Neg - Black Disability - Michigan 7 2022 K LAB
Neg - Black Disability - Michigan 7 2022 K LAB.docx
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Neg Case 1NC --- Presumption Alt can’t change society’s worldview and only marginalizes material experiences Vehmas & Watson 13 (Simo Vehmas & Nick Watson, “Moral wrongs, disadvantages, and disability: a critique of critical disability studies”, p. 648-649) Further, deconstructing differences will not in and of itself produce respect and equality between all people with various characteristics. Neither will it result in a social order free from a sense of difference. It is simply unrealistic to assume that a society could exist were people would not see some other people as different, and their lives or characteristics as representing a deviation from some norm considered important regarding good human life. This is because some of the individual characteristics that define disabled people are, sometimes with good reason, undesirable, even in a utopia where all differences would have been queered. Disability is not the same as many other group identities and we need to explore both morally and socially disability and difference rather than simply use difference as a concept through which to critique the disability identity. There are no rational reasons to consider homosexuality or gender undesirable characteristics whatever the social context, but there are many impairments that can reasonably be seen as undesirable (Shakespeare 2006). Motor neuron disease, depression or spinal cord injury are the kinds of conditions that we would prefer not to have, and this is not merely because of the cultural representations attached to them but because these conditions are the kinds of predicaments that cause suffering irrespective of one’s cultural environment. In acknowledging that impairments can include an undesirable dimension does not imply devaluing people with impairments nor their positive group identity (Shakespeare and Watson 2010). As long as people are genuinely free to decide for themselves and feel about themselves however they wish to feel, we are pretty close to relational justice, free from hierarchical evils. Imposing on people ableist or disablist assumptions is certainly wrong, but so would be the denial of the personal experiences of fearing the loss of one’s physical and mental capacities, or the fear of dying (Carel 2008). To explain the psychological anguish related to conditions such as motor neurone disease or depression merely in terms of internalized oppression and ableism would be insensitive, disrespectful and simply nonsensical. 1NC --- Cyborg Bad Cyborg theorizing is rooted in ableist and Anti-Black logics that ensure it’s failure. Knadler 19 - ( Stephen Knadler; Stephen Knadler is an associate professor of English at Spelman College, where he teaches US literature and cultural studies. He has been published in American Literature, American Literary History, American Quarterly, Minnesota Review, and Modern Fiction Studies.; Originally published: August 6, 2019; “Vitality politics : health, debility, and the limits of black emancipation”; http://link.umsl.edu/portal/Vitality-politics--health-debility-and-the/n6SXiAQq3achttp://library.lol/main/D8D265377A8F7623EB4F5A75223D22AB) Dōgen What I am also unwilling to take with the theory of assemblage is the freighted territory of the cyborg: the feminist materialist theory of becoming developed by Donna Haraway that combines human, animal, and machine as a radical political enterprise that ushers in the future both theoretically and practically. I have found it useful as a thought exercise that complicates the relationship of the body to itself and to others and deals with our very real reliance on machines and kinship with animals. Since the cyborg opens up the conversation about futurity—which usually elides madness and Blackness—it also becomes a useful space to consider who we are becoming.60 Certainly, to think through our kinship with machines is apropos for discussions of disability given the medicalization of certain bodies, and remains so given my emphasis on speculative fiction. But the cyborg is an incomplete, politically fraught, and ethically suspicious answer to a series of questions about raced and disabled futurity. Material reality must reckon with what others have pointed out are the lived experiences of the Black and disabled body, what amount to (in this project, at least) the gaps and folds within Black speculative fiction. Read in alignment with Tobin Siebers’s theory of complex embodiment and Alison Kafer’s questioning of spatial, cultural, and temporal logics, the emphasis on the cyborg and the desire to supersede the body has an antagonistic relationship with concerns at the heart of disability studies: pain, fiscal access, and the validity of embodied experience, to name a few.61 What happens when one does not desire cyborgian intervention as cure? What of those for whom material cyborgian realities are more painful than useful or pleasurable? As much as cyborgian futures promise a radical set of possibilities for considering disability, we ought to be wary of them because they are also reliant on a set of middleclass (or rich) realities. I have elsewhere pointed out the way the cyborg’s promise of radical potential hinges on an original white Western subject.62 Leaning on Donna Haraway’s original definition, João Costa Vargas and Joy A. James understand the Black cyborg as a postbellum construction that requires Black degradation: “A Black cyborg: a modified, improved human whose increased ethical, spiritual, and physical capabilities generate unusual strength, omniscience, and boundless love.”63 They invoke Haraway’s understanding of the cyborg as both real and fictive to pinpoint how the Black cyborg relies on a set of interracial dynamics that extend from a history steeped in anti-Blackness. The Black cyborg is required to participate in its own self abnegation since it is built on top of the foundations of American democratic and imperial projects reliant on phobic understandings of Blackness. The Black cyborg, then, in Vargas and James’s formulation, echoes that of the disabled cyborg: neither can escape the desire for normalcy that erases Blackness and madness both. Alison Kafer reads in the gaps of Haraway’s work and its intellectual genealogy to reinsert the oft-overlooked contributions of women of color—among them Octavia E. Butler and Chela Sandoval—to the definition of the cyborg. She pinpoints that the cyborg as transgressive figure has limited potential precisely because of how it has been developed and mobilized in ways that erase women of color and reify the virgule between disabled and able-bodied. Though the cyborg asks for blasphemous interpretation—a promise and proposition Kafer, Vargas, and James readily champion—as part of its political transgression, I question how much the cyborg can map a future of any kind when it relies on a past and path of erasure. What the cyborg ushers in—that I’d prefer to leave aside for this discussion—is an assemblage yoked to anti-Blackness and ableism, a method of becoming that requires theoretical overcoming since the theories rely on but refuse disabled and Black embodiment. The Aff is an ableist cyborg hoax Ellcessor 16 (Elizabeth Ellcessor is an associate professor of media studies at the University of Virginia, “Cyborg hoaxes: Disability, deception, and critical studies of digital media”, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1461444816642754, 4/19/16, Buck) Cyborg hoaxes, deceptive forms of identity presentation that articulate gender, disability, and technology, have been persistent but unremarked upon elements of online culture. By identifying, contextualizing, and deconstructing them, this article has highlighted the persistence of an ideology of ability in online culture and in cyberculture and Internet studies. An ideology of ability is at work in the pitiable presentation of a digital sweet innocent and in the excuses offered by cancer. Identifying these themes reveals that online cultures remain closely connected to larger ideologies and norms. Far from offering a “liberation technology” (Coombs, 1991), online spaces may reproduce and amplify the prejudices and normative assumptions of a broader cultural context. These deceptive assemblages deploy disability strategically for an able-bodied audience, taking advantage of existing hierarchies. Yet, they may also challenge the very ideologies upon which they depend. For instance, the prominence of romance and sexuality in these hoaxes counters very real tendencies to desexualize people with disabilities. Such contradictions, and the blurring of identity and technology, are indicative of the “cyborg” component of these hoaxes. While I retained this language in order to highlight the possibility of such provocations, it is in the experiences of people with disabilities using online media that a richer form of cyborg can be found. These experiences reflect a variety of possible linkages of gender and sexuality, disability, and technology. In these formations, people with disabilities can be understood “as cyborgs not because of [their] bodies (e.g. our use of prosthetics, ventilators, or attendants), but because of [their] political practices” (Kafer, 2013: 120). In claiming disability identity and engaging in community formation, by reconfiguring default settings of computer hardware and software, and by speaking back to dominant narratives of disability and gender, these individuals and communities are producing disability technocultures that are seditious and, too often, invisible. Disability is a necessary and theoretically rich addition to the forms of identity, community, and material technology that have dominated critical and cultural studies of digital media. Present since the earliest cyberculture work, but rendered invisible or metaphorical, disability offers important critical resources for the nuanced and complex study of the digital networked media that increasingly permeate daily life. Not a metaphor, and not invisible, but ever-present and meaningful, disability offers a lens through which to examine theoretical assumptions and exclusions and with which to critically interrogate normative forms of digital media and the ideological structures that maintain and challenge them. 1NC --- Liberalism Even if political liberalism currently excludes the disabled, discussing questions of implementation can revise it Badano 13 (Gabriele – PhD candidate at the Centre for Philosophy, Justice and Health at University College London – “Political liberalism and the justice claims of the disabled: a reconciliation,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, April 2013, http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/tHKkbrxhGYIWAxTcJrAW/full#.UxyV-PldX-4) I argue that any proposal abandoning the language of political justice would not seem to do enough for those individuals with disabilities who fall outside the basic idea of persons as depicted by Rawls. In fact, the intuitions supporting the idea that concepts like rights and opportunities are indispensable are very strong.11 Let us go back to the examples of individuals falling outside Rawls’s idea of persons because their disabilities prevent them from being a net benefit to social cooperation. They are individuals who need multiple carers to work, or whose disabilities prevent them from providing a benefit to social cooperation that is large enough. To put the point more sharply, it is worth noticing that the disabilities in question are compatible with being in full possession of one’s logical and moral powers. Now, should we accept that those individuals ought to be given no rights or opportunities? An affirmative answer would strike us as implausible, and for a good reason. In a liberal society, having one’s rights, opportunities and basic distributive entitlements acknowledged is one and the same as being recognized as an equal. And what is missing from Rawls’s political liberalism is precisely the idea that falling below a threshold of full cooperation should not be enough to prevent the disabled from being regarded as persons on an equal footing with anyone else. In sum, Rawls’s political liberalism is not amenable to any extension that, keeping the basic ideas of society and persons intact, is able to include a concern with the status of individuals with disabilities. In addition, the proposal that the interests of the disabled are not for public reason to protect is not satisfactory. Consequently, a substantial revision is the only way to reconcile political liberalism with our intuitions concerning what is due to the disabled. 5. Revising political liberalism I: beyond Hartley’s contractualism The aim of this section and the next is to propose a substantial revision of Rawls’s theory that accommodates the justice claims of the disabled while upholding the project of political liberalism. A question that needs to be answered at this point is: why should we uphold the project of political liberalism, rather than endorsing a different model that more neatly fits with our intuitions concerning what is due to the disabled? First, the general project of political liberalism is compelling. Rawls’s political liberalism aims to identify a common ground of political ideas that can work as the basis on which the most important political decisions should be made. This project is of the greatest importance because, if successful, it creates legitimacy by building institutions on the basis of concepts that are acceptable to each reasonable individual. Moreover, it promotes stability in societies that are characterized by deep pluralism. Second, despite Rawls’s failure to take the interests of the disabled into consideration, political liberalism is well suited to support the justice claims of individuals with disabilities. This is because the idea that the disabled are citizens who deserve our respect is part of the common culture of our societies. In other words, there is an overlapping consensus on the idea that rights, opportunities and distributive shares must be granted to individuals who are not fully cooperating members of society, including those who fall below full moral powers. It is widely believed that those with physical disabilities should have the same rights as their fellow citizens, live in a social environment that does not excessively limit their opportunities and receive benefits that help meet their special needs. Besides, although the state or third parties are given exceptional rights to interfere with the autonomy of individuals with severe cognitive disabilities, it is widely recognized that the mentally disabled are citizens whose basic interests must be protected by the law.12 In the public space, any proposal that individuals who are not fully cooperating members of society should have their basic interests neglected would be widely received with outrage. Such proposal would be said to fit a fascist society, not a decent one. Among other legal documents, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN General Assembly, A/61/611) can be taken as the epitome of this widespread attitude. Adopted in 2006, the Convention requires that all individuals with disabilities should share in the enjoyment of equal fundamental rights. 1NC --- State Good The bidirectionality of this topic allows for state action for info sharing which resolves the securitization of collective trauma that caused the War on drugs, terror, and poverty Jonathon P. Whooley 21 [San Francisco State University, International Relations, Ontological (In)visibility and Cyber Conflict: The Problem of Sight and Vision in Establishing Threat, Global, Local, Political 2021, Vol. 46(2) 47–51, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/03043754211024583?journalCode=alta, -ekh-] International Relations (IR) is a field of vision. Elements traditional to IR like nuclear deterrence, armed conflict, terrorism, or great power balancing, all require states to interpret the behavior and posture of other actors to define the menu of options that are available to them. Ontological security theorists in general agree with this position, arguing that feelings and interpretations of their security are required for states to understand their position in relation to others in the international system. Thus, a state’s identity is defined as much by its relationship and feeling of threat toward and among other states. But what happens if the linchpin of defining a state’s security is covert, what if the mechanisms by which a state understands its security standing is accomplished not in the light, but rather in the shadows, around computer networks, non-state actors, disinformation campaigns, hacking, and at least for democratic states like the US through electoral manipulation? At a recent conference panel with intelligent scholars of various stripe I was asked ‘when was the last cyber attack?’ They noted the presence of Stuxnet (a US-Israeli produced computer virus targeting the Iranian nuclear refining infrastructure at the Natanz plant) but hinted in confusion that there had not been much since. And my colleague was not alone, polling on the threat of cyber-attack routinely finds that these actions among the lowest of concerns for most Americans,1 The problem inherent in the disconnect between the assumptions of my informed colleagues and the reality of the cyber landscape is vision and sight. Cyberthreats often fall in between and within the context of our blindspots, hackers and non-state actors use the fact that much of what they do, be it malware or ransomware toward a hospital, misinformation or disinformation online, or direct attacks on networks or individuals, all too often are relegated to page A7 instead of the front page and largely away from public vision. However, if say, a series of bombs were exploded paralyzing the financial sector of a major American city the focus would immediately be apprehended and the eyeballs of many Americans would be glued to said attack. This approach is both normative and theoretical in that it is directed at a central question: why do people misconstrue or fail to take seriously cyber threats? We argue that for democracies to thrive with well-informed voters making decisions in their elections and transmit their policy preferences to their elected leaders. But this requires the referential Self to effectively understand and develop their own identities relative to the national or effective assessments of threat must be possible. Placing OST in the conversation helps us to organize how publics conceive of their security and organize it into preferential voting behaviors. This folds in notions of threat and visibility, as well as the presumption that to properly ascertain how threatening an action may be is entirely relative to the perception that the problem is something tractable enough to apprehend, and cognizable enough to properly fold into an existing structuration of concern. Voters in an overwhelming information environment may fail to properly aggregate potential threats to their governments or persons, but this does not mean those threats do not exists. It only means we (as the public) may fail to properly tabulate and understand how those threats relate to our lived experience. Ontological security theory as a set of practical and empirical assumptions about state and individual behavior is an important tool for heuristically constructing how preferences are sorted in an atmosphere of threat and contestation. Huysmans’s (1998) study is particularly important for this work because it situates how states come to view internal/external others as threats to the self/identity both in terms of space and vision. Because, as Huysmans argues, OST is founded upon relational security practices and the ability to perceive which are and are not manifest security threats is hotly in contention and is driven “by ‘securitiz
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