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2022 Michigan Disadvantage

DA - Strategic Concept - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR

DA - Strategic Concept - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx

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Strategic Concept DA – BFHR
Notes
Not a finished product --- mostly because things could change significantly in the next two weeks. In case it does, we have written multiple versions of the disad. Think of the disad as an overstretch da, that also has arguments about political in-fighting and cohesion. The better version of the da is probably NOT just the straight cohesion argument because there are so many things in the alliance that the allies disagree about. Rather, the disad is an argument about the future vision for NATO. Every 10 years or so NATO puts out a document/announcement called the strategic concept. The concept both reiterates the goals for the alliance for the next decade, as well as reinforcing the strategy and direction of the alliance. NATO has a summit in Madrid this coming week where they may theoretically release the concept. There is talk that due to Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine that they may push back the release of the concept and the accompanying statements for another 6-12 months. Obviously what happens at Madrid will change the disad significantly. The disad in its current form says that the allies are negotiating what will be included in the document. The general tenor is that they strayed too far away from their core tasks in the last concept, and that the re-emergence of Russia as a serious threat to global stability and NATO allies in particular justifies re-focusing the alliance on Deterrence, while including a new component about Chinese deterrence. The disad argues that the plan shifts that focus away by including a new governance/technology/civilian focus around EDT that is at odds with the current concept strategy. There are several different link arguments available including focus, a narrow mandate/agenda, as well as a separate in-fighting/cohesion argument. The concept is a very important moment for the future of the alliance with several issues facing the potential cohesion and coherence of the alliance going forward. Pushing the concept away from its traditional focus and causing in-fighting with its release has serious implications for long-term stability and cohesion.
Links overlap for different versions of the disad. If the Madrid talks formalize the concept, I will shift the uniqueness story for the disad in future updates. However, the link work the students have done in this file will work for other versions of this disad. At worst, there is a cohesion da that has all the components necessary to make it a viable da. I would just suggest continuous cohesion updates and really staying on-top of the disagreements within the alliance if you want to go for that version of the da.
Some other notes:
There are some uniqueness tricks vs. EDT now --- some decent arguments about the NATO focus on EDT currently being at more of a public-private partnership level, and that NATO is staying out of the business of EDT governance and standard-setting. This should jive well with the way that most of the aff’s are written. There is of course, lots of room for innovation, and I think there are probably domestic political arguments as well as a potential credibility da about the Secretary General. He has been trying to get a focus on more tech/EDT into the concept, but also trying to keep the mandate narrow and focused on Russia, so there may be some link/link turn arguments either way.
Forslund
Thank you to the following students for their work:
Eleanor
Nikki
Joseph
Eric
Micah
Alex
Top Shelf
1NC --- Concept DA Shell
A --- Strategic concept will focus on deterrence – the direct nature of the Ukraine war means NATO will refocus on conventional deterrence instead of hybrid and non-state threats.
Simon 22 [Prof. Luis Simón is director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute, and director of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) at the Brussels School of Governance.; “The Madrid Strategic Concept and the future of NATO”; NATO Review; June 2, 2022; https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/06/02/the-madrid-strategic-concept-and-the-future-of-nato/index.html]//eleanor
Initial discussions on the next Strategic Concept revolved around the need to prepare the Alliance for a world characterised by the return of inter-state threats and great power competition. This alone marked a sharp contrast with the Alliance’s post-Cold War focus on transnational challenges and non-peer competitors. What would the return of great power competition entail for the evolving balance between NATO’s so-called three core tasks (i.e. collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security)? How should NATO balance a renewed focus on inter-state threats and great power competitors with the ongoing relevance of transnational threats and challenges, like terrorism or the climate-security nexus? When thinking about great power competition, how much emphasis should NATO put on Russia’s immediate threat to Europe, as opposed to the more systemic challenge represented by China’s strategic rise? And what should be the right balance between the military and non-military aspects of great power competition? The latter question becomes particularly relevant in light of the growing salience of “hybrid” forms of warfare and emerging disruptive technologies, which compel the Alliance to emphasise societal resilience at home and step up its efforts to innovate technologically. The war in Ukraine – and ongoing debates about how the Alliance can assist Ukraine while strengthening deterrence in Eastern Europe – have become important topics in Strategic Concept discussions. In a way, the current war vindicates the view that we do indeed live in an increasingly competitive world, and that inter-state threats are back. On the other hand, the overt and direct nature of Russia’s invasion challenges some of the pervading assumptions about how future conflict was likely to unfold in indirect and hybrid ways. The Strategic Concept from a historical perspective The current NATO Strategic Concept, adopted in Lisbon in 2010, aims to strike a balance between the Alliance’s so-called three core tasks: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. In many ways, the Lisbon Strategic Concept draws on the previous one (adopted in Washington in 1999). It represents a crystallisation of NATO’s experience in the post-Cold War period, an era characterised by Western military-technological supremacy, and the seeming absence of peer competitors. In the immediate post-Cold War period, the belief that former adversaries like Russia and even emerging great powers like China could somehow be integrated in the rules-based order was still widely held. This was a truly exceptional period. The power surplus enjoyed by the United States and its allies gave the West a free hand (both politically and militarily) to engage in ambitious out-of-area endeavours, and leverage crisis management operations and collective security initiatives to expand the remit of the so-called open and rules-based international order, not only in the broader Euro-Atlantic neighbourhood but also beyond. During the long-post Cold War era, collective defense and deterrence took a back seat. Even though they constituted the fundamentals of Euro-Atlantic security, they were considered almost superfluous in light of Western military-technological supremacy. Crisis management and collective security ruled the day. But this world is gone and great power competition is back. That reality was illustrated by Russia’s annexations of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Crimea in 2008 and 2014, and even more starkly by its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Also striking has been China’s strategic rise and growing assertiveness in East Asia and beyond. Peer competitors are once again challenging security, and geopolitical and security architecture in the important regions of Europe and East Asia, but also the institutional and normative fabric that underpins the open, rules-based international order. Adapting the Alliance to this new wave of great power competition is arguably the main challenge in the coming decade. Beyond Ukraine Since NATO’s birth in 1949 – and potentially as far back as the industrial revolution – the Euro-Atlantic region has been the undisputable centre of gravity of global politics. Developments in and around the Euro-Atlantic region typically had a profound impact upon geopolitical and strategic balances elsewhere. However, in today’s and tomorrow’s worlds, the opposite is likely to be true. As the Indo-Pacific becomes the center of gravity of global economic growth, military competition and technological innovation, dynamics emanating from that region are likely to have a growing impact on other regions, including the Euro-Atlantic. Thus, the geopolitical and security architecture of the Euro-Atlantic region is likely to be increasingly affected by exogenous factors. In a world that no longer revolves around the Euro-Atlantic region, and is increasingly defined by China’s strategic rise and the growing centrality of the Indo-Pacific region, the Alliance will need to think more globally about security. To be sure, the Euro-Atlantic region will remain NATO’s direct referent. However, the future of that region – and that of NATO itself – will likely become increasingly affected by broader geostrategic dynamics to a degree and in ways that are unfamiliar to NATO and its member countries. NATO must therefore adapt to a world in which the Euro-Atlantic region will remain important, but will probably become a secondary theatre in world politics, as well as in the context of US geostrategy. These changes should push the Alliance to develop a more global approach to security. Beyond the more specific question of whether NATO itself should act globally (e.g., by developing a presence in the Indo-Pacific region), the Allies ought to think more systematically about the main communicating vessels between Euro-Atlantic security and broader geostrategic dynamics, specifically the Indo-Pacific. Three stand out: the global implications of China’s rise; the evolution of the Sino-Russian relationship; and America’s need to prioritise between Europe and Asia, and what that may mean for NATO, European security and the longstanding debate about a transatlantic division of labour. The war in Ukraine, and Allied efforts to assist Ukraine and to bolster deterrence in the East, seem to have led to a revival of the transatlantic relationship, and a renewed focus on Europe, including for the United States. Yet contrary to what one may instinctively think, the war in Ukraine is unlikely to alter the steady shift in the centre of global strategy and politics – or, for that matter, of US geostrategy – towards the Indo-Pacific region. Rather than halt a shift towards the Indo-Pacific, the Ukraine crisis and the response to it so far, provide a powerful illustration of how European geopolitical and security dynamics are increasingly affected by extra-European ones. For one thing, China- and Asia-centric considerations have featured prominently in debates about how the United States should respond to Russia’s aggression in Europe. Some experts argue that the United States should avoid getting bogged down in a European war – lest this should distract its attention from the Indo-Pacific. Others have contended that a strong U.S. response will deter adversaries and reassure allies elsewhere, notably in the Indo-Pacific. As long as the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific hinges largely on US power, and as long as these two regions continue to exercise significant pressure on US defense resources, their alliance and deterrence architectures will probably remain intertwined. This underscores the importance of greater political and military coordination between NATO and its key partners in the Asia-Pacific, namely Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand. For another thing, it is also important that NATO and its Asia-Pacific partners have a common picture on Russia and China, and how their relationship may evolve. Without ignoring existing frictions, if the Sino-Russia relationship remains broadly cooperative, attempts to drive a wedge between them may prove challenging. The broader point, however, is that whatever the United States and its European and Asia-Pacific allies think they can do in relation to engaging Russia or China, or manipulating their relationship, they must remain aligned. Otherwise, there is a risk they may draw different conclusions about either power’s trajectory or how their relationship may evolve, and thus frame their policies on the basis of different premises. This could conceivably trigger competition between the United States and its allies, and among NATO Allies themselves. Conclusion The war in Ukraine has become an important aspect in the debate about NATO’s forthcoming Strategic Concept. Discussions on how to continue to assist Ukraine and bolster deterrence along the Eastern part of the Alliance will no doubt take center stage in Madrid in June. This is understandable: deterring a war in Europe is what NATO was created for. In fact, when it comes to the main questions informing the debate on the Strategic Concept - i.e. the balance between the three core tasks; state vs. non-state threats; military vs. non-military; Russia vs. China, etc. - the war in Ukraine may make the pendulum swing closer to the former than many would have anticipated just prior to the invasion.
B --- The plan crushes NATO’s strategic concept --- causes infighting, collapses cohesion and deterrence and overstretches the agenda
Dr. Tardy ‘20
(Thierry Tardy, PhD in Political Science, Director of the Research Division at the NATO Defense College (Rome), taught at Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (HEID, Geneva), the War College in Paris, the Sorbonne, the Paris School of International Affairs (Sciences Po) and the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilisations (INALCO, Paris). He is also Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges., “The risks of NATO’s maladaptation,” European Security Volume 30, 2021 - Issue 1, pg Taylor and Francis //um-ef)
In the debate about congruence, one logical conclusion of the above-described elements about the character of the Russian threat is that NATO has to embrace a broader agenda than the one defined by the “deterrence and defence” mantra. To remain relevant, NATO needs to go beyond a too narrow defence-focused agenda, the argument goes. It needs to engage into a securitisation process, by which issues that were not previously belonging to its portfolio of tasks, would now appear on its agenda. As a matter of fact, the shift to security is not new. Since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance has indeed broadened its agenda through activities in the fields of crisis management, implementing mandates often closer to police tasks than to genuine military undertakings. In doing this NATO demonstrated a sense of adaptability and resilience (Menon and Welsh 2011). NATO’s role in Afghanistan’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), or in humanitarian relief operations, provides more specific examples of NATO operating at the frontier of military core tasks to respond to broader security needs (see Gallis 2007, Jakobsen 2010, Williams 2011). Similarly, NATO’s role in counter-terrorism, energy security (Bocse 2020), security sector reform, training, or more recently in the cyber domain, also attest to a broadening of the agenda. The entire discussion about hybrid threats and warfare epitomises this evolution. NATO has also developed expertise on these issues, both within its own staff in Brussels and through its network of Centres of Excellence. To a large extent thus, the defence agenda is subsumed into a broader security agenda and the challenge is therefore to make trade-offs between different types of activities. We believe though that not only are these activities politically and operationally less prominent than what the “deterrence and defence” agenda has implied since 2014, but a key argument of this research is also that further developing these tasks carry risks of maladaptation. Maladaptation may result from issues spanning a lack of expertise and legitimacy deficit on many of the new tasks embraced, inter-institutional duplication and competition, uneven members states’ backing, to dilution of the Alliance’s core military role. Enlarging the scope: towards security and internal threats Acquiring a mandate or a capacity to tackle a broad range of threats implies that NATO moves in two directions: towards more security-type activities as opposed to defence-focused ones; and towards more internal issues. In both directions, a more assertive role for NATO implies three levels of activity: policy development, i.e. the ability to produce policy documents that frame NATO’s role in a particular domain; capability development, i.e. the ability to acquire expertise or resources that can be used for the implementation of a particular policy; and operations, i.e. the ability to act through operational activities, be they exercises, training or actual use of NATO and member states’ capabilities placed under NATO command. These three levels allow us to distinguish between domains where NATO would only act in a coordination or information-sharing role (for which capability development and operations are not necessary), and domains where NATO would be having a more central function. Applied to the current landscape, the broadening security agenda beyond what is already done would imply a more assertive role for NATO in defensive/offensive cyber activities (with the cyberspace being an operational domain and covered by Article 5), in the fight against organised crime networks, inter alia through maritime security, as well as in the broad security sector reform (SSR) agenda of partner countries, to take just a few examples. In all these tasks coercion and military effect are not absent, yet they are less central than in traditional defence activities. The second direction of the move – inward-looking – would mean that NATO plays an increased role in the defence against internal threats, by contributing to: critical infrastructure protection and resilience building; civilian protection tasks; police-type activities such as anti-terrorist operations in European capitals; operations that aim to tackle the security consequences of (massive) migrant flows; or support to police forces facing under-the-radar hybrid-type non-conventional attacks. This would imply establishing relations with a set of national actors, from law enforcement entities to municipalities, public companies (in the energy and transport sectors among others) and the private sector (Machi 2017). The role of NATO in these various activities could vary in ambition, spanning information-sharing, awareness rising, coordination, exercises, and more operational tasks. The implied risks of task expansion Although these various tasks make sense when assessed against the broad security needs of NATO member states and societies, and may be justified for political reasons, they carry a number of risks of maladaptation. First, NATO would have to further develop or acquire an expertise on issues that can be very technical, or human resources-heavy, and for which even the member states may have a deficit (as in the cyber domain, energy security, or critical infrastructure protection). The added-value of NATO’s role would be all the more challenged as its expertise is being questioned. Second, the legitimacy of NATO’s role in some areas may be challenged due to a lack of expertise or because of the possible intrusiveness of NATO’s activities; this leads to sovereignty considerations, with states – be they NATO member states or not – having issues with any attempt from NATO to interfere with their internal sphere, in the law en

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