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2022 Michigan Negative

Neg - PGMs 2 - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR

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Neg – PGMs 2 – BFHR
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PGMs NEG
1NC---AT: Turkey
Appeasement fails.
Aktar 22 [Cengiz Aktar; professor of political science at the University of Athens; 5-23-2022; "Appease and enable: The West’s disastrous Russia and Turkey policies"; POLITICO; https://www.politico.eu/article/appease-enable-west-disastrous-russi-turkey-policies/; KL]
Despite how odd Turkey’s strategic choices as a NATO member may be, the West continues to do business as usual with Ankara.
Western powers once again make excuses for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, understanding Turkey’s mysterious “legitimate security concerns,” which often equates to a license to kill. But by appeasing him for the sake of “keeping” the country within NATO, they miss the point that the Turkish leader is not so different from Russian President Vladimir Putin — and that once again, a policy of appeasement simply won’t work.
As the war in Ukraine has unfolded, Turkey has been allowed to indulge in its long-running double game, continuing to play Russia and the West against each other, delivering pre-ordered drones to Kyiv on the one hand, while ignoring sanctions against Moscow and opposing Finland and Sweden’s applications to join NATO on the other.
But as pointless offers to broker peace by Turkey’s president have “convinced” the West of Ankara’s “strategic value,” Erdoğan — “the dictator we need,” to quote Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi — is back on the global stage once more. Even United States President Joe Biden’s administration has started lobbying lawmakers to agree to the delivery of fighter jets to Ankara.
Yet the similarities between Russia and Turkey today, as well as the strongmen who have shaped them, draw an obvious and ominous parallel that should be noted by Western leaders.
Topping the list of citizen complaints before the European Court of Human Rights, the systems Erdoğan and Putin have crafted disregard the rule of law and supersede it with one-man rule, as they both have surrounded themselves by oligarchs and yes-men. Both countries are undemocratic, their elections neither free nor fair, their regimes pushing narratives and pursuing actions that are irredentist, revisionist and bellicose.
In both Russia and Turkey, the opposition — or what remains of it — is systematically hounded and repressed, its leaders attacked or jailed, as in the cases of Alexei Navalny and Selahattin Demirtaş. And there still exist large crowds who recklessly support “their” regimes.
In Europe, Germany has played a central role in appeasing these dictators over the years. And while the country’s elite has started some timid soul-searching about its policy toward Russia in the wake of Ukraine’s invasion, it remains wedded to appeasement and engagement with Turkey.
During her time in office, former Chancellor Angela Merkel developed a Faustian pact with Erdoğan, paying 10 visits to Turkey— three in 2016 alone, when the country was politically and morally devastated — setting a record among Western leaders. And as Merkel continued to visit and welcome Erdoğan in Germany, neither his authoritarian drive at home, nor Turkey’s aggressive moves in the Eastern Mediterranean, Iraq, Libya and Syria or its U.N.-documented sponsorship of jihadi terrorism lessened. None of this deterred Merkel’s unconditional support either, including arms sales — just as with Russia.
Since 2015, the EU has followed this appeasement policy initiated and led by Merkel. And Ankara’s pro-EU utterances, its empty rhetoric on reforms and tactical retreats from confrontation are systematically taken for granted by the pro-Ankara axis.
This cynical agenda is driven by the fear of losing “NATO partner Turkey” to Russia. In addition, Europeans have been avoiding jeopardizing their economic interests in Turkey and are fearful of placing their refugee deal with Ankara at risk. They have also been terrified of doing anything that might trigger a social implosion — despite the fact that appeasement is not an adequate answer to any of these of these angsts.
The more the EU and the West appease, the more brazen and entrenched Erdoğan becomes, and the more insolent and dangerous he is for others. Exactly like Putin.
There are strong similarities between Russian arrogance toward Ukrainians and Turkish high-handedness toward the Kurds. Ankara targets anything that sounds or looks Kurdish — inside or outside the country. And both Erdoğan and Putin see it as their historic missions to “civilize” these “substandard” and finally “non-existing” nations, to invoke their right to self-defense and preventive strikes against Nazis and terrorists respectively, who they say threaten to attack “peace-loving” Russia or Turkey.
When it comes to the rules of “war” — a proscribed term in both countries — both armies outdo others’ war crimes against civilians. Putin targets Ukrainian grain warehouses; Erdoğan steals the olive oil of Syrian Kurds; and both have cut water supplies. Forced relocation and ethnic cleansing have been common practice in both countries. In Turkish-occupied northern Syria, the Kurdish language is banned in official institutions and schools and replaced by Turkish, much like in occupied Ukrainian land, where Russian has ousted the Ukrainian and Turkish Tatar languages.
Despite the disastrous consequences of its pre-invasion policy toward Russia, the West continues to indulge their illusions about Turkey. Appeasers fail to understand that Western standards, values and principles are obstacles to the functioning of these regimes.
Thus, they cannot be engaged through values and rules-based approaches but need to be treated as what they are — security threats.
Sales have significant implications for the Greek-Turkish security balance.
Zanotti 22 [Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs; Clayton Thomas, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs; 6-7-2022; "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief"; Congressional Research Service; https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R44000.pdf; KL]
With U.S. officials already having notified a possible upgrade of F-16s for Greece to Congress in 2021,104 U.S. willingness to upgrade Turkish F-16s could have significant implications for the security balance between Turkey and Greece, and for relations involving the three countries.105 Erdogan announced in May 2022 that he would no longer deal with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, after Mitsotakis appeared to raise concern about U.S.-Turkey arms transactions while addressing a May 17 joint session of Congress.106 Turkey and Greece have long-standing disputes over maritime and airspace boundaries, energy exploration, and the status of Cyprus (see text box). A recent 2019-2020 spike in tensions has somewhat subsided, but during that time Greece strengthened its relations with the United States and a number of regional countries such as France, Israel, and Egypt.107
Greece says no and despises the plan. Or it escalates. This is their prime minister’s speech.
Mitsotakis 22 [Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Prime Minister of Greece; 6-7-2022; "Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ address to the Joint Session of the US Congress"; ekathimerini.com; https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1184653/prime-minister-kyriakos-mitsotakis-address-to-the-joint-session-of-the-us-congress/; KL]
And speaking of open acts of aggression, I ask you, esteemed members of Congress, not to forget an open wound that has caused Hellenism unending pain over the past 48 years. I am referring to the invasion and subsequent division of Cyprus. This issue has to be resolved in accordance with international law and in line with the relevant decisions of the United Nations Security Council. As I told President Biden yesterday, nobody can and nobody will accept a two- state solution in Cyprus.
The same is true for all other regional disputes. Greece is a peace seeking democracy that always extends a hand of friendship to our neighbors. We are always open to dialogue. But there is only one framework we can use to resolve our differences: international law and the unwritten principles of good neighborly relations.
I want to be absolutely clear. We will not accept open acts of aggression that violate our sovereignty and our territorial rights. These include overflights over Greek islands, which must stop immediately.
Please also note: the last thing that NATO needs at a time when our focus is on helping Ukraine defeat Russia’s aggression is another source of instability on NATO’s Southeastern flank. And I ask you take this into account when you make defense procurement decisions concerning the Eastern Mediterranean.
Greece war draws in great powers.
Özgür 22 [Ozan Özgür; World Socialist writer; 6-14-2022; "NATO-Russia war inflames conflict between Turkey and Greece"; World Socialist Web Site; https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2022/06/14/xxxd-j14.html; KL]
Amid the ongoing US-NATO war against Russia in Ukraine, tensions are rising dangerously between NATO member states Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea. The two countries are holding war games aimed at each other, trading accusations of disregarding international treaties, and violating each other’s borders with jet fighters and warships.
The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) Ephesus 2022 exercise, held in the Aegean Sea and attended by more than 10,000 military personnel, ended last week. Thirty-seven countries, including the United States and Italy, participated in air, sea and land drills. Held in Seferihisar, only 1.5 kilometers from the nearby Greek island of Samos in the Aegean Sea, the exercise was based on the scenario of a “military landing on an island.” It was widely treated in Turkish capitalist media as a threat against Greece.
Greek media reported that during Greece's naval exercise Storm 2022, which ended on May 27, Turkey sent “two F-16 fighter jets that violated Greek airspace, reaching just two 2.5 nautical miles from the northern port city of Alexandroupoli.”
During the Ephesus 2022 exercise, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan accused Greece of militarizing Aegean Sea islands in violation of international agreements. He warned Athens 'one last time' on this: “We invite Greece to stop militarizing the islands that have non-military status and to act in accordance with international agreements. I’m not joking, I’m speaking seriously.”
Threatening to militarize Turkish islands if necessary to threaten Greece, Erdoğan said, “We again warn Greece to avoid dreams, statements and actions that will lead to regret, just as they did a century ago,” a reference to the Turkish war of independence against the British-backed Greek invasion in 1919-1922.
A week ago, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Çavuşoğlu accused Greece of violating its peace treaties with Turkey: “But what is another reason for Greece to be aggressive? Greece's violation of the status of the islands given to it in the 1923 Lausanne Treaty and 1947 Paris Treaty under the condition of not militarizing them [Greek islands in the Aegean Sea], and our raising this violation within the framework of international law.”
Cavusoglu added: “The sovereignty of the islands will be questioned if Greece does not end its violation.” This threat to “question” Greece’s sovereignty over islands it controls amount to a threat to invade them and go to war.
The Greek Foreign Ministry reacted to the Ephesus-2022 exercise and statements by Turkish officials on Twitter, writing, “Ankara poses a threat to regional peace and security.” On Thursday, Greek government spokesman Giannis Oikonomou dismissed the Turkish claims, calling them “Ahistorical claims and baseless myths that can neither challenge nor, let alone, substitute for international law and international treaties.”
Accusing Erdoğan of provocation, Oikonomou threatened, “It is clear to everyone that our country has upgraded its geostrategic and geopolitical footprint as well as its deterrent capacity to be able at any time to defend its national sovereignty and sovereign rights.”
A century after World War I began in the Balkans, NATO and the bourgeois governments in the region again risk plunging the world into a catastrophic war. In 2020, tensions between Turkey and Greece over natural gas and sea borders in the eastern Mediterranean were defused by EU and especially German mediation. Greek-Turkish talks resumed. However, as the World Socialist Web Site warned, “History shows such conflicts cannot be peacefully resolved under capitalism, whether or not a temporary Greek-Turkish peace deal is somehow reached.”
The US-NATO war on Russia in Ukraine has now inflamed the Greek-Turkish conflict, turning the Aegean into an undeclared second front in the NATO-Russia war.
The right-wing government of Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis has unabashedly aligned itself with Washington’s moves against Russia. The Greek port of Alexandroupoli in the northern Aegean Sea has been transformed into a major US military base. Alexandroupoli is also being used to deliver weapons to Ukraine and to NATO forces along the border with Ukraine in Romania.
The Turkish bourgeoisie has pursued a cynical, two-faced policy on the NATO war on Russia. On the one hand, it has backed NATO’s Ukraine policy, including the far-right coup NATO backed in Kiev in 2014, and armed Kiev with armed Bayraktar TB2 drones. On the other, it has kept diplomatic channels with Russia open, greeting Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Ankara, and posed certain obstacles to the most aggressive NATO moves targeting Russia.
Ankara closed the straits linking the Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea coast of Ukraine and Russia to both NATO and Russian warships, blocking a NATO naval attack on Russia. It also threatened to veto NATO’s plans to absorb Sweden and Finland and post NATO troops on Russia’s northern border with Scandinavia. The Turkish government was not objecting to the war, however, but continuing its long-standing targeting of the Kurdish people: it denounced Sweden and Finland for having ties to Kurdish-nationalist organizations.
Washington responded to this veto threat by inviting Mitsotakis to give a speech denouncing Turkey in the US Congress. During his enthusiastically received speech, Mitsotakis blamed Turkey for the division of the Mediterranean island of Cyprus and demanded a halt to US F-16 sales to Turkey. US President Joe Biden also gave Mitsotakis strong support.
Erdoğan condemned Mitsotakis' trip, declaring that Mitsotakis “no longer exists” for him. Erdoğan added that he viewed the US-NATO bases in Greece, targeting Russia and growing Chinese economic influence in the region, as a threat to his government, saying, “And, most importantly, there are nearly a dozen bases in Greece. Whom does Greece threaten with those bases?”
Workers in Greece, Turkey and internationally must be warned: the danger that the conflicts in the Black Sea and the Balkans will escalate uncontrollably into a world war is very great. In the third year of the COVID-19 pandemic, prices are spiraling out of control as the financial aristocracy massively increases its wealth. This has provoked strikes and protests internationally, and capitalist governments are all terrified of the international eruption of the class struggle.
Russian-Turkish relations are inevitable.
Kara 22 [Mehtap Kara, PhD in International Relations from Eastern Mediterranean University, assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Bahçeşehir Cyprus University; 6-13-2022; "Turkish-American strategic partnership: is Turkey still a faithful ally?"; Southeast European and Black Sea Studies; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14683857.2022.2088081?journalCode=fbss20; KL]
Turkish-Russian rapprochement and future of the transatlantic alliance
Turkish-Russian relations deteriorated after Turkey’s shot down of a Russian jet over Turkish territory in November 2015. However, the failed coup attempt marked a new beginning between the two. Both countries have reached agreements on several issues, including the maintaining territorial integrity of Syria despite their differences of opinion about the future of the Assad regime. Along with individual leaders’ common frustration with the Western countries, both countries also have been driven by pragmatism (Ibryamova and Kara 2017). In Turkey and Russia, the decision-making mechanism is centralized around one person. Both leaders, Erdoğan and Putin, have strong leadership characteristics and have been in power for a long time, which evidences that, further to the strategic interest, Turkish-Russian reconciliation is also the result of the overlapping ideologies of both political leaders on several issues, including being sceptical about the Western countries’ intentions, restricting media freedom, oppressing oppositions, and using nationalist narration and religious values in policy making (Nougayrède 2014). Erdoğan’s growing personal domination has turned into an authoritarian populism, especially after the Gezi Park protests and transition from parliamentary to a new presidential system, which allowed him to further consolidate his executive powers (Özpek and Tanriverdi 2018; Castaldo 2018; Özen 2020; Cilliler 2021). The new presidential system enabled Erdoğan to have a monopoly over the country’s foreign policy and national security matters. His populist rhetoric has been characterized by nationalism and anti-Western discourse where the West, particularly the US, is resituated as the ‘other’ (Kaliber and Kaliber 2019). Erdoğan seized disproportionate power to shape the country’s response to external stimuli and the AKP’s unofficial coalition partner, the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli. Both leaders’ images and threat perceptions have been based on an enemy image of Western countries.
Russia successfully took advantage of the increasing tension between Turkey and the Western countries. During a telephone conversation on a special occasion, both leaders, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Erdoğan, used the term ‘strategic partnership’ to define Turkish-Russian bilateral relations (Mercouris 2017), which is quite significant, considering the term was also used to define the Turkish-American relations. Turkish policymakers have tried to respond to uncertainties of international anarchy by seeking to shape regional developments in its favour by establishing new alliances with Russia and Iran. One manifestation of this was the result of the Astana peace talks. On 15 September 2017, Russia, Turkey and Iran signed a deal to establish de-escalation zones across Syria, including Syria’s northwest province of Idlib.1 Turkish authorities believed that this was another opportunity to break the terror corridor, which was the term for YPG’s three cantons in Northern Syria established in 2014, located southern border of Turkey. The YPG aimed to unite these cantons with Afrin canton to have geographical unity. With the support of the US the YPG dominated SDF’s capture of Manbij in 2016 was further extended the corridor on the Turkish border (Milliyet 2022). During the Idlib operation, Erdoğan pointed out Afrin as the next stop. ‘Operation Olive Branch’ in Afrin was launched in January 2018 as a response to the US decision to build new border security with the SDF.
As Turkey’s security interest has been long-ignored by its Western allies, Turkish policymakers felt they were left with no option but to cooperate with non-NATO countries, especially after the Obama administration blocked the sale of the Patriot air missile defence system to Turkey. These developments have intensified anti-Americanism in Turkey. Turkish policy makers’ desire to build an air defence structure pushed them to seek other options, resulting in Turkey’s dea

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