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2022 Michigan Counterplan

AT - EU CP - Michigan 7 2022 BEJJ

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AT: EU CP
2AC – LTNB – NATO Drawn In
EU strategic autonomy is impossible – practical obstacles and inevitable reliance on NATO
Jolyon Howorth 17, Visiting Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at Yale University, Senior Research Fellow at the European Union’s Institute for Security Studies, Senior Research Associate at the IInstitut Français des Relations Internationales, and Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, “EU–NATO cooperation: the key to Europe’s security future”, 08/17/2017, European Security 26(3), p. 454-459 /lg
Nevertheless, at the strategic level, the EU–NATO relationship remains absolutely fundamental to the future of the European security and defence project for two interconnected and seemingly incompatible reasons. The first is the very existence of NATO, its history, its mythology and its political reality: an alliance that, unlike any other in history, has outlived the demise of the threat against which it was initially created. This has been in very large part due to US leadership and to the perceived usefulness of NATO to American global strategy. US leadership has had, as an inevitable corollary, European followership. Whatever the specifics of the constant tensions over burden-sharing, American leadership has generated a degree of demotivation on the part of Europeans, which US commentators have castigated as “free-riding”. At the same time, since the end of the Cold War, there have been growing demands, in Washington, for the EU to take over greater direct responsibility for the stabilisation of its volatile neighbourhood (the Balkans, the Maghreb and the Eastern borderlands). Europe, since 1989, has ceased to be central to the US strategic radar screen. This has given rise to the various projects for a European defence capacity, both from within NATO (the short-lived attempt, in the 1990s, to form a European Security and Defence Identity – ESDI) (Howorth and Keeler 2003), and outside of NATO (the 20-year quest for a Common Security and Defence Policy – CSDP) (Howorth 2014). However, so long as US policy suggests that Uncle Sam will always be on hand to ensure European security if a serious crisis develops, there will inevitably be clear limits to the ambition of the purely European project.
From this perspective, the “micro-cooperation” that forms the focus of some articles in this special issue (in particular, Smith et al. 2017, Graeger 2017), is only one part of the challenge. Arguably, as Duke and Gebhard (2017) suggest in this volume, and as the case studies of Fiott (2017), Lavallée (2017), Mayer (2017) conclude, of even greater long-term concern is the overall nature of the relationship between these two security actors. What is each of them for? Why does Europe need two such entities? Should ever greater cooperation lead to a formal division of labour or to a radically new balance of responsibilities and commitment as between the US and the Europeans?
When the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) was first launched in December 1998, the key concept was “autonomous action”. The EU, it was asserted, would develop its own strategic vision. The European framework would allow the member states to generate serious military capacity, whereas in NATO they would simply free-ride. And CSDP would allow European forces to tackle regional security challenges the US did not wish to engage with. Alas, CSDP did none of those things. Almost two decades later, the EU Global Strategy asserted that the EU’s foreign and security policy goal remains “strategic autonomy”. If words have meaning, this suggests an ambition for Europe to become self-reliant in defence. The reality, as we have seen in Libya and Ukraine, and as it is lived by member states with a Russian border, is that Europe appears to be more dependent on NATO and the US than at any point since the 1980s. Yet Donald Trump has called NATO obsolete, thereby significantly intensifying the European drive for a new defence capacity (Trump 2016). And his view is by no means marginal in the US. Major International Relations scholars such as Barry Posen (2014), Andrew Bacevich (2016), John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (2016) have recently called for the US progressively to withdraw from NATO and to hand it over, lock stock and barrel, to the Europeans. How likely is such a scenario and what are the alternatives?
In May 2017, Angela Merkel, deploring Trump’s berating of the European allies at the previous week’s NATO summit, famously declared that “the era in which we could fully rely on others is over to some extent” (Merkel 2017). The President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, even suggested that European integration itself could be re-kick-started via the drive for defence integration (Juncker 2017). And yet, all these voices continue to insist that cooperation between the EU and NATO is vital to this process. How can the aspiration for autonomy coexist with intensified cooperation? If the EU actually achieves strategic autonomy, what is NATO for? Conversely, if the EU does not achieve strategic autonomy, what is CSDP for? Europeans need to be totally realistic. There are huge obstacles standing in the way of “strategic autonomy”: persistent nationalist reflexes from member states; significant divergences in European strategic cultures; lack of consensus about the level of ambition in this policy area; challenges to defence budgets in a time of austerity; the sheer scale of the challenges facing Europe in its Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods; the absence of public awareness of and/or support for a more muscular or assertive Europe; and above all the parallel existence of NATO. I see three scenarios for the future of EU–NATO relations.
European crises have empirically inspired an increase in EU-NATO collaboration – proven by cybersecurity threats
Nina Graeger 17, Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), where she was Head of Department from 2008 to 2013 and Associate Professor II in International Relations at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences since 2013, “Grasping the everyday and extraordinary in EU–NATO relations: the added value of practice approaches”, 08/17/2017, European Security 26(3), p. 340-358 /lg
Studying the EU–NATO relationship as practice enables the researcher to transcend the extraordinary-everyday dichotomy but also to overcome the arguably “hyped-up” focus on the extraordinary in security and strategic studies. While designed to provide a (rapid) response to an extraordinary situation or event, security production involves practices that are ordinary, day-to-day experiences and where social artefacts constitute an essential part. In the EU–NATO relationship, such artefacts include everything from meeting agendas, reports, and informal memos exchanged between EU and NATO staff and diplomats, informal briefings by EU commanders in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) or by NATO commanders in the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC), as well as mutual visits to EU and NATO vessels at sea in the anti-piracy or refugee operations (Græger 2016).7.
However, crises may also strengthen and expand the repertoire of everyday security practice. The Russian annexation of the Crimea in 2014 put the relevance of EU–NATO cooperation, also for territorial security, back on the political agenda.8 Both the EU High Representative for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the European Commission and the NATO Secretary General have emphasised that a more uncertain and hostile European security environment is a challenge that their respective organisations should handle together (Mogherini 2014, NATO 2016a, 2016b). Since 2014, EU and NATO representatives have met informally on several occasions to exchange views, discuss common or coordinated responses, and convey joint messages to the external world.9
This is not an entirely new phenomenon, however. Crises, especially when Europe is expected to take a stand or a specific role, have facilitated EU–NATO communication and opened up meeting arenas that the “Cyprus issue” has otherwise rendered inaccessible. For instance, reciprocal informal cross-briefings and meetings between the ambassadors in the NAC and the PSC happened during “the Arab Spring” and the Libya operations during 2011, as well as when violence broke out on the ground in Kosovo in 2007 and in 2012 (Græger 2016). Although the frameworks for the coordination of defence, capability development, training of personnel etc. established as part of the Berlin Plus Agreement and Agreed Framework have been blocked since 2005, the member states of both organisations generally have turned a blind eye to practical cooperation as long as it generates results and is conducted discretely, sensitively, and without serious incidents (Smith 2011, p. 255).10 At the operational level, EU and NATO staff have found ways of working alongside each other or together both in crisis management operations, support missions (e.g. handling refugees), and anti-piracy operations.
Practice approaches are able to capture the essence of these informal encounters, which constitute the intersubjective understandings of security and how to handle them, whether as part of the everyday production of security or a response to major crises.
The perceived strategic uncertainty in Europe the past years surely has securitised EU–NATO cooperation, rendering an expansion of cooperation outside of Berlin Plus politically desirable and possible. New threats, such as “hybrid warfare” and cyberattacks, but also energy-security, capacity building in third countries, and illegal migration and refugee flows opened up new areas of practical cooperation. In responding to the refugee crisis from 2015, NATO and the EU signed an agreement in March 2016, emphasising that they had reached a “common understanding” on the modalities of the cooperation. In practical terms, it implied ensuring consistency and complementarity of the Frontex operation and NATO’s support activities (European Commission 2016). New initiatives regarding information sharing and incident response coordination between NATO and the EU have also been made within the cyber security domain (EEAS 2016). These agreements and coordination of activity are examples of everyday practice that originates in the extraordinary.
NATO and the EU are intertwined when it comes to security and defense – overlap, liaison offices, and formal agreements make cooperation frequent
Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters 5/26, Chair for International Security & Conflict Studies at Helmut-Schmidt-University/University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg and Non-Resident Research Fellow at the Global Europe Centre based at the University of Kent who was previously Lecturer and Research Fellow at Leuphana University Lüneburg, Germany and DAAD Postdoctoral Fellow in the Programme ‘The United States, Europe, and World Order’ at the Foreign Policy Institute of the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University, “Positioning member states in EU-NATO security cooperation: towards a typology”, 05/26/2022, European Security, https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2076558 /lg
Increasing interactions and functional overlap depend, however, also on the distribution of power among the two organisations, which can either be symmetric or asymmetric. Traditionally, power is in the hands of states with autonomy over decision-making and it has been distinguished between “power over”, power exerted by one actor over another in a relationship, and “power to”, the ability to trigger change and shape certain outcomes (Ojanen 2018). In this context, power of an organisation denotes “its ability to retain, or expand, its capability to pursue its policies within the area of functional overlap”. Under an asymmetric power distribution, a so-called “sectoral specialisation” of the organisations is most likely to happen because the weaker organisation needs to withdraw its governance activities from the respective policy area (Gehring and Faude 2014, p. 479). In the case of a symmetric power distribution, both organisations need to coordinate their governance activities in the overlapping policy area. Herein, multiple members – those states that are members of more than one international organisation within the same interorganisational network – play a crucial role as they can negotiate the institutional arrangements within both organisations to avoid conflicts and malfunctions of the regulatory bodies. Under symmetrical power distribution, co-governance and a division of labour are more likely to occur than role specification (Gehring and Faude 2014). Accordingly, Gehring and Faude propose “that institutional adaptation gives rise to an institutionalised division of labour among the elemental institutions of an institutional complex” (2014, p. 482). Division of labour then results in enhanced cooperation and fostered exchanges. In the case of the EU and NATO, their functional overlaps have increased over time as both have actively collaborated, for example, in crisis management operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and off the Somali coast. As a result, they have become so-called interlocking institutions due to their increasing coordination and cooperation (Biermann 2009, Schleich 2014).
Interorganisational interactions are not a one-way street and can take different forms including exchanges of information and material resources, coordination of activities, joint activities and decision-making and the establishment of formal structures (cf. Biermann 2008, 2015). Interorganisational relations may also go a step further in which one organisation can influence and shape the other’s policies, procedures and institutions, leading to a process of socialisation and learning from the other organisation (Johnston 2001). While learning can be accelerated through the rotation and exchange of staff members, the so-called alumni effect (Koops 2017a, 2017b), it can also be prevented by communication problems, lack of implementation and shortage of resources.
Since interorganisational relations are a dynamic process of exchanges and coordination, they take place on different levels within the organisations. Building on Waltz (1959) distinction of three levels of analysis – international system, state and individual – interorganisational interactions occur within the network of IOs in the same policy area (international system level), are shaped by their member states as well as by individual key players within the organisations and their member states. Koops (2017a, 2017b) introduces two additional levels: the bureaucratic level and the inter-secretariat (also called inter-institutional) level. While the bureaucratic level refers to administrative structures within IOs, where decisions are taken and the day-to-day management occurs, the inter-secretariat level includes jointly created cooperation channels, such as working groups and steering committees that oversee the formal cooperation in an interorganisational relationship. Liaison committees and working groups in the case of EU-NATO cooperation have played particularly relevant roles. For example, the EU and NATO introduced and actively engaged via their liaison facilities since 2000 with a focus on capabilities which later resulted in the creation of the EU-NATO Capability Group in 2003 (Messervy-Whiting 2005). Besides these formal channels of cooperation, informal exchanges play a crucial role, especially in cases of organisational incompatibility or other institutional and legal barriers. This is particularly relevant for EU-NATO relations because of the so-called participation problem and the issue of limited sharing of classified information and intelligence despite the signing of the 2003 Security of Information Agreement (Lachmann 2010, Smith 2011, Græger 2017).
An interorganisational relationship emerges only under certain circumstances. In the regime complexity and organisation theory literatures, scholars have developed and compiled key components. These allow to identify and study EU-NATO cooperation as an interorganisational relationship and highlight the specifics of their relationship. For example, both Merrett and Aldrich (cited in Dijkstra 2017) identify four key dimensions of interorganisational interactions – formalisation, intensity, symmetry and standardisation – which have also been picked up by Gehring and Oberthür (2004, 2009). In addition to the levels of institutionalisation, the frequency and intensity of interactions, and the power relations (symmetry) among organisations, Gehring and Oberthür, emphasise the relevance of functional overlap and membership overlap. In this context, Young (1999) distinguishes between functional interplay and political interplay. Functional interplay occurs when at least two organisations deal with the same issue or problem and when these organisations are geophysically or socioeconomically linked. Political interplay implies an intentional interplay, i.e. created on purpose by the concerned organisations to set up links in pursuit of specific goals, which can either be collective or individual.
Regime complexity, network analysis and interorganisational relations, interestingly, cannot grasp the full scope of member states in the interactions between two organisations. Although they possess the explanatory power to depict the relevance of secretariats, member states still play a minor role. Due to their focus on the bureaucracies and secretariats, these approaches express little about how states can impact the evolution of interorganisational relations. As reality has shown, several member states have essentially affected EU-NATO relations, particularly France, Cyprus and Turkey, which needs to be accounted for in theorising interorganisational cooperation. After all, states are the key building blocks of organisations, possess the main decision-making power in security issues and make essential contributions of financial resources and capabilities (Abbott and Snidal 1998, Koch 2008). Member states have thus a decisive impact also on interorganisational cooperation because they can steer the direction of the organisation’s external relations, its partnerships and general orientation. Against this backdrop, member states shape interorganisational relations under certain conditions: They need to be the main decision-makers, particularly in cases of unanimity rule, and provide key resources for maintaining cooperation.
While the interactions between the EU and NATO are rooted in the security and defence realm and are based on several formal agreements and declarations such as the 2003 and 2016 Joint Declarations and the Security of Information Agreement, they also maintain liaison offices and frequently exchange information. Yet, what has become most prominent in their relationship are the overlaps in their functions and membership. Functional overlap indicates the overlap of policy areas and mandates that are covered by the IOs (Gehring and Oberthür 2009, Hofmann 2019). It is expected that more links and opportunities for dialogue and exchanges exist with more functional overlaps. This dimension also includes geographical scope, i.e. the geographical area covered by an international organisation regarding both membership and activity. Membership overlap is another defining component, which refers to the number of states that are members in more than one international security organisations. Here it is assumed that a higher level of membership overlap facilitates interactions and generally affects cooperation, either positively or negatively. Membership overlap is particularly defining for EU-NATO cooperation since twenty-one NATO states are also member of the EU, which means that issues discussed

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