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2022 Michigan Counterplan

CP - Bilateral and Unilateral CP - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR

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Unilat and Bilat CPs --- BFHR
Notes
Thank you to Eshan, Ros, Eric, and Eloise for their work on this file.
!!!Unilat CPs!!!
Unilat Carrots CPs
Top Shelf
1NC --- CP Shell
The United States federal government should substantially increase inducements for __________________________________________ to facilitate __________________________________
The US can incentivize allies to avoid free riding.
Joel R. Hillison 14. Professor of National Security Studies at the U.S. Army War College and an Adjunct Professor at Gettysburg College. He is the author of Stepping Up: Burden-sharing by NATO’s newest members and spent three years working in NATO. “Stepping Up: Burden Sharing by NATO's Newest Members.” Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, pp. 183-187, 2014. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1939&context=monographs //EM
A RATIONAL CHOICE EXAMINATION OF FINDINGS
The rational choice explanation for continued burden sharing by new members of NATO after accession emphasizes the benefits of maintaining a reputation as a credible partner. Certainly, members join and remain in NATO for both the tangible and the intangible benefits of being in a powerful alliance. With a combined population of almost 880 million and a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of $28.5 trillion,4 NATO membership offers a degree of physical and psychological security to its member states.
The rational benefits of being in an alliance have also been studied in international relations theory. In his game-theoretic study of alliances, Alastair Smith found that defensive alliances deterred aggression. The more reliable the alliance was, the greater the deterrent effect it had. In his words, “nations form alliances because it improves the outcomes they expect to receive.”5 Certainly, this concern for physical and psychological security was influential in the burden sharing decisions of recent new NATO members. As the current Romanian President said in an interview, “with the accession to NATO, the Romanians felt safe . . . NATO meant the beginning of our road to prosperity.”6
Finally, a rational choice explanation might emphasize the quid pro quo that supports burden sharing decisions of member states in NATO. Certainly, there have been side payments made by the United States to new member states in order to encourage greater levels of military spending and in order to reward contributions to NATO and U.S.-led missions in the war on terrorism. For example, Poland received a generous $3.5 billion loan to buy F16 aircraft after committing sizable forces to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).7 In addition, NATO established the Joint Forces Training Centre in Poland in 2004. Both the Czech Republic and Hungary received side payments from the United States for their support in the war on terrorism.8 In 2002, the 1999 wave of new members received a combined $35 million in Foreign Military Financing with an equal amount requested for 2003 and 2004.9 Estonia, one of the 2004 waves of new NATO members, was scheduled to receive over $6 million per year over the same period.10 In 2005, in addition to normal International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assistance, President George W. Bush requested $200 million from Congress “for coalition allies that have supported military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.”11 NATO also uses incentives to influence its member states. These incentives include investments in infrastructure resources by NATO common funds. For example, Poland funded most of its airfield renovation program through the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP).12 Romania, a big supporter of both OIF and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), was rewarded with the rotation of U.S. forces into Romania for training as part of Joint Task Force East.13
While the side payments discussed above provide some incentive, NATO has the greatest leverage over aspiring member states prior to accession through conditionality. In the case of NATO, conditionality consists of “specific conditions which an aspiring state must fulfill before accession. These conditions comprised of both adherence to the community values and the ability to contribute to the functional tasks of the organization.”14 The assessment of whether or not these conditions have been met is a subjective and very political matter. Oftentimes, geostrategic concerns can trump accomplishment of accession standards, as in the case of Georgia and the Ukraine, which have not been granted admittance into the Membership Action Plan (MAP) due to concerns over relations with Russia. Accession into NATO requires unanimous agreement by existing members and ratification by the legislatures of the member states. It is not surprising, then, that aspiring NATO members are keen to demonstrate they have not only met the intent of the conditions established, but also the objective benchmarks established by the Alliance. One of the two most recent NATO members, Albania, is a good example. In a recent visit to NATO Headquarters, Albanian representatives were “very proud to say they (were) meeting the 2% (GDP) benchmark as well as deployment and sustainability criteria.”15 These public declarations support the explanations based on conditionality and are consistent with the burden sharing behavior of new member states reviewed earlier.
Not surprisingly, conditionality was an effective tool in influencing aspiring NATO members. In Judith Kelley’s study of international institutions in the early post-Cold War period, she found that membership prerequisites were an essential factor in changing state behavior.16 Kelley also acknowledged that socialization played a role. Kelley found that while most changes in state behavior could be attributed to conditionality, “socialization-based efforts often guided them.”17 Yet, these explanations alone cannot explain why new NATO members did not free-ride once they became members of NATO. In fact, many new members increased their troop support to NATO missions after gaining membership. NATO Director of Policy
Planning Jamie Shea specifically addressed the issue of free-riding incentives after accession.
The argument that once in the alliance, new members will slack off is not fair. For example, Romania currently has 720 (troops) deployed to Afghanistan and is trying to find another 120. That is not a bad effort for a new NATO member.18
However, conditionality is just one incentive to induce norm conforming behavior.
NATO has several informal mechanisms to reward states that support Alliance efforts after being granted membership. Research has shown that rewards can help states to overcome the incentives to free-ride.19 First, NATO uses a variety of prestige rewards that are not only beneficial for domestic political use, but are sought out by both diplomatic and military bureaucrats for their own benefit. These rewards range from hosting summits, conferences, or exercises to the assignment of commands and staff positions. One example of these types of rewards is called “flags to post.” A flags to post conference is convened to assign general officer billets to member states. These conferences often result in a contentious debate; these leadership positions not only yield influence in the Alliance but also prestige at home to the officers assigned to fill them.
During NATO missions, command positions are also allocated on the basis of relative troop contributions. Unless the forces are under a standing NATO Headquarters, such as the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, then command usually goes to the state with the largest number of troops in that sector or in the overall mission. NATO also provides material incentives in the form of investments. This reward allows leaders to bring home the bacon to their national constituents and thus build support for contributions to NATO. For example, NATO investment into Poland exceeded Poland’s contributions to NATO’s infrastructure budget in 2004.20 A portion of these NATO funds is being used to construct a training facility in the city of Bydgoszcz.21 This facility will cost approximately 33 million Euros to build. Finally, individual states within NATO often provide incentives to other members to reward cooperation. As the largest and most powerful member (and leader) of the Alliance, the United States often times provides these incentives.
Allies say yes---they have mutual incentives to partner with the US in the expectation of future security assistance.
Tommy Ross & Melissa Dalton 20. Non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation at the Pentagon and was the senior defense and intelligence adviser to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid. He has also held other senior positions in the House and Senate. Melissa Dalton directs the Cooperative Defense Project and is a senior fellow and deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Prior to CSIS, she served in the U.S. Department of Defense for 10 years. “A Roadmap for Better Choices from Security Partners.” War on the Rocks. 1-17-2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/a-roadmap-for-better-choices-from-security-partners/ //EM
In the realm of security sector assistance, experience has been disproportionately focused on negative approaches, almost always negative and ex post. In addition to Egypt, Indonesia, and Pakistan, the United States has sought to limit or cut off security sector assistance in El Salvador in the 1980s, Rwanda in 2012, Bahrain in 2011, and Burundi in 2015. All these efforts followed the ex post/negative pattern in which the United States has taken essentially punitive measures to reframe an existing security sector assistance relationship. One might view the application of the Leahy Law, which restricts assistance in cases of human rights abuse, or post-coup legal restrictions as cases of ex ante/negative conditionality, given that partners are expected to be aware of these condition-triggering laws prior to the acceptance of assistance or the commission of violations.
By contrast, examples of positive conditionality in the security sector assistance arena have been few and far between, even though the idea is not particularly new. “Incentive-based conditions” might tie additional and/or more sophisticated levels of security sector assistance, including new military capabilities or specific weapons platforms, to reform milestones to incentivize behavioral changes. In addition, rather than authorizing aid and then withholding it, on the basis of shared interests, the United States might identify positive actions that a recipient is considering taking and then incentivize them. More recently, the U.S. Institute for Peace Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States argued for “graduated security sector assistance,” in which the United States calibrates its engagement with fragile states according to a jointly agreed plan that enables partners in those countries to achieve escalating levels and types of U.S. security sector assistance as partners achieve reform milestones leading to more inclusive governance. These recommendations build on recent experiments in new government approaches to security sector assistance, such as the Security Governance Initiative, which have sought to establish joint bilateral planning on the basis of overlapping interests as the foundation of assistance programs, though these initiatives have not ultimately meaningfully conditioned assistance. The challenge has been that, while positive conditionality has been posited as a potentially viable and beneficial approach to improving security sector assistance outcomes, it has neither been sufficiently attempted in practice nor sufficiently elaborated in literature.
Toward a Framework for Positive Conditionality
What if the United States had approached its relationship with Uganda differently in pursuit of shared objectives? It’s possible that if the United States had structured its assistance in a way that incentivized Uganda’s politicians and security officials to take specific steps toward clearly — and mutually — identified milestones, that could have led to the development of stronger capabilities for and commitment to civilian protection and governance by Uganda’s military over time. Instead, a reactive posture to human rights and corruption transgressions has had limited effects, and punitive measures may only strain the relationship and undermine possibilities for cooperation.
The United States should develop a framework for positive conditionality in security sector assistance to better shape political and security outcomes with partner countries. On balance an affirmative framework will offer the United States the widest latitude in shaping outcomes in a broad range of circumstances. This approach also does not rule out the sequencing of punitive steps — or a pause to assess partner performance.
First, this framework assumes an ex ante/positive approach to conditionality, at least in some manner. With the U.S. government providing security sector assistance to nearly 200 countries around the world, it is unlikely that the United States will be initiating a security sector assistance relationship wholly from scratch. An ex ante approach would focus on developing concrete plans, including triggers for clearly identified conditions, at the inception of an initiative or set of programs. It should involve a plan covering at least five years, identifying ultimate objectives and intermediate milestones, a theory of change for how objectives will be achieved, and metrics to provide a basis for assessing progress. Policymakers and planners can then link conditions to milestones and metrics. Moreover, such an approach builds on recognized best practices for capacity-building initiatives.
Second, the framework must include a partner government’s mutual participation in the creation of the assistance plan, the identification of objectives, and the agreement on conditions. The partner will be more incentivized to progress toward objectives when it understands and commits to such objectives based on its own identified interests. A memorandum of understanding, bilateral compact, or some other formal written instrument can commit both parties to its terms.
Third, the framework should structure conditions as positive inducements for the recipient to take steps toward milestones or objectives. Milestones could include completion of defense institutional reforms, starting with development of a process to align budget to strategy, progressing to completion of a first budget cycle with the new process, and culminating in institutionalization of the process through policy and/or law. They might also include progress toward capability or interoperability milestones (e.g., ability to conduct nighttime counter-terrorism operations in accordance with the laws of armed conflict or command and control and intelligence integration across platforms and systems). In addition, milestones could include transparency and accountability activities (e.g., publication of public budget, completion of audit, investigation of specific incidents of resource waste and abuse or diversion, establishment and activity of an independent third-party investigative unit for accountability).
Partners will likely respond to inducements that are material in nature, including access to an expanded variety of types of assistance and an expanded quantity of assistance. However, partners may also value incentives such as eligibility for key agreements to facilitate access and information and/or technology sharing (e.g., acquisition and cross-servicing, general security of military information, etc.) or eligibility for expanded partnership opportunities (e.g., National Guard State Partnership Program or the Military Personnel Exchange Program). Moreover, incentives may also be political, such as access to membership in certain organizations or eligibility for certain agreements.
Such inducements are consistent with the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States’ concept of graduated assistance: As a partner achieves key milestones, it is able to “graduate” into a new status that allows it to access increasing quantities and types of assistance, as well as other benefits. Policymakers should tailor the potential tiers of access and associated benefits, as well as the milestones triggering graduation to a higher tier, to the individual recipient, and accordingly integrate them into bilateral development plans or compacts, as discussed above. A possible tiering of graduated assistance could include:
Tier One: nonlethal training and individual education.
Tier Two: comprehensive training and nonlethal equipment.
Tier Three: lethal equipment and access to U.S. military staff colleges.
Tier Four: high-level exercises, high-level staff talks, and joint and combined planning and operations.
Yet, for fragile states with weak security institutions, the task force rightly notes that assistance should initially focus on institutional reforms, with “increasingly sophisticated and lethal capabilities and equipment … contingent on sustained improvements in security sector governance.” The reforms should also institutionalize inclusivity. In practice, such an approach may prove difficult if partner governments or their security forces are vested in a corrupt status quo, such that institutional reform poses an existential threat or compromise to their personal gains. In such partnerships, identifying geographic areas or bureaucratic processes that may be more receptive to change first should be the focus of investment, and may be most successful if there are third parties, such as other allies and partners, media, or civil society that are calling for similar changes. For a potential coalition partner with comparatively good governance, on the other hand, milestones and incentives may be built around coalition interoperability and the capability to perform certain roles within the coalition context. In collaboration with the partner, U.S. policymakers should design a program of graduated or tiered assistance, structuring incentives and milestones across the full portfolio of security sector assistance. The total program of assistance could grow in both scope and sophistication as the partner progresses through milestones.
In addition, within each broad category of security sector assistance provided by the United States, policymakers and planners may find opportunities to moderate U.S. investments based on a partner’s progress (in other words, in relation to specific security sector assistance lines of effort). The table below outlines engagement at low, moderate, and high levels across several broad assistance categories as they could be applied within the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility. As planners construct graduated assistance programs, they thus have options to moderate assistance both within a specific type of support and across the full portfolio of security sector assistance. In practice, the categories and degrees of security sector assistance options would be tailored to meet the objectives of the specific partner relationship.***FIGURE 1 OMITTED*** Importantly, conditions should be based on realistic assumptions about what partners would be willing to do (in terms of both what steps can be realistically expected given the recipient’s unique political and institutional context as well as what leverage relatively small sums of U.S. assistance can be expected to produce). Also, conditions should be accompanied by concrete U.S. commitments. Positive conditionality will quickly cease to be attractive to partners when the United States fails to follow through on a promised inducement.
Of course, fo

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