CP - NATO Withdrawal - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR
CP - NATO Withdrawal - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx
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CP – Cease NATO – BFHR 7wk This is simply a supplement to existing Cease NATO material and NATO bad impact turns that serve as a net benefit---most of the competition and perm work is aimed at beating “perm: cease NATO coop besides plan + do plan” Thanks to Coralynn Yang for her hard work on this file! Please email khirn10@gmail.com with any comments or concerns. 1NC 1NC — CP: Withdraw The United States federal government should cease its alliance commitment, including security cooperation, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Complete, unconditional withdrawal is key — any signal of commitment makes nuclear war inevitable. Barndollar ’19 — Gil; Senior Research Fellow at CSS and a Senior Fellow at Defense Priorities. From 2018 to 2019 he was Director of Middle East Studies at the Center for the National Interest. He holds an AB in history from Bowdoin College and MPhil and PhD degrees in history from the University of Cambridge. At CSS he is working on a book examining America’s All Volunteer Force, conscription, and future national security threats. April 8, 2019; “NATO Is 70 and Past Retirement Age”; National Interest; https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato-70-and-past-retirement-age-51482; //CYang The United States, meanwhile, is committing itself to fight — four thousand miles from home — for allies who won’t fight for each other. This state of affairs, which has become increasingly clear to both friendly and hostile onlookers, does not create security or stability. Instead, this hollow alliance invites brinksmanship, escalation, and miscalculation that could lead to nuclear war. Will Americans fight and die to defend Europe, when Europeans won’t? We may find out. European collective defense should be built on a bedrock of shared sacrifice and credible deterrence. As long as the United States remains committed to defending Europe, Europe will lack the will and the means to defend itself. Nearly three decades of post–Cold War defense welfare has made Europe militarily weak and strategically unserious. American pressure for Europe to share more of the defense burden, going back to the Kennedy administration, has had little effect. Americans are increasingly fed up with this unsustainable state of affairs. Only the shock of a U.S. withdrawal from NATO can spur the European nations to commit themselves to their own collective defense. America is made less safe by remaining in NATO. The opportunity costs of the United States’ counter-productive commitment to European security imperil real national-security interests, especially in Asia. Giving Europe a few years to get its house in order before an American pullout is a reasonable hedge against miscalculation and escalation. That prudence aside, the United States should withdraw from the alliance as quickly as possible. NATO at seventy is decades past its retirement age. Competition 2NC — AT: Perm — Bilaterally Cooperate “NATO” is exclusively its institutional organization, NOT its member states. Johnston ’19 — Seth; Fellow of the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, former chief of international security cooperation for intelligence at the U.S. Army Europe, former Task Force Commander in NATO’s Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan, PhD international relations, MA comparative politics, Oxford University. Autumn 2019; “NATO’s Lessons from Afghanistan,” The US Army War College Quarterly; https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/natos-lessons-afghanistan; //CYang In contrast to national assessments, this analysis focuses on the formal institutions of the Alliance. NATO is unique among alliances in that it is not only a treaty-based agreement among member states, but also an international organization — and a highly institutionalized one at that. Since its early years, NATO has been comprised of a permanently staffed formal political headquarters supported by a network of military and civilian organizations. Particularly noteworthy is NATO’s integrated joint multinational military structure, a unique innovation without equivalent among other alliances or international organizations. This integration, capped by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium, extends through various echelons and included the ISAF headquarters and other NATO structures in Afghanistan.7 Thus, for this article, “NATO” refers to the various formal institutions and not the group of allied countries. Likewise, the focus is on the collaborative conduct and not that of the United States, other allies or partners, the government of Afghanistan, or other regional actors. Nor does the article address the efficacy of counterinsurgency warfare. That excludes bilateral cooperation Tsuruoka ’10 — Michito; Senior Research Fellow, Regional Studies Department, National Institute for Defense Studies. October 2010; “Japan-Europe Security Cooperation: How to “Use” NATO and the EU”; Boei Kenkyusho Kiyo, Volume 13, Issue 1; http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/2011/bulletin_e2011_3.pdf; //CYang Second, this article focuses on cooperation with NATO and the EU; however, that by no means implies that security cooperation with individual countries such as the UK, France, and Germany is insignificant. For a long time, the majority of dialogue and cooperation between Japan and Europe in the areas of foreign policy, security, and defense have been conducted under bilateral frameworks with major European countries. As a result, the accumulation of knowledge and experience in Japan with regard to cooperation with NATO and the EU remain shallow compared to bilateral relations with individual countries. Against this backdrop, this article will focus on NATO and the EU. 1. NATO’s transformation and the development of Japan–NATO cooperation: How to use NATO9 (1) NATO as a political partner From a Japanese perspective, NATO can be seen, first, as a political partner, meaning a partner with which to have political dialogue. When visiting NTO and addressing the North Atlantic Council (NAC), both Foreign Minister Taro Aso (May 2006) and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (January 2007) spent a great deal of time talking about the security environment in Asia, including the abduction and other issues of North Korea as well as China’s military buildup.10 Abe directly requested the understanding and support of NATO members concerning Japan’s stance on the North Korean abduction and other issues. This illustrates the fact that, for Japan, dialogue with NATO is a new venue to acquire understanding and support from Europe for its position on problems related to politics and security in Asia. With regard to political and security dialogue between Japan and Europe, in addition to traditional bilateral frameworks between Japan and major European countries like the UK, France and Germany, there is now a channel between Japan and the EU (to be discussed later). Dialogue with NATO provides a new venue for discussion. In addition to Prime Minister and ministeriallevel visits to NATO (meetings with the NATO Secretary General and the NAC) and dialogue with the NATO Secretary General during his visits to Japan, at the officials’ level there is the annual Japan –NATO High-Level Consultation. Moreover, in addition to dialogue with NATO officials —the International Staff and the International Military Staff— ad hoc meetings are held from time to time between Japanese officials and representatives of the member states’ delegations to NATO in the context of the Political Committees (PC), Policy Cooperation Groups (PCG), and other frameworks depending on the topics to be discussed, such as the security situation in East Asia, Central Asia, and missile defense. In recent years, the NAC and the Secretary General have issued statements condemning North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests, which Japan appreciates a lot, showing one aspect of NATO’s value as a political partner.11 NATO is a forum suitable for Japan to discuss Asian security and other security-related issues mainly because many security experts, both civilian and military, are assembled and deal with various security problems on a daily basis. Japan is not alone in seeing NATO as a political partner. NATO is often described as the strongest and the most successful military alliance in history and encompassing all major powers from North America and Europe. Thus, NATO inevitably carries a unique weight in international security and world politics. That weight may even be heavier than NATO itself is aware.12 In fact, demand from non-members to conduct political dialogue with NATO has been increasing. At the same time, countries that do not necessarily have positive perceptions of NATO or that do not share fundamental values with the Alliance often see the strengthening of relations between NATO and non-members with concern and suspicion. For instance, Russia and China often react with vigilance when Japan and NATO cooperate. This partly comes from their genuine concerns over the strengthening of concrete military cooperation between Japan and NATO, but it also has to do with their recognition of NATO’s political weight. Moreover, these countries view Japan–EU and Japan –NATO cooperation differently. Put simply, they react more negatively to the latter than the former. This fact demonstrates that NATO carries a distinctive profile as a political actor that differs from that of the EU. Nevertheless, it goes without saying that NATO is a military alliance based on collective defense. NATO is not supposed to be aiming to expand its political and diplomatic influence as a political actor in international relations. This is how NATO differs from the EU, which has been trying to construct a common foreign, security, and defense policy. At the same time, however, NATO is not an alliance that concerns military affairs alone. NATO has long labeled itself a politicalmilitary alliance, and even its founding North Atlantic Treaty emphasizes political and economic cooperation among the Allies (Parties).13 (2) NATO as an operational partner NATO today can be characterized as an “alliance in action.” In addition to large-scale operations in Kosovo (KFOR) and Afghanistan (ISAF), NATO is currently conducting an antiterrorism operation in the Mediterranean (OAE), antipiracy measures off the coast of Somalia, and a training mission in Iraq (NTM-I). Furthermore, from March to October 2011, NATO conducted an operation over Libya. Many non-NATO countries, as well as NATO Allies, are contributing troops to those operations and missions. In the case of ISAF, for instance, in addition to all of the 28 NATO countries, a total of around 20 non-members are participating as Non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations (NNTCNs). The presence of non-member contributors has grown considerably in the context of ISAF over the past several years.14 In the past, Australia and New Zealand had contributed troops to NATO-led operations in the former Yugoslavia, such as in Bosnia in the 1990s. However, the current level of non-members’ involvement in NATO-led operations is truly a new phenomenon. One reason behind this is the expansion of NATO’s operational commitments beyond the capacity of its members. In other words, it is impossible for the Alliance to conduct all the operations alone as a self-sufficient entity. At the same time, as most former communist countries in Europe have already become members of the Alliance, the weight of the countries outside the Euro–Atlantic region that used to be referred to as contact countries —Japan, Australia, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, etc.— is increasing instead. From NATO’s point of view, cooperation with new partners is in essence an “import of support” 15 and NATO naturally welcomes countries with the will and capabilities to contribute to the operations that it leads. On the other hand, operational cooperation with NATO is often an effective means for nonmembers in terms of enhancing their efforts in international peace and security, not least in the context of international peace operations. Most of these operations today are conducted multilaterally. What is more, looking at global trends in international peace operations, it is clear that the weight of United Nations-led peacekeeping operations (PKO) has been relatively decreasing in recent years. In its place is a growing presence of peace operations led by regional organizations such as NATO, the EU, and the African Union (AU).16 While the activities of the AU are limited to intra-regional operations on the African continent, NATO and EU operations (other than territorial defense mission by NATO) are basically assumed to take place outside of their member states.17 As a result of the expanding operational engagements of NATO and the EU outside of Europe, other countries including Japan often find themselves in a situation where they need to cooperate with NATO and the EU whether they like it or not. When the ISAF operation in Afghanistan was launched at the end of 2001, it was commanded on a half-year rotation by countries with the will and capacity to command. However, due to cost and complexities related to the establishment and maintenance of the headquarters, NATO took over command in August 2003.18 Furthermore, ISAF later expanded its area of responsibility and came to cover the whole country. As a result, those who were deploying troops in Afghanistan had no choice but to cooperate with NATO as long as they wanted to continue their engagement. Seen from a different angle, it can also be said that countries can use NATO as a framework through which to participate in international efforts. Without such a framework, small to medium-sized countries may not able to make contributions. Nevertheless, there are various ways to pursue operational cooperation with NATO. Potential contributors could complete official procedures, including concluding a participation agreement with NATO, become a troop-contributing country, and then deploy troops under the ISAF command, or they could cooperate locally via individual arrangements made with other countries already active in the area (without having official relations with NATO).19 Theoretically, at least, it is even possible for those countries to conduct a completely independent operation on its own in Afghanistan. However, regardless of how self-contained the activities are, the necessity to coordinate on issues such as the division of roles with ISAF will of course come up, and it is practically impossible to assume that the countries that endeavor to send troops to Afghanistan could conduct its own activities without relying on the capabilities and various infrastructure of ISAF at all, including in extremis support and security information. Furthermore, even assuming it is feasible, it will not be the most efficient way to use the limited amount of resources available. In sum, it is not only in NATO’s interest, but also non-NATO troop contributors’ interest to cooperate with each other. Former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer succinctly pointed out that, “NATO is a framework that they [nonmembers] can use to make their own efforts more effective.” 20 Furthermore, if a country completes official procedures with NATO and takes position as an official ISAF troop contributing nation, they can participate in various levels of ISAF meetings, receive more information, and get more involved in policy-shaping. For a number of constitutional, legal and domestic political reasons, it is very difficult for the SDF to operate under the command of NATO.21 Short of coming under NATO’s command, however, various options are conceivable for the SDF to work with NATO in the areas where it operates. At the same time, operational cooperation with NATO does not need to be limited to the military domain alone. In Afghanistan, since 2007 Japan has provided humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in cooperation with PRTs, and since 2009 has dispatched development experts (civilian assistance teams) to the Lithuania-led PRT in Chaghcharan, Ghor province.22 Assistance from Japan was of great value for Lithuania, a country which does not have much funding and experience in development assistance. From a Japanese point of view, the importance of this scheme comes from the fact that it enables Japan to expand the geographical reach of its development assistance beyond those areas where an Embassy or the Japanese aid agency (JICA) are already present. Without the cooperation of the Lithuania-led PRT, it is easy to imagine that Japan would not have been able to operate in a remote province like Ghor. Moreover, Japan and NATO concluded a security agreement in June 2010, which allows Japan and NATO to share classified information with each other.23 This is expected to be a foundation for deeper dialogue and practical cooperation between Japan and NATO.24 (3) NATO as another venue of cooperation with the United States The comparative advantage that cooperation with NATO offers Japan, as opposed to bilateral cooperation with major European countries and with the EU, is the fact that the US, Japan’s only formal ally, is part of NATO. For all NATO Allies excluding the US, what NATO means is essentially an alliance with the US. When NATO was founded within the context of the Cold War, it was primarily seen as a means to secure US commitment to defend Western Europe. Moreover, for former communist nations that joined NATO after the end of the Cold War, the NATO membership was synonymous with receiving a commitment from the US for collective defense, exemplified by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. For those reasons, NATO is usually conceived in the context of policy toward the US in many countries. It’s entirely distinct Nauta ’17 — David; Ph.D legal adviser in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He has published various articles on international law aspects of military operations. December 1, 2017; "Chapter 4: Current Institutional Framework of NATO and NATO’s Decision Making Process"; The International Responsibility of NATO and Its Personnel During Military Operations; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang 4.5 Conclusions This chapter has described the institutional framework of NATO. Member States are represented in the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which is the highest political organ of the Alliance. Decisions on NATO operations are taken by the Council through consensus. The Secretary General of the Alliance is responsible for steering this process of consultation and has several tools at its disposal to achieve consensus, in particular the so-called ‘silence procedure’. Consensus and the silence procedure show that NATO enjoys a degree of autonomy from its member States, as the Alliance can function even without full agreement of all of the members. The NAC, its supporting International Staff and the civilian agencies constitute the civilian structure of the Alliance. The military structure consists of the Military Committee, supported by the International Military Staff, the two Supreme Commands and international military headquarters subordinate to them. Supreme Allied Commander Europe commands NATO operations. SACEUR has “operational command and control” over the military forces assigned to him by the Troop Contributing Nations, which could either be member States or States that are not member to NATO (Non-NATO Contributing Nations, or NNCN). Two aspects are relevant to note here. First, States that participate in NATO-led operations transfer a significant degree of control over military forces to NATO. Chapter 7 will examine in more detail whether the degree of control transferred to NATO by States equates to ‘effective control’. If NATO does have effective control over conduct of forces placed at its disposal, the conduct c
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