CP - Democracy QPQ - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR
CP - Democracy QPQ - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx
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DEMOCRACY QPQ CP NEGATIVE 1nc Counterplan: The United States federal government should condition its defense cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in [PLAN AREA] on allies’ compliance with incremental tailored standards for adopting democratic reforms. Allies say yes Lee 19, graduated with a Master in Public Policy degree from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, et al, 2019 (Martha, “Partnering to Protect: Reforming US Security Assistance to Reduce Civilian Harm,” Belfer Center, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/partnering-protect-reforming-us-security-assistance-reduce-civilian-harm)//BB Others argue that the “total package” approach of US security assistance does provide the United States with real influence over partners, and thus a real opportunity to enforce conditions. Partners are dependent on American expertise to operate, maintain, and modernize weapons systems throughout their entire life-cycles. This dependency should give US officials leverage, but one expert noted that the US government is often “constitutionally incapable or unwilling to use that leverage” for fear of disrupting the bilateral relationship.256 Given this mixed record, policymakers might try to identify opportunities to implement positive conditionality: a conditions-based framework where partners are incentivized to demonstrate good behavior over time in exchange for security assistance. Rather than authorizing aid and then withholding it when confronted with undesirable behavior, the United States could identify specific positive actions the partner is open to taking, and the specific incentives the United States would provide if benchmarks were met. To implement this, the State Department could negotiate a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States and the partner. It should reflect the elements, including civilian protection measures, that would govern security assistance between the two countries over a certain period of time. Milestones should be built over the course of the MOU such that when the partner meets a goal, they are rewarded. If the partner fails to meet the milestone, they do not receive the agreed-upon security assistance. The implementation of this framework would have a real impact by lending predictability to the relationship and limit the potential for mismanaged expectations on both sides.257 One major hurdles would be overcoming entrenched bureaucratic tendencies to “shovel security assistance out the door,” as one expert put it.258 However, if tackled in a piecemeal fashion – for example, starting with a few “easy” partnerships and building on momentum and success – this approach could feasibly be implemented at either State or DoD. Counterplan promotes democracy in NATO and is a pre-requisite to NATO viability Matthijs 19 – Matthias Matthijs, assistant professor of international political economy at Johns Hopkins University, Senior Fellow for Europe Council on Foreign Relations (“Hearing on Democracy and the NATO Alliance: Upholding Our Shared Democratic Values”, before the Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the Environment, 11/13/2019, https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/Democracy%20and%20the%20NATO%20Alliance.%20Upholding%20Our%20Shared%20Democratic%20Values.pdf) FGY What can the United States and the European Union Do? Both the United States through NATO and our European allies through the EU should do more to encourage common values like the rule of law and democracy in Turkey, Hungary and Poland. While it may be hard to achieve concrete results in the very short term, both organizations should be aware that they are playing a long game, and that none of the three current leaders in Ankara, Budapest, and Warsaw will be in power indefinitely. While lecturing allies and friends on democratic principles may easily backfire and be quickly condemned as hypocrisy, the US especially should stand by its enduring commitment to democratic freedoms and the rule of law in all its official (and unofficial) foreign policy statements. Going forward, the European Union can: • make its funding more conditional on abiding by democratic principles and rule of law and withhold funding if necessary. The EU is currently debating instituting tougher ‘rule of law’ conditions on its funding in the next budget cyle. • condemn anti-democratic countries directly, rather than focusing on economics, the EU could also rank countries based on political freedoms, by naming and shaming the worst performers. • encourage its mainstream pan-European political parties – especially the center-right EPP and the center-left D&S – to not allow parties with autocratic or illiberal tendencies within their political groupings. Going forward, the United States should: • continue to support civil society groups and free media in countries experiencing democratic backsliding. For instance, recent reports that Radio Free Europe would be recommencing operations in Hungary are a step in the right direction. • emphasize that NATO membership means rights as well as responsibilities beyond spending 2% of GDP on defense. NATO must be an alliance based on basic common democratic values. The transatlantic alliance has proven so strong and enduring not simply because of Realpolitik, but also because it has been an alliance based on a shared commitment to freedom and democratic values. If those values are no longer seen as common to the alliance, it will inevitably erode. • encourage overseas investment through OPIC in countries that show a strong commitment to the rule of law and democracy while showing a higher level of reluctance to support investment in regimes that are distmantling those institutions. That saves the LIO. AND illiberalism shreds all NATO initiatives. Tome 21, Professor at the Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa where he is currently Director of the Department of International Relations (Luis, “Future of NATO: Significant Insights from 2021 Meeting of NATO Ministries of Foreign Affairs,” https://cesran.org/interview-with-professor-luis-tome-future-of-nato-significant-insights-from-2021-meeting-of-nato-ministries-of-foreign-affairs.html)//BB Question: Rising rightist or leftist populist political groups in Europe and the US indicate that they would be quite influential in their own national politics in the near future. Do you think that this could complicate NATO’s stance regarding democracy and freedom? Luis Tome: Of course it can. The spread of nationalism, populism, authoritarianism and extremisms threatens the liberal international order and the security environment. And if national egoisms, populisms, autocratic tendencies and “illiberal democracies” flourish in NATO member countries, as is already happening, then it makes it very complicated for the transatlantic Alliance to be the bulwark for the defence and promotion of freedom, democracy and liberal order. Fortunately, there seems to be a sense of urgency within NATO today to put democratic values back at the heart of the transatlantic Alliance’s action. But we must recognise that the virus of nationalism and populism is difficult to fight even within NATO countries. Question: There are too many significant points to cover in an interview, but as a closing question, I would like to have your comments on an issue that is the most important one regarding NATO’s future. Luis Tome: The decisive factor for the evolution and future of NATO is the strengthening of its political dimension, namely dialogue, articulation, cooperation and political cohesion among Allied countries. Organisations are what their members make of them, and NATO is no exception. NATO is a military alliance, but it is also the main political forum of the transatlantic community of shared values and interests. Without political cohesion among Allies, powerful deterrent and defence capabilities have less value. Without constructive political dialogue, differences between member countries cannot be overcome or minimised. Without political cooperation, it is not possible to formulate common and coherent strategies. Without political articulation, the transatlantic Alliance will face many difficulties in projecting security and stability in its periphery, whether to the East or to the South; effectively confronting the many risks and threats; managing crises and conflicts; establishing fruitful partnerships with external partners; or dealing with major rivals such as Russia and China. Without political cohesion, it will not be possible for NATO to make the necessary re-adaptation to a geopolitical and security context in great transformation. Nor to be the pillar of democracy and liberal order that the Allies want and preach NATO to be. NATO’s military dimension remains robust, but the Alliance’s political dimension and political role are undervalued and underused. NATO’s future success depends on the ability of the Allies to leverage the political dimension of the transatlantic alliance. LIO solves nuclear war, climate change and tech disruption – all existential Harari 18, Professor of History at Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Yuval Noah, “We need a post-liberal order now,” The Economist, https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/09/26/we-need-a-post-liberal-order-now) The second thing to note about this vision of friendly fortresses is that it has been tried—and it failed spectacularly. All attempts to divide the world into clear-cut nations have so far resulted in war and genocide. When the heirs of Garibaldi, Mazzini and Mickiewicz managed to overthrow the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire, it proved impossible to find a clear line dividing Italians from Slovenes or Poles from Ukrainians. This had set the stage for the second world war. The key problem with the network of fortresses is that each national fortress wants a bit more land, security and prosperity for itself at the expense of the neighbors, and without the help of universal values and global organisations, rival fortresses cannot agree on any common rules. Walled fortresses are seldom friendly. But if you happen to live inside a particularly strong fortress, such as America or Russia, why should you care? Some nationalists indeed adopt a more extreme isolationist position. They don’t believe in either a global empire or in a global network of fortresses. Instead, they deny the necessity of any global order whatsoever. “Our fortress should just raise the drawbridges,” they say, “and the rest of the world can go to hell. We should refuse entry to foreign people, foreign ideas and foreign goods, and as long as our walls are stout and the guards are loyal, who cares what happens to the foreigners?” Such extreme isolationism, however, is completely divorced from economic realities. Without a global trade network, all existing national economies will collapse—including that of North Korea. Many countries will not be able even to feed themselves without imports, and prices of almost all products will skyrocket. The made-in-China shirt I am wearing cost me about $5. If it had been produced by Israeli workers from Israeli-grown cotton using Israeli-made machines powered by non-existing Israeli oil, it may well have cost ten times as much. Nationalist leaders from Donald Trump to Vladimir Putin may therefore heap abuse on the global trade network, but none thinks seriously of taking their country completely out of that network. And we cannot have a global trade network without some global order that sets the rules of the game. Even more importantly, whether people like it or not, humankind today faces three common problems that make a mockery of all national borders, and that can only be solved through global cooperation. These are nuclear war, climate change and technological disruption. You cannot build a wall against nuclear winter or against global warming, and no nation can regulate artificial intelligence (AI) or bioengineering single-handedly. It won’t be enough if only the European Union forbids producing killer robots or only America bans genetically-engineering human babies. Due to the immense potential of such disruptive technologies, if even one country decides to pursue these high-risk high-gain paths, other countries will be forced to follow its dangerous lead for fear of being left behind. An AI arms race or a biotechnological arms race almost guarantees the worst outcome. Whoever wins the arms race, the loser will likely be humanity itself. For in an arms race, all regulations will collapse. Consider, for example, conducting genetic-engineering experiments on human babies. Every country will say: “We don’t want to conduct such experiments—we are the good guys. But how do we know our rivals are not doing it? We cannot afford to remain behind. So we must do it before them.” Similarly, consider developing autonomous-weapon systems, that can decide for themselves whether to shoot and kill people. Again, every country will say: “This is a very dangerous technology, and it should be regulated carefully. But we don’t trust our rivals to regulate it, so we must develop it first”. The only thing that can prevent such destructive arms races is greater trust between countries. This is not an impossible mission. If today the Germans promise the French: “Trust us, we aren’t developing killer robots in a secret laboratory under the Bavarian Alps,” the French are likely to believe the Germans, despite the terrible history of these two countries. We need to build such trust globally. We need to reach a point when Americans and Chinese can trust one another like the French and Germans. Similarly, we need to create a global safety-net to protect humans against the economic shocks that AI is likely to cause. Automation will create immense new wealth in high-tech hubs such as Silicon Valley, while the worst effects will be felt in developing countries whose economies depend on cheap manual labor. There will be more jobs to software engineers in California, but fewer jobs to Mexican factory workers and truck drivers. We now have a global economy, but politics is still very national. Unless we find solutions on a global level to the disruptions caused by AI, entire countries might collapse, and the resulting chaos, violence and waves of immigration will destabilise the entire world. This is the proper perspective to look at recent developments such as Brexit. In itself, Brexit isn’t necessarily a bad idea. But is this what Britain and the EU should be dealing with right now? How does Brexit help prevent nuclear war? How does Brexit help prevent climate change? How does Brexit help regulate artificial intelligence and bioengineering? Instead of helping, Brexit makes it harder to solve all of these problems. Every minute that Britain and the EU spend on Brexit is one less minute they spend on preventing climate change and on regulating AI. In order to survive and flourish in the 21st century, humankind needs effective global cooperation, and so far the only viable blueprint for such cooperation is offered by liberalism. Nevertheless, governments all over the world are undermining the foundations of the liberal order, and the world is turning into a network of fortresses. The first to feel the impact are the weakest members of humanity, who find themselves without any fortress willing to protect them: refugees, illegal migrants, persecuted minorities. But if the walls keep rising, eventually the whole of humankind will feel the squeeze. solvency – t/l 2nc – solvency – general Conditional SC incentives are more strategically valuable than the aff “security assistance” and “security cooperation” used interchangeably Gwinn 22 – Jeremy Gwinn, director of Army and Special Missions Team at OSC-I at the United States Department of Defense, Ph.D. in international law from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, B.A. in military science from Penn State University (“Sweeter Carrots and Harder Sticks: Rethinking US Security Assistance”, 4/19/2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/sweeter-carrots-and-harder-sticks-rethinking-u-s-security-assistance/) FGY Hard Is Not Impossible These failings notwithstanding, there exists no shortage of arguments in favor of the status quo and against shifting America’s focus in security assistance to security-sector reform and conditional aid. In an era of great-power competition, Russia, China, or regional competitors may simply step in to fill the gap with the partner nation if the United States insists upon unwelcome reforms in exchange for aid. I know this is a valid concern because I have sat in meetings where partners made thinly veiled reference to other nations which may provide assistance if the United States is unable or unwilling. Still, the quality and technological edge of U.S. kit and the total-package approach which includes training and follow-on support do provide the United States a competitive advantage. But the bureaucratic apparatus responsible for delivering aid is far too slow and, as a result, is a liability. To outcompete, the security assistance enterprise itself requires major reform to shorten typical lead times from years to months. The Pentagon and State Department need the agility to turn aid on and off like a switch or rheostat. Another argument against placing preconditions on security assistance is that the stakes are too high to deny a partner a critical capability while waiting for reform to happen. This is the “we can’t let them fail” mentality. It is also valid — but only in certain crisis situations where aid is needed immediately, and reform truly cannot wait. Ukraine today is a good example. Rather than ceasing aid writ large until a condition is met, place conditions on discrete packages of aid. The intent should be to provide sufficient incentive to the host-nation government to modify behavior, not threaten national survival. During the years I spent in Afghanistan, the security threats faced by the government never appeared to afford the breathing space to withhold aid while institutional reform took place. In hindsight, doing so may have required coalition forces to carry a greater operational burden while the Afghan forces sorted themselves out, but it also would have been worth it. As the events of August 2021 demonstrated, 20 years of unconditional capacity-building built shockingly little capacity. Implementing this change requires a recurring review of Defense Department-led train and equip programs to determine which truly qualify as crisis situations. Those which do not should be moved under State Department control for more deliberate, reform-focused approach. There is also the simple argument that instituting meaningful reform in a recalcitrant partner nation is hard. This is true. But hard is not impossible. The security assistance enterprise should approach reform not in broad, sweeping terms but incremental steps. Rather than requiring the partner to eliminate corruption wholesale across the security forces, perhaps require that a particularly corrupt commander be removed before providing assistance to that unit. In the case of Iraq in the late 2000s, the United States might have required Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to fire certain commanders guilty of sectarian excesses or modify the personnel policy to make the armed forces more broadly inclusive. In other cases, reform measures may be as mundane as switching to an electronic pay system to reduce the opportunity for graft. Such a change in approach would also require a change in how the United States prepares officers for security assistance duties. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency has made great strides in its educational program to professionalize the security assistance workforce in recent years. It could further improve this program by embedding security sector reform more deeply into the curriculum. Better Rewards,
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