lead to passivity and isolation and not smarter decisions, will come at the price of speed and secrecy.
The Constitution creates a presidency that can respond forcefully to prevent serious threats to our national security. Presidents can take the initiative, and Congress can use its funding power to check presidents. Instead of demanding a legalistic process to begin war, the Framers left war to politics. As we confront the new challenges of terrorism, rogue nations, and WMD proliferation, now is not the time to introduce sweeping, untested changes in the way we make war.
Ukraine proves Congressional re-assertion in foreign affairs is occurring now – BUT, is only escalatory – AND, runs counter to executive restraint
Rachael Bade 22, Rachael Bade is a 10-year veteran of the congressional press corps, where her stories illuminated the power struggles and personal dynamics animating the major policy clashes of Capitol Hill. She spent the past two years covering House Democrats' oversight of the Trump Administration for The Washington Post, where she routinely broke news on the party's attempts to hold the president accountable as well as the historic impeachment effort. She is currently writing a book, "A Perfect Phone Call," for HarperCollins' William Morrow publishing house about how and why the move to oust Trump failed. Before joining the Post in early 2019, Rachael covered Congress for POLITICO, where she spent six years of her journalism career. From her vantage point on the Hill, she chronicled President Trump's remaking of the GOP, churning out stories with behind-the-scenes details about the struggle between pro-Trump lawmakers and those fearful of the new direction of the party. Rachael is a political analyst for CNN and has also appeared on CBS's "Face the Nation," ABC's "This Week" and Fox News' "Fox News Sunday." A small-town, Ohio-native, she graduated from the University of Dayton with degrees in political science and communication and is a former classical ballet dancer., 03/14/2022, "POLITICO Playbook: Something unusual is happening between Biden and Congress," https://www.politico.com/newsletters/playbook/2022/03/14/something-unusual-is-happening-between-biden-and-congress-00016935, nihara
PRESSURE POLITICS — Something quite striking has happened in Washington since Russia invaded Ukraine. Congress — which typically takes a back seat on foreign policy matters — has repeatedly driven the White House beyond its comfort zone with bipartisan demands for more assertive policies.
It started with calls for tougher sanctions, then escalated to an appeal for a larger military and humanitarian assistance package. Members of both parties then clamored for a U.S. ban on Russian oil, which the White House saw as politically risky given the effect on gas prices at home. And they insisted that the U.S. end permanent normal trade relations with Russia.
The tactics have worked. And this week, lawmakers will be at it again — this time nudging the Biden administration to go further than it wants in facilitating the transfer of fighter jets from Poland to Ukraine.
The White House POV: The Biden White House — worried about ratcheting up tensions with the Kremlin — has rejected Poland’s offer to move their Soviet-style planes. Indeed, Russia over the weekend warned that it would view any such delivery as an escalation, and signaled that any such convoys (even American-delivered ones) would be considered “legitimate targets.”
Alex Ward, who anchors POLITICO’s National Security Daily newsletter, noted Sunday that the administration has gone out of its way to avoid any moves that could trigger further conflict with Russia. It has even taken steps back to ease tensions, such as canceling special operations training and delaying missile tests. Our colleagues also scooped Sunday that a “Pentagon push to send more trainers to Ukraine was scrapped in December amid White House fears of provoking Russia.”
The supporters’ POV: Supporters of approving a transfer of fighter jets argue that Russia has drawn multiple lines that the West has already crossed — and that VLADIMIR PUTIN is the aggressor here. Sen. ROB PORTMAN (R-Ohio), speaking from the Ukraine-Poland border, noted on CNN’s “State of the Union” on Sunday that Putin had also called sanctions an “act of war” and warned the U.S. against providing stringers and helicopters.
“What we’ve heard directly from the Ukrainians is they want them badly,” Portman said of the planes. “They want the ability to have better control over the skies in order to give them a fighting chance. I don’t understand why we’re not doing it.”
The build-up: While Republicans led the charge calling for the transfer last week, over the weekend we saw some Hill Democrats join the fray. Ex-military Democratic Reps. JASON CROW (Colo.), JARED GOLDEN (Maine) and CHRISSY HOULAHAN (Pa.) and a couple of others signed a bipartisan letter backing the move, as we first reported in Playbook PM on Friday. By Sunday, the 58-member-strong bipartisan Problem Solvers Caucus — half Democrats — had joined them.
“With Russia’s alarming disregard for Ukrainian civilian casualties, the U.S. must … help supply more comprehensive air defense systems to defend Ukraine and its people,” the letter read.
Meanwhile, Sen. AMY KLOBUCHAR (D-Minn.) — who doesn’t break often with President JOE BIDEN — said the U.S. shouldn’t rule out making the transfer: “I have made clear to them — I spoke to the president himself about 10 days ago about this — I’d like to see the planes over there,” she said on “State of the Union,” floating the idea of other types of air defense assistance that could also work. “I still don’t rule out having planes at some point.”
So is it just a matter of time before the Biden White House flips and moves on the Poland transfer? Perhaps. What is clear is that Congress has had success with this type of vocal, bipartisan push before. WaPo’s Amy Wang has more on the bipartisan movement on the plane issue. (Read on for more on Ukraine below.)
Executive flexibility is inevitable – even if they’re right – Congress will NOT re-engage due to political incentives – AND, gridlock enables executive power grabs – NO spillover
Daniel W. Drezner 21, Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, 8-30-2021, " Why Congress will not reengage on foreign policy," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/08/30/why-congress-will-not-reengage-foreign-policy/, nihara
As more information comes out about the proximate causes of the Taliban’s swift takeover of Afghanistan, AEI’s Kori Schake has a good op-ed in the New York Times reminding everyone (including Trump administration officials hoping for national amnesia) about the February 2020 deal that the Trump administration negotiated with the Taliban that set the table for the horrible meal we are all digesting now.
That agreement led to “the release of 5,000 combat and political Taliban prisoners” and bypassed the Afghan government entirely. As Schake writes, “For someone who prided himself on his abilities as a dealmaker and displayed an ‘I alone can fix it’ arrogance, the agreement he made with the Taliban is one of the most disgraceful diplomatic bargains on record.”
The deeper point to Schake’s op-ed, however, is that President Donald Trump’s debacle is simply the most recent and most prominent example of a U.S. president believing that personal diplomacy can solve everything. Instead, “presidents should return to the practice of persuading their fellow Americans of the merits of agreements with foreign powers.”
If they do not, Schake advises Congress to reclaim its powers over foreign affairs:
Congress can begin by reasserting its role in diplomacy and requiring specific authorizations for the use of military force rather than continuing to acquiesce to claims that existing executive authorizations can be endlessly expanded. It should refuse the shifting of funds previously authorized and appropriated for other purposes (Mr. Trump made such shifts to construct the border wall). It should reject foreign policy changes enacted by executive order rather than congressional approval, and it should force the Supreme Court to clarify the extent of the president’s war powers.
Agreements with foreign powers, whether states, international institutions or organizations like the Taliban, should be submitted to Congress for a vote. The best way to prevent catastrophic foreign policy mistakes is to require the 535 representatives of the American people to put their jobs on the line, become informed, and support, reject or modify a president’s program. Congress tried to slow or block Mr. Trump’s planned drawdown of U.S. forces. Members who supported the Taliban deal should be explaining why they thought the outcome would be different than the tragedy unfolding in Afghanistan now. Apathy and unaccountability are the real enemies of good foreign policy. Presidents get around oversight by offering unilateral policy actions or claiming international agreements aren’t formal treaties. Congress shouldn’t let a president from either party get away with that.
As an analyst, I agree wholeheartedly with Schake’s diagnosis of the problem. One of the running themes in my own long-form writing on American foreign policy — see here, here, here, here and here — has been that a variety of factors has led to everyone treating the president as the last adult in the room. This is a real problem when Americans elect a petulant child to occupy the Oval Office.
Nor is this argument original to me. It begins with Arthur Schlesinger’s “The Imperial Presidency,” continues with Andrew Rudalevige’s “The New Imperial Presidency,” proceeds with Linda Fowler’s “Watchdogs on the Hill” and so forth.
The diagnosis makes sense — but Schake’s proposed remedy does not, for two reasons. First, most members of Congress have little incentive to act responsibly on foreign affairs. As Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley note in “Sailing the Water’s Edge,” what motivates Congress is the distribution of concentrated costs and benefits. Foreign affairs, which is mostly about advancing the national interest, has very little of this outside of the defense budget.
As a result, most individual members of Congress do not care about foreign policy, except as an exercise in partisanship. Neither do their constituents. The result is that when Congress does get involved in foreign affairs, it is mostly through displays of self-sabotaging symbolism, such as passing JASTA or impulsively flying to Kabul in the middle of a rescue mission or, as I noted in Foreign Affairs, imposing economic sanctions so that they “can tell their constituents that they are doing something about a problem even if that something isn’t working.”
Now it could be argued that if Schake’s proposed reforms were enacted, the shared sense of responsibility would focus the mind of Congress, leaving lawmakers no choice but to act responsibly. Alas, that is highly unlikely, for two reasons. First, even if Congress was blamed collectively for inaction in foreign affairs, individual members would not be punished by their constituents. Ordinary Americans barely consider foreign policy when voting for the president, much less their House representative.
Second, when a foreign policy crisis does emerge, attention naturally gravitates toward 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Congress has 535 individual voices; the president is a singular voice. During a crisis, the president will always have the incentive to act using executive power in the face of congressional gridlock. Furthermore, that very gridlock will enable the president to get away with power grabs more often than not. So long as a president’s party provides backup, there is little that Congress can do as an institution to constrain executive power.
This is normally the point in the column when the hard-working staff here at Spoiler Alerts offers a better solutio

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