CP - Future Gens - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR
CP - Future Gens - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx
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Future Gens CP Thanks to Archan Sen for his work on this file. Email khirn10@gmail.com with any questions or concerns. 1NC 1NC – Future Gens CP The United States, using a strictly limited constitutional convention, should establish an independent, fourth body–comprised of randomly-selected representative samples of the population and experts, and that solicits petitions to challenge government action–of the United States federal government dedicated to protecting the interests of succeeding generations. The body should have exclusive authority to negotiate [plan] and bind the United States to its result. The amendment should be limited exclusively to this issue and no state should ratify proposals for additional constitutional changes on other issues. Imbuing elected branches with authority grants decision-making authority to present populations – that trades off with future generations – only the cp solves Tremmel 13 [Joerg Chet Tremmel is a Professor for "intergenerationally just policies" at the University of Tuebingen. He is Editor-in-chief of the Intergenerational Justice Review and a visiting lecturer at the Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-University Frankfurt, the University of Stuttgart and the Heinrich-Heine-University in Dusseldorf, Germany. An extended separation of powers model as the theoretical basis for the representation of future generations. July 26, 2013. https://www.futurejustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Paper_Future-Branch_Tremmel.pdf] And rightly so. The absence of representation of future generations means that conflicts of interest are decided by the majority of eligible voters, not the majority of those affected by the decision. Future people that are relevantly affected by a decision don’t have any influence over it. This ‘representation gap’ is fundamentally different from deficiencies in the participatory rights of other social minorities or interest groups for which representation is also lacking (e.g. women, the elderly, or foreigners). These groups are present here and now; they can take part in political discourse, write opinion-editorials, appear on talk-shows and in many cases participate in elections. None of these options are available to future generations. “The future is another country”, states Posner,8 paraphrasing that the welfare of future generations is as low on the agenda of political incumbents as the welfare of a foreign country. If future citizens could assert their interests in the political decision-making process, majority outcomes in important political decisions of the present would be different. Energy policy is a good example: Energy production of present generations, which relies heavily on fossil fuels, provides a high standard of living today, but at the expense of creating serious disadvantages for the medium-term future of fifty to a hundred years. Post-1990 - the year in which the IPCC’s First Assessment Report assessed a connection between anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions and climate change with a 90 per cent probability- presently living generations can no longer legitimately claim ignorance of the consequences of their actions. Scientific analyses indicate that current energy policy intensifies the natural greenhouse effect and causes the global average temperature to rise.9 Let’s assume that the future individuals born in the next 200 years could partake in the next general election, in the present. The consequence would be that all parties would rewrite their official party positions on today’s energy policy and implement a much more rapid decline in carbon dioxide emissions. The same effect could be achieved if a future branch were implemented in the set-up of democracies as a fourth power in the separation of powers model. Especially with regard to environmental matters, the effects of current actions extend far into the future and have the potential to seriously negatively influence the quality of life of numerous future generations, as figure 1 shows.10 In light of these facts, a prolongation of the legislative session seems appropriate. However, election periods cannot even come close to corresponding to the time span in which the effects of political decisions are felt without restricting voters’ influence in such a way that would endanger the very essence of democracy. Problems posed by the short-sightedness of democracies are not limited to ecological issues. Long before the emergence of modern environmental movements, excessive national debts were considered a prime example of carelessness with regard to the future. As early as 1816 Thomas Jefferson discussed potential solutions to this problem.11 Insufficient investments in education or failing to adjust pay-as-you-go social security systems are further examples of lacking long-term orientation in political systems. Modern democracies are either direct democracies (prime example: Switzerland) or organised according to the principle of representation. Both democratic forms are legitimate; the principle of representation is therefore neither an essential element of democracy nor does it contradict it. In this respect, democratic principles do not oppose an extension of the principle of representation to cover future people. The representation of future people is thus compatible with democratic principles. As Gohler notes, “In the broadest sense of the term, representation means to make something invisible visible and something absent present’’.12 Thaa adds that representation should be understood as “the visualisation of an absentee".13 Although this phrase may have been coined in a different context, it cannot be better expressed. Lack of liability for inadequate performance in office An additional issue amplifies this orientation to the present: In democracies, politicians’ governmental responsibility is for a limited amount of time. Indeed, this is one of the advantages of this system of government. However, it also means that an elected official does not have to assume that his own shortsighted decisions will catch up with [them] him twenty or thirty years later. As soon as a new government comes into power, she is no longer liable. Discounting future generations causes extinction – only formalizing a mechanism to weight their concerns solves Jones et al 18 [Natalie Jones, Mark O'Brien, and Thomas Ryan, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom. Representation of future generations in United Kingdom policy-making. Futures Volume 102, September 2018, Pages 153-163. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328717301179#sec0005] Global catastrophic and existential risks pose central challenges for intergenerational justice and the structure of our current democracy. The Global Challenges Report 2016 defines global catastrophic risk as risk of an ‘event or process that, were it to occur, would end the lives of approximately 10% or more of the global population, or do comparable damage’ (Global Challenges Foundation & Global Priorities Project, 2016). A subset of catastrophic risks are ‘existential’ risks, which would end human civilisation or lead to the extinction of humanity (Global Challenges Foundation & Global Priorities Project, 2016). Catastrophic and existential risks may be categorised in terms of ongoing risks, which could potentially occur in any given year (e.g. nuclear war; pandemics), versus emerging risks which may be unlikely today but will become significantly more likely in the future (e.g. catastrophic climate change; risks stemming from emerging technologies). Ongoing risks have existed for some time now and are generally well-understood. However, emerging risks, particularly those arising from technological developments, are less understood and demand increasing attention from scientists and policymakers. These technological developments include advances in synthetic biology, geoengineering, distributed manufacturing and artificial intelligence (AI) (Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, 2014). Although the impact of these technologies is still very uncertain, expert estimates suggest a non-negligible probability of catastrophic harm. In this article we rely on two main premises. The first is that future generations are under-represented in current political structures partly due to political ‘short-termism’ or ‘presentism’ (Thompson, 2010). Governments primarily focus on short-term concerns, which mean that they may systematically neglect global catastrophic risks and, accordingly, future generations (Global Priorities Project et al., 2014). The problem of presentism transcends political divisions: people across the political spectrum are concerned about its effects, and should care about mitigating global catastrophic risks. This situation is exacerbated in that the good of mitigating global catastrophic and existential risks is typically global. Individual political actors (even whole countries) bear many costs in providing for such goods, whereas the benefits are dispersed globally. In addition to the benefits of mitigating existential risks being global, many of the beneficiaries are future people who do not exist presently and as such have no voice in the political process. There is a clear lack of incentives to mitigate such risks, and market failure should be expected (Beckstead, 2013). The second key assumption is that we as a society consider the rights and interests of future generations to be important. It is beyond the scope of this paper to present a complete account of the philosophical arguments on this matter. It is sufficient to note that although significant philosophical problems have been pointed out, chiefly due to the fact that the actions of present people have a causal impact on the values, number and identity of future individuals (Parfit, 1984), there are several theories of intergenerational justice that may support this assumption (Gosseries, 2008). The need to include explicit pathways in governance structures for accountability to the rights and needs of future generations has been noted (Global Priorities Project et al., 2014). Some thought has been put into how future generations may be represented in relation to environmental risks such as climate change, resource depletion and biodiversity loss; this research is reflected in the sustainable development literature (Brown Weiss, 1990). However, this problem has not been explored in relation to society’s burgeoning awareness of technology-related catastrophic and existential risks. In addition, such pathways have not been fully explored in the United Kingdom (UK) context. This policy paper hopes to fill this gap in the literature. OV 2NC – OV Anything short of existential impacts – Russia war and pandemics – are small missteps Bostrom 7 [Nick Bostrom -- come on, you didn't think we wouldn't read at least one of these, right? The Future of Humanity. 2007. https://nickbostrom.com/papers/future.html] Extinction risks constitute an especially severe subset of what could go badly wrong for humanity. There are many possible global catastrophes that would cause immense worldwide damage, maybe even the collapse of modern civilization, yet fall short of terminating the human species. An all-out nuclear war between Russia and the United States might be an example of a global catastrophe that would be unlikely to result in extinction. A terrible pandemic with high virulence and 100% mortality rate among infected individuals might be another example: if some groups of humans could successfully quarantine themselves before being exposed, human extinction could be avoided even if, say, 95% or more of the world’s population succumbed. What distinguishes extinction and other existential catastrophes is that a comeback is impossible. A non-existential disaster causing the breakdown of global civilization is, from the perspective of humanity as a whole, a potentially recoverable setback: a giant massacre for man, a small misstep for mankind. An existential catastrophe is therefore qualitatively distinct from a “mere” collapse of global civilization, although in terms of our moral and prudential attitudes perhaps we should simply view both as unimaginably bad outcomes.30 One way that civilization collapse could be a significant feature in the larger picture for humanity, however, is if it formed part of a repeating pattern. This takes us to the second family of scenarios: recurrent collapse. Perms 2NC – AT: PDB The perm doesn’t solve – [1] Authority– Transferring decision rights is key -- powers need to be explicitly chartered for future generations Boston 14 [Jonathan Boston, Professor of Public Policy, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington, Fulbright Fellow, American University. Governing for the Future: How to bring the long-term into short-term political focus. November 5, 2014. https://www.american.edu/spa/cep/upload/jonathan-boston-lecture-american-university.pdf] But one other point deserves highlighting: if there is only a limited capacity to change the structure of political demand to incentivize policy-makers to give adequate weight to long-term considerations, then other options must be considered. These include additional legislative constraints on what policy-makers are able to decide and transferring formal decision-rights on designated policy matters to bodies that are partially insulated from short-term political pressures. In each case, of course, the overall desirability of such options must be carefully weighed. Not all constraints and insulating techniques are democratically acceptable. Quarrels over authority will weaken the new branch Tremmel 13 [Joerg Chet Tremmel is a Professor for "intergenerationally just policies" at the University of Tuebingen. He is Editor-in-chief of the Intergenerational Justice Review and a visiting lecturer at the Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-University Frankfurt, the University of Stuttgart and the Heinrich-Heine-University in Dusseldorf, Germany. An extended separation of powers model as the theoretical basis for the representation of future generations. July 26, 2013. https://www.futurejustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Paper_Future-Branch_Tremmel.pdf] Let’s deal with the former first. If a new SO (sustainability organization) is granted real force to act, it is already a variant of the extension of the division of powers model, even if it is not named as such. The only two variants are the “power to assert" and “powerless”. If the representatives of the three established branches quarrel over the new SO, or they make concrete attempts to disempower it, the new SO constitutes a new branch of government - even if at first with a weak power base. The disempowerment of the ombudsman as well as the commission was a clear indicator that these two organisations have already acquired the power to assert. [2] INDEPENDENCE – that’s fundamental to success Smith 15 [Graham Smith, Foundation for Democracy and Sustainable Development. The Democratic Case for an Office for Future Generations. April 2015. www.fdsd.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Office-for-Future-Generations-FDSD-format.81.pdf] Notes: OFG = Offices for Future Generations; Italics in Original The democratic credentials of an OFG depend very much on how its role and functions are conceived. At a 2014 conference on Model Institutions fora Sustainable Future,1 there was some disagreement as to the desirability of an independent body. Critics contend that such institutions should be more formally embedded and connected to power: in other words, be part of the parliamentary (and/or executive) infrastructure. This would also ensure explicit democratic legitimacy for the body. For example, the permanent Finnish Parliamentary Committee for the Future has a specific remit to consider the long-term within the work of the Assembly.2 The Finnish Parliamentary Committee for the Future consists of 17 parliamentarians from all political parties. It deliberates on parliamentary documentation, makes submissions to other committees and engages in futures research modelling on issues that range from the domestic (e.g. health care and social capital) through to the international (e.g. relations with China, Russia and the rest of Europe). It has also actively promoted innovative engagement techniques such as crowdsourcing and held hearings to engage the broader public. The virtue of such a design is that it is embedded in the day-to-day work of parliament and the political parties. The Finnish Parliamentary Committee is without doubt an important parliamentary innovation, not least because it is a rare opportunity for parliamentarians to engage across party lines within a time frame that extends beyond day-to-day politics and the normal electoral cycle. We can also learn much from its methods of working. The extent to which its impact in other parliamentary contexts is replicable, however, is an open question, especially where party cleavages are more prevalent and public confidence in parliament much lower. It is also a mistake to underestimate the important democratic case for independent oversight within political systems. OFGs are creations of parliamentary legislation and thus have formal democratic anchorage. But it is their democratic function as an independent actor that is fundamental. It must have veto power over other branches – the perm is just an extension of the advisory system Tremmel 6 [Joerg Chet Tremmel is a Professor for "intergenerationally just policies" at the University of Tuebingen. He is Editor-in-chief of the Intergenerational Justice Review and a visiting lecturer at the Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-University Frankfurt, the University of Stuttgart and the Heinrich-Heine-University in Dusseldorf, Germany. Establishing intergenerational justice in national constitutions. Handbook of Intergenerational Justice. 2006. profs-polisci.mcgill.ca/muniz/intergen/Tremmel%20-%20Establishing%20intergenerational%20justice%20in%20national%20constitutions.pdf] These kinds of new institutions make sense if they really have the competencies to protect future generations. This means, for instance, that these institutions can veto or at least freeze laws or that they can propose laws themselves. Without this responsibility the advisory system is merely extended. In Germany, for instance, there are already four institutions: the German Advisory Council on the Environment (Sachverstandigenrat fur Umweltfragen, www.umweltrat.de), the German Advisory Council on Global Change (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Umweltregierung fiir Globale Umweltveranderungen, www.wbgu.de), the German Council for Sustainable Development (Rat fur Nachhaltige Entwicklung, www. nachhaltigkeitsrat.de) and the Parliamentary Advisory Council on Sustainable Development (Parlamentarischer Beirat fiir nachhaltige Entwicklung, www.bundestag.de/parlament/parl_beirat/) which was appointed in 2004. They all do not have the necessary power to stop laws which threaten the well-being of future generations. [3] COHERENCE– agreement on risk-reduction strategies are key – the perm introduces another veto point which undermines focus on future generations Boston 14 [Jonathan Boston, Professor of Public Policy, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington, Fulbright Fellow, American University. Governing for the Future: How to bring the long-term into short-term political focus. November 5, 2014. https://www.american.edu/spa/cep/upload/jonathan-boston-lecture-american-university.pdf] While the long-term governance challenge arises in all democratic systems, the evidence also suggests that the magnitude and complexity of the challenge varies. Relevant contextual factors affecting this variability include the constitutional rules, the structure of organized interests and party competition, the degree of ideological polarization, the level of soci
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